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
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
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
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PROGRESS OF RUSSIA

IN THE

WEST, NORTH, AND SOUTH.

SHORTLY WILL BE PUBLISHED,

By the same Author,

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

UNDER

ABDUL MEDJID.

~~SECRET~~

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




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PROGRESS



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IN THE

WEST, NORTH, AND SOUTH,

BY OPENING THE SOURCES OF OPINION AND
APPROPRIATING THE CHANNELS OF
WEALTH AND POWER.

BY

DAVID URQUHART.

4

"Votre vieille Europe m'ennuit."—NAPOLÉON.

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:

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P R E F A C E
TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Settlement with Russia.

August 9th.

“AN immediate rise of the public securities” is this morning proclaimed as the result of the welcome announcement of the acceptance by the Emperor of Russia of the proposal of the Powers, terminating a crisis which has so long held in suspense the political relations and commercial interests of the world. The British public and the British Government are reassured and delighted by this union of the great European States. It is no longer England, or England and France, interposing for the protection of Turkey. All principles, all interests are united, and whatever bears the name of a European, is opposed to the Czar. But in all this there is nothing new—it is an old and sickening story; what it is worth I shall presently show: in the meantime let me direct my reader’s attention to an event both startling and new, which has this morning been equally announced to the inhabitants of these Isles.

Last night, in the House of Lords, it was asked,

“WHAT HAS THE GOVERNMENT OF THIS COUNTRY DONE?” This question was followed by “cheers.” Lord Clanricarde further asserted, that all Treaties between Russia and Turkey—why did he not add between Russia and England—were abolished by this act, and he therefore expected to hear that the English Squadron was inside of the Dardanelles.

There is something even more wonderful still than this. The Minister for Foreign Affairs “agreed in everything that had fallen from his noble friend,” and “considered the entire evacuation of the Principalities as a *sine qua non* of any agreement whatever.”

On the same night Lord John Russell stated, in the Commons, his belief in the favourable acceptance of the proposals of the Powers by Russia. Putting the two propositions together, and dropping the immaterial question of a first and a second proposal, we have now the Government nailed to the complete and *immediate* evacuation of the Principalities, because “any arrangement whatever” must imply instance in point of time. It is to be inferred, from the cheers of the two Assemblies, that England would be content with such a settlement. But what shall happen if Russia does not accede? Is your Ambassador then to be withdrawn? No. You will either not obtain the evacuation, or you will obtain it *on terms*.

First let us consider the question of occupation. In the war of 1828 three *corps d'armées* were sent across the Pruth; at present *four corps d'armées* have been sent across the Pruth. In the last war thirty gun-boats were sent into the Danube, at present *one*

hundred and fifty gun-boats have been sent into the Danube, (“a few gun-boats,” Clarendon.) In the last war the pontoons had to be made on the spot and failed; at present they are all ready. The operations therefore are on a larger scale than in 1828, without there being an Ismail to take, which delayed a third of the forces, during a third of the campaign.

In 1828 those countries produced only the grain requisite for their own consumption, now 1,500,000 quarters are ready for exportation to England. That grain is now available for the troops of Russia, and may be set down in round numbers at £2,000,000. You will have to go to Russia for that grain; it will cost you there a much higher sum, and the Russian treasury will receive from 10 to 15 per cent. in duties before it is exported. Russia therefore by the operation profits from £5,000,000 to £6,000,000. That profit will equally be secured, whether she evacuates or not. The Provinces thus present to her resources for future operations infinitely greater than in 1828.

In that year she had developed no comprehensive scheme; there was no combination with Europe to give to her the succession to the crown of Denmark; she was not pretending to occupy a province south of the Caspian in Persia; there was no revolution in China; she had revealed no projects on Little Thibet; and had not announced her intention of establishing herself on the Upper Himalaya.* There were then no Russian Princesses on a visit to England.

* An offer was made to the Emperor of China to support him against the insurgents, on condition of his ceding Little Thibet, which is only twenty days' march from Calcutta.

After the declaration of Lord Clarendon and the withdrawal of the English agent from Bucharest, one might have believed in the evacuation—of course Russia will submit to anything to which the English Minister has made up his mind—if Lord Clarendon were a Grand Vizier : but he is only a member of a Cabinet, and in that Cabinet, alas ! there are Lords Aberdeen, John Russell, and Palmerston ; the latter is busy in representing Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as acting under the influence of pique. I do not therefore say that there will be no evacuation, but this I say, that Russia, if she evacuates, will lose nothing by it, for it will be with an arrangement *to establish a common interference of the Powers with the subjects of Turkey.*

A lie has been placed on the lips of Europe in the word *Russo-Greek Church*. The one is a form of Revealed Religion, the other is the worship of a man. In the official Church of Russia the Czar is “vicegerent of God upon earth,” and as such is the object of “FAITH” and “WORSHIP.” The disease that preys on the vitals of the Russian Empire is religious dissent originating in this sacrilege. The Nonconformists maintain the original faith, such as it was when the Russian Church was in communion with that of Constantinople. The only name they give to themselves is that of “Old Believers,” in Russian *Starovirtzé* ; they are therefore identified with the 12,000,000 or 13,000,000 of Christian subjects of the Porte in Europe ; they are the objects of the most bitter persecutions on the part of the

Russian Government, and the familiar term they apply to the Emperor is "Antichrist." The recent movements towards independence of the Malo-Russians, amounting to about 10,000,000, is principally attributable to this schism and persecution. Were there no Mussulmans in Europe and Russia free to extend her dominion to the Ionian Sea, we should find her, if she attempted it, at once engaged in the most furious of religious wars, with populations, old subjects and new, amounting to 20,000,000.

This change in Russia Proper has required five centuries and a quarter, for it began in the year 1330. Fifteen generations of Muscovites have gone to their graves in the course of its completion. They were induced to submit, in the hope that the concentration of all power in the hands of the Czar would facilitate the subjugation of *others*. The Christian subjects of Turkey, born and bred under the habits of Mussulman toleration, filled with the most extravagant ambition by Muscovite art, will not resign in a single hour every political right and every conscientious conviction, and that too in the hour of triumph and for the subjugation of *themselves*. The Turks, if they had never strayed beyond their pasturages of Broussa, would, on such a contingency, be called in by the Christians for the protection of their Church and Faith. Such an event no doubt would be surprising, but it would not be new; the ablest polemical writer amongst the Greeks of the present age, has explained, in the very words I have used, the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

Since the year 1846, the Sultan has become the immediate protector of the Starovirtzé, by having secured for them the Apostolic succession of their priesthood after that priesthood was seized by Russia, formed into regiments, and sent to die of ague in Lankeran, on the Caspian; he would stand in the same relation of Protector to his actual Greek subjects from the moment that he was driven into Asia by Russian arms. Such being the position of Russia with regard to the Christians of Turkey, her object in a joint intervention of the Powers is evident; she could never have moved them to propose such an intervention, but (as in 1826, when the Greeks declared they would rather perish than allow of her interference) she terrifies the Powers by a threat to act alone, and then they rush forward to yield to her their support, on the pretext of clogging her action! Then she can use the Sultan to establish her supremacy over the Oriental Church, whilst she uses it to break down the authority of the Sultan. From the moment that a common interference is established, any quarrel in the streets can bring down her squadron to Constantinople. The only danger is from Russian interference; the only course for Europe to take is to prevent it. The course which Europe always does take is to sanction it, by co-operating in it, giving to her their power for effecting it.

To prepare for her possession, she has to raise a religious persecution between Mussulmans and Christians, bringing in England and France to attack Turkey; she must engage Austria in a war of exter-

mination with the neighbouring populations; by these means, or a union of the Roman and Russian Churches, she must break the confederacy of Greeks and Latins, which is sure to be formed against her. Besides these local operations, she has to work out a war between England and France, and a European revolution. Such are the preliminary steps to the elevation of the Christian subjects of Turkey to the rank of serfs, and to the *peasants* of Christendom for the long promised mass in St. Sophia.

Another illusion is, that the Christians of Turkey are Greeks, and consequently that they are *united* against the Mussulman rule. They amount to about 13,000,000, the Greeks not exceeding 1,000,000, and the half of them not a located population, but *strangers*, dispersed throughout the different cities. Unfortunately the Turks like them, and confide in them (one of them is actually Ambassador in London), but every other race hates and despises them. The Wallachians and Moldavians amount to 4,500,000; the Bulgarians, the descendants of the Tartars of the Volga, to 4,500,000, some of these are Mussulmans; the Bosnians, including the Serbians and Illyrians to 3,000,000, of these 1,000,000 are Mussulmans, and about 500,000 Roman Catholics; the Albanians to 1,500,000, half of them Christians of the Eastern Church, half of them Mussulmans. It will thus be seen that the Greeks have no standing at all in European Turkey, save that which they derive from the Turks. One-third of the Mussulmans are allied in blood to the Russians, and three-fourths of the *Christians, south of the Danube, to the Turks.* All

these populations have accepted the Turks as masters ; not one of them would endure for a moment the supremacy of any of the others. If you had not the Turks, you would require to invent them, unless you wish to see European Turkey a chaos of bloodshed, not for the wretched inhabitants alone, but for Europe, and when so exhausted to be annexed to Russia, transferring to her a position which, in her hands, must command the globe.

What I have here said regarding the Greek and Russian Churches has been recently to the letter borne out by the statements in the Greek press, which reach us from the Levant. Their Smyrna organ warns Russia not to "indulge in illusions." The *Ελληνικη*, the organ of Hellenism, explains the object of the Czar in extorting the protectorate of the *Oriental Church* to be to convert it into an "instrument of his PANSLAVIC schemes," and denies "that the protection (!) of the Powers afforded to the Sultan is, as the journals of Russia pretend, the protection of Mahometanism against Christianity, but the defence of the political inheritance of the Hellenes (Greeks) against Russian incorporation, in which every Hellenic spirit must wish them success."

The correspondence of the Vienna papers is in the same sense. "There is no nation," says the *Oest Deutsch Post*, "less inclined to be absorbed by Russia than the Greeks. When struggling for political existence, they looked on her as the victorious power that was to come to their assistance, but they rejected the proffered hand so soon as they perceived that it was more inclined to impose than to remove fetters."

I cannot omit noticing a ground of confidence which has recently, for the hundredth time, presented itself as a novelty; it is, "The Emperor has no money." The same thing was said in 1827, when he came forward to support the Bank of England, as he had already supported the Bank of France, £6,000,000. were vested in English and French securities, £22,000,000. of bullion were then held in deposit. She receives nearly £5,000,000. yearly from her mines, and actually her stock is quoted at 16 per cent. above par. She offers to remit a claim of 80,000,000 roubles for a province, being between the Caspian and Little Thibet, and to pay the difference; yet, according to diplomatic report, "The guards, the crack corps at Zarskoi Zelo, are destitute of clothes and everything." Well then they can be clothed as well as fed in the Principalities—Napoleon believed Europe to be in danger from the *poverty* of Russia—she preserves the appetites of poverty, while knowing how to employ the seductions of wealth. It is her gold you have to fear, and not her steel. She makes a little go a long way, and she takes it from yourselves.

"The evacuation of the Principality is," says Lord Clarendon, "a *sine qua non* preliminary to a settlement." But will an evacuation of the Provinces be a settlement? Not unless it be unconditional, as far as Russia is concerned, and provision be made against present injury and future aggression. *First*, then, the evacuation must take place without any engagement entered into by Turkey. *Secondly*, an *indemnity to Turkey* for pecuniary loss, and to the

trade of all nations on account of the accidents at the mouth of the Danube, resulting from her neglect. *Thirdly*, the abrogation of all existing Treaties between Russia and Turkey, and consequently of any pretence of interference with the subjects of the latter country. *Fourthly*, the abrogation of the Treaties of 1840 and 1841, equally violated by her act, and the consequent admission of men-of-war of all nations to the Black Sea. *Fifthly*, the modification of the English Treaty of Commerce of 1838, so as to obtain the free exportation of Turkish grain. *Sixthly*, the renunciation of all claims upon Persia, whether pecuniary or territorial. *Seventhly*, the abrogation of the Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852, and the consequent restoration of the succession and constitution in Denmark.

This is the only settlement. This, if you are in earnest, is what you will obtain; there is no more difficulty in obtaining all, than in obtaining one. If you do not you are, in the words of Lord Clanricarde, "parties to the present act of piracy, as you are to all the previous steps that led to it." Of the seven points which I have indicated, the essential are the admission of our vessels to the Black Sea, and the exportation of Turkish grain; no one will pretend that there is the slightest difficulty in obtaining either. They have even nothing to do with Russia, but only with Turkey. So long as you suffer a Russian Ambassador to reside in London you will not obtain them, for England is governed from Ashburnham House.

THE CROSSING OF THE PRUTH, AND THE
PASSING OF THE DARDANELLES.

“Catherine perceived that she could not continue her aggressive system against Turkey without the aid and co-operation of the other Powers.”—WELLESLEY POLE.

THIS volume, though not written with a view to the actual crisis, may not on that account be the less acceptable: its interest lies not in the immediate facts, but in the motives and position of the parties to which this volume addresses itself. The actual alarm which affords so favourable a conjuncture for its appearance may be thus of importance for averting future dangers—there are actually none in the sense that the people of this country understand; they may rest perfectly assured that there will not be now, and that there never will be hereafter, collision between England and Russia. Who can set other powers by the ears, need not fight them. As to England, the question is one of balance, the tongue of which vibrates through the Straits which separate Europe and Asia, transferring to the one side or the other absolute supremacy and absolute subjection.

It was deemed an act of unexpected and almost startling courage when an ex-Chancellor of England—a man pre-eminent for his intellectual powers, and

who, had Russia had the good fortune of possessing him, might have already reared the banner of the azure cross on the flagstaffs of Caloutta and the Dardanelles—pronounced the pretensions of the Czar to be “fallacious, offensive, illogical, and insulting.” The pettiest *attaché* of every Russian Embassy smiled with a contempt derived from position alike at the capacity and the feeling of that great lawyer. *Crude ingenium* cannot of itself prevail in human affairs, and toil and labour will ever bear away the palm. The genius of Lord Lyndhurst is practised in detecting fallacy—the genius of Russia in conquering men; she requires no lessons in logic; you need some instruction in conduct: if it was worth Lord Lyndhurst’s while to think upon a foreign matter, it was surely the acts of the members of the English, not the Russian Cabinet, which deserved his animadversion.

You have long been in a slumber, and she has profited by your security; you have long confided in her honour, she has profited by your friendship; your eyes are at length opened, and your indignation aroused—does she suffer retribution, do you regain character? You discover that she is illogical—in rhetoric which has convulsed an Empire; you denounce her to be insane—in marching with your aid on the Bosphorus; you send your men-of-war to the Dardanelles—she seizes the Sound; she grasps the Danube—you send—no, you do *not* send, a note; she usurps the vastest plain of Europe, and you *do*

send an apology.* When she has overrun a province you convoke a conclave; you prevent war by removing landmarks; and stop a burglar by opening the door. And all this is peace; two campaigns and a dozen fortresses are offered up for the sake of the tranquillity of Europe; and two Empires (Turkey and Austria) are stripped of their arms in the interest of their defence.

There remains, however, another discovery to be made—not that you are cowards, but that you are impostors. Was there ever imposition compared with that of your pretending to cope with Russia? She can be met only by men with minds equal to herself; equal to her in cunning, or at least superior to her in honesty; you neither have the last, nor do you form the first. While she perverts truth and justice through love of power, you sacrifice right and power by fatuity. This is your struggle with Russia, or rather your confederacy.

The prophetic year 1853, closing the millenium of Russia's delay from her first entrance of the Golden Horn, has beheld the purposed excitation of the fanatic frenzy of the Muscovite race, and the direct

* The Russian note of the 2d July, calling England and France to account for sending the squadrons to the coast of Turkey, was answered by the French Cabinet by one which it published on the 15th, and which Lord Clarendon declared to be the counterpart of a note transmitted by England. The French Minister therein exculpates France from the charge of having interfered with the plans of Russia; he says:—"No, sir, I say it with all the power of conviction, the French Government in this grave *discussion*, has no reproach to make to itself."

and simultaneous invasion of the two channels of wealth and power, on the north and the south of Europe.

Unhappy Denmark! it was only robbers she fell amongst in 1813; it is Thugs she has chanced upon now; the "roumal" which your hands have wove and placed, is round her neck, and a quivering of life scarce remains in her limbs; * a gun brig, with a will behind it, might have saved the Baltic; but, alas! your ludicrous ships-of-the-line were demonstrating in the Levant. Then the emperor was all magnanimity, then—February, March, April, and May last—Europe was so alive to Russia's designs that she never could attempt anything on the Crown of Denmark, on its Constitution, or its Sound.

Unhappy Turkey! in vain have you escaped from anarchy and bloodthirstiness; in vain have you restored order and inaugurated a rule of mildness and of charity; vain have been the painful efforts to subdue and extirpate the malconformities of centuries; in vain the unparalleled success in reorganising a powerful army, which ensured you from foreign violence and aggression; you have trusted to England;

* On the day that this passage was sent to press—the 19th of July, the doom of Denmark was sealed; it was formally announced to the Diet that despotic rule was restored, bearing out to the letter the statement in the body of this volume, that the Constitution would not be extinguished because the Diet refused to accept the Treaty, but that the Treaty would be used to extinguish the Diet. However, the event is announced to the British public by the Russian organ in the following fashion:—"In all this there is nothing of a *coup d'état*, but a legitimate and constitutional way of modifying an impossible Constitution."—*Times*, July 30, Note to 2d Edition.

you have confided in her wisdom, and, alas! in her honour.

Unhappy England! in vain have you expended thousands of millions to be prepared against sudden emergencies;* in vain have your worthiest sons cogitated by night, and laboured by day, to improve the condition of the people in gaining for them cheap food: † in vain have your shipbuilders and mechanicians laboured to perfect the terrible science of war; in vain do you possess the alliance of the great military power of the West; ‡ in vain are you called mistress of the ocean; alas! the decree has gone forth to forbid your flag on the waters where is to be decided whether a barbarian man shall be master of Constantinople and protector of Calcutta.

Here lies the whole matter: let us consider it. I must entreat the reader's patience, the task of conciseness is here a difficult one. He has as yet not been troubled upon this point; it touches taxes and rates as well as honour and independence.

* The Principalities, from 1806 to 1815, occasioned to England, by the war resumed on account of them, an outlay of 650 millions sterling; since then we have expended on armaments 350 millions.

† "The occupation of the Principalities contributes at this moment to raise the price of wheat in Mark Lane, and to check the productive labour of Manchester and Lyons. For it must be remembered that although we live in an age when it is especially inconvenient and disagreeable to run a risk of war for distant political causes, *yet* those distant political causes are brought nearer than they ever were to our own doors, and affect even the supplies of food and the demand for labour in the British Isles."—*Times*, Aug. 2, 1853.

‡ The French Government has ordered its flag to be struck in the Principalities; the representative of England is exchanging friendly communications with the Russian General-in-Chief regarding the navigation of the Danube.

In the published note of the French government, M. Drouyn de Lhuys states, that the united squadron was only sent "to a bay freely open to the navies of all nations, and situated beyond those limits, which Treaties forbid to transgress *in time of peace*." This statement is erroneous: he refers to the Treaty of 1841, signed between the Great Powers and Turkey, by which they are equally and in all times excluded, and Turkey is deprived of the sovereignty of its own waters. A Treaty holds only so long as there is peace, but if war is requisite to justify the passage, it is war with Turkey, not with Russia; consequently the English and the French Governments do not understand their own engagements.

Together with the inviolability of the Dardanelles, was established the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and in favour of the latter stipulation the former was allowed to pass. Russia had hitherto resisted every compact stipulating for the integrity of Turkey; on one occasion she refused to ratify a Treaty to that effect, which her Minister (Ouvril) had signed. She could safely admit it when the Dardanelles were closed; from that moment the Western Powers could have nothing further to say respecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

This Treaty was signed at the moment that the Administration of which Lord Palmerston was Foreign Minister was going out of office; it is dated exactly one week after the expiration of the Treaty of Hun-kiar Skellessi; it passed at the time without notice or comment, being considered as merely closing the

rupture between England and France respecting Syria. I at the time strove to awaken attention as to its consequences with no more effect than I had previously done to warn of its approach; in the height of the quarrel with France, and when war was considered imminent, I asserted that "the matter would close with an arrangement between them which would incorporate and extend (*avec quelques articles de plus*—for the letter I refer to was in French) the Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi against which both had protested." But let that matter pass; let us drop the causes, and ignore for the moment the motives. *You* negotiated that Treaty, you negotiated yourselves out of the Black Sea; Turkey was never thought of; France only was considered; you proposed it to her; you induced her to accept it; she accepted it because it was to ensure the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. What connection was there between the two points—at least as you have linked them?

On that connection the present results are the commentary. Russia passes the Pruth,—you cannot enter the Dardanelles. Perhaps you were deceived; perhaps you believed that the non-passage by Russia of the Bosphorus was the equivalent for the non-passage by you of the Dardanelles; let us see.

In 1833, in consequence of the refusal of England to succour Turkey in the quarrel of Mehemet Ali, and *by her advice*, a Russian squadron with an army of disembarkation reached the Bosphorus. Before its departure Turkey was called upon to sign a Treaty, in recompense for this succour, which was

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We must not however forget another demonstration—that of 1849, when we sent a squadron not merely to a Bay freely open “to the Navy of all nations,” but to the inside of those famous Straits, violating “those limits which Treaties forbid to transgress in times of peace.” The curious reader will learn the consequences of this vigorous act in a subsequent part of this volume.

I have now emphatically to state that the Turks are not adverse to our passing the Dardanelles ; they were so doubtless in 1809, for the best of reasons, for we had attacked them; but now regarding you as their protectors, their whole desire and hope consists in seeing your force upon the only field where it can be available for them; they cannot conceive how are to be reconciled your friendship, of which unfortunately they have no doubt, and your avoidance of the only measure which can render it effectual. It must be evident to the commonest apprehension, that an English frigate in the Black Sea alters the balance of power between Russia and Turkey. Lord Palmerston has explained the sacrifice of Cracow, by the fact that line-of-battle-ships could not reach that town ; he has more recently ascribed the failure of protection of English navigation in the Danube to the “want of water in that river,” and in both statements he has fairly represented the feelings of the whole of the Populations of the East. As no one there ascribes the absence of your vessels to objec-

article was offensive while it merely stood as a compact between Russia and Turkey, not even officially known to the other Powers until England rendered to Russia the service of publishing it, what did it become when signed by England itself? Could the secret article of the Treaty of 1833 have been pleaded to-day against the entrance of our squadron? Comment is superfluous.

England had prepared for the Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi by her attempt to bombard Constantinople in 1806, when she was at peace with Turkey. About that time she did bombard Copenhagen: there is a mesmeric attraction between the two Straits. The object of this felonious attempt was to force Turkey to *surrender the Principalities to Russia*, with whom Turkey was also at peace: the parallel attempt on Copenhagen was with an opposite pretext; the result in both cases was the same, except that at Constantinople you fortunately had neither a Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as Ambassador nor a Sir William Parker as Admiral; qualms of conscience did prevail over instructions, and a chance was left to the Northerly wind; your demonstration consequently sailed away with its shot and shells on board, and Wallachia and Moldavia still, to the exceeding annoyance of the English Government, belong to the Porte. Thus the two Treaties for the Dardanelles are the children of naval demonstrations, with which at least the school-boys of Europe would be acquainted had they occurred in the 105th and 111th Olympiads, instead of the year of our Lord 1806 and 1833. Then they would have been historical not diplomatic questions, as

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tions on the part of Turkey, so every one explains it by objections on the part of Russia. So long as they are not there, England counts for nothing, and Russia is accounted everything.

I have had to struggle with incredulity whenever I have asserted that the Porte desired the passage of an English squadron ; but unquestionable confirmation is afforded by the Correspondent of the *Times*, who announces that the inhabitants of Constantinople "were so confident that the English and French flags would float side by side in front of Stamboul, that the quays were crowded with spectators on the watch, and ready to hail with shouts of welcome the first appearance of the Allies in Turkish waters." Precisely the same thing occurred in 1834, when the news arrived of the speech of M. Bignon in the French Chamber.

The Turks have not confined themselves to mere aspirations ; they took steps though with a caution, which surprised me at the time. The first time that Redschid Pasha visited these shores (he was then ambassador in Paris), it was to propose the entrance of the British squadron, but not till he had received the assurance *that the request should not be refused*. That assurance could not be obtained. Standing orders at Constantinople render the contingency impossible.*

* When I was Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, I was not allowed to see the archives. One of the persons long employed in the embassy observed : "There is a document there which they would never have allowed you to see, and which no English Minister dares to withdraw : it is to prevent the passage of the squadron."

In 1830, an English frigate, the *Blonde*, commanded by Sir Edmond Lyons, at present representative of Great Britain at Stockholm, following the track of the *Argo*, passed the "blue Semplygades," and performed the "Periplus" of the Euxine. The Russians retorted by sending two line-of-battle ships into the Bosphorus, on which the Austrian Internuncio observed, "the *Blonde* has been brought to bed of twins, larger than herself." The Russian representative remonstrated in London; a reprimand was sent to the venturesome captain, and the above referred to measure taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar offence. Lord Durham having chosen, on his way to St. Petersburg, the route of the Black Sea, to indicate that England apprehended the vulnerable point of Russia—the guns of the man-of-war which carried him to Odessa, were lowered into the hold!

As it will have been observed that this exclusion has been maintained under no less than six foreign ministers any one of whom by a couple of lines could have caused it to cease, and must have caused it to cease, unless he had taken the other course, there will be nothing invidious in detailing the reasons which one of them has himself assigned. The first conversation I ever held with Lord Palmerston bore upon this point; he entered into the discussion not idly, but after the late King had come into the same views and required him to discuss the matter with me. His objection was, that "any question pending between Russia and England must be decided by the

no other than a defensive alliance: the Powers being severally bound to furnish succour in case the other was attacked: but a secret article was appended, by which the succours on the part of Turkey were transmuted into a simple closing of the Dardanelles against any power with whom *Russia* might be *at war*. It was some months before Western Diplomacy made this great discovery, by perusing the document in the columns of the *Morning Herald*, but in fact it was modest, and knew the matter from the beginning. Lord Ponsonby had written from luxurious Naples, where he was awaiting the termination of the incident before proceeding to his post, to announce that the Russian Squadron would not leave the Bosphorus until such a Treaty had been extorted. The Turkish Government had transmitted to the English Embassy the draught of the Treaty so soon as it was presented to them. The English Government, however, laid up the grievance, in its heaving breast, until a *dragoman* communicated the Secret Article to the correspondent of the *Morning Herald*; then indignation arose, and energy was manifested in Downing Street. The English Embassy called the Porte to account, with exemplary vehemence, for its baseness and treachery, proving that the Secret Article constituted the Treaty "an offensive one against England;" the sentiments of the English Government were communicated to and re-echoed by that of France, and consequently the two squadrons proceeded on their way to the Dardanelles, to support the notes against Turkey, and to make a demonstration against *Russia*.

They declared that they "would act as if the Secret Article had never been signed," which the vulgar interpreted that they would pass the Dardanelles. Russia replied that she would act "as if that Protest had never been made." Turkey, ground between the two millstones, was now constrained to sign the Convention of St. Petersburg, regulating the internal government of the Principalities so that henceforward "the relation of those Empires in respect to these Provinces became a domestic concern which no longer regarded foreign states." Such was the result of that Demonstration by the two first maritime powers of the World.

The Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi had, however, one redeeming point,—it was but temporary; it was but to last for eight years, consequently the freedom of the Dardanelles would be restored on the 8th of July, 1851: but, in the course of the previous Autumn, another naval Demonstration had taken place, but this time it was in *concert with Russia and against France*. However, the two countries were soon reconciled, and that reconciliation was sealed as above seen by the Treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, by which England and France bound themselves not to enter, not for a period of years but for ever; not now in case of one or both being at war with Russia, but in peace as well as in war.

There was therefore no delusion in respect to the nature of the Secret Article; the difference between it and the Treaty of 1841, was merely the increase of its "offensive character." Now if that

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the Cabinet which succeeded that of which the noble Lord was a member, neglected to disown the treasonable policy of the noble Lord, and to set aside the Treaties which are its monuments—the Treaty of Adrianople, which he adopted—the Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi, to which he adhered—and more shameful still, the Treaties of 1840 and 1841, which he made.”*

At that time the House of Commons had its attention called to the subject by no event, and it might judge the allegations if true, to be practically unimportant, as curbing the ambition of a state then quiescent, or for protecting the independence of an Empire then unassailed. In fact they knew nothing on the subject and cared as little; being spoken to about the Dardanelles, they only opened their eyes in stupid wonder or closed them in contemptuous pity. Lord Palmerston’s reply, however, constitutes a most important document; *now* it will be understood, the heads are:—

That the Treaty was an act of reconciliation between France and the other Powers; that the main consideration was, that no foreign ships of war should pass either Straits without the consent of the Turkish Government, that consequently, it “merely repeated the Treaty in 1809,” and “the only thing it did was to record the same arrangement on the part of Austria, France, and Prussia;” that it “was a virtual abnegation of the Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi,” and “superseded that Treaty, and placed Turkey as it

* Speech of Mr. Anstey, Feb. 28, 1848.

were under the care of all the five Powers." To these specific points was added a general declaration of the absence of all purpose of "exclusive ascendancy over Turkey" on the part of Russia. The results are described as having been most beneficial, that whereas, previous to its signature, the condition of the East had constantly been one of agitation or convulsion, all insecurity had since then disappeared: it had restored Turkey and put an end to all alarms on the score of Russia.

It has been said by an old English Statesman, "there is a time when evil measures escape detection, but there comes a time also when they are brought to light." For this measure, that time has now come, and for Parliament that for dealing with it.

The violation of the territory of Turkey has taken place, not in consequence of a war of which the merits are uncertain, and in which the aggression might have been on the side of Turkey, but without any war at all. The case is therefore in an inconceivable manner relieved from all embarrassment. It is the pure act to meet which the Treaty was professedly negotiated and signed. The English Government had but one course open, no option was left to it and no alternative as to the means to be employed. The act was one of aggression against Prussia, Austria, and France, as well as against England and Turkey, being a violation of the Treaty with the four first powers as of the territory of the last.

There might be negotiations between the Powers, but there could have been no negotiation with Russia;

a summons to retire, and a demand of indemnity, and the instant withdrawal of the representatives of the Allies, in case of refusal, together with the entrance of their vessels, to see, in the one case, the retreat effected, and to prevent in the other the further passage, at least over the Euxine, of vessels or troops,—these were the negotiations to have opened with Russia. If the other Powers did not concur in these steps, that was their affair; the obligations of England concern herself alone, and her power in this case rendered their decision a matter of the most utter insignificance. That France should have allowed to England the sole honour of such an achievement, could hardly be hoped for: she would have insisted on bearing a part. The only risk that could have possibly attended the operation, was that of France being prepared to join Russia, and her having at the Dardanelles a superior force before the arrival of the British squadron—after the thing was done, all the power of France could not have undone it: the peculiar configuration of the Euxine must render whoever enters *first*, omnipotent, not only there but throughout the globe.

Such I say must have been the course of the Government which I have supposed. Either the Parliament had to abrogate the Treaty of 1841 on the grounds of its own guilty motives and injurious effects, or the Government had to execute the engagements of that Treaty—if they did not, it was for the Parliament to call them to account for its violation. No declaration of war was required: you declare no war against

pirates—you require no riot act to resist house-breakers; your vessels were wanted in the Black Sea to stop Russia's operations; a cutter would have stopped them. It would be worth to the Emperor his Crown—to Russia, perhaps, at this moment, her existence—to fire on an English man-of-war's punt if floating in the Euxine.

But the Minister who made the Treaty of 1841 is actually a member of the Cabinet. He is in possession of all the facts: he is acquainted with the motives for which it was signed—those motives which he has stated in Parliament. He has now discovered the deception of which he has been the victim: he has now learnt the value of those declarations of Baron Brunow to which he listened in 1840, and which he detailed to the House in 1848; and has seen that the practical results of the Treaty of 1841 are anything but the security of the East. Must he not have remonstrated with his colleagues, deplored his former error, besought them now to atone for it, and infused into their minds some of that daring energy which he has revealed in so many lands?

We must therefore assume, that in violating its engagements, and in counselling Turkey to submit to the invasion of its territory, the Cabinet has acted in defiance of the member whose opinion, if he was admitted as a colleague, must have been held to be all authoritative on this matter.

The Treaty of 1841, adopting as a *principle* that which when formerly put forward by Russia as a pretension, excited the indignation of Europe and provoked

the protests of England and France, amounts in fact to a revolution of all ideas on what has been termed the "Eastern question." Any one starting from that point is utterly at sea, as the governments of Turkey and England have been. The case of that country is as completely falsified by it as is that of Denmark by the Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852. When you adopt false maxims in contracts, and calling those contracts, Treaties, institute these maxims as public law, of course there remains neither right upon which to take a stand, nor common sense by which to be guided.

It has not failed to strike the discriminating British public that Russia's conduct is strange and unaccountable; but they content themselves with referring it to the distracted mind of the Emperor. His "pride, vexation, and resentment," have compromised, say they, the position of Russia; in other words, Nicholas is mad. He is so, just as Philip was mad to the Athenians; insanity is not on that side: Nicholas is not mad, but Russia is in danger.

The West is to her as a preserve, where she goes forth to hunt when in want of venison, or sport; she consults her pleasure only, and can subsist without its spoil. In the East it is her necessities that she has to consult; there she cannot slumber for an hour, or rest for a single day; there it is ditches she has to dig, and ramparts to throw up; it is war, not sport; the contest is for very life.

The same paper that announced the formation of a

Turkish camp on the borders of Asia Minor for the purpose of joining the Circassians in case of war, announced also the rejection by Persia of proposals for the cession of Astrabad, and the approaching departure of the fleet of Egypt for the Bosphorus. A universal revulsion of the East is now made manifest. The development of a great military power in Turkey, the loss of the lever of religion, the animosity of the populations westward of the Black Sea, including Hungary, the continued successes of the Circassians,* and the rise and growth of a spirit of disaffection in her own southern Provinces, are facts which no longer require proof or illustration. Unless she succeeds in altering the circumstances, Russia will soon find herself no longer menacing, but *menaced*.

There are other matters remaining behind still veiled from observation. Turkey has been engaged in recasting her Financial system; she has last year effected a change in respect to the chief internal tax, which, by displacing the farmers of revenue, has been no less a relief to the People than a profit to the Treasury. The next step in contemplation was one which would have burst the fetters in which its agricultural resources are at

* The *Aachener Zeitung*, of the 24th June, gives as news from Trebizond, "that Shamyl has beaten a Russian army, and taken twenty-three pieces of cannon, and an enormous amount of munitions of war. Five battalions of Poles and irregular troops went over to the Circassians, and Shamyl has issued a proclamation, offering protection to all deserters."

present bound. This Russia at every hazard had to prevent.*

It will thus be seen that however injurious it may be to allow Europe to learn that Turkey is possessed of military power, or to provoke and excite the national spirit of the Ottomans, still it was a higher object to divert their minds from peaceful internal ameliorations, and by expenditure on armaments to deprive the Treasury of the means of making those sacrifices, whether in fact, or in supposition, which necessarily attend every financial alteration.

The Turkish military organisation is entirely local, and in that consists not only its excellence, but its economy. The Rediff follow their ordinary occupations and assemble for exercise only during one month in the year. By forcing Turkey to arm, and to assemble her troops on the frontiers, besides the sacrifice in money, there will be also the exhaustion of spirit and goodwill. The army, especially the Rediff, however ardent at present, will be disgusted by being uselessly drawn from their native provinces, and the indignation of the Mussulmans will turn from Russia on their own Government.†

* The *Times* correspondent from Berlin, under date of June 29th, indicates for the first time an indistinct perception of this object.

“The war which threatens now to break out may be also represented as a struggle between restriction and freedom in commerce. The commercial resources of Turkey and the Danubian Principalities are the prize which Russia longs to carry off.”

† This admission was recently made by the *Times* :—“ In fact, the indefinite prolongation of the present state of suspense may prove more injurious to the Porte than war itself. These preparations have

It is the exportation of the Provinces of the Danube which principally competes with those of Russia in the markets of England* and Europe, for they are subject neither to the fiscal system of Russia, nor to the prohibitory duties established throughout Turkey by the English Treaty of Commerce. Her army will therefore be fed by provisions that otherwise would have reached the Thames, to the exclusion there of grain from St. Petersburg and Odessa. The very connection which has sprung up between England and the Danubian Provinces will assist her in suppressing them. Her movement taking place at the shipping season, the City will be thrown into alarms respecting supplies, which a war with Russia would endanger; and so the English Government, if ever called to account for its present acts, will be able triumphantly to refer to the necessities of England as limiting their power of action.

The occupation of the Principalities is a matter

given a shock to the Ottoman Empire which it will long feel, if, indeed, it ever recovers from the effects of them. While our attention is directed to the negotiations of the day, it must not be forgotten that there is at the bottom of these discussions the greatest question which the statesmen of this age have yet to solve."—June 27.

* "Since we have opened our ports for the free importation of foreign grain, our trade with Russia has gradually declined, but from the same period that of Turkey has gradually increased; and while the former has diminished nearly fifty per cent., the latter has risen to the same extent since 1845. In 1850 the exports of Indian corn from the port of Galatz, amounted to upwards of 1,400,000 quarters. Our exports of merchandize to Galatz, in 1850, amounted to about £435,000, and to Ibrail to about £463,000. A third of our importations of foreign grain (value £12,000,000), is in the hands of the Greek merchants of the Mediterranean."—*Bankers' Circular*, July 2nd, 1853.

wholly distinct from the original quarrel with Turkey, but it was required as a preliminary. Russia has already twice entered the Principalities in time of peace, but in both cases there was a pretext; in the first, the war raged in Europe, and the ambition of Napoleon sufficed; in the second, there was a revolution. I have for the last two autumns been looking hourly for the news of a revolution in Yassy or at Bucharest; however, had she obtained such an occasion, it would have been necessary to have recommenced, on the conditions settled by the Treaty of Balta Liman.

If the Russians had pushed the matter in reference to the Holy Sepulchre to a rupture, then the crossing of the Pruth would have been considered by the Turks as an act of hostility, and dealt with as such. This then was never contemplated. If the occupation of the Principalities had been arranged between the two Courts as the consequence of an insurrection, then a Turkish force would have entered together with the Russian, and her object would have been frustrated. The fire having been drawn upon Bethlehem, she quietly marches into Bucharest, and tells off the garrisons for the fortresses of the left bank of the Danube.

One course only was open to the Porte, and it was to send forward her troops into the Provinces so soon as the Russians crossed the Pruth. If Russia's step was not war, so then this was not war; and, if war, it was at a distance from Turkey, on a field where Russia could not make it. By this every point would

have been covered ; there was no difficulty in its execution ; the troops were there, and under the very same general who had taken the same step in 1848, and had then been received as a deliverer by the Wallachians. With astonishment and indignation it has to be asked, "What meanness, what treachery, has been at work at Constantinople?" There has been, indeed, neither meanness nor treachery ; the security of the East and the peace of Europe have been compromised only by generous confidence on the one hand and friendly caution on the other.

General Valentini describes the last war as a combat between a blind man and a seeing one ; and that war occurred when Turkey was in a state of total political and military disorganisation. Pozzo di Borgo has assigned as the ground of that war the necessity of breaking the new military organisation of the Turks, which prepared for Russia in his opinion *dangers for the future*. These dangers are now realised, and still the game is between a blind man and a seeing one. Russia, by her present move, has incurred hazard that is terrible to contemplate. Never could she have risked it without a man of whom she was certain as representative of England at Constantinople.* It has been avowed in Parliament that there were no instructions sent out, that everything was remitted to the judgment, knowledge, and prudence of the Ambassador : and there could be no doubt that

* At the beginning of the year, when there was some doubt as to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe being sent back again, the Russian representative took care to allow his satisfaction to be detected.

on the critical point for which all the rest was preparatory, and upon which everything was to hinge, Lord de Redcliffe would suggest, and having suggested, imperiously require — *caution*;* there is scarcely less doubt that Colonel Rose, if left in charge of the Mission, would (being uninstructed) have said, “Of course, you must send your troops from the Danube if they send theirs from the Pruth.” In fact, England having tremendous power and no policy, the gravest events must hinge upon the temperaments of the individuals cast by accidents into determining posts; it is upon these accidents that Russia makes her game. In this case the individual diplomatist to whom I refer stands pre-eminent in our service, and his zeal and interest in favour of Turkey are as unquestionable as has been his courageous assertion in Parliament of British rights against Russian encroachments. The matter is not therefore to be narrowed to the limits of individual merit or demerit.

But the return of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to his post was not the only measure required to make the game a safe one: it was equally requisite to prevent M. Von Prokesch from being there as representative of Austria, to which post he had actually been designated when Russia interposed, and in so open a manner that her interference was of public notoriety at Berlin and Vienna. Again, it was requisite to keep Riza Pasha out of office, and here she was served both by accident and by England; she

* The advice of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in case of a war, to withdraw behind the Danube, has reached even the papers.

was equally fortunate in London, where she had now Lord Palmerston and Lord Aberdeen in the same cabinet, and neither of them ostensibly Foreign Minister. Thus were the cards shuffled and packed for 1853, and nothing left to the chapter of accidents.

Let it now be remembered that it is but two years since she evacuated these very provinces. Within this short space of time have circumstances altered, or is her mind changed? Not in the least: but she found that they were of no use to her while there was a joint occupation of a Turkish force. True there were but 10,000 Turks to 50,000 Russians, yet that force sufficed to paralyse her occupation and to prevent her from converting them into a basis of operations. There was also another slight inconvenience, the contact with the Turkish troops suggested—DESEPTION. The Muscovites are not apt scholars in Liberalism, and do not comprehend Revolution, but they are not insensible to the difference of food, pay, and treatment, which they then for the first time witnessed in an army composed of populations, many of whom spoke the same language as themselves: they revolved in their stupid minds whether it might not be more desirable to serve the Sultan than the Czar. The regiments so debauched when withdrawn across the Pruth were judiciously placed out of harm's way. For these and other reasons it was judged advisable to put an end to the conjoint occupation, in order that a Russian force might return *alone*. I refer the reader to the Chapter in this volume on the

evacuation of the Provinces, printed before the Pruth was crossed.

It may now strike with astonishment, that in 1851 there should have been a Turkish force in occupation. "What," I may be asked, "becomes of your theory? Either your assumption of English influence was groundless, or that influence was not exercised in the manner you describe." That matter is easily explained. When Omer Pasha crossed the Danube in 1848, the English Ambassador *was not consulted*, for the best of all reasons, that the Porte was not aware of the fact until it had occurred; and it was kept in ignorance by its own functionaries for fear it should consult the English Ambassador.

I now assert in the most emphatic manner, that by deficiency of military power Russia cannot attack Turkey. I assert, that as compared with the circumstances of the late war, the force of Turkey has multiplied many fold, and that that of Russia has absolutely diminished. I do not refer to any extraneous support given to Turkey; I speak of an even-handed contest, of which the Principalities are to be, and must be, the theatre. If you commence by surrendering them, Turkey is, of course, placed in the same condition that India would be, by allowing Russia to occupy the Punjab.

In 1828 Turkey made no defence of the Principalities; being a champaign country, a regular army would have been required for that purpose, and Turkey had none; yet Russia, in the course of that campaign was beaten back. She had 200,000 men;

in fact, her whole resources were called up after two years of preparation. In 1810, with half that force, she captured all the fortresses on the right bank of the Danube. Turkey has an army now to defend the Pruth, and, in the words of General Bem, better soldiers than Russia, and more of them. I insert textually a letter of his:—

“ To Mehemet Ali Pasha, Minister of War.

“MONSEIGNEUR—Not seeing the order arrive to command my presence at Constantinople, I conceive it to be my duty to address to your Highness some considerations which appear to me to be urgent.

“ I commence by declaring that the Turkish troops which I have seen—cavalry, infantry, and field artillery—are excellent.

“ In bearing, instruction, and military spirit, there cannot be better. The horses surpass those of any European cavalry. That which is inappreciable is the desire felt by all the officers and all the soldiers to fight against Russia.

“ With such troops I would willingly engage to attack a Russian force double their number, and I should certainly be victorious.

“ And as the Ottoman Empire can march against the Russians more troops than that power can oppose to them, it is evident that the Sultan may have the satisfaction to see restored to his sceptre all the provinces treacherously withdrawn from his ancestors by the Czars of Moscow.

“ I have the honour to remain, &c.

“ MURAD.”

This opinion may be considered tinged by the feelings of the man, but the fact is unquestionable

that Turkey can now muster on the theatre of war twice the number that Russia can bring against her; and if these are not all regulars, they are the same irregulars who, in 1828, at Kurtèpe, under every disadvantage of position, beat twice their number of Russian regulars. As to their quality, the opinion of General Aupick, expressed to the Sultan, in 1849, tallies with that of General Bem. "Your majesty's troops," he said, "are able to give a good account of any enemies that will be opposed to them."

Even supposing that this army were forced to retreat, it would devastate the Provinces before it, and in its retreat entrench itself on the Danube. To place herself in a similar position to that at which she commenced the campaign of 1828, Russia would require at least 400,000 men; this force could not be supported, and besides she has not got it.

If the war be made from the Danube, the idea is involved of the downfall of Turkey; all enthusiasm is destroyed. Further is involved that of the co-operation, or consent of England and France, with the consequent depression upon the minds of the populations which extend from the Baltic all round to the Steppes of the Kirghis. If the war be made from the Pruth and a powerful Turkish army brought within hail, so to say of the Cossack country, the Tartars of the Crimea, the Poles and the Hungarians, it then is a question of the fall of Russian not Turkish power. Then most assuredly would be seen 100,000 Circassians on the Eastern plains of Russia, and every population would strike for independence. The Sultan

is now the protector of the old Muscovite Church; their bishops and priests now repair to Constantinople for consecration; he is the religious head of the Musulman subjects of Russia, and the recent excitation of fanaticism will be a new spur to Catholic Poland and to the Starovirtzé, who have already projected flight into Turkey. If then Russia were so insane as to make a war which had to commence when she invaded her neighbour's territory, she must leave in observation a body no less powerful than that which she would employ in the war.

There remains the not immaterial question of supplies and transport. The Principalities being the theatre of war would be used for the support of the Turkish and not the Russian army; the latter would advance only where the country was exhausted and from whence the population had retired. The Turks in retreating would fall back on their resources; the Russians in advancing would be removed from theirs; as they advanced they would not secure the country behind them, as their whole line would be exposed to incursions from the Dobroja (the slip of land inclosed between the Danube and Black Sea); they would have to bring everything, even forage and fuel by means of oxen waggons, across the Steppes of the Ukraine,*

* "If Austria remained strictly neutral, and refused to supply provisions by means of Transylvania, the Russian troops would be literally starved, and it would be physically impossible to convey the requisite supplies for an army of 200,000 men by land through Bessarabia, for a smaller army would be useless to attempt any thing against Constantinople."—Military opinion quoted by Vienna Correspondent of the *Times*, Aug. 1.

where there are no roads, scarcely any inhabitants, no trees, no water, save along the rivers, and which with a short interval of spring passes from a Siberian winter to the summer of an African desert. Across the same country her reinforcements would have to pass, and the sacrifice of life on these occasions has always exceeded the loss of men in a campaign.

On the other hand, the Turks would be close to their supplies; steam has opened up for them a new resource: a water communication bisects the Empire; from their capital they could receive supplies in the same number of hours that the Russians could from theirs in weeks, and that without loss or expenditure. The levies from the furthest maritime province might be brought up in a week, or at furthest a fortnight.

Without going further into the matter, I think that what I have said will remove every possible doubt that on the occupation of the Principalities without contest, depends whether or not Russia will make war, that is to say, that if not so allowed to occupy them, she could not invade them, and that being so allowed, she then can and will invade Turkey.

I do not intend to say that by giving her all this, you ensure her triumph, but I do say that her case is desperate, and that she is forced to play a desperate game. A timely revolution at Constantinople, a momentary indignation of the Queen of England, or of the Emperor of the French, may plunge her, even before she enters on the further contest, into the most frightful perils, but once established on the Danube she can wait her time: thence she menaces

Austria just as much as Turkey. She has therefore other pieces on the board besides those we have seen moved. An attempt on Constantinople is not to be hazarded until England and France are "engaged in a hot war," or till Europe is engaged with a Revolution. *Beware then of the spring of 1854!*

I have now to point out the most alarming sign and symptom of our degradation. It is not long since the allegation that a minister or a journal was under the influence of Russia was received with indignation if not with contempt; now that charge is in every one's mouth; we have avowedly a Russian faction in England,—not indeed a faction, but a management, management of the Cabinet, management of the press. We learn the fact from denunciations: it is considered monstrous, but the denouncers represent no party; no one will say that there is an Anti-Russian faction. This especially is remarkable, that papers supposed to be severally under the influence of the two statesmen, now Colleagues in the same Cabinet, who have been in turn Foreign Secretary for more than a quarter of a century, are those which most vehemently denounce each other as "Russian;" I point out the fact, not for the benefit of Englishmen, they unfortunately know it too well, but as a warning to the Turkish Government against that danger of English Counsel which brings in its suite every other danger—Russian violence—Mussulman insurrection, and Christian revolt; I therefore explicitly state that in the best informed circles, the *Times* is supposed

to represent the views of Lord Aberdeen, and the *Morning Post* those of Lord Palmerston: the *Times* is already well enough known at Constantinople; the *Morning Post* has long been known here as the *reputed* organ of Russia; the latter speaking of the former, says: "A contemporary of ours—the tool of Russia—has plucked up courage enough to advise his countrymen to be cowards. Such audacious baseness is as curious as his complicated errors and his perplexed understanding." *

One result of the passage of the Pruth, largely commented on in the public press, is the dangerous position in which the Turkish Government is placed in reference to its own subjects. Is this effect confined to Constantinople? Will it not react on the Governments of the Continent? Must it not affect the position of Louis Napoleon? The Queen of England, as a sovereign, may not suffer; but will any one say that the character of public men in England has not been degraded? I do not speak of the Members of the present Government alone: where is the Opposition? Is it safe in a Constitutional State that the word "Russian" should be bandied about and stick wherever it strikes—that there should be no name in public life not stamped with incapacity or tainted

* The *Morning Herald* writes: "It is merely as the head of the house, in which the present Premier occupies a subordinate position, of 'Times, Nicholas, Aberdeen, and Co.,' that we ever refer to what it puts forward."

The *Press*, the organ of a powerful party, charges Lord Clarendon with connivance with M. Brunow.

The philosophical *Spectator* expresses similar opinions.

The *Morning Advertiser*, having the next largest circulation to the *Times*, repeats the same charges.

with suspicion?* It is only as yet the seed that is put in the ground; wait for the germination under the Russian dews of events and the March showers of invasion and revolution. The seed that is sown is the knowledge that the Government has co-operated in preventing Turkey from resisting an invasion: the harvest which English Statesmen will have to reap will be certainly contempt—probably exasperation—possibly impeachment. Yes, Statesmen of England, you are proceeding to reverse the comfortable maxim upon which you have slumbered so tranquilly and so long; and England will have to thank you at last for recalling to her awakened memory that “the days of impeachment have *not* gone by,” for the remedial process of the law returns from the instant that she remembers it. In the meantime let the Cabinet filch measures, and the Press masticate news,† for we must be worse before we can be better. Since reason has not availed to save us, we must look to vengeance.

* An unusual number of Russians have been allowed this year to travel, and they are also unusually communicative; amongst other things they say, “there will never be any serious hostility against Russia, for Russian gold makes its way into Parliaments and into Cabinets, and smooths matters down to the state the Emperor would have them.”—Paris Correspondent of the *Times*.

† The *Times*, of the 8th of July, inserts two leaders, the one preparing the nation to support an energetic decision on the part of the Government, the other exposing the absurdity of taking any decision at all. The process of contradiction is carried still further. One of these articles in the same paragraph ridicules “England and France putting themselves into a hostile attitude by the side of the hapless and helpless Mussulman,” and asserts that “Russia would consult her interests as little as her honour by forcing onwards in the face of a people as military and as fanatic as herself,” and against whom she “can do but little, except in cooperation” with her allies.

Chatham in one breath threatened the vengeance of the law, and the fury of the rabble,* and that was only for an unjust war which England herself had made: here for no passion, for no private end, with nothing to mislead the judgment, or disguise the facts, the fabric of the world is to be shaken because an English Minister does not dare to face a Russian Ambassador.

I will not conclude without a practical suggestion:

In home matters the rule is—Measures, not Men; in foreign matters it is men, not measures. Here you deal not with ideas, but with antagonists: you have to measure yourself, not against abstract ideas, but against talents: you have to cope, not with inherent difficulties of matter, but with the purposes of men: it is a champion you require, not a proposition; skill of fence, not volubility of tongue: your champion must be at least equal to his adversary in the use of his weapons, in the knowledge of his manœuvres, and must master him by the eye before he can touch him with the point. Such fencers cannot be fabricated by a sign manual; and England has taken no heed to form such. Nor would the matter be worth referring to, had it not so happened that England by accident does possess such a man. She has but to take him, and commission him to preserve the commonwealth from detriment. Every difficulty would then disappear in five minutes. The person I refer to is in repute, in honour, and in office, but his office is that of *Poor Law Commissioner*.

* "If you are successful in this war, impeachment hangs over you; if unsuccessful, you will be torn to pieces in the streets."

He has been in the diplomatic service, forcing his way to the highest grades from the humble station of assistant-surgeon. He then chose to renounce that career when presenting to him every worldly attraction; not that he sought repose, or was unfit for toil.

But this you will not do. It was once said by Colletti,—“It would be economical for England to expend three millions in forming a man to understand Russia; but if she had such a man, she would only expend money to destroy him.” And the reason is, that your public men know, or they do not know, that they are unfit to deal with her. This is the spell under which you are bound; its existence is no reason why I should not seek to expose it. But I have another proposal to make, somewhat less unendurable than the former—*send away the Russian Ambassador*. That would be worth more, even, than a squadron in the Black Sea. Russia as yet, and especially at present, cannot dispense for an hour with your support.



OBJECTS OF THE WORK.

THIS volume was in the press in May, but was delayed by a visit to Denmark. I had undertaken it in anticipation of a crisis in Turkey,—by an occupation of the Principalities in the autumn. By this delay the event has occurred before the publication. I had conceived that by bringing together the proceedings of Russia on various fields, and connecting them in point of time, a chance was afforded for dissipating the illusions by which, on each field and at each moment, she is enabled to carry her point. May my fellow-countrymen perceive that in all she is undertaking against others, she is only preparing the means which will be employed against them. I now subjoin the Preface as originally written.

When the 'Progress of Russia in the East,' by Sir J. M'Neill, was planned, I undertook to prepare an account of her progress in the North and West. These materials were, however, used in fragments for immediate publication; I now complete the task, and chiefly out of events which have occurred since that time. Our object in 1836 was to prevent her future

progress by exhibiting the past; in 1853, I have to sum up the march of acquisitions then undreamt of.

The danger, which in 1836 we had to warn against, was the fall of Turkey: the resuscitation of the energies and power of that Empire have, so to say, caused, on that field, history to pause. The danger now is, war in Europe—a danger arising, not from the dispositions of France, but from the talents of Russia,* and into which we shall be plunged, not by any direct aggressions, not by any reciprocal violations of rights, for, fortunately, in both countries such questions must be submitted to legal adjudication, but by becoming mutually involved in false courses in *third* countries.

In this review, I have, however, excluded all direct mention of France, because its internal state results from the reaction of diplomatic proceedings in Spain, Turkey, Denmark, Hungary, &c. I have devoted to Spain considerable space, as there was elaborated the revolutionary ferment. The invasion of Spain, in 1823, brought the curtailment of the Electoral Franchise and of the duration of Parliaments in France, and provoked those endless agitations, ultimately resulting in the events of 1848.

The Revolutions of that year, with the wars of

* A great desideratum is a work on the Diplomacy of England, since 1792, showing how Russia has made for us our wars with France. The materials and the proof are to be found in the *Memoirs* of Lord Malmesbury. Pretended histories of England, France, &c., are mere perversions: for the last century, the only history is that of Russia.

that which succeeded it, are neither isolated incidents, nor have they sprung from local and distinct causes. At Copenhagen, Presburg, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Bucharest, and Palermo, the germs had been severally cultured, the instruments prepared, and the parts distributed. The warlike operations that ensued were equally directed by the same hand. One of the victims has said, "the events of 1848-9 show, that in every Cabinet Russia has had a spy, and it is not too much to infer—an agent:"* she had no less in every conspiracy. If by conspiracies she upset Governments, so by Governments did she prostrate conspiracies.† The result is, that at this moment every Government looks up to her as its protector, and every conspirator as his patron.

England was meanwhile engaged in managing mankind : her objects were the Constitution of Sicily, the improvement of the condition of central Italy, the independence of Lombardy, and the settlement of Hungary. All were in her hands ; but somehow everything has slipped through her fingers, and in a word, the word of the *Times*, "The continent of Europe is governed to-day by Colonels in Russian uniforms."

The entrance into Hungary of a Russian army was the great event of that period. A conquest was there

* Kossuth.

† Seven millions of adult Frenchmen rushed, in terror, to the polling booths to vote against the Red Republic.

effected of Austria by the aid of her own troops, and the subjugation of the most warlike kingdom of Europe, obtained by the loss in battle of less than a thousand Russians. The occasion was prepared by England, who revolutionised Italy, drawing the resources of Austria to the South; who then compromised the neutrality of Turkey, without which the war could not have been brought to a successful issue. I have, therefore, selected this field (Hungary) as illustration of the catastrophe of 1848, adding to it a sketch of the military and diplomatic events, and an exposure of the unparalleled trickery practised in reference to the extradition of the Refugees, and the falsehoods put forth in regard to the pretended support then given to Turkey.

A separate chapter has been opened in the North, by the London Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852, bringing in the Emperor as Inheritor of Denmark. That matter being still in suspense, this statement may yet have a political application. At this moment the event hinges upon the belief of certain individuals that in spite of what they have done by that Treaty, the House of Romanoff will not succeed to the Danish Crown. The chief object of this publication is to dispel that illusion.

These subjects I have subdivided into the WEST and the NORTH. To the SOUTH of Russia lie the Ottoman Empire, the Euxine, the Caspian, and the Caucasus: I have here confined myself to the Commercial branch, exhibiting the steps which she has suc-

cessively made to stop up the water-ways and suppress the production of the adjoining countries.

After all, the facts are of importance, only as enabling us to form a judgment of ourselves; and herein lie the difficulty and the necessity of the task. "To praise the Athenians to the Athenians" is easy, but superfluous. I avow that my attempt is no less than to dispraise Englishmen to Englishmen. If argument could have availed, the work to which I am desirous of making the present one an humble and unequal appendage, England's dependency must long ago have been broken, and the course of recent unhappy history arrested. But clearly knowledge avails nothing, and nothing can be done save when fallacy is attacked. *Russia* was the subject of the work of Sir J. M'Neill; the *Character of the Age* is that of the present. I have endeavoured to trace home to the thoughts of each of us the causes of Russia's success. I can scarcely believe that any man of ordinary capacity will lay down this volume without asking himself the use of Constitutional Checks, Parliamentary Inquiries, and a Free Press, and exclaiming with Descartes, when he contrasted the power and pomp of the French Monarchy with the misery of its People,—"*La Méthode doit être mauvaise.*"

My acquaintance with the countries and men here treated of, has not been derived from books. All of the first I have visited; with most of the second I have had intercourse, and with reference to the subjects. As to the events, I have watched them from

near ; in respect to some of them, from myself has originated the plan, or the opposition. With such transactions in the ordinary course of life, men exercising representative or ministerial functions can alone become acquainted ; I have had the opportunity of taking part in them, on no other ground, whatever, save objections to measures or opinions. The key that has opened to me the door, has been a phrase, which almost invariably closes it—" You are wrong !"

Whoever has worked out for himself his own results upon any field, must be engaged in a war with prejudice, and even if he is dealing only with a maxim of finance, or a combination of chemistry, must seek to show that truth is on his side. The field I have selected is the plateau that links the highest summits—the practical connexion of the welfare of kingdoms and empires with the observance of the moral law. This alone is permanent, fluctuating with no passion, touched by no majorities. Men may change and circumstances revolve, but the position of a nation with reference to other nations is irrevocably fixed by its acts, which again return upon itself, determining its own character. What motives have I not, then, for offering proof that I am right ? The evidence is that my anticipations have been justified by results, and that even opinion itself has come round on many points on which it was most opposed to my conclusions.

I have to deal with history—not history that has died, but history in action. In so presenting it, I

feel as the Chorus of the Greek stage, announcing the actors and foretelling the event; like it, too, lamenting in vain. The audience I may assemble, resembles also those who witnessed the performance of the "Seven Chiefs" or the "Œdipus Tyrannus:" for they come not to arrest a crime, but to witness a catastrophe; not to act the part of citizens, but of spectators. The mimes and gladiators of old are replaced by Archons and Consuls; the nations themselves take the place of Antigone or Iphigenia, and are at once enchanted with the spectacle and victims of the plot. He who is not under the illusion, is as one who in a dream beholds a murder but cannot find breath to utter a cry; for what does a cry avail when there remains no indignation for wrong? The great realities of a people's life have become illusion, the drama is admired for its march, and pleases however it may end.

Where there is mismanagement it is not Institutions that are at fault, but Institutions that are falsified. The organisation of a People is in its mind; and errors are always retrievable where the root is not in misjudgment. That ignorance of passing events for which an excuse is sought in the secrecy in which they are involved, or in the form of Government, is but the result of the loss of the sense of right and wrong; when that is possessed by a nation, its Government is under the necessity of giving a reason for whatever it does.

The knowledge which is requisite for managing

our business, is so also for protecting our character; spendthrifts are more generally ruined by the dread of looking into neglected accounts than by the temptations which lead them into excess. England within the last generation—that is to say, since the Treaty of July 6, 1827, for the pacification of the East, has become involved in a multitude of affairs for which her own history, and indeed the history of no country and of no age, furnishes no parallel. In consequence of the influence of her name, every matter she has touched has become, so to say, a capital, or revenue, liable to dissipation; she has gone on recklessly squandering, and dreading to examine the accounts. When brought up by a humiliation she is ready to exclaim, “Oh, we must have no war!” Such a frame of mind is not one to overcome difficulties. Even this state might have its countervailing advantages did it proceed from mere cowardice, for then it would be accompanied with care and cunning; but if reason is prostrated, passion is not so; we are as ready to buckle on our armour on the slightest difference with a State really powerful, as we are to quail before a riddle propounded to us by one physically weak.

One preservative effect supposed to be realised by our popular Constitution, is the presence of pre-eminent men in pre-eminent stations. Such men are not only held to be capable of fathoming a transaction, however complicated, and grasping the leading features of a case, however foreign in its nature or

remote in its field, but also of rising above the errors of their times—a condition requisite even for permanent fame in the management of Domestic concerns. The results, however, do not bear out the inference. Since the death of one whose name rises familiar to the mind and lip when it is a question of England's power and fame, we have seen no pre-eminent man, in the station of Foreign Minister. Such men have filled the posts of Premier and of Chancellor of the Exchequer. The character of our government is departmental; the other ministers periodically sit in council upon foreign matters, but in reality exercise no independent judgment, far less control the mode of execution. The hours of office are laden with too many cares to permit of laborious investigations in matters not affecting majorities, and the character of mind superinduced by free Institutions, disqualifies politicians for seeing a world beyond the sphere of a debate, or the bourne of a division. Thus the only portion of England's affairs, with the exception of the Colonies, which is not so strictly limited by Act of Parliament that a clerk might perform the requisite duties, has been surrendered by common consent into the hands of mediocrity.*

While by such hands is wielded in secret the power of this Empire, our Antagonist scrutinizes the earth for talents, and having found them, disciplines them

* An exception may suggest itself to the reader; but in that case the powers of the minister were revealed in his office, not displayed as the means of reaching it.

to an order which never has been matched, and inspires them with the prospect of a triumph never yet attained. There are united superiority of mind, unity of system, permanency of purpose, the coercion of an iron rule, the inspiration of a golden harvest, and the doubly fortifying sense of confidence in themselves, and contempt for the rest of mankind.

Dr. Hamel, in the St. Petersburg Journal, calls the attention of the Russian public to the fact that "the current year completes three centuries of nearly uninterrupted amicable relations between Russia and England." The fact is also well worthy of the attention of the British public; *there never has been collision between England and Russia.* Other States are our friends, or our foes, according to the various accidents of the times, Russia alone has undeviatingly and on system been our enemy,—against her alone of all the States of the world, have we *never* drawn the sword. In all times, under all administrations, England has been her private property. Flusters of opposition periodically flare out, but they are commissioned, and invariably end with "entire satisfaction" on the sacrifice of the State, or interest, which had given rise to the discharge of notes, or the parade of ships of the line;*

* In 1801, Denmark; in 1807, Denmark; in 1822, Spain; in 1827, Persia; in 1829, Turkey; in 1831, Poland; in 1833, the Dardanelles; in 1836, the quarantine on the Danube; in 1837, the *Vixen* and Circassia; in 1838, Persia; in 1846, Cracow; in 1849, Hungary and its exiles; in 1850, Greece; in 1853, Wallachia and Moldavia—event not doubtful.

On May 21, 1853, the representation of the Powers at Constantinople answered the appeal of the Turkish Government, by stating

a farce, harmless indeed in itself, but of deadly effect on the States immediately endangered, who are thereby led to confide in us; the system marches with the regularity of machinery, the method of a drama, and the facility of a dream.

At no former period has the Commonalty occupied itself with the respective merits of implements of war; and that not with a view of achieving conquests, but of resisting, purely ideal for the time, projects of Invasion. While needle guns and long range are evoked whenever we speak of France, is it not worth while to consider what the influence may be of the discoveries in chemistry, mechanics, and engineering, effected during this peace, on the designs of Russia? The vast extent of her own territory; the distance which is placed between her and the vulnerable points of Europe and Asia, together with the obstacles presented to the movement of troops by her own deficiencies and mal-administration have hitherto paralysed the operations of her army. A new era opens for her with railways. With those already commenced in Poland, linked to Germany; with that projected from Moscow reaching to Odessa, and established as she will soon be on the Isthmus of the Baltic, and the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, she will be ready to smite Europe

that they "are of opinion that in a question which touches so nearly the liberty of action and sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan, his Excellency Redchid Pasha is the best judge of the course to be adopted, and they do not consider themselves authorised in the present circumstances to give any advice on the subject."

at any point: she will come too as a protector. Thus have those Arts and Sciences which are the boast of Civilisation passed into the service of the Barbarian.

This revolution in the art of war, coinciding with Russia's expansion to the North and South, renders the contest infinitely more deadly, or would do so if there were a contest. Nature seems capriciously to have formed Europe to illustrate these new inventions. It consists of a peninsula, stretching to the south-west, from a basis which is Russian territory; at each angle there is a vast space of sea, enclosed, and having a narrow entrance, or outlet. By means of galvanic batteries and submerged floating mines connected with them, these narrows may be rendered impassable. Neither is at present in her possession; they may be sealed against her. In her possession, they will be sealed against Europe. Then will she command the materials requisite for war, and hold in her hands the food of nations.

It has long been the habit to dispose of all warnings by the trite phrase "Russia is a poor country, she cannot get money, and without money war cannot be made." All these acquisitions have been effected *in peace*. Poor as she is, she has so husbanded her means, and you have so mismanaged your wealth, that she has been able to come forward to support the tottering credit of the Banks of London and of Paris. The house of Rothschild may hold down the head of the Emperor on the grinding stone

of an artful contract, but Russia commands the monetary operations of the two first capitals of the world, and controls their policy by the Stock Exchange.

To the nations of Europe the Currency is a wholly distinct matter from Metaphysics; so are both from Military affairs; all three are so again from Commerce; Politics is another walk, and another again is Diplomacy; Religion is not only distinct, but has nothing to do with any one of them: the men engaged in each know nothing of the other. For those who manage the affairs of Russia every branch of science, every field of knowledge, and every motive of the human mind is equally possessed and mastered, and the combination of the whole is—Diplomacy.

Knowledge is not Power, but he who is cunning is powerful. Did we bestow upon the great interests of the State the care which is given to the construction of a railway of ten miles, Europe would be at peace and at rest. Indeed the end might be secured at less cost; it suffices to withdraw your Embassies. How can an age, which derives its instruction for practical life from the history of Greece and Rome, be afflicted with the illusion that a Foreign Department is a necessary portion of a State? That system cannot work which involves two opposite and hostile maxims; it is self-condemned either way. To be rational, not to say prosperous, you must institute secrecy in your domestic concerns, or submit your external ones to control. If you will maintain

your Embassies, then sink your Navy.* Disposing of the "moral" means of the Admiralty and Horse Guards, the Foreign Office will put down this Empire, unless it be itself put down.

* A sailor on board Admiral Duckworth's squadron, being asked what sort of vessels the Russians had, answered, "*Russia wants no navy: she has ambassadors!*"

N. B. I would direct attention to the Chapter on the "Evacuation of the Principalities," p. 363, where the present circumstances are not only foreshadowed, but expressly stated. That Chapter is the *résumé* of a Memoir drawn up at the end of 1850, showing that, with a concurrent Turkish force occupying the Principalities, Russia could make no impression on Turkey.

THE WEST.



PART I.—SPAIN.

PART II.—HUNGARY.



*“No man is by nature either an aristocrat or a democrat :
their disputes relate not, then, to system of government, but to
their own advantage.”—LYCURGUS.*

The paper was written in Spain in 1546, and
was first published under the title of "Account
of the Kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, Sicily, and
Sardinia" as a warning against the danger
of the Turkish invasion. The manuscript somehow dis-
appeared from Madrid. A copy, however, having be-
come known in London, and recently discov-
ered in the library of the "Royal
Society."

PART I.
S P A I N .

CHAPTER I.

*How circumstanced for the Development
of Opinion.*

THIS age is distinguished by extent of knowledge and contrariety of judgments,—a misfortune no less than a contradiction, and which arises out of the habit of attaching importance to News. Things which, if announced beforehand, would be held too improper to be possible, are, when done, taken as the data on which maxims are to be formed for our future guidance. Our morals as nations are what the morals of individuals would be who took for their standard *facts*, that is, the cases brought for trial before the courts of law. Thus it is that knowledge is divorced from wisdom, and that we have much speech and little profit.

Unless a man knows what, in a given case, ought to be done, he can never know what has been done; information can be of service only to those who know how to use it; and it is conduct, not knowledge, that is the object of education. The difficulty of classing knowledge as here to unlearn; the life of the mind is one who ever chooses may be all that is

These pages were written in Spain in 1846, and were to have been published under the title of "Account of Spain with Europe, in INVASIONS, INTERVENTIONS, MEDIATIONS, and MARRIAGES," as a warning against the danger of two nubile Princesses. The manuscript somehow disappeared on its way to Madrid. A copy, however, having been taken by the precaution of a friend, and recently discovered, I have thought it might be of use for the "Europeans" themselves.

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of Opinion.*

THIS age is distinguished by extent of knowledge and contrariety of judgments,—a misfortune no less than a contradiction, and which arises out of the habit of attaching importance to News. Things which, if announced beforehand, would be held too improper to be possible, are, when done, taken as the data on which maxims are to be formed for our future guidance. Our morals as nations are what the morals of individuals would be who took for their standard *facts*, that is, the cases brought for trial before the courts of law. Thus it is that knowledge is divorced from wisdom, and that we have much speech and little profit.

Unless a man knows what, in a given case, ought to be done, he can never know what has been done; information can be of service only to them who can class it, be it science, be it conduct. In the latter case, the difficulty of classing does not arise from ignorance. The task is here to unlearn; the life of the spirit is on the lip; whoever chooses may stop on it the garrulity of his fellows, and this is all that is required to recover from the decrepitude of his times.

The order of societies does not depend upon the equality of size and strength of its members, but on the submission of their differences to that process of investigation which distinguishes men from animals. The rights of states are equally independent of numbers and dimensions, and consist in the human character of reason belonging to all the individuals composing them. That differences be brought to adjudication, not only by the authorities of the nation, but by each separate man, is the purpose of international law. In this consists the equality of states, in this the freedom and virtue of each member of a community, and indeed his quality as a reasoning being.

Individuals may, and generally do, profit by the wrong they do; not so communities, and therefore is a public crime by nature wholly different from a petty one. It thus interests no less the powerful than the weak to guard that public rule of right on which depends alike internal freedom and general peace. And in truth this is the excellent, the abiding part of all governments and of all systems: it is the health common to all, without the variety of the infirmities of each; it is the "law of nations," because respected equally by all. It emanates from no human authority, because it is the source of all laws, and is enforced in every judgment rendered, for a village or for an empire. No compact violating it can bind; against it no prescription hold. It requires no interpreter; it brings its own penalties when infringed, and its recompenses when obeyed; it has not to be taught—it is already known; it may for a season be obscured, but each man can himself find it again.

This rule is no less simple than authoritative, and consists in these two commandments: "THOU SHALT NOT STEAL,"

"THOU SHALT DO NO MURDER." There is no possible injury that a state can inflict, or suffer, not provided for by these two laws.

It is not less in the conscience of all beliefs, than in the

theory of all legislations, and stands alike by Divine command and human ordonance. The petty malefactor sins only, the malefactor community is degraded and enslaved. It has denied faith when it has broken law—lost conscience when abjuring freedom, and becomes an infidel at the same time as a robber.

It will not fail to strike, that it is no hypothetical case which I am here putting. Every reader will understand that it is the actual condition of the states of Europe that I intend to describe, and there is no Spaniard who will question the accuracy of that description. But as the individuals who compose those states are singly neither lovers of blood nor seekers of prey, it must be by some great and general mental perversion that they have sunk as nations, to a condition abhorrent to themselves as men. This perversion is to be found in the representative form of government. Each man holds himself to be free from guilt, by that very absence of knowledge, which converts it into *judicial blindness*.

The law of nations is careful to arrest the beginnings of evil by *keeping distinct the concerns of independent states*. Any interference, however slight or disguised, is as grave a crime as slaughter or invasion. One state cannot even hold intercourse legally with another, except in the same manner as practised by private individuals when they go to law, and place their concerns in the hands of a lawyer. The sword of justice is placed in the hands of a king only for self-defence. Communications not called forth by such necessity, coalitions founded thereon, destroy equality between states, subvert international law, and extinguish the sense of right amongst mankind. This is what we call *diplomacy*.*

In the origin of every community; *intercourse* with foreign powers has been entirely prohibited, except as the result of

* There may be treaties to interfere in the affairs of others, but these are violations of the laws of nations, and such a treaty adds merely the guilt of conspiracy to that of violence.

a special and judicial decision. The kings and princes of our Gothic races might decide upon internal affairs; international ones were only treated of in the common council. The senate and the councils of Rome dispatched domestic business; international affairs were decided and even managed by a legal and religious body. Spain's last effort for her liberty, three hundred years ago, was directed against the assumption of her kings to make peace and war, and to conclude treaties without the assent of the Cortes.* In England, no minister of state can lawfully to this day hold so much as intercourse upon public matters with the minister of a foreign power, unless specially commissioned by the competent authority. For every such transaction, a commission must issue under the great seal, and on the responsibility of the Chancellor of England himself; for this he requires a warrant of the privy seal, which can be appended only after a decision of the privy council, signed by the counsellors who advised the measure.† Such was the

* "No king shall make war with another king or queen—peace or truce, or any important act, without having taken council with twelve richombres and twelve elders of the country."—*Fuero de Navarra*, b. i, tit. 1.

"Whenever the king shall have occasion to make war, he must assemble the procuradors or Cortes, to explain its causes, that they may say if the war is just or unjust; so that, in the first case, the people, recognising it to be useful, shall furnish the necessary aids, and that, in the second, that no war may be declared or made."—*Cortes of Valladolid*, 1520, readdressed by sixty-nine members of the Cortes to the King on the 14th of April, 1814.

No wonder that, "up to the commencement of the sixteenth century, the Cortes were always regarded by the Spaniards as their most precious institution, and as their port of safety in unhappy times."—*Miraflores*, vol. i, p. 59.

No wonder that the modern Cortes and constitution should be the source of the evils for which it was the remedy, and of the disease of Spain for which it was the cure.

† This statute has been repealed.

elaborate care taken by our forefathers to preserve themselves from foreign crimes. Theirs was the wisdom which exhibits itself in knowing how to keep things in order. There were few facts in those days because there was judgment, and there being judgment there were no opinions.

When the return to this rule is urged, the answer is, "This process is incompatible with our present multiplied relations; no legal officer could take upon himself the responsibility of the things daily done by the governments of Europe." The object of restoring the ancient law is to put an end to the present practice, which consists in exercising a power in foreign countries which no minister possesses at home.* Such acts alone constitute our multiplicity of relations and their guilty character. This is what goes under the name of *policy*.

But we have gone a step further. Parliaments and Cortes, instituted to control the officers of state, have usurped their functions, and appoint them; thus have been revolutionised our Gothic kingdoms, and the liberties of their separate communities extinguished by their representatives. The same change extends itself to nations: kingdoms are now extinguished, as formerly boroughs were, by the representatives they appoint. Hence have ensued those varieties of conditions between communities which had hitherto been presented only between their members. Their equality before the law being lost, their relative position depends upon their respective strength and weakness. This has introduced the distinction of "FIRST AND SECOND RATE POWERS."

Conferences of the first of these take upon themselves to decide upon what the second shall do, or be made to do, of their own free will,† by fear of consequences or dread of

* For instance, levying a private war on the allies of the Queen of England, as a minister of England did in respect to Spain—conspiracies to bring about revolt, &c., as done again in Spain—changing the laws, customs, taxes of a province, as was done in Syria, &c.

† "The principle that every nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs, so long as it injures not its neighbour. To this

censure,* and this process is denominated *moral influence*. To obtain this "influence" is the duty of the powerful; to endure it, a necessity of the weak.†

This amalgamation does not require concurrence, or entail concert: alliances spring up, the counterpart of the factions in the separate states, such as the "Holy," the "Constitutional," the "Continental," "European," "Western," "Northern," "Transatlantic." No single nation can make out what part it has been made to play, or what share it has had in the aggregate efforts of "influence" on themselves, or on others: losing power over their acts they mistake their interests, and out of the chaos a false order has arisen; again relative strength and weakness lose their places, and the case is resolved into relative cunning. Law had been displaced in favour of force, force now yields to SECRECY. Events appear the result of chance, and the hand that wins is that which is unseen. Every new event is a new perversion. Facts are as false as maxims, fallacious, and the sources of history are poisoned for future generations. The sum of these misjudg-

principle I most cordially assent. It is sound—it ought to be SACRED, and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation."—*Lord Palmerston's Speech*, of 1st June, 1829. The cheers of both sides followed this declaration: the speech in which it was uttered, and of which it is in doctrine the leading feature, raised to the management of the foreign affairs of England the minister who has made Europe what she is to-day!

* Sir R. Peel declared, in reference to Don Carlos, that so much as a *recommendation* was unjustifiable from a stronger to a weaker state, because it would be the overthrow of the independence of the weaker one.

† "When protection was most needed by the Christian population of Syria, *France had withdrawn herself from interference altogether: since she has again taken her proper place in the conferences of the great powers on Eastern affairs, she enjoys her full share of influence, but no more. It must unquestionably fall to the lot of each power to obtain redress for injuries done to its own subjects—yet the general policy to be pursued in the province (of Turkey) must be regulated by general considerations*" of the great powers.—*Guisot*.

ments resulting from the irresponsibility of ministers at home, and secrecy in their acts abroad, is called *Public Opinion*.

"He," said Mr. Canning, "will form but a poor estimate of the value of constitutional freedom who does not take into account the power of the press." Let us consider, also, the value of this mechanical contrivance for multiplying ideas: we are certainly not destitute of materials.

Between 1832 and 1846, Spain had been the subject of above 5,000,000,000 of printed columns, written, published, and read throughout Europe. Has Spain been benefitted, or has Europe been enlightened? A province of Africa having been misgoverned by a civilised nation* for twenty-two years, the "*Press*" has been engaged thereon with equal intentness, with the effect of rendering it half waste, and France wholly savage. Need I proceed to other fields to convince at least the Spaniard that Mr. Canning was a dreamer, or that he inflicted a sarcasm on fools, who hailed it as an oracle?

The association of Spain with the doctrines of Europe is accidental; her adoption of its terms imitative only. The malady thus exhibits features more hideous than elsewhere, and a salutary effort is still within human reach; already has an authoritative voice been raised in warning,—“the opinions of Europe,” said Savaadra, “are a worm eating into the bowels of our state.” Unless Spain will so give peace to herself, she must remain degraded unto the field of Europe’s bickerings, and be the source to her of endless suffering.

Rome and Carthage maintained between themselves respectful and courteous relations for several centuries. In both, the law of nations was an object of special instruction, and enforced by an authority distinct from the executive. Carthage being older and more corrupt, first turned longing

* “This great movement of emigration (5,000 cavalry, 30,000 foot, and more than 20,000 tents) changes the character of the struggle—Abd-el-Kader carries off the population that we have been able neither to *organise, administer, or govern.*”—*Algeria*.

eyes upon Sicily. Rome became jealous, and the first Punic war ensued. Carthage next endeavoured to regain in Spain the ground she had lost in Sicily. Rome sought to counteract her in Spain by opposing to her there an "influence," instead of calling her directly to account. Thus on the soil of Spain commenced the struggle which ended in the extinction of the one and the decline and fall of the other.

England and France remained from the Heptarchy down to the accession of William of Orange without cause of quarrel, except such as arose out of conflicting claims of feudal seniorage. A new one then came, whence have sprung the great wars of a century and a half, and caused ten times the blood to flow that had been spilled in war in ten times the previous number of years. This new cause was precisely the same as that which produced the wars between Rome and Carthage and on the same field.

Spain cannot be properly called neither a first-rate or a second-rate power. Unlike the first, she is engaged in no designs dangerous to the independence of her neighbours; and, unlike the second, she is not liable to be coerced. She is free from the immorality of the one, and above the necessities of the other. Yet has she neither the strength that springs from the absence of unjust purposes, nor the repose that results from an unassailable position. It is that her uprightness is not of the heart nor her strength of the spirit. Unassailable by arms, she is subdued by words. Guiltless of designs upon others, she is guilty of their designs upon herself. She who was recently the bulwark of the liberties of Christendom, presents a picture of degradation, such as was never seen even in the darkest age or amongst the corruptest people—Ministers alternately raised to power by the machinations of rival foreign governments; the road to office being treason and conspiracy. The like was not in Poland, even when occupied by foreign troops. Her factions spring neither from the power of a despot, nor the turbulence of a mob, nor the strength of an oligarchy, nor the privileges of an aristocracy, nor the power of a church, nor the reckless

misery of a nation ; but solely and simply from the assault made on the ancient rights, usages, and immemorial customs of a people, by the desire of some to be like strangers, and by the profit a few others make of the confusion so introduced. Spain's sole evil lies in a mistake.

As contract is the basis of civil law, so much the more must it be so of international relations. Spain's dealings with foreign powers may, therefore, be considered as a succession of bargains, and yet she has nothing to seek or to gain from them, and the only pretext for bargaining between her and them must be *her* interest; as she cannot be coerced by them, it is only practicable by her *will*. Nevertheless, all such bargains are one-sided ; one party only is taken into account, and that one is *never Spain*. In every matter discussed between her and a foreign power, it is not the interest even of that power that is considered, but the purposes of its minister, and that with reference only to the purpose of some other minister. Her sufferings are as indifferent to them as her rights. Anger and contempt, nay violence, ensue if she is not submissive, and she who has provoked no resentment by her conduct, discovers that she equally provokes it by presuming to have a will of her own.

For any equality to exist, she should be seeking influence in England and France, supporting a M. Guizot or a Sir R. Peel, a M. Thiers or a Lord J. Russell. She, proud, strong, tolerates a French or an English ministry, and virtuous France and England impose what they would not endure. But this interference may be a beneficial superintendence : truly her foreign friends must be profoundly wise, if not singularly wicked. Every Spaniard is either ungrateful to a watchful providence or friendly to an evil genius, and while he remains in doubt, he combines the shame of guilt and the penalty of error.

If it be said that he is no dupe of their benevolent pretexts, I ask, who but Spaniards render the foreigner preponderating? As well might an army in the field of battle expect to beat their enemy's left wing, by joining the

right, as they to subdue French influence by leaguings with England, or English influence by joining with France.

If France and England differ in purpose, they are one in character. Their object is not conquest of her, but competition between themselves. In their diverging views appear their coinciding immorality. She would be safe even if unendowed with sense, were she destitute of sensibility. There is a common expression in Spain, "*You did it for your own ends.*" This is a graceless recognition of benefit received. The foreign governments, on the other hand, have ever on their lips "*The good of Spain.*" Let us test by recent facts the value of the admission and the assertion.

When the French invaded Spain in 1808, it was professed that the sacrifice was made on account of Spain, to restore order. Some years after the minister revealed the true cause, *French interest*. And what was this "French" interest? The restoring of vigour and spirit to the French armies, and the consolidating of the monarchy by the restriction of the electoral franchise and the prolongation of the term of parliament! Purposes which, if revealed at the time to France, would have been held more hostile to France than to Spain. So soon as the foreigner had gained his end, or fancied he had done so, he retired, after having taken the poignard out of one desperate hand and placed it in another more savage still.

England vehemently denounced this attack on the "interests" of England, but did nothing more. Had she then adopted the pretended doctrines, or associated herself with the secret purposes of the French minister? No. Her minister had concluded that the French would leave their bones in the Peninsula, and on the entrance of the French troops exulted in *France's miscalculation!* His reasoning on Spain, like that of the French minister, had nothing to do with Spain, but with France. "Rights of nations," "English influence," were all as nothing compared with the master question of triumph for England at the expense of France.

Twenty years later there was a regency in Spain during

the minority of the Queen, nominally English. The French agents judged the opportunity come for labouring at the great work. They set themselves about upsetting the Regency, and, like a Bedemar or a Boutenieff, by conspiracy and bribes. So hurried were they, that it was against an order of things which had only a year to live, that this assault was planned. The administration which they assailed was, however, the most hostile that Spain ever had to the material interests of England. It had refused that so much agitated treaty of commerce; it had shut out the Basque provinces from English trade; and had actually cut off Gibraltar from the coast navigation. It had also adopted the system of French centralisation, opening new projects of ambition, by violating the Fueros of the Basques; and of all these acts it was on England herself that fell the odium and obloquy. Why does France break down this minister (Espartero) so invaluable to her in Spain?—to secure in Paris a triumph over England to the ministry of peace everywhere and always.

But it was not France, but Spaniards, who effected these things. The thought of attempting them sprung only out of Spanish resignation, and then the act is quoted as evidence of Spanish independence. She has blended the name of her factions with that of her neighbours. It is not Whig or Tory. It is not Liberal or Legitimist. It is French or English—the old story of the *hats* and *bonnets* of Stockholm.

With this new maxim of intervention must have arisen new methods of management. If one of the business men of the great European governments were inclined to be confidential, he would tell you that foreign transactions have to be considered under three points of view:—

First—As affecting the chambers.

Secondly—As affecting the other powers.

Thirdly—The case itself.

Supposing a lawyer into whose hands a case is put, were to reason in this fashion, his language would be plainly this:—
 "Before I look into its merits, I must consider if some one

will make it worth my while to abandon it." Such is the rule of the great nations in the most solemn matters, and of persons selected as preeminent for all the qualities that can adorn a man or preserve a state, and into whose hands is remitted the fullest power for the execution of the most sacred functions according to the highest justice!

Abd-el-Kader makes from Morocco an irruption into the Algiers territory. The French people are all excited. The government has to act. Morocco had done nothing. It was Morocco and not France, that was endangered by Abd-el-Kader. It was the African army that preserved Abd-el-Kader as the means of carrying on war. The French government were no sharers in this wish, and had no more designs against Morocco than Morocco upon them. But they have to consider the case with reference to the *opening of the chambers*. They must prepare a paragraph for the king's speech, and want a victory or a surrender. An ultimatum is sent, and thus may a war of extermination be opened or rendered subsequently inevitable, merely to justify a paragraph in the speech, which half an hour after it is delivered, is worthless and forgotten.

The next point which they would have to consider is England, whether or not she would take offence, and, if so, how it would affect their conjoint negotiations at Buenos Ayres, or the Lebanon, or Queen Pomare. In fact, as in dealing with Spain, in sending the ultimatum, Morocco would be the last thing thought of.

But more insignificant considerations even than these determine the greatest events. Some years ago, France made war upon the Spaniards of Mexico, because they resisted a demand which the French government knew to be fraudulent, and had a year before as such refused to entertain. But the editor of the 'Journal de Paris,' Mons. Fonfrede, had been at Bordeaux, and there became the guest and advocate of the claimant. At this time, a division had arisen between the chief members of the cabinet, M. Guizot and Molé, and the latter desirous of securing the 'Journal de

Paris' against the former (that paper having been established by the king), came into the terms of M. Fonfrede, which were war with Mexico. No sooner was the money extorted, than proceedings were taken at Bordeaux against the claimant by his French creditors; and it was proved that the entire value of the cargo, for a portion of which the Mexican government had had to pay £60,000, was under £6000! The legal disproof before the French courts of the claim France had enforced by war so shocked the press, that no journal would give publicity to the fact except—for a consideration: the 'Mémorial Bordelais' got 3,000 francs (£120) from the Mexican Consul for the insertion of the report; an extract in the 'National' cost 10,000 francs (£400). M. Molé lives—his days neither conscience nor the law will shorten. The poor editor alone suffered, for his end was hastened by the discovery of the fraud in which he had been made an unconscious instrument.

England sanctioned this outrage on Mexico, understanding its nature just as well as M. Molé, and tamely suffered the injury inflicted upon her own trade. Indeed, it was she who gave effect to the French blockade by acknowledging it, when the French courts of law refused to admit it. Such are the villainies that pass under the name of policy among nations who call themselves free, Christian, and civilized.

The first step Spain has to take is to draw a line between *Europe* and herself. Her force consists only in the detestation with which she utters the word "stranger;" without this she can have neither virtue nor peace. She suffers at once from Europe's *character, thoughts, and acts*,—how deep ought that abhorrence to be! Besides the Spaniard, Europe presents four primitive races not infected with the vulgarisms of London and Paris—the Jews, the Turks, the Gipsies, and the Russians. They make no distinction of English or French, German or Italian. They know them, or hate and despise them *as one*. To the Jew, they are the "heathen" still; to the gipsey, "Buseo:" by this distinction, these

wanderers and outcasts contrive to live. Let us glance at their mighty compeers.

Who, deserving the title of philosopher, has not been astounded at the permanency of an empire sustained in Europe by not more than a million and a half of Tartar shepherds, and its resistance to the assaults of two redoubtable neighbours, backed by the hatreds, the opinions, and the arms of all Europe? This is the secret, the Europeans to them are "dogs." They despise not the Christians, their own subjects; they opened a refuge to the persecuted Christians of Europe, and the Jews expelled from Spain. This contempt of the Turks for Europe has been Europe's safeguard, for it has sustained their empire. In that contempt all good things are included—respect for law which Europe has forgotten—freedom from faction, which is Europe's pride.

Who has not gazed with amazement, if not with fear, on the expansion of the Colossus of the North? Ignorant and savage, divided and debased, that power threw off simultaneously with Spain the yoke of the Mussulman; where is Spain to-day—where Russia? The Russian knows well the map of Europe and the names of its people, yet they are to him all as one, they are the *schwab* the "dumb." Alas, that they are not so!

Deem not that the progress of Russia is attributable to characters belonging to the Slavonic race. The Pole is of the same race; his state was great and glorious when Russia was as weak as now she is ambitious. The Pole, like the Spaniard, imitated Europe, and in his factions allied himself with this and that neighbour till he had prepared them and Poland for a partition. The weeds of Paris became the flowers of Warsaw, as now they are of Madrid. May the fate that has overtaken the one, serve to avert it from the other.

In England, great and small, wise and simple, consider FOREIGN AFFAIRS not as the affairs of England, but as the affairs of other people. To tell them that

England is intriguing in Spain, conveys no more sense than if they were told that she was intriguing in the moon. Thus is a free scope left to all intrigue, and we have nothing to depend upon save the practical obstacles that rise in our path.

If the Spanish people have these causes of grievances against the people of England or of France, what are the grievances that these have against the Spanish people? May not the French say with justice to the Spanish, we do not know what our government does, diplomacy is a mystery impenetrable to us but not so to you, upon you is the edge, upon us only the after recoil? You feel the blow, and you tell us not—nay, you invite it. Had you not, as for instance in 1834, accepted, nay, clamoured for, intervention, there would have been no diplomatic pottering, no fortifications of Paris, and England and France would have reposed in the security of their united strength.

What a position is not open to the minister in Spain who should take his stand against *all* interference? He would expose himself to no danger, because a foreign power works only on the dissatisfaction of the people, and dissatisfaction spring from this very cause. Spain has no invasion to dread. Such a minister would command the services, wherever useful, of both the foreign governments. What inducements are there not in the ministerial declarations of London and Paris—"I will not interfere unless France does." "I will not interfere unless England does." One condition is however requisite, that of popularity. Party sustains the minister in the Cortes, but neither party nor Cortes will sustain him in Spain. No minister can be popular except one who knows how to govern Spain: and for this he must be a Spaniard. It is not from that class that her ministers and her members of Cortes are chosen. These, like her Hybrids of old, are begotten only upon Spanish mothers, and like them speak a foreign tongue—these Political Economy, those Latin. Try Spaniards in tongue, and dress, and heart, and then you would see how easy what I have spoken would be

to do. Then you would see Spain no longer the dependant of foreign councils, the discussed of their parliaments, or the pitied of their market-places—no longer the victims of stockjobbers, scribblers, milliners; but in her traditions, her manners, her dignity, her equal distribution of wealth, reading a lesson to distracted Europe.

Revolution here comes never from the people, but from the government. Disorders do not spring from the soil, but from the Cortes. Any government would be strong that contented itself with governing, and abstained from legislating.

A Spanish lady, who had been present at a conversation with some Spanish "politicians," remarked after they were gone—"I don't see why we should do for a nation what it would be absurd to do in a family—for nations are only many families. If things went wrong in this house, I should have to put them in order—not to copy what next door had been done for some other purpose. What is good, is good for itself, and I am a fool if I have to borrow it."

It has been said by one of the strangers to whom they applied to construct for them a constitution, that of all species of literary labour, the easiest is legislation. They have gone a step farther, and dispensing with the trouble of compiling, have been content to translate: they have not thought worth while to execute what they translated, and for thirty years have been fighting for a constitution which they have never read.

The constitution of every country is that which is unwritten; for the first enacted laws only mark the incipient aberrations. When these accumulate, come reforms having reference to special wrongs. It is impossible to transfer from one country to another the rectification of an abuse, for the subject matter does not exist, and the primeval unwritten thought cannot be transferred. But it is not to be supposed that the reform had been in its own land applicable, for the people who have endured a wrong must be incapable of rectifying it. A naked man you may clothe, but to introduce a constitution is introducing a costume—you must strip him naked

first, and if he is unwilling you will have the old set of clothes rent and the new trampled under foot. Constitutions cannot be propagated like trees by slips, nor like lettuces by seed. You may make drawings of a machine and construct another like it, but you cannot so fashion men. You may run metal into a mould, but you cannot cast a nation. It would be more wise or less foolish to use the English or the French tongue as a means of rectifying the provincial accent of Catalonia or the Asturias than the laws of either country to improve their condition; it would be as judicious to substitute the language of either country for that of Castile, and as practicable too, as to replace the customs of the one by the constitution of the other. To take our laws, that is, our modern ones, which are the remedies of our evils, and to impose them upon Spain, is the same thing as to take the medicines from the bedside of one patient and pour them down the throat of another, or the infected bandages of a man diseased to strap down a man in health.

The good that is in England and France is in the people,—their knowledge, activity, and enterprise. The government is the source of all our social ills: these we bear up against by our individual qualities, and Spain would copy our government as a means of making up for the want of our industry!

How is it that the rulers have not perceived a truth so evident? Because they are hybrids, foreign bastards—neither Spaniards nor Romans—European Creoles, whom their fathers despise and their mothers cast off. They are changed not at birth indeed, but at nurse. Spain will have foreign nurses, and they bring her home gipsies.

This spell can only be broken when some one man, however humble in station, shall arise, capable of grappling with the intellectual fallacies of Europe. Until then—vast, yet compact, with a people of provinces but of one name and race, liable to invasion with difficulty, open everywhere to receive support, and standing between the two great rival powers of Europe, each of which are alert and ready as one man to fly

to her succour if assailed bodily by the other—she will remain the sport of minions and the plaything of intrigue.

During the last century, while as yet no Spaniard was known by any other designation, than that of his country and his province, the Peninsula was the chief cause of the great European wars. It was then only the ambition of disposing of her crown, or the desire of acquiring her possessions. There was in each of her two neighbours a guilty purpose, but there was as yet no conspiracy to undermine her independence by working upon her broils. Circumstances then altered; the violence of popular commotion having ceased in the one country, and rude trials having matured wisdom in the other, a new system commenced—schemes of conquest were denounced, justice was the policy adopted, freedom the treasure in which they gloried: but, not indifferent in their happiness, they sought to extend to all around the benefits they enjoyed. What is the accomplishment? Who shall know the beginning and believe the end, or seeing the end recollect the beginning?

Then was faction born in Spain: it reached maturity at its birth. They called on either side to their aid, the parental sympathies of the neighbouring states, but Constitutionalist and Absolutist soon became *English* and *French*. Thus has opened for Spain the old prospect under new names: thus again reappears for Europe the old dangers. England and France now join to do for their common gain, that which each would have then regarded as a national loss. For her thrice in three generations has Christendom been wasted with war. On the next signal blast she will no longer be the guiltless victim, but the guilty cause. Her hands will have taken down the buckler from the wall and pulled the spear from the earth. Her hands will have saddled in their stalls the "pale horse of death and the red of destruction," to ride up to the bridle in Spain's best blood. To Rome she gave a sword—for Europe she prepares a torch.

CHAPTER II.

Review of past History.

THE structure of Spain, not a peculiarity of race, has given to events at the remotest periods a consanguineous character. It is an island with the dimensions of a continent—fortresses with pasturage grounds—defiles and rocks and mountains, with arable land for tens of millions of men. As there is nothing like it in the composition of any other portion of the earth, so is it unlike it in its fate and history to the remainder of the human race. Circassia is an inaccessible range, and it may be a barrier of heroic defence; Switzerland, a fortress of rocks, without the substance of a nation, leaving no room for a throne—a centre of contending interests, sustained by the jealousy of neighbours more than by the heights of the Alps.

Spain, surrounded on three sides by the ocean as a ditch, on the fourth by the Pyrenees as a rampart, and not exposed to immediate and constant danger, is armed neither in mind nor in body against invasion; defence by the distribution of the mountains, and the hardihood and local attachment of the inhabitants, commences only after she has apparently been prostrated. She has thus exhibited an unvarying paradox to the eyes of successive generations, being the easiest of nations to be overrun, and the last to be subdued.

Here, then, it is not Iberian, Goth, Saracen, or Spaniard, whose character we have to examine, but it is the influence on man of a certain configuration of country, where mountain and plain are mixed together in sufficient dimensions and extent to present a large mass of human beings, forming a champaign and sea-board kingdom, with the attachments of mountaineers and their defences.

The attachment to their community and their customs stiffened them against the centralisation of power, and made them hold, in an equal degree their enemy, the government

that invaded their franchises, or the foreigner that occupied their soil. They did not however divide apart into clans and cantons: and constituting a general government, there was the form of monarchy and the practice of republicanism.

The strangers thought that influence over the government was influence over Spain, but when they pressed upon its weakness, they only strengthened the unknown Spanish people; therefore have results belied in every case judgment, and triumph over her has been a prelude to defeat. In this anti-national condition of their government, the Spaniards have been deprived in every crisis of the advantage of concerted action, but have regained that of local and individual resolution.

If an enemy presented itself on the shore of Kent, all England would rush thither as to the point of defence: broken there, she would bow the neck. Austria could be subdued at an Austerlitz, and Paris even taken at a Waterloo. Not so in Spain: the enemy is at Pampelona; the Biscayan says "bueno. I shall be ready at Bilboa;" and so on, district after district, mountain after mountain. The Spaniard waited at home, as he did in the days of the Scipios, to defend his house and his fueros, and does not hold them lost by what happens elsewhere, whether the victory of an army or the vote of a Cortes.

This similarity of character, and events at the most remote periods, is rendered so striking by present circumstances, that I may be permitted to revert to Carthage and Rome.

To both Republics Spain then stood as she would now to England and France, were she at the time the peninsula of Hindostan.

It is to be observed, that that war was not an invasion of Spain, but a contest in Spain. We derive our impressions of the event from Roman writers. Had we the annals of Carthage open to us, we should find that alarms for the encroachments of Rome had invested the Carthaginians with the character of *protectors*. This is proved in the very event that completed the subjection of Spain to Carthage, and that occasioned the war between Carthage and Rome.

Spain then furnished to Hannibal means for the invasion of Italy, alike by the occupation of the Roman armies far from home, and by the auxiliaries who aided him at Trebia and Thrasymene; but these would not have availed unless Spain had furnished other and indispensable resources.

We have standing armies defrayed out of the ordinary expenditure of the state; but in ancient times there was neither standing expenditure nor the resource of temporary loans. The nations feebly organised for assault were powerfully organised for defence; disciplined invasion required gold in hand. This gold was furnished to Hannibal by the mines of Spain.

The whole military history of the ancient world is one of metal. It was the treasure of Susa and Ecbatania that rendered illustrious the field of Marathon and the narrows of Thermopylæ. It was the mines of Philippi that brought the subjugation of Greece, and reared the empire of Alexander. It was the treasures of Toulouse that, changing masters, effected the conquest of Gaul; so was it the mines of Barcelona that brought first the passage of the Alps, and then the disaster of Cannæ.

No sooner was Italy, by means of Spain, overrun, than Spain rose against Carthage. In about the same time that it had taken the three chiefs of the house of Hanno to subject her to the Carthaginians, the three Scipios transferred her to Rome. Scarcely had the conquest of Carthage been effected, than the Spaniards, abandoned and betrayed by the only power that could have defended them, rose again to assert her liberty as well as their own, and replied to the Roman pro-consul that their fathers had left them steel to defend, not gold to redeem, their inheritance: Rome, departing from her wont, found gold more useful than steel; and Spain could alone say of Rome, that she dreaded less her arms than her arts. The war commenced with Saguntum, and concluded with Numantia,—one population devoting itself for Rome, the other for Carthage.

On the fall of Carthage, Rome became the world; the

contentions between her factions presented, like the rivalry between independent nations, occasions for the assertion of the liberty of the smaller states. Spain alone judged of these occasions, and acted in these events. Thus in the contest of Marius and Sylla, she reappeared on the field, and during ten years defeated the finest armies and baffled the ablest generals of the republic. She was indeed under a Roman leader, but he, a fugitive, whom she invited and invested with command: her triumph was again the shame of Rome, and Sertorius fell, as Viriathus before him, by the hand of an assassin.

Next came Cæsar and Pompey; again she was in arms on the side of the vanquished, offering asylum in her fastnesses and defenders in her sons, to the beaten faction. After the cause was desperate, and Rome and the East in the hand of the victor, and the corpse of Pompey on the sands of Canusium, she arose to restore the contest for Roman liberty, and Cæsar had to win the world a second time on the plains of Munda, where he avowed he had to fight for life—not victory.

Actium did not close the temple of Janus; in the midst of a prostrate world, an army had to be led into Catalonia and the Asturias; the benign and benevolent Augustus, surpassing the ferocity of his predecessors, suffocated whole populations in those caverns whence was to issue in a future generation the avenging genius of a Pelagius. Agrippa, too, closed his career of victory by that one most dearly purchased, most hardly won, and most mercilessly used, on Celtiberian soil.

What a contrast with Gaul and Britain. The progress of the Roman arms against these nations was gradual and systematic. The fiercer spirits driven backwards held their ground; and into the extremer regions, for centuries, Rome did not penetrate: they took no share in the play of Roman faction; when subject, they followed the fortunes of their leaders, when independent, they equally resisted whatever bore the name of Roman. Spain, in contradistinction to all the races sub-

jugated by Rome, with the exception of Greece, thus exhibited a pliability of genius such as might have been expected in an old and polished state: much as to day, while reputed a stranger to Europe, she has excelled us in branches where least we would have expected to find competitors beyond the circle of our ideas and instruction. She entered with facility the intellectual existence of her victor, rivalled him in all the fields of literary and philosophic excellence, and contributed to the common glory, greatness and refinement, more than her share of poets, rhetoricians, historians, philosophers and princes.* The first stranger admitted to the honours of Rome was a Spaniard; and it is in his family mansion preserved by the ashes of Vesuvius, that the opportunity has been best afforded to us, of estimating the dignity of a Roman patrician.

The periods of the Visigoths and of the Moors, although those which confer upon Spain its historic value and romantic character, do not in respect to our subject afford such salient features as the earlier and more recent periods, save indeed that both found the conquest easy, and the retention difficult; nowhere else were the barbarian occupiers of the Roman provinces expelled—nowhere else have the Saracens been driven back. Under these catastrophes, Spain as usual seemed to recover force and life from those very changes that in ordinary cases cause the fall of empires, and in the midst of those external circumstances which denote the decline of a people.

No sooner had the crowns of the kingdoms of the Peninsula been united and the Moors expelled, than Spain was, as it were, ravished from herself by the union of her crown with the imperial diadem. From that time "this noble country has been the appanage of some foreign family without having been conquered by one of them." This is the period in her

* Quintilian, Columella, Pomponius, Mela, Florus, Lucian, Seneca, Hadrian, Trajan Theodosius the Great &c.

history which, represents the centralized power gathered in from the plains, as opposed to the decentralizing and retentive faculties of her mountains.

Neither under the Austrians nor under their Bourbon successors, did the encroachments of the central government reach to that point that the villager got sight of his enemy; therefore Europe mistook the power of Spain to do injury to others, and her might to defend herself. The indifference of the people was construed "power of the crown." When the most ambitious of mortals—the most daring and cunning of his age, King of Spain and Roman Emperor, held as hopeless captive, the King of France—well might Europe tremble for her liberties, and apprehend that the dream of universal empire was about to become a reality. It was dispelled by no diplomatic combinations or warlike efforts. For its accomplishment it wanted only in the breasts of Spaniards the lusts or the slavery that constitute the character of a conquering people or forms the implements of an ambitious king. The victorious armies of Charles were defeated by the Cortes, which refused supplies for a war which it judged neither necessary nor just.

The successor of Charles, however, found resources independent of the Cortes: though no longer master of Austria, Portugal was added to the Spanish crown with all her commerce: in the religious strifes in which he engaged, he had the faculty of arousing the bigotry of his people. Here, however, the internal rights and local independence of another portion of his dominions were the safeguard of neighbouring states, and the treasure of American as the blood of European Spain were engulfed in the Netherlands. Soon afterwards Catalonia's resistance enabled Portugal to emancipate herself. Nor was it possible even here, in reference to so near a neighbour, to arouse the evil passions of the Spanish people.

And with all these events before us, the present generation neither knows that Spain has rights, or that it has internal

freedom : neither do they know that it is these, and not the fictitious adjustment of the dimensions of states, that are the curb upon ambition, and the foundation of peace.

From groundless fears regarding the ambition of Spain under the first two monarchs of the Austrian line, Europe passed into an equally erring judgment of her decline of the fifth and last. They treated her at the close of the seventeenth century as in the present day they treat Turkey ; they called her a corpse, and they coalesced to ensure the demise by a division of the carcass. England, France, and Austria signed, in anticipation of the death of Charles II in whose person they seemed to consider Spain to exist, the infamous act called the Partition Treaty, and the commencement of such crimes in Europe.

The folly of the design was soon shown to be equal to its iniquity. Spain, thus menaced, accepted a French prince. The treasures of England were squandered,—in vain she poured forth her blood and that of Germany, and the war ended by a Treaty to sanction the settlement which they had taken up arms to prevent. Spain, too, whose maritime power had previously been extinguished, regained strength in her struggle with the mistress of the seas, the benefit whereof was transferred to England's rival—France, and cooperated in wresting from England her North American possessions : it was again placed at the disposal of France during the first short war at the beginning of the French Revolution. The naval power of both was indeed broken by England, and that of Spain utterly extinguished at the battle of Trafalgar. It was for France that this sacrifice was made ; it was on Spain that fell the penalty, and England rejoiced in the injury that she had done her, as being the most effective means of weakening France.

Now again was the judgment of Europe to be exercised ; Spain was again but a corpse : such was the judgment of England on the one side, and of Napoleon on the other. It was a country which he could outrage at his pleasure, whose fortresses he could occupy without a struggle, whose princes

he could kidnap like the negroes of Guinea, on whose throne he could place, as on those of the Europeans, a puppet with a crown. The result was that Napoleon went to Elba.

Between 1690 and 1807 no change had taken place, therefore, in the material condition of Spain, and no improvement in the perceptive faculties of Europe.

CHAPTER III.

Formation of Faction. Constitution of 1812.

UP to the close of the great continental war there had been a total absence of political differences; the opposition to Government had been by province, and then of a practical kind only; there had never been a Revolution. The people had met by a stubborn though isolated resistance every encroachment of the Crown, and had fortunately never been exposed to usurpations by a Parliament. Thus had been preserved less obliterated than elsewhere the footsteps of early freedom. The people were indeed, indolent and ignorant, but there was amongst them contentment and equality, a fair distribution of the goods that they possessed, no depreciation of one class by misery, or elevation of another by pride of station or wealth; sedulous politeness linked together the classes of society, and kept open running the fountain of charity with its twofold blessings.

Madrid was not properly a metropolis. To the foreign families who had slipped into the occupation of the throne this city was as a permanent camp, to which they retired from Spain, and whence they commanded but did not govern it. A vast mass of functionaries were employed in the central government and inhabited Madrid, but Madrid contained no manufactory of laws, and the agents of the Government never took out of the hands of the locally elected magistrates the administration either of province, city, district, or village. Thus did the Government remain distinct from the people, and the people, being admitted to no share in it, preserved at least their character; they remained men of Valencia, Estremadura, of Seville or Saragosa.

This original framework was preserved by a variety of circumstances,—the mighty chains of mountains to which I have referred, the absence of roads and the difficulty of communica-

tion, differences of dialect and of costume, and corresponding animosities ; in fact, the administrative physiognomy was of a remarkably oriental character. While the internal dissensions of the other countries of Europe invited the progress of the French revolutionary arms, or paralysed the resistance to her of the great military Governments, no more effect was produced by the new and exciting doctrines on the Spanish than on the Turkish people. Yet after these Governments had been severally discomfited and collectively reduced, Spain, which was deemed sunk in the darkest night of ignorance and superstition, rose single-handed, and astounded, without enlightening, the Europe she saved. When Spain commenced this enterprise she was without a king, an army, or a navy ; her entire central administration was in the hands of the French, together with her capital, the head of her church, and the chiefs of her nobles : she was deprived of all that visibly constitutes power, and this precisely was her strength. Then reappeared the Spain of Saguntum and Numantia, and, nearer to our times, of Barcelona and Saragosa,—names which will yet be fresh when European Civilisation will have departed to the same place as the Roman sword and the Moorish scimitar.

Between the commencement and the close of the struggle, that is to say, from 1808 to 1815, the country was occupied with very different matters than politics, and under any circumstances the time was too short to allow of any marked change in doctrine or opinions, which are necessarily of slow growth ; and yet shortly afterwards the Peninsula is so transformed that we find it engaged in a Revolution. It is essential to note, since we transfer to this country the notions which we entertain of others, that there never had here been a Revolution, and that it was here the people, and not the Government, who rose to resist the French. We have, therefore, a phenomenon to account for, one wholly unparalleled ; it is rendered the more inexplicable by the fact, that in the short interval between the period when theoretical principles were wholly unknown and that at which a Revolution was accomplished and a Constitution introduced, the people having been engaged

in a desperate war against an enemy who was the patron of so-called liberty, in their minds must have been associated constitution with invasion, despotism with independence: but, in fact, the infection that was repelled by the braced arm and the rigid muscle in the front of the battle, penetrated from behind by the flaccid and ignoble parts.

While the Spanish people were on their rugged sierras, their smiling vegas shrivelled by the breath, and their fair cities levelled by the tread of war, a few black-coated men had assembled in a church, travestied into a theatre, in an alley of a remote city, guarded by the fleets of an Ally. This assemblage, aloof from danger and undistracted by care, was not engaged in procuring supplies, or in furnishing to their struggling countrymen clothing or ammunition,—they were framing a Constitution; in other words, they were passing a decree of annihilation upon the rights, the customs, and corporations of the Peninsula, for its separate kingdoms had their Constitutions and their several Cortes. The crime of the Burgundian and Bourbon despots had amounted to no more than this, that they did not convoke them; the self-appointed Conclave of Cadiz undertook to destroy them.

When the Parliament of London absorbed into itself that of Edinburgh and that of Dublin, not only were separate acts required from the body incorporating and the bodies incorporated, but Treaties also were entered into, and conditions established: the measures propped up by these forms were enacted in the eye of the nations themselves, but they were still held to be invalid by the lawyers of the greatest weight of their respective times, and denounced as suicidal by the patriots of highest name. What would have been said had some Chartist Convocation decreed of their own authority a new law for the three kingdoms, which was to supersede all their laws and to extinguish their three Parliaments by the erection of a new and distinct body? Such was the Constitution of Cadiz, and so absurd was it felt to be, that it fell stillborn.

If this new Constitution had been the wisest ever conceived and the justest ever possessed, no less would this character of

violence attach to it ; but it was at once the most foolish and the most violent of legislative measures ; it was a mere transcript of the dreams of the previous century, which had placed the enemy against whom they were struggling in the hands of a despot, who had practised against Spain the basest of felonies, and had found in the French nation the docile instruments of his malignant will.

In fact, the self-appointed gentlemen who assembled in the church of San Felipe Neri, were doing nothing more or less than preparing to impose on Spain after she should have triumphed the yoke of the enemy she had vanquished,—and worse than the yoke of that enemy, for the French would have respected, even as victors, those local privileges and general rights which the old despotic monarchs of Spain had been unable to subdue.

The king returned and swept away the idle fiction ; but as the Constitution had sprung from one of the European factions, so did he call in the doctrines of the other to counterbalance it. Now no longer content with that despotic authority which had hitherto prevailed, he embodied therewith centralisation and uniformity. The failings in the character of the monarch found neither guidance nor restraint in those who surrounded him, and whose habits had ceased to be Spanish ; and the people who, unlike those of Germany, had neither made conditions in supporting their monarch, nor expected advantages as a consequence of their triumph, were taught to believe that there must be some virtue in the Constitution when they discovered so much vice in those who hated it. Thus in four years was Spain, always indifferent to what passed at Madrid or which had reference to its central Government, thoroughly disgusted at the existing state of things, and prepared to accept with favour any change.

So far, the direct agency of no foreign Government appears, but now the necessary elements for foreign intrigue had been created in the engenderment by imitation of the contrarieties, which in the other countries of Europe have sprung from real causes, and required centuries for their development.

CHAPTER IV.

Revolt of the Isla de Leon.

IN the course of the year 1819, troops had been collected in the arsenal of Cadiz, called Isla de Leon, destined for the re-conquest of the American colonies: they were neither recruits nor regiments, but composed of soldiers drafted from the whole army, with the view of purifying it of restless spirits engendered by the war of Independence and of dangerous opinions evolved by contact with the French. The expedition had been planned no less for the safety of old Spain than for the recovery of the new. But instead of instantly despatching this menacing corps, it was retained in a confined and inattractive cantonment, and lay for many months in an inaction that must have disorganized the best disposed and best officered troops. The principle that had dictated the drafting of the men had also been followed in the selection of the officers. What then was to be expected? In fact, it was of public notoriety that a revolt was preparing, and the views of the government were held to be a mystery solvable only by the supposition that these projects had high support. The General went to Madrid to represent the danger—he was displaced. Two captains of men-of-war reported their vessels which were to transport the troops to America to be unseaworthy—they were deprived of their command. The Government then adopted a measure, the effect of which was too clear not to have been foreseen, that of granting one step in rank to each officer; every incentive to undergo the dangers and the sufferings of a transatlantic campaign in crazy vessels was thus removed. In a word, nothing was left undone to foment discontent and to encourage insurrection; the Conspiracy was perfectly public.

But who within the Government could be suspected? This

matter was under the direct control of the king, and none of his immediate counsellors either belonged to the opposite party or were suspected of treachery. There was, indeed, a second party within the royal one, that of Don Carlos, but *still less* to it than to that of Ferdinand could such designs be attributed. So far the public facts—indubitable and systematic support given by the Government to the Conspiracy, almost, indeed, its Organisation—no clue whatever to the motives or the persons who wielded this sinister influence.

A quarter of a century has effaced the interest connected with this event, but the period is not so extensive as to have engulfed all contemporary evidence. In the hope of finding some clue I repaired to the spot: the first person whom I met was the astronomer of San Fernando, who from his observatory, twenty-five years before, had watched the motions of that tumultuous Camp. To my question respecting the source, his answer was "RUSSIA." I inquired whether he expressed an opinion prevalent at the time: he answered, "Everybody knew that it was her doing; she had great influence at the Court of Ferdinand VII; she openly patronised the Conspiracy; she had here a most intelligent agent, a Pole, and M. Tatetschef himself came down."

It was in the silent streets of San Fernando that these words were uttered: they proceeded from a man grave by his character, distinguished for his acquirements, and who was utterly unconscious of their bearing and their value. Here was no theory that twisted cases; no foresight warning of future peril: it was merely a fact which he recorded, the knowledge of which had led to no conclusions, and which was about to die away in the narrow circle of the village where it had occurred.

It was impossible here to resist the temptation of experimenting upon the cataract on Europe's eye; I therefore objected to Signor Cercera, that Russia was an absolute power and very far away; that she could have nothing to do with Spain, or, having so, could have no hand in Conspiracies. His answer was to the following effect:—

“What you say is no doubt true, but I have only repeated the general belief at the time; if, however, I were to express an opinion of my own, I would say, that although she may be in principle absolutist, she had a hand in the revolt, because she had an interest in the success,—an interest of a pecuniary nature. The vessels in which the expedition was to be embarked consisted of nine sail of the line, belonging to Russia, which had been detained during the war, and on the peace, not being in a state to reach the harbours of the Baltic, she had sold them to the Spanish Government for a good price. If they were not deemed able to reach the Baltic in 1814, there was little chance of their reaching America in 1819, so that if the expedition had sailed, it would certainly have gone to the bottom, and she would have been called on to refund the price of the ships. At all events, this was the way in which at the time we explained her patronage of the revolt.”

Again I ventured to object that the mystery was not solved; that the influence at the Court of Ferdinand, which had enabled her to make that government foment a Conspiracy, must have sufficed a hundredfold to cause the expedition itself to be abandoned. Again my informant was ready with an answer:—

“A few years after the revolt, in reading the message of the American president, after the death of the Emperor Alexander, I discovered that she had another motive; for in that document it is said that Russia had given to the Government of Washington the assurance that she would prevent the sailing of the Spanish expedition, and had given her *guarantee that it should never quit the port of Cadiz.*”

On further objecting, that this furnished no key to the transaction, as this end could equally have been obtained without the Conspiracy, it came to my turn to be questioned; and when I pointed out the chain and sequence of events, which all hung upon d'Isla de Leon, viz. the Constitution of Spain, the spreading the flame of political discord

so the inflammable materials prepared in other parts of Europe, whence the convulsions of Italy; the imposition by the Northern powers of an armed Intervention by France, the reaction in Spain, the monarchical reaction in France, leading to a democratic one; and these being steps only in a progress of exhaustless patience and matchless enterprise towards the dominion of a desolated world; when, I say, I offered this as the explanation, there was nothing therein either visionary or startling to a man who knew of his own knowledge that the Proclamation in Isla de Leon of the Cadiz Constitution of 1812 had been the work of that Government which had instituted the "Holy Alliance."

It was by a word dropped on the subject of this Revolt at the opposite extremity of Europe that I was first attracted towards those subjects, and, indeed, I may say at once initiated into their mysteries. I had arrived from Greece, at Constantinople, just in time to be present at a fête given to commemorate the Peace of Adrianople. I was much surprised to find myself the object of the sedulous attention of a Russian diplomatist who had recently been on a mission to Greece. He took the trouble to indoctrinate me: the Greeks, he informed me, had from a horde of pirates been humanised by the magic genius of a single man who was now the idol of their affections, at once their Lycurgus and their Mahomet.* Astonishment deprived me of speech, and I sat listening in amazement. I had seen so far already as to know that the conduct of England and France in Greece had been atrocious and perfidious, and I looked to Russia as the only hope for that country, as she might be inclined towards them on the score of religion, and her agents could not be so stupid as those of her allies. When the Russian had done with me, in my perplexity I asked one of the Prussian secretaries of Legation the meaning of the words I had heard, and inquired if Russia

* This was in reference to Capo d'Istrias,—a man universally abhorred and ultimately assassinated, and whom England had forced upon the Greeks.

could really have some object in injuring Greece. He smiled, and said, "Did you ever hear of Isla de Leon?" I answered, "No." "You know, at least," he replied, "that Spain is always in trouble. Her trouble commenced with that Revolt. *That was Russia's work*, and such is her work everywhere."

Distance is nothing to systems that work by the spirit, and Russia's victories have been gained more by wheels than gunpowder, by courtiers than armies,—the deep no less than the land furnishes her a path. The viewless messages which thus reach Europe's bounds span the Atlantic; and the Colonies lost to Spain, and which she was bargaining with the United States that Spain should not retake, were on the very point, had it not been for the resistance of Canning, to render her the centre of a European Combination for their reconquest, and of an American Confederacy for their defence. The barbarians who have heretofore subdued Europe presented a physical object; also they had virtues and introduced laws. This Invasion is one which the eye cannot see, nor the hand resist; it is not the march of armies, but the spread of infection. The Vandals, to kill the living by the dead, slaughtered their prisoners around the cities they besieged; so Russia has found the secret of infecting Europe with its own corruption. Preserving intact the spirit of barbarism, she culls from Europe its sciences of philosophy and destruction.

Gibbon concludes his observations on the fall of the Roman empire of the West with these memorable words of unparalleled infatuation:—

"Cannon and fortification now form an impregnable barrier, and Europe is secure from any future eruption of barbarians, since before they can conquer they must cease to be barbarous. Then gradual advancement in the science of war would always be accompanied, as we may learn from the example of Russia, with a proportion of improvement in the *arts of peace and civil policy*! they themselves must deserve a name amongst

the polished nations they subdue. We may therefore acquiesce in the pleasant conclusion, that every age of the world has increased and still increases the real worth, the happiness, and the knowledge of the human race."

Four short years had thus sufficed to plant in Spain the fulcrum of Faction, hitherto unknown; the levers were to be worked from afar, by what process it will be now our task to trace,—with what effect, future generations alone can tell.

CHAPTER V.

*Position of France in 1822.—Invasion of
Piedmont and Naples.*

To speak in 1822 of a Spanish war was to recall the previous one, in which above half a million of Frenchmen had perished. The object proposed in so perilous an enterprise was not a disputed succession: it was to obtain redress for no injuries, there was no French interest involved; it was *to change institutions, in an inverse sense to those of France.* It presented, then, insuperable difficulties, and involved the reappearance of the armies of England in the Peninsula. Wellington survived, Napoleon was gone, and but seven years had elapsed since the Allies had, for the second time, entered Paris, having the first time marched thither from the Pyrenees. No enterprise could present itself under features more forbidding to the French nation.

The king was not in favour of the plan; the President of the Council was most adverse to it; the royalist minority deemed it insane; the Constitutionalist majority held it an attack upon themselves. No men of genius supported, by their private judgment or senatorial eloquence, the unpopular measure. At this hour, when all secrets have been laid bare, we can scarcely discover a known name not hostile, save those of M. de Montmorency and M. de Chateaubriand: of these the first was the minister of foreign affairs, the latter the ambassador in London. M. de Montmorency fell a sacrifice to his ardour in this cause, even before the Congress of Verona had terminated its sittings, and M. de Chateaubriand had been backed by England, as the opponent of "extreme measures."

Astounding as such a statement may be, the proofs of its accuracy lie within the reach of any diligent man. There are the columns of the 'Moniteur,' the official documents, and the published *exculpation* of M. de Chateaubriand.

The event has proved that these apprehensions of Spanish resistance were unfounded; may not, therefore, the promoters of the war have calculated with greater accuracy the chances than the public? We have their most secret communications before us: from these I extract the leading points, as given by the author of the Invasion.

He considered the people of Spain intractable, not attached to "legitimate principles more than to constitutional;" he held the whole case "to reside in the character of the king;" he was the political disease of Spain; he was "false, imbecile, and treacherous;" the people of Spain were vindictive, and the restoration of the absolute king would be the signal of every excess to which "they were entitled by their traditional habits of arrogance." He held the Invasion to be most dangerous, and to place the French armies entirely at the mercy of England: he looked on failure as "the fall of the Bourbons in France," and the beginning of a convulsion "more dangerous than that of 1793." Had he looked to prompt and easy success, had he come with a scheme of government to introduce, he might have been set down as fit for a place in St. Luke's; but he had no such hope or plan. How shall we describe him if not in his own words, "It is not he that is fabulous, but the age?" Let us now consider the dispositions of foreign Powers.

France was then humbled. She was admitted to no Conclaves: she had just escaped from a project of further partition projected by England: she was hated by the despotic Powers for her supposed liberalism, and by the Constitutionals for her entrance into the "Holy Alliance." She was then linked by no *entente cordiale* with England, but looked upon her neighbour as engaged in a national policy to humble and weaken her. The Spanish Constitution was considered England's work: an eventual occupation of Spain was therefore, justly to be considered "a possible war with England." Canning was minister.

As to the Continental Powers, and especially the Holy Alliance, it may be supposed that they were not only favour-

able but so ardent in the matter, as to make common cause with her when repeating across the Pyrenees the recent expeditions of Austria across the Alps. The cases, however, were widely different.

In these Interventions, Austria acted in the pursuit of a definite policy on a field abandoned to her at the Congress of Vienna; there was no danger of a war thence arising between her and England. Prussia did not apprehend that she would extend her power, or change in a dangerous manner her own character, but knew full well that she would be only weakened. France alone could have taken umbrage at Austrian Intervention in Italy; it was against her that the blow was aimed, and she was prostrate. The Holy Alliance had, moreover, denounced these Revolutions from the beginning. No danger for the person of the king could arise from the hostile operation.

The Invasion of Spain by France presents the counterpart in all respects of this picture; there the Revolution had been recognised, the powers had their ambassadors at Madrid—the Russian ambassador, who was also a Spanish general (Pozzo di Borgo), had taken part in the appointment of the ministry. The Invasion was considered not an easy suppression of doctrines, but as a great war with incalculable consequences. Austria and Russia reduced the question to this dilemma, “either France will be victorious, or she will be beaten:” in the first case she will regain her preponderance—in the second Revolution its strength.

Where then was the support of the promoters of the project against their King, their Colleagues, the Chamber, the Charter, the Parties, in a word—France? Let us open the “Congress of Verona”—I mean the volume.

CHAPTER VI.

Congress of Verona.

THE Conference at Verona was attended, not like that of Laybach, by the members of the Holy Alliance only, but also by the Representatives of other States and of England, who had protested against such meetings, declaring that she "never contemplated that the alliance of the great Powers was to be converted into a conclave for the government of independent states." The Conference ended without any decision: no joint declaration of principles was published, and no concerted action of any description resolved on.

There were five major points discussed, which I place according to their order of discussion and supposed importance:

1st. The Slave Trade.

2d. Suppression of piracy in America and the Spanish Colonies.

3d. The differences between Russia and the Porte.

4th. The affairs of Italy.

5th. The Revolution in Spain.

These subjects were treated severally by the Powers directly interested. The smaller States were excluded from the discussion on the affairs of the Porte, and France, though not excluded, was allowed no consultative voice; from those of Italy, she was *entirely excluded*. Those on which she was called to treat were the Slave Trade, the Spanish Colonies, and Spain. The first two were introduced by the English Government; the rôle of France was limited to declining to accede to the English proposals. France herself introduced Spain in the form of a question as to how far the Powers would lend to her their sanction or co-operation in eventual circumstances, such as, for instance, a declaration of war by Spain.

The French Commissioners had however been enjoined by their instructions "*to avoid presenting themselves to the Congress as reporting on Spanish affairs,*" because, says the President of the Council, "*should Spain declare war against us, we do not require succours, and we could not even admit of them, if the result were to be the passage of foreign troops across our territory.*" He proceeds to show the impossibility of conquering Spain, or of maintaining there an army of occupation.

These instructions were framed to meet and counteract supposed warlike dispositions on the part of the Congress, which might place France in the alternative of defending the Spanish Revolution against Europe, or of attacking it on behalf of Europe.

The French Plenipotentiary, in the teeth of these specific orders, did, as we have seen, make himself the reporter on Spanish affairs, and, in so doing, applied the words of M. Villele, in reference to a defensive war against Spain to an Intervention in Spain, and so identified the proposed measure with those operations against Piedmont and Naples, which the President of the Council had energetically repudiated. In his communication to the Congress of the 20th October, he says:—

"Besides, the Spanish Government may suddenly determine upon a formal aggression. France must therefore foresee as possible, and perhaps even as probable, a war with Spain. By the nature of things, and in the sentiments of moderation by which she seeks to regulate her conduct, she must *consider this war as strictly defensive*. Full of confidence in the justice of the cause she will have to defend, and honouring herself with having to *preserve Europe from the revolutionary scourge, &c.*" He then proceeds to indicate a middle course as possible between war and peace,—that of breaking off diplomatic intercourse; and his proposal is, that the other Courts shall also withdraw their Representatives. This step, not in his instructions, was that best calculated to exasperate Spain, and to identify France with the Holy Alliance. He himself contemplates this result. "This measure, which

would have so much the more effect as it would be consummated by a perfect concord between the high powers, might bring grave consequences. It would probably exasperate the men who at present govern Spain, but they alone would have to incur the responsibility." He then proceeds to put three questions :

1st. If the Allies will break diplomatically with Spain *when France does ?*

2d. In case of war, what moral support could be lent to France ?

3d. What material succours could be afforded in case *she demanded it ?*"

Thus introduced, the Conference examined the cases of war, as follows :

1st. That of an attack on the French territory.

2d. The dethronement of the king, or legal proceedings against his person or his family.

3d. A formal act of the Spanish Government to change the legitimate succession.

Here were added two new cases not contemplated in the French instructions, and upon the whole collectively the French Plenipotentiary demanded a decision. Prussia and Austria answered, "that if the conduct (the subsequent conduct) of the Spanish Government in respect to France or her ambassador at Madrid was such as to *force the latter* to break off diplomatic connection," they would then do the same. "That if, *in despite of the care* the French Government takes to prevent a war with Spain, that war came to break out" (by Spain's act), they would yield to her their moral support. "That if the events or the *consequences* of a war made France feel the necessity for more active succour, they would consent to that kind of succour in so far as the necessities of their position might leave them the faculty of so doing."

England protested against the whole proceeding, and declared that the interference of foreign Powers was in every case calculated to exasperate and not to allay faction ;

that this sentiment was stronger in Spain than in any other country, and that the very existence of such communications tended to put in danger those august persons for whose security they were undertaken.

"Russia alone," says M. de Chateaubriand, "answered energetically, YES, to all the proposals of France. She is ready to withdraw her ambassador—she is ready to give to France, in every case, every moral and *material* support without restriction and without condition."

Proposals of France! They were at the time *unknown* to the French Cabinet. The proposals assented to by Russia were her own. But let us hear her view of the case:—

"Anarchy reduced to principle, and power become the price of insolence to the throne and to religion—disorder delivering up to a destructive scourge entire populations—the almost consummated loss of the rich possessions in the new world—the public fortune dissipated—the most subversive doctrines openly preached: some faithful subjects array themselves for the defence of their Sovereign, and this Sovereign forced to proscribe them. Abroad, the sad spectacle which is presented in the countries which the *artizans of the troubles of Europe* had destined to be the prey of Revolution. Last year, the two Sicilies on fire, and the Allied Powers constrained to place there legitimate power under the edges of their arms, Piedmont convulsed, and endeavouring to propagate revolt in the north of Italy, and provoking the same Intervention and the same assistance. Assuredly it is impossible that such a state of things should not excite the regrets and the inquiries of *all the European powers*."

"This frank note," says the French Plenipotentiary, the historian of the Congress, "dissipated all fears relative to the war with Spain." The *fears* of the French Government were lest the war should be rendered inevitable—those of the French Plenipotentiary lest it should not be made.

The next step was to propose the withdrawal from Madrid of the Representatives of the other powers *before* that of France. This was to be a *concerted measure*, taken by the Allies

who had promised only to support and follow France when attacked. This carried, it is next proposed to send *separate* Notes justifying the rupture. As France was not yet to come to her rupture, the composition of these Notes was for Austria and Prussia a rather difficult enterprise: the first harps on Piedmont, the second is full of apprehension for war.* Russia, however, hits the blot, and buries the weapon to the hilt.

“France has seen herself compelled to confide to an army the care of her frontier, and perhaps she will have equally to confide to it the care of causing provocations to cease of which she is the object.”

Those whose judgments await results may conceive that the cautious and guarded terms of the early communications of Austria and Prussia were a disguise, and that their real dispositions were revealed in their subsequent acts. How, indeed, could it be possible that in the course of a few days they should be changed, on the most important affair of Europe, from one settled course to another exactly the reverse? But what portion of this statement is not liable to the same objection? What, for instance, more incomprehensible than that the French Minister should have been opposed to the war, and have forbidden his agents to make any report on the affairs of Spain? Those who allege such improprieties, know not the magic of the human mind, nor the sorcery of the powerful spirit over the weak. Russia had at Verona the kings and statesmen of Europe brought within her reach, and placed in the very palm of her hand. The balls being together on the table, she could make the points off them, and win the game without dropping the cue.

She proposed from France to the Conference what the French

* “C'est elle qui, par la contagion de ses principes et de ses exemples, et par les intrigues de ses principaux artisans, a créé les révolutions de Naples et du Piémont.”—*Austrian note*.

“L'effet inévitable de tant de désordres se fait surtout sentir dans l'altération des rapports entre l'Espagne et la France. L'irritation qui en résulte est de nature à donner les plus fortes alarmes pour la paix entre les deux royaumes.”—*Prussian note*.

Government never projected ; she induced the Conference to reply to the proposal so as to bring consequences which they never anticipated. Associating herself to their action, she interpreted their act in words which, not daring to repudiate them, they had to accept as their own. She misled Austria and Prussia as to the disposition of the French Ministry through the treachery of its agent, and represented to the French Ministry their extorted consent as a coercion !

The tardy protestation of England, which at the commencement would have nipped the system in its bud, came then but to vex and exasperate M. de Villele, and to furnish Russia with the occasion of launching at England an insolent defiance in the name of the "Continental Alliance."

All this may be gathered from the published documents but beyond these, we are in possession of still more surprising materials.

To what a pass has diplomatic secrecy reduced the human race and understanding, when the phrases of an intriguer couched on a sheet of paper can inflict on the world tortures and desolation, such as in former times would have required the irruption of savage hordes, or the rare and terrible phenomenon of a conquering genius. The following passage bears its own comment :—

"In order to render intelligible the different parts of the Congress of Verona, it is now necessary that I should give an account of my private correspondence with M. Villele. It will be seen that the Verona correspondent (himself), by a natural connivance with his own desires, exaggerates the desire of the sovereigns for the war, with the exception, as we have already said, of the Emperor of Russia. I* sought to fix the determination of the President of the Council, for his ideas were less fixed than mine, upon an enterprise with which I associated the safety and honour of France. I was not Minister of Foreign Affairs, and there was not the least appearance that I should soon be called to exercise the functions so worthily

* M. de Chateaubriand always uses the word *soe*.

SPAIN.

filled by the Duke de Montmorency. But I flattered myself that if I could get my plan adopted by M. Villele, that, on my return to London, I should be able to contribute to render the execution of it more easy, by standing so well with George IV and with Mr. Canning."

The reader may be curious to see some fragments of this correspondence.

"Verona, 31st Oct.—The despatch of M. de Montmorency will carry you to-day nearly the conclusion of the Spanish affairs in *the sense of your instructions*. To-night we have a Conference to consider the means of making known to Europe the dispositions of the alliance. Russia is well disposed towards us (*La Russie est aimable pour nous*). Austria serves us in this question, although she be for the rest all English. Prussia follows Austria. *The desires of the Powers are strongly in favour of a war with Spain*. It is for you, *my dear friend*, to see if you ought not to seize this occasion, perhaps unique, of replacing France in the rank of military powers—of *re-accrediting the white cockade* in a short war, almost without danger, and towards which the opinion of the royalists and the army strongly pushes you. All Continental Europe will be for you, and England, if she take offence, will not even have time to lay hold of a colony. As to the chambers—*success covers everything*. To destroy a focus of Jacobinism, to establish a Bourbon upon the throne, by the hands of a Bourbon, are results to overbalance all secondary considerations; and, after all, how are we to get out of our present position? Are we eternally to keep an army of observation at the foot of the Pyrenees? Can we, without exposing ourselves to the hisses and contempt of all parties, send back our soldiers some morning to their garrisons."

"20th November.—Do not believe, my dear friend, that in speaking of the 'advantages of this war,' I do not feel the serious consequences it might bring. England softens herself, and appears at this moment less opposed to the interests of *Continental Europe*, but if our fleets were long in activity, and if *Russian soldiers were put in motion*, the double jealousy

of our insular neighbours might be re-awakened. You are therefore quite right not to precipitate yourself blindfold into hostilities of which it is necessary to calculate all the chances, &c.

“ I must tell you, my dear friend, a thing which, however, will not pain you. You are accused here to *the man who does all* (or rather the man to whom everything that is done is attributed) of extreme moderation. I have been enveloped as your friend in this charge. I have been therefore treated coldly, because I was suspected of wishing to look twice before precipitating my country into the chances of a war that might become European; and then it happens that I alone have remained Constitutional, when no one will hear of Constitution. What is to be done? Take all this in patience and in pity; however, after the departure of M. de Montmorency, I will play a nobler part.

“ I perceive already the symptoms of favour to come; above all, will I succeed if you write to me, and if it is known that I am *your man*, for whilst finding some fault with your prudence there is the highest idea of your capacity. *Au reste*, I must tell you in this long letter, that I write with a flowing pen, that Austria and Prussia are by no means ardent for the war, and *if you should be so disposed, it would be very easy to cause obstacles to be started* on the part of the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin.

“ **POSTSCRIPT.**—*Whatever be the resolution of the Council of the Tuileries, the other Cabinets seem determined to send their Notes and withdraw their Agents from Spain.*”

“ Verona, 28th November.—We are, it appears to me, in a most difficult position; whatever we do here is pleasing to no one. France acts by constraint (*a la main forcée*); Russia is dissatisfied because we do not go far enough; Austria has moved only that she might not come to a rupture with Russia; Prussia trembles at the least disturbance; and England opposes everything. Whilst we fancied we had succeeded in doing something at Verona, the real business was managed elsewhere. We see now the cause of the

violent notes of the Duke of Wellington. * * * It is therefore not a simple war with Spain, but a possible one with England."

Now let us turn to M. Villele: on the same day, but in answer to the *previous* Postscript he writes:—

"28th November.—I see that it is upon us that will roll the whole weight of the determination with respect to Spain. I have no objection if they give us both the balls; but if it is only one we are to have, I am not to be seduced by the appearance of so much honour. *The whole matter rests on the Notes of Russia, Prussia, and Austria.* If their contents are of a nature to bring a rupture, it is clear that we shall be immediately in war, or in a state so like it as not in reality to have any choice to make.

"At the end of the year I shall have twenty-five millions in hand, all expenses paid—Why should these unhappy external affairs come to trouble such prosperity?"

The measures of England having irritated M. Villele, he writes, on the 5th of December, a most important letter, in which he expatiates on the needlessness of the course in which they were engaged, gives expression to his suspicion that they were played upon, and of his fears of the ultimate triumph of the extreme party in Spain, in France, and throughout Europe. He recoils, however, from any measure which would wear the appearance of concurrence with England, but is terrified at the idea of separating from the Allies.* He therefore implores the French Plenipotentiaries to obtain from the Allies that their Ambassadors should not be withdrawn from Madrid, and that the ultimate decision should be remitted to a Conference at Paris. He concludes his earnest and supplicatory letter in these terms:—

"May it please God, for my country's sake and for Europe's, to cause them to desist from a resolution which,

* On the one side, it would be frightful (*affreux*) for us, and we could not resolve upon such a step, to separate ourselves from the Emperor of Russia,—to imitate whom? the only power whom we have reason to mistrust,—England.

with profound conviction, I announce beforehand as about to compromise the safety of France herself."

To the opinion of this statesman I must add a passage concurrently written by Mr. Canning:—

"Leave the Spanish Revolution to burn itself out within its own crater. You have nothing to apprehend from the eruption if you do not open a channel for the lava through the Pyrenees."

M. de Chateaubriand answers from Verona on the night of the 20th December:—

"As soon as I received your letter of the 5th, I had with Prince Metternich this morning a conversation of the last importance. The Emperor of Russia has also granted me an audience, and this generous Prince spoke to me for more than an hour with an interest for the King and for France truly admirable. In two words, the three Powers will not withdraw their notes and will despatch them to Madrid, granting us, however, a few days to act with them if we be so disposed."

Here ends the Congress of Verona.

"It results from this correspondence," says M. de Chateaubriand, "that M. Villele and I had each of us a fixed idea: I wanted the war, he wanted peace; and I attributed to all the Allies the sentiments of Alexander, and told the President of the Council that the strongly pronounced wish of all was for the war. M. de Montmorency was also for the war, but he had altogether another object, and his opinions were openly expressed. I clothed my determination under doubts, and feared that in revealing too much, I should spoil all."

It is here necessary to remark that M. de Chateaubriand did not share in the more enlightened opinion of the present day in respect to Russia, and held her to be neither stupid nor weak. In a work in which he avows his entire devotion to her chief, he admits her to be most subtle, powerful, and ambitious; he speaks of the Emperor as "the Potentate to whom Napoleon had bequeathed Europe." His avowed purpose is to restore the military power of France, to make her "a

useful ally to Russia" in the accomplishment of that prophecy. He and his colleague received each, as compensation for the ingratitude of their country, a pension from the Emperor of 25,000 francs. But M. de Chateaubriand was a religious man, and had published on "The Genius of Christianity."

I cannot resist the temptation of inserting a letter of Mr. Canning to M. de Chateaubriand, written after the matter was decided, and to the last person in the world on whom it was worth while to expend paper and ink. It is curious to observe how completely the man of genius, destitute of the sense of *action*, and conversant only with ideas and words, is at the mercy of the intriguer.

"London, January 21st, 1823.

"I think these changes unfortunate, but still I do not despair *if you continue to be for peace, and if your just estimate of the dangers of war to France does not yield to your belief of its facilities, and your anticipation of its glories; but I own some of your topics alarm me more than your reasonings tranquillise me upon that point.*

"When I speak of the dangers of war to France, do not suppose that I undervalue her resources or power. She is as brave and as strong as ever she was before. She is now the richest, the most abounding in disposable means, of all the states of Europe. Here are all the sinews of war, if there be the disposition to employ them. You have a million of soldiers, you say, at your call. I doubt it not; and it is double the number, or thereabout, that Napoleon buried in Spain. You consider a "premier succès au moins" as certain. I dispute it not. I grant you a French army at Madrid. But I venture to ask, what then? If the King of Spain and the Cortes are by that time where they infallibly

will be, in the 'Isla de Leon,' I see plenty of war if you once get into it, but I do not see a legitimate beginning to it; nor an intelligible object. You would disclaim to get into such a war by the side-door of an incidental military incursion; you would enter in front with the cause of war blazoned on your banner. And what is that cause? Is it to be learned from the notes and despatches of four Continental Powers? or from M. de Villele's only? Is it vengeance for the past, or security for the future? You disclaim the former, no doubt, but how is the latter to be obtained by war? I understand a war of conquest; I understand a war of succession,—a war for the change (on the one hand), or the conservation (on the other) of a peculiar dynasty. But a war for the modification of a political Constitution, a war for the two Chambers, and for the extension of the regal prerogative—a war for such objects as these I really do not understand, nor do I conceive how the operations of it are to be directed to such an end. You would not propagate *La Charte* as Mahomed did the *Alkoran*, or as in the earliest part of your Revolution France did the Rights of Man. Consider, is there not some forbearance on the part of Spain in not throwing these things in your teeth? Might she not, when informed that her change of Constitution had not been bloodless, desire that it should be compared with 1789 and 1792-3? Might she not, when accused by Russia of a forcible change of government, remind the Emperor Alexander of the events which preceded his own accession, and the treaty of Tilsit which made over Spain to Buonaparte? Might she not speak to Prussia of promises of free Institutions made by a King, and violated? Might she not accept Prince Metternich's appeal to the former union of Spain and Austria, and turning to us (if we took part in the lecture) say that she was ready, like England in 1688, to preserve her laws and liberties by a small change in the reigning dynasty, and to place an Austrian Prince with enlarged powers upon her throne? Surely the discussions with which

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own flag will alone wave over your cities;—the provinces that my soldiers shall traverse, will be administered in the name of Ferdinand, by Spanish authorities:—we do not pretend to impose upon you laws, we only desire to restore to you order.”

Three days before the date of the Duke’s Proclamation, another had appeared, also issuing from the French territory; it contained these words:—

“Spaniards, to you belong the glory of exterminating the Revolutionary Hydra.

“The Provisional Junta of Government declares that sovereignty resides entirely in the King, and emanates from him.

“Spaniards, your Government declares that it does not recognise, and holds as null, all the public and administration acts, as well as the measures of a Government established by Rebellion, and that consequently it *temporarily* re-establishes things in the state in which they were previous to the 7th March, 1820.”

The place from which it was dated, and the concurrent transmission of the two Proclamations, prove the connivance. At a subsequent period the French Government attempted to exculpate itself by its inability to restrain the Party it had placed in power, without exposing its troops to the fury of a reaction. But of what further violence could it be guilty? The proclamation of the Duke was not his voluntary act, nor one to which he had assented,—it was sent to him only at the moment that it was to be published, and with pressing orders that the publication should not be delayed an hour.*

* “The Duc d’Angoulême found at Toulouse the members of the ex-regency of Urgel. He received them very coldly, and only as private persons. He showed attention only to the Baron d’Eroles, but whether it was that his opinions had undergone a change, or that he had been overreached by some intrigue, it is certain that, in direct contradiction with his moderate ideas, a provisional junta made its appearance on the 6th of April at Bayonne, composed of Eguia, Erol, and Gomez Calderon, and which, without waiting to know whence its power came to it, or who it represented, com-

The only course was the appointment of the Duc D'Angoulême as Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, until the close of the expedition. The political circumstances of the country rendered this imperative, and it presented no administrative difficulty even of detail, the municipal bodies having there the entire management, and standing distinct from the Cortes and their system. Whilst the issue remained uncertain, there was absolutely nothing for a general government legitimately to do.

Two savage factions stood in face of each other: *how* could France restore order if not by standing as a moderator between them? To announce that her armies *shall* advance as stalking horses, for the vengeance of a proscribed minority, was a device to accumulate obstacles in their van, to surround the march with dangers, and to mark their track with the desolation of a civil war. To tell the one party that the door of vengeance was open, was to shut against the other the hope of reconciliation, and to bring upon the army a fate similar to that with which it threatened Spain. Had the design been executed in the spirit in which it was planned, 100,000 Frenchmen would have marched to their graves; Spain would have been a chaos of convulsion, of which the counterpart would soon have appeared in France herself; and the Russian troops, which, as we learn from M. de Chateaubriand, were to be put in motion, would have found their concerted destination.

However, the Spaniards are not a reading people, and they had made up their minds upon the matter in a manner which Shakspeare has anticipated in the words, "A plague on both your houses." The Duc d'Angoulême was hailed as a liberator; the French troops were everywhere received with

menced from that day by declaring null every act since the 7th of March, 1820; and that declaration, although calculated seriously to injure the cause of restoration, and to produce the worst effects in France, was not the less sanctioned by the proclamation of the Prince-Generalissimo at Oyarzun on the 9th of April."—*Mar. de Miraflores.*

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* “The Duc d'Angoulême found at Toulouse the members of the ex-regency of Urgel. He received them very coldly, and only as private persons. He showed attention only to the Baron d'Eroles, but whether it was that his opinions had undergone a change, or that he had been overreached by some intrigue, it is certain that in direct contradiction with his moderate ideas, a provisional junta made its appearance on the 6th of Eguia, Erol, and Gomez Caldera know whence its power came.

The only course was the appointment of the Duc D'Angoulême as Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, until the close of the expedition. The political circumstances of the country rendered this imperative, and it presented no administrative difficulty even of detail, the municipal bodies having there the entire management, and standing distinct from the Cortes and their system. Whilst the issue remained uncertain, there was absolutely nothing for a general government legitimately to do.

Two savage factions stood in face of each other: *how* could France restore order if not by standing as a moderator between them? To announce that her armies *shall* advance as stalking horses, for the vengeance of a proscribed minority, was a device to accumulate obstacles in their van, to surround the march with dangers, and to mark their track with the desolation of a civil war. To tell the one party that the door of vengeance was open, was to shut against the other the hope of reconciliation, and to bring upon the army a fate similar to that with which it threatened Spain. Had the design been executed in the spirit in which it was planned, 100,000 Frenchmen would have marched to their graves; Spain would have been a chaos of convulsion, of which the counterpart would soon have appeared in France herself; and the Russian troops, which, as we learn from M. de Chateaubriand, were to be put in motion, would have found their concerted destination.

However, the Spaniards are not a reading people, and they had made up their minds upon the matter in a manner which Shakspeare has anticipated in the words, "**A plague** both your houses." The Duc d'Angoulême was hailed as a liberator; the French troops were everywhere received

menaced from that day by declaring null every act since the 20th of May 1808; and that declaration, although calculated to produce the same effect as the proclamation at the time of the invasion, but

useful ally to Russia" in the accomplishment of that prophecy. He and his colleague received each, as compensation for the ingratitude of their country, a pension from the Emperor of 25,000 francs. But M. de Chateaubriand was a religious man, and had published on "The Genius of Christianity."

I cannot resist the temptation of inserting a letter of Mr. Canning to M. de Chateaubriand, written after the matter was decided, and to the last person in the world on whom it was worth while to expend paper and ink. It is curious to observe how completely the man of genius, destitute of the sense of *action*, and conversant only with ideas and words, is at the mercy of the intriguer.

"London, January 21st, 1823.

"I think these changes unfortunate, but still I do not despair *if you continue to be for peace, and if your just estimate of the dangers of war to France does not yield to your belief of its facilities, and your anticipation of its glories*; but I own some of your topics alarm me more than your reasonings tranquillise me upon that point.

"When I speak of the dangers of war to France, do not suppose that I undervalue her resources or power. She is as brave and as strong as ever she was before. She is now the richest, the most abounding in disposable means, of all the states of Europe. Here are all the sinews of war, if there be the disposition to employ them. You have a million of soldiers, you say, at your call. I doubt it not; and it is double the number, or thereabout, that Napoleon buried in Spain. You consider a "premier succès au moins" as certain. I dispute it not. I grant you a French army at Madrid. But I venture to ask, what then? If the King of Spain and the Cortes are by that time where they infallibly

will be, in the 'Isla de Leon,' I see plenty of war if you once get into it, but I do not see a legitimate beginning to it; nor an intelligible object. You would disclaim to get into such a war by the side-door of an incidental military incursion; you would enter in front with the cause of war blazoned on your banner. And what is that cause? Is it to be learned from the notes and despatches of four Continental Powers? or from M. de Villele's only? Is it vengeance for the past, or security for the future? You disclaim the former, no doubt, but how is the latter to be obtained by war? I understand a war of conquest; I understand a war of succession,—a war for the change (on the one hand), or the conservation (on the other) of a peculiar dynasty. But a war for the modification of a political Constitution, a war for the two Chambers, and for the extension of the regal prerogative—a war for such objects as these I really do not understand, nor do I conceive how the operations of it are to be directed to such an end. You would not propagate *La Charte* as Mahomed did the *Alkoran*, or as in the earliest part of your Revolution France did the Rights of Man. Consider, is there not some forbearance on the part of Spain in not throwing these things in your teeth? Might she not, when informed that her change of Constitution had not been bloodless, desire that it should be compared with 1789 and 1792-3? Might she not, when accused by Russia of a forcible change of government, remind the Emperor Alexander of the events which preceded his own accession, and the treaty of Tilsit which made over Spain to Buonaparte? Might she not speak to Prussia of promises of free Institutions made by a King, and violated? Might she not accept Prince Metternich's appeal to the former union of Spain and Austria, and turning to us (if we took part in the lecture) say that she was ready, like England in 1688, to preserve her laws and liberties by a small change in the reigning dynasty, and to place an Austrian Prince with enlarged powers upon her throne? Surely the discussions with which

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imprisoned and *massacred by the orders of the Regency*. You have not seen the reports of the cruelties of Merino and the other royalist chiefs, and, consequently, you have not been in a state to judge of the effect."

Can it be believed that the sentence immediately following is this: "*Une seule ordonnance a tout gaté?*"

The *only act* of the Prince was that Proclamation: it was directed against the *only danger* that France had to fear—the *only business* in which the Regency was engaged.

I subjoin a Spanish statement of the case, from the introduction to the Marquis of Miraflore's valuable collection of State Papers:—

"In six short weeks this change has been effected, so powerful were the means and so instant the agents, the Duc d'Angoulême having, in the mean time, remained a passive spectator, restrained by that same occult influence which had already not only coerced his judgment, but compromised him in its own measures. His patience was at last exhausted, and he fulminated against the regency, on the 8th August, the Decree of Andujar. On this a howl arose from the clubs and journalists of Madrid, and, far more important, a whisper came to him from Paris. He had dared to take at length a step, according to his pledge, to arrest excesses and vengeance. He had dared to take measures for the safety of his army, thereby compromised. He had dared to endeavour to keep faith with those who had laid down their arms by Compact with France, and on the condition of an Amnesty, and he was consequently bearded to the face by the regency and its minions, threatened with the resistance of the armies of Spain, in case he attempted to withdraw from their lusts the victims of their vengeance. He was told by the rabble of the streets of Madrid that he had attacked Spanish independence, and it was notified to him from Paris that '*vengeance was a customary habit of the Spanish nation;*' that he had exceeded the powers with which he was invested, mistaking the views of the King's government; that his act would seriously compromise it in face of the Northern Powers."

The easy march of the French, so contrary to all expectation, brought to the clearest demonstration two truths. The first, that the party of the Cortes had no root: the second, that the Royalist party had, if possible, still less, for it had been expelled by that very Government which vanished before the French. The Spaniards are the proudest of people, and the ablest to resist a foe; but France was their friend, or they expected her to be so. They looked to being rescued by her out of the hands of 200,000 brawling Philistines, who had got hold of them as a Dragoman does of a traveller, or an Ambassador.

The grave and important part of the matter is, however, the insight it affords into the causes of the present condition of Europe, and into the working of its governing system. The Minister of one power here appears acting for another, who is kept out of view. To serve this foreign master, he had accepted every consequence, and employed every means, even to the last. What the urgency was that impelled him, may be estimated from the obstacles against which, apparently unaided, he had to contend—the aversion of his colleagues, the exasperation of England, the opposition and disgust of the agent whom he employed,—no less a person than the heir to the French Crown, in face of the anticipated contingency of a general triumph of Revolution, and a Muscovite occupation of France. The path was too intricate to have been hit by chance,—the difficulties too great to have been conquered by accident,—the consequences too appalling not to have been avoided,—the results too evident not to have been foreseen.

That Minister was no longer M. de Villele, but M. de Chateaubriand, suddenly transferred to the Foreign Office at Paris, and dismissed so soon as the Spanish operation was completed.

CHAPTER VIII.

Quadruple Treaty.

THE Decade does not elapse without a new convulsion; French troops are again crossing the Bidassoa, not as foes but friends, and this time, according to the original scheme of Chateaubriand, wearing the Spanish cockade. But in the meantime the colours had changed. It is no longer inviolable right to succession that had to be maintained,—it is no longer to support a King against a Constitution, but to maintain a Queen set up by one. Strange reflections might be suggested by such events to the inhabitants of the other planets, but in this earth they are not extraordinary. England, who was so decidedly convinced in 1823 of the guilt and folly of interference in the affairs of neighbours, is now engaged with France in this same scheme, and, indeed, has seduced her into it. This is a matter which admits of no discussion; if not seen at a glance it cannot be seen at all.

Now what had we to expect? Time had passed his hand over the wounds of former strife, and covered even the cicatrices: mutual jealousies had ceased between England and France; they admitted community of political interests, and a new bond had arisen between them,—that of similarity of opinions in regard to government, and of Institutions. Was it possible then to conceive that both should concur, or that even one should undertake, any foreign operation not unmistakably just, profitable and necessary; or that the freedom of the people should suffer any measure to be undertaken, except after the fullest exposition and the freest consent?

This union of the nations was not merely one of sympathy, it also involved the profoundest political objects; it was at once an enjoyment and a security. It must have been their first care to preserve these blessings, and therefore to

avoid the rock on which their amity had been formerly shipwrecked. That rock was Interference. Nothing could occur directly between them to impair their good-will, and of all foreign waters of which they had to steer clear, the chief were those of Spain. In the East the positive encroachments of a third Power might excuse in this respect misjudgments, and even rectify the effects of errors; but in the Peninsula there was no safety-valve, there was no lightning conductor; and so sure as either moved, and so doubly sure when both combined, was the great alliance of the West ruptured.

I speak not here of the general sense of a nation unapplied to a particular case; I speak not of an abstract sense of right, unadopted as a specific conclusion, by influential statesmen. Intervention as a Principle had been judged—Spain as a field had been excluded. Not to multiply quotations, I will refer for England to the declaration of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the “Principle of Non-intervention was sound, and ought to be held sacred;” and for France to that of the Duke de Broglie, that “the Government when sought to pursue a policy of influence (he referred to Spain) played the part of a dupe, and prepared for itself a harvest of difficulties.” Both declarations were received in the respective Senates without a dissentient whisper, and with every sign that men can give of satisfaction.

My first knowledge of this transaction, although a year subsequent to the signature of the Treaty, was derived from the King of England himself.* When pointing out the absence of all action on our part in face of Russia’s activity

* I have no hesitation in mentioning the circumstance, as it was settled with his best friend, Sir Herbert Taylor, that the whole of the transactions in which the King had taken part, in reference to the East, should be made public; and shortly before his death there was transmitted to me a mass of letters for that purpose, completing the series with those already in my possession. The execution of this plan has been delayed, partly in delicacy to certain individuals still alive, partly from the indifference prevailing in regard to such matters.

everywhere, his Majesty replied, "There is something now preparing which will be a heavy blow to her." I remained silent and stupified, apprehending some new Treaty like that of the 6th of July. After a pause, he went on to say, "We are going to hit her in Spain." "Into what hole have you fallen!" The exclamation escaped me. Out of this conversation arose an article, afterwards published in the first number of the 'British and Foreign Review,' pointing out the necessary consequence of this Intervention, to be that rupture of the alliance between England and France which it afterwards produced, and further indicating Russia as the only possible source whence the idea could have come.

It may appear at first sight unwarrantable to place on the same line the diplomatic parchment of 1834, and the warlike sword of 1823. But in truth the pen was the weightier instrument of the two; the object and effect were in both cases the same. The restoring of an expelled Faction, and the re-invigorating of a struggle on the point of cessation, equally prolonged confusion. Though an Army was employed in the one case, and a Treaty in the other, that Treaty was an *alliance* and an *engagement*; it involved the employment of the resources of the Allies. By it England and France concurred to effect what, in 1823, France undertook to do alone, in spite of England. If corresponding results did not follow, it was not that power was wanting. Mercenaries and auxiliaries, supplies and arms,* were indeed furnished, but they were administered with care and in moderate doses.

The Invasion had been prompted by no French interest, and had originated in no decision of the French Government: yet for the transaction there was an explanation, and it was accepted at the time. Whatever use a Cabinet placed beyond the circle of Europe's habits and principles might make of Revolution, or of the fear of it, still it was not the less true that such fears did exist, and that they were very real and pressing. It having been stated (and

* A quarter of a million stand were sent, and scattered so as to arm both parties.

believed) by M. Villele, that France had sent an army to the Tagus to avoid having to send one to the Rhine, the value of the reason remained indeed open to discussion, but the fact was unquestionable. For the Treaty of 1834, no such pretext as this is to be found. The Government of Madrid was endeavouring to put down an insurrection of a fortieth part of the population, inhabiting provinces not integral parts of the kingdom, but an annexed domain. They had taken up arms, as they possessed by Treaty the right of doing, in consequence of the infringement of their laws. There was here nothing to alarm any foreign Government or faction; there was indeed no association possible between the parties in Spain and the opinions of Europe, unless by changing the parts. Nothing could be more republican than the followers of Don Carlos, nothing more tyrannical than the Constitutionals of Madrid.

Supposing that any neighbouring and benevolent Government had desired to put an end to these troubles, nothing was easier. The Madrid exchequer was empty, save of debentures; the arsenal was exhausted, except of the swords of Roland and the Cid, not available on the occasion; their armies were destitute when not defeated; there was no heart to their cause; the insurgents paraded the Peninsula, and once might have entered Madrid. A friendly adviser would have had every weapon on his side; indeed, they could not get on without aid, and the question was opened by their requesting it. *They obtained it.* Those who enabled them to go on could not have wished them to desist, and, it is to be inferred, had prompted them to begin. This is just what had happened before: the only difference is, that the "occult Government" is now in London.

The only way to deal with the case is to consider what in a *bona fide* transaction must have been the reply of the British Cabinet to this demand for aid from that of Madrid.

"The embarrassments experienced, and the dangers apprehended by the Cabinet of Madrid," it must have said, "are the

consequences of its own acts in violating the rights of domains of the Crown secured by Treaty. No just Government, and no enlightened people, can look with favour upon such proceedings, and least of all the people and the Government of Great Britain.

“The Government of Great Britain cannot accept, as relevant to the matter, the arguments into which that of Madrid has been pleased to enter. That Government may be perfectly in the right respecting the value of a representative form of Government, and the inhabitants of Biscay may be wholly in the wrong in rejecting the share in the general representation that is offered them; it may equally be true that the usages and privileges of these provinces are not in accordance with the spirit of this age, but neither were they in accordance with that of Charles V, Philip II, or Philip V, as estimated at Madrid.

“This appeal to the Government of His Majesty is more-over singularly timed. The present Administration accepted office for the purpose, amongst others of a similar nature, of carrying into effect the maxims of free trade, long professed by the liberal party. This Administration is actually engaged in restoring municipal freedom to the boroughs of England. Both principles appear to be expressed and contained in the form of *rights* in the ancient Spanish word ‘Fuero,’ which the Biscayans are actually in arms to defend, and the troops of Her Catholic Majesty engaged in putting down. The aid of the English Government is thus sought for the purpose of extinguishing in Biscay the very system which, by seeking to establish at home, it svinces its desire to see extended to the rest of Spain.

“England is a commercial nation; her chief external object is to break down the barriers that oppose the free circulation of trade. The grounds of her recent differences with Spain have been the system of commercial restriction which the influence of England has been exerted to remove, as an injury to her own trade, and as also a drawback to the prosperity of Spain; and you expect England’s aid in extending

Custom House lines to provinces free hitherto by immemorial usage and by solemn Treaty! These liberties of the subjects of Her Catholic Majesty become thus rights of His Majesty's subjects, and England can no more suffer them to be invaded by the Crown of Spain than it could by the Crown of France.

“If the objects sought by the Spanish Government were as legitimate as they are illegitimate; if they were as conducive to its repose as they are the reverse; if they were as congenial as they are repugnant to the sympathies of the British nation and its present Government; if they were beneficial as they are injurious to British interests and rights—still would it be impossible for the British Government to take any part in differences between the Crown of Spain and its subjects. England has no ground of war with the Basque Provinces if their belligerent rights be recognised; and if not, what the Spanish Government requires would be legal only after a Declaration of war against the Crown of Spain itself.

“But that Intervention which, in every case, would be a crime, would further, in that of Spain, be a folly, and nothing would more prejudice the parties in whose favour Intervention was exercised, than that Intervention itself.”

These latter sentences are not hypothetical, they are the words of the Duke of Wellington addressed to the Allied Sovereigns at Verona.

The first question is: why did the English Government not adopt this, the natural course? We are left without any answer. The second is: why did it select that which it followed? It gained nothing by the course it did adopt, and it could gain nothing; it lost much, and that loss could not but have been anticipated: it sacrificed lives and money; but it acquired no influence in Spain: it failed to obtain a commercial Treaty, and the Colony of Gibraltar, up to this period admitted to the coasting trade of the Peninsula, was excluded. But the signal loss incurred was that of the goodwill of France: dragged by England into mediation, and then

alarmed at the unscrupulous measures proposed, though not consigned in the Treaty, Louis Philippe turned for support to the Northern Alliance, called into existence by the "Constitutional League of the West."

Where then are we to look for the origin of the Quadruple Treaty, save in that Cabinet which alone has profited by it? the same which concerted the Conspiracy of the Isla de Leon, and managed the Conference of Verona.

The reader may, perhaps, be surprised to find no mention of Don Carlos. The reason is, that he had nothing to do with the transaction. The Insurrection was not raised by him; it merely availed itself of him. In any other portion of the Peninsula, the title of the Prince might be a good ground for Insurrection, only it was not used as such: in the Basque Provinces *it could be none*. The "Lord of Biscay" is the *de facto king of Spain*, fulfilling, of course, the conditions attached to the lordship. There alone the question of kingly title could not be entertained, and there only could be entertained that of provincial right. The question of succession, as regards the remaining provinces, was wholly distinct from that of form of Government. The Constitution had been established under Ferdinand. However, constitution and succession, fueros and legitimacy were so mixed together, that the whole field was covered with a mist, which changed to a mirage, and presented to the eyes of Europe the reflection of its own lanes and alleys;* but the illusion was for the vulgar only. Those who directed affairs knew in 1834, as well as in 1823, that "neither party had any roots." The attempted subversion of the Basque Pro-

* I had at Bayonne a discussion with the chiefs of the Insurrection, in presence of some of their supporters. The chiefs had assumed the false ground of hereditary right, not only in consequence of the contaminating contact with Europeans, but also in the hope of ribbons and decorations. On coming away, one of the members of the municipality of Bilboa, who before had his mind closed to all argument by respect for his chiefs, said to me, "I now see that we have been rattled like dice, and sheared like sheep!"

vinces was the sole cause of the disturbance, as afterwards shown when they sent off Don Carlos, nor would lay down their arms till the Convention of Bergara recognised the fueros.

The complicity of M. de Chateaubriand with the Russian Cabinet is established by direct evidence, furnished by himself: he was but a short time in office. He had the management of no other important matter, and but for the documents, which he has himself made public, it would have been difficult to prove the source of the expedition, and impossible to establish his guilt.

The Quadruple Treaty was the work of a man of another mould, capable of no inadvertence, who never speaks save on compulsion, and then only in reference to the occasion and the prejudices of his hearers. All that it was ever requisite for him to say in Parliament, limited itself to "Don Carlos," and "Constitution:" for the time he rendered himself perfectly secure by the affectation of a savage hatred against the one,* and of a sentimental affection for the other; but the organs of the Government could not be so reserved, and by them, especially the *Morning Chronicle*, the Treaty was attributed to Talleyrand.† In the shifting grounds assumed at various times, this credit was, when the Treaty had become popular, withdrawn, and it was then revealed to the nation that England had the merit of having produced the statesman who had engendered this vast and "truly British plan." When at another time it fell into disrepute as having estranged France, then it was boldly charged by the organ of the Foreign Office on M. Thiers. It is perfectly true that M. Thiers exerted himself to extort the consent of Louis Philippe to the measures proposed by the English minister, and for my part I was led into the belief, not of Thiers's

* In the rapidity of incidents, the reader may have forgotten the order sent out to Spain, to refuse access to Don Carlos on board of any English vessel, even if flying for his life.

† Talleyrand's assent was conveyed in a note in these terms, and these alone:

"Puisque vous le voulez, soit."

suggestion of the measure, but of his zealous concurrence in it; however, during that Minister's recent visit to Spain, I had the opportunity of ascertaining the truth. When charged with his concurrence on this occasion, as having produced all the subsequent dangers of Europe, he answered, "Good God! I had no love of the Treaty, but I yielded to it as a choice of evils; the English alliance was everything to me, and it was to be had *only on this condition*. I did not know why Lord Palmerston was so bitter about it, but this I did know, that he was the inevitable man."

Finally, the *Morning Chronicle* treats us with a cabinet picture of the transaction, in which with the laborious accuracy of a Teniers, the various groups are exhibited, some in the market-place, some looking out at the window, some entering at the door. It is varnished and framed to hang up as a *pendant* to that other picture by the pencil of Canning of the expedition to Portugal, dear to all lovers of art.

"On Friday the news was received; on Saturday the Cabinet was called together, &c."

"On Thursday, the application from the Spanish Minister was received; on Friday the Council sat; on Saturday, the adhesion of the Minister of Portugal was obtained; on Sunday the French Ambassador was applied to, &c."

But if the Minister could thus shuffle off the Parliament and the public, by what means could he circumvent his colleagues? If I had merely the testimony of William IV, now dead, it might be a very dangerous assertion to make that he had brought a body of English gentlemen to concu with him in this measure,—those gentlemen comprising the most distinguished members of the party who had sent Mr. Adair to St. Petersburg, and the chief of them being Lord Grey himself, compromised in that very act,—on the grounds of its being a blow against Russia. But in an inadvertent moment he has himself revealed the fact in an article in the *Morning Chronicle*, which, of all his contributions to the press, is the only one which has been brought

home to him, and that not by me, but by another journalist, and on grounds wholly irrespective of the cause of my present reference. Meeting a charge which at the time had produced some sensation, he writes in the *Morning Chronicle* of the 16th of January, 1844.

*“The originator and signer of the Quadruple Treaty which withdrew Spain from Russian influence; the statesman who embarked with such frankness and boldness in the Constitutional League of the West; and who, on the Indus and the Danube, the Persian Gulf, and the Dardanelles, made the boldest stand of any European politician against the encroachments of Russia in Europe and in Asia—he, * * * Russian in Soul!”*

I might here ask, what had he to do with overthrowing Russia, who, in regard to the East, had declared himself ‘satisfied with her declarations and conduct;’ who, in regard to Poland, had declared the rights of the Emperor to be ‘undeniable;’ who, in regard to France, had broken the English Alliance? But we are past inferential conclusions; here is a fact which is direct and incontrovertible; if the object in Spain was to oppose Russia, why was it kept secret? If opposition to Russia was intended, why was Spain selected as the field? What are the results?

When tracing the plot of the Congress of Verona, that which I had to state every Englishman could take in at a glance, but no Frenchman admit, or conceive. What I have said of the Quadruple Treaty will be equally plain to the Frenchman and obscure to the Englishman. The Spaniard will have no difficulty in apprehending the one transaction and the other.

CHAPTER IX.

Future Marriages.

As some slight compensation and atonement for the evils inflicted on Spain by my country, the limits of which diplomatically include Europe, and Muscovy to its furthest Calmuck bounds; and at the same time as a warning against the evils which she is again about to inflict, I have presented to Spaniards this picture of the genius of Western systems, and of the men of modern genius. From it they may collect that the highest intelligence on earth has deeply pondered the means of decomposing their country; that by its "occult" command over the Western Pentecraty, glittering with the tinsel of a Villele and a Canning, a Wellington and a Metternich, and alas, too, of a Talleyrand,—it has converted Spain into a Pandora's box for Europe.

Can any reasonable Spaniard now doubt that a MARRIAGE can serve Russia as well as a Constitution, or a Succession? Let your proverbial gallantry, if not your political foresight, at least forbid, that ladies and their affections shall be, because seated on or near your Throne, converted into cards and dice in a game of perfidy and fraud. To prevent this is the easiest of things; settle the matter at home; allow no diplomatist to put his hand in; Fortune offers a solution without doing violence to Nature. *You have two marriageable princes.*

POSTSCRIPT.

May, 1853.

The apprehensions which induced me to draw up the foregoing paper have been verified to the extent of nearly producing a war between England and France. Out of the "Spanish Marriages" came the confiscation of Cracow, and, within a short time, the fall of Louis Philippe and the revolution of 1848, on which the Cossacks entered Hungary. To that field I now pass on.

It is a fact here deserving of record, that the mutual exasperation of the two countries, in reference to the Spanish marriages, bore upon the Treaty of Utrecht, which the English Minister asserted had been violated by the union of a son of Louis Philippe and a Spanish princess. This Treaty, as that Minister had himself, on a previous occasion, stated in Parliament, had ceased to exist, having lapsed by war, and not having been restored at a subsequent peace. Had the author of the 'History of Civilisation' been a little earlier* acquainted with this fact, there could have been no quarrel in 1847, and no revolutions in 1848.

* A note was sent to the French Embassy in London, inquiring in what article in the Treaties of Luneville, Amiens, or Vienna, the Treaty of Utrecht had been restored. It arrived two hours after the note of M. Guizot, taking ground upon the Treaty, had been transmitted.

PART II.
H U N G A R Y .

CHAPTER I.

Political Value of Hungary.

CANNING electrified the year 1826 by a quotation from the *Æneid*, "Celsa sedet Æolus arce," &c. It was not that it was charmed by a "calida junctura" in Æolus and England, but in Opinion and wind. For war, Ambition, it was perceived, was no longer required ; it could be engendered by thoughts alone ; hurricanes to overwhelm Empires, and tempests to subvert Thrones, could now be evolved from tropes and metaphors.

It took, however, two and twenty years for the poetic proposition to become historical, which it did in 1848, when the Continental Governments were blown up, with the single exception of the country (Spain) whence had been derived the explosive matter. The man, in the Eastern tale, who let the genius out of the bottle was only alarmed at his own work ; but the nations of Europe, when they had ruptured their bags, were confounded at themselves : after a wild dance over hill and dale, they hurried back again to shut themselves in, and to sew themselves up. It was not, however, Canning's Æolus, who, reversing his trident, had let forth Eurus and Nothus ; England did not ride the whirlwind, and had not been the Merlin of the storm. It is not, indeed, to be expected in the country of the winds, that operations should be very distinct, or the figure of the genius very discernible ; and thus

when thunderbolts do fall, the startled nations may attribute them to a wrong Jove.

The astute, but earnest Emperor, Leopold the Second, had elaborated in the alchemy of his German brain two antagonistic *Principles*, which threatened to devastate Germany in the accident of their corporeal collision,—as he imagined them to be embodied severally in the neighbours of Germany on the North and on the West. That Emperor consequently adjusted his policy to meet this contingency, and thence that temporising scheme for Hungary, which has not been without its influence on recent events.

Napoleon too had his notions; they agreed with those of Leopold in respect to number, but differed in character. The German's principles were Despotism and Anarchy; the Corsican's, Revolution and Ambition. In the first case, Germany was only to be victimised; in the second, Europe herself was to be the prize. So he too was swept from the scene, and passed away as a myth, only that he left behind him a wreck, and a paradox. He bequeathed Europe to Ambition (Alexander), as Leopold had prepared Austria for Despotism (Paskiewitch). As for his prophecy of our becoming "Republican or Cossack," what child does not now see that these are but two stations on the same road,—all the roads lead one way: "Empire" brought the Calmucks to Paris; "Constitution" the Baskirs to Pesth. Thus, whilst the winds of '48 were blowing, and mankind was engaged in ascertaining their direction and estimating their effects, Russia leisurely laid one mailed hand on the heart of Austria, and stretched with the other arm, an encircling embrace around the Danish Belt. Here, for a time, pauses the epic, which opened at Isla de Leon, and we proceed to the incidents of the Hungarian canto.

We have heard enough that the inhabitants of Hungary are Magyars, but what it was important to know, and what for the best of reasons no one comprehends, is, that the Magyars are not Europeans: this truth the legislation of a hundred Diets and the rhetoric of a thousand Kossuths cannot

pervert ; it is a fact which the Camarilla of Vienna, the Foreign Office of London, and Field Marshal Prince Paskiewitch himself cannot alter. The upper basin of the Danube is not included in the region of the winds, and owes as yet no fealty to the sceptre of Æolus. Had it been so, the chaos of the continent would ere this have been reduced to the order that reigns at Warsaw ; the Hungarians, like the Spaniards, are an unreasoning mass : slow in Progress, backwards in Civilization.

Wars in the West lead to great effusion of blood, but to little alteration of frontiers ; those in the East alone determine great results. In the one case, contest is a mere shock of equally powerful arms, or equally futile doctrines ; in the other, it is a tide sweeping on to dominion for a thousand years. On the descendants of Attila and his Seven Hordes hangs at this hour the future fate of European society ; for Poland, and especially Hungary, though subjugated, stand even as the wreck of a battered wall in the victor's way.

Identity of race is no motive for political union ; but when two people have the same interests and the same enemies, and happen to be of the same race, their enemy being of a different one, then indeed does that relationship become profitable and noble. The Turks are slow to move, and not likely, under any considerations of advantage, to unite themselves with a Christian people. But their ancient associations with the Hungarians, acting like gravitation on inanimate bodies, steadying for a time at least the Eastern bulwarks of the fabric of general power, afford to Europe a reprieve and a security not the less real because she is unconscious of its existence.

It is doubtless true that the fiercest wars have been carried on between the two people : so long as Hungary stood by herself, so long as the ancient line of monarchs, or the elected sovereigns, possessed the supreme sway, she dreaded the Turkish power ; the very ties which united the people rendered that hostility all the more intense. When a member of the House of Hapsburg was elected to the throne, the position was reversed. Then Austria, the Empire, Germany,

and the West, became for Hungary the sources of dread and the causes of suffering, and she turned towards the Sultans as to Protectors. This change occurred in the sixteenth century, when Turkey had ceased to be dangerous, but was still powerful. It was, in fact, at the instigation of the defeated competitor of Ferdinand (brother of Charles V) that the Turks invaded Austria and besieged Vienna. If Hungary did, under the most trying circumstances, preserve her ancient Institutions down to these evil days, it is to be attributed to that confidence, no less than to that Constitution's inherent worth.

So long as this latent alliance with Turkey imposed on Austria respect for the Constitution of Hungary, that country was the main strength of the Emperor at Vienna: its support was yielded to him on every contingency; not by a blind and slavish submission, but by a free loyalty of the people, exercised through the organ of their legitimate Representatives. Maria Theresa was enabled to maintain the seven years' war against Prussia, only after carrying her infant son to the Diet at Presburg, and entrusting him and herself to its chivalrous guardianship. Again, against Napoleon was Francis enabled to make head in consequence of the enthusiastic declaration of the Diet of Presburg and its steady refusal to accede to the overtures of France. But the circumstance peculiarly bearing upon present events, was the war of the Spanish succession. The Austrian encroachments had at that time driven Hungary into rebellion. Louis XIV did not neglect the occasion thus offered to him, not only of paralyzing Austria, and depriving the Allies (England and Holland) of her support, but of subduing the Empire itself while securing the inheritance of Spain. There were, however, then in England, not Diplomats but Statesmen: Bolingbroke was still writing despatches, and had not taken to essays. The Cabinet of St. James perceived that Austria could be no Ally if Hungary was her foe, and that Hungary could be her friend only on one condition,—the preservation of her rights; therefore, on being applied to by the Hungarians,

it hastened to offer its good offices, which were successful in a settlement of differences between the two nations, Hungary and Austria, and the two Sovereigns, though one person, the *King* and the *Emperor*. This Treaty, concluded under the mediation of England, was signed at Szathmar, in 1711.

In treating of Spain in 1834, we could find no reason for England's interference; in Hungary, in 1848, we are equally destitute of a reason for her non-interference; and if we accept the only reason suggested in the one case,—that of opposition to Russia where no Russia appeared, we can only be the more perplexed in accounting for the other.

Let us consider in what position Hungary will now stand to Austria in any future war. Let us take the cases of a rupture with Turkey, with France, and with Russia.

1. The sympathies between the Turks and the Hungarians were, after all, one-sided. The recollections enduring in the hearts of the former, had in the latter been in recent times overlaid by their connection with Europe; thus Austria, in her last three wars with Turkey, found no difficulty in obtaining from the Diet its contingent in troops and its contribution in money. Were a war now to break out, she would be under no necessity indeed to apply to Presburg for a contingent, and the Hungarians would without opposition be enrolled, and sent forward to the frontier. Need I ask what effects would follow the first hostile shot?—even if the troops did not pass over to the Sultan, Hungary would rise as one man, to shake off the now detested yoke of Austria.

2. The Diet of Presburg, which declared against Louis XIV and Napoleon, no longer existing, the first symptom of a difference with France would force Austria to send all her disposable force away from the Rhine, and to concentrate it on the Danube. In such a war Hungary would no longer be the right hand of Austria, but the principal Ally of her enemy. She would be to Austria what Poland is to Russia, multiplied sevenfold.

3. Of a war with Russia I need not speak. If Russia's

whole disposable force was required to bring Hungary, even after an exhausting struggle, into submission to Vienna, how can Austria presume to stand a moment before that Ally, now backed by the Dependency which her own arms had before reduced.

Had England known that it was her own hand which had stifled Poland, Hungary might have been spared. If she could now understand that it was again her hand that had stifled Hungary, Austria and Turkey may hereafter be spared. I shall make the endeavour to put her in possession of this truth, from the Blue Books. We must first, however, glance at the petty treacheries within, by which armies were led to slaughter.

CHAPTER II.

Events in Hungary.

AT the very moment of the dispersion of its Government Hungary was achieving at Pakozd its first victory. The vaunting Jellachich was absolutely beaten by a handful of men ; he signed a suspension of arms, and decamped in the night, leaving ten thousand of his rearguard prisoners.

The Austrian Government, infuriated at the murder of Count Lamberg and the defeat of Pakozd, declared Jellachich, who had been so easily defeated, and so ignominiously driven out, Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and reinforced his army with the garrison of the capital. A sanguinary Insurrection at Vienna itself was the result.

The Hungarian army had pursued Jellachich to the frontier ; there it halted, waiting legal authority to cross. The Diet at Vienna gave an evasive answer, and enabled Windischgrätz to assemble and dispose his forces for the bombardment of the city. The Hungarian army arrived too late, and was placed by treachery in the power of the Austrians ; its general, Moga, said before the court martial, by which he was afterwards tried, that the Austrian generals did not *know* how to take complete advantage of the opportunity he had given them.

Kossuth, on the field of battle (Schwechat), displaced Moga, and made over the command to Görgey : from that hour the Russian Intervention became inevitable. It has been supposed that the treason of Görgey was an after-thought : I have it from Hungarian officers that, at that very moment, he spoke undisguisedly of the futility of the struggle.*

* He had personal ties with the establishment of the Archduke Michael. Strange expressions are attributed to him, which were interpreted as marks of genius, as those of Szechenyi were of madness.

yet it was the offer to lead the troops to Vienna that induced Kossuth to give him the command.

Görgey retreated across the frontier, followed by Windischgrätz; both armies then remained in inaction for weeks! In consequence of Görgey's representations of the necessity of concentration, the troops were collected from all parts, and placed under his command. Windischgrätz at last advanced. Görgey had drawn out his forces on an extended line—they were driven in upon every point, save one (Wieselburg); he announced to the Government this action as a victory, and retreated. First, he neglected to take up a position on the Lake Neusiedler, from which he could not have been dislodged; next, he passed through Raab, neglecting equally the intrenchments, which had, at great expense, been thrown up; then avoiding the impregnable position of Comorn, he made a straight course to Buda, as if, like the flying Scythian, to draw the Austrians on. Pertzel advancing with about 13,000 men, reached Moor, when Görgey was distant about fifteen miles, and making sure of support, engaged the advanced guard of Windischgrätz—he was left to be beaten. Himself neglecting the Capital, its defences, its defenders, and the Danube, passed by Buda in hurried flight, evacuated the town, and abandoned the defence of the river and of the castle. Had he made a stand anywhere, he would have been joined by Pertzel's, and other small corps then on their march; new levies were hastily being raised, and the army of 20,000 men in the south was marching to join him; even while his army was at the lowest number it could not have been left in the rear; had he stood still anywhere Windischgrätz could not have penetrated into Hungary.

Görgey had, during his retreat, written to the Committee of Defence to say that he could not insure the safety of the capital twenty-four hours: the Diet, in consequence, retired to Debretzin. He now issued a Proclamation, in which he charged the Diet with abandoning the army, and declared

that the army thenceforward would act for itself. This appeal was not responded to by the soldiers.

Then, leaving the plain at the mercy of the enemy, he carried his army northward among the mountains. He divided it into two corps,—one of 10,000 men, commanded by Guyon, the other of 15,000, which he headed in person. These advanced or retreated, for it is difficult to define his operations, on parallel lines. He suffered the corps of Generals Simonich, Goëtz, and Jablanowzski, to enter unopposed by different passes, and was pursued by them. On the right flank he was cut off from the plain country by the main army of Windischgrätz advancing from the Danube to the Theiss: in front, his passage was barred by Schlick, who, entering from the north, had taken up his position along the line of the great Gallician road, with 25,000 men, and occupied passes which it was supposed 100,000 men could not force. Görgey had always kept suspiciously close to the Gallician frontier; he had been deaf to every appeal from Guyon for cooperation: now no escape was left him, save by entering Galicia and capitulating. Then it was that Guyon, at the battle of the Braniszko pass, unexpectedly opened a passage to both corps; Görgey allowed Schlick to carry off the remnants of his army when they were in his hands.*

Obliged through Guyon's inconvenient victory to effect his junction with the main army under Dembinski, he was present at the battle of Kapolna, where the Hungarians were decisively engaged with the main army of Windischgrätz; he abandoned his post: he then called his officers together, and deposed the Commander-in-Chief. Next day the action was renewed without results; both parties retreated. After the first day at Kapolna, Windischgrätz had written to announce too hastily the utter discomfiture of the Hungarians, and thereupon was issued the Proclamation abolishing Hungary

* This action, scarcely paralleled for its fortunate audacity and its important consequences, was the theme of coarse jokes in Görgey's tent and at his table.

as an independent State. Up to this hour the Hungarians were acting by virtue of the royal authority.

Kossuth now decided that a bold push should be made on Vienna with the main force under the command of Görgey, strengthened by the garrison of Comorn, leaving 10,000 men to invest Buda. Görgey sent against Vienna 10,000, and 37,000 to Buda, of which 7,000 were cavalry. After storming several times, he wrote to say he could not take it. Kossuth replied, "Since you have sacrificed Vienna to Buda, at least take Buda." Görgey afterwards accounted for the loss of the occasion, time, and men, by Kossuth's intermeddling. He then managed to consume week after week in inaction, till the Russians were in the centre of Hungary. This was the *denouement* of the Drama, and its action thereafter has little interest.

Narrated of some former time, would not the tale discredit history? Might not the existence of Kossuth and Görgey be denied, with more show of reason than that of Python and Chimæra? Their motives defy, their achievements surpass, scrutiny and possibility.

An adventurer is taken out of the lower grades, to be made General of an army by a country lawyer, who has become head of a nation; this army is the sole defence of the insurgent nation; it is before the Capital of an Empire, where its presence alone had created a Revolution. The adventurer carries this army in flight through a difficult and narrow border district, where in all times this kingdom had made good its stand, or at least, attempted it: as he retreats reinforcements pour in; by merely standing still he can resume the offensive, still on he goes, leaving here to the right, a position which could not be turned; there to the left, a fortress that could not be taken. He passes by the Capital with all its resources, bisected by a mighty river; he terrifies and disperses the Government by false reports, and then denounces them as cowards; having led the enemy into the centre of the country, he carries his army to the mountains, through the passes of which other bodies are

about to penetrate; he stops no gap, but presents himself to be chased by each of them, as they successively enter; finally, he places himself in a trap between the corps which have so penetrated, and those which had followed him into the plain. A native army caught by foreigners in its own gorges! He is extricated by a disorderly miracle. Meanwhile he leaves the Government to shift for itself, in ignorance of his intentions, prospects, condition, movements, and for six weeks of his, or his army's, existence. Forced by the victory of his subordinate to join the new army, under a new Commander-in-chief, he wrenches from it by disobedience a decisive victory, and deposes his Chief! The authority of this adventurer depended all this while on the breath of the country lawyer. If such had been related of the war of Troy, who would not have set down the story as a fable, and who would have heard of Homer as a poet?

But this is nothing. The Hungarians, martial and civilian, hold this adventurer to be their first soldier, and in all these achievements a true patriot!* This too after his treachery has been accomplished and unmasked. I had not read one contemporary line respecting these events; and it was only at Kutayah, in the midst of the chief actors, that I commenced to inquire respecting them. From the origin Görgey's treason appeared: it was the very first fact that presented itself: the plain narrative of the retreat from Vienna was not evidence, but demonstration. When I stated this it was met with incredulity—no, with anger. They could not brook the thought of having been led like dumb animals to slaughter.†

* I have one exception to make in favour of General Guyon, who not only suspected him, but denounced him as a traitor to Kossuth.

† Count Szechenyi knew all from the beginning. His brother, chamberlain to the Archduchess Sophia, came to Pesth to detach him from the Insurrection when the Hungarians knew not that they were to be insured. He was doubtless initiated under a bond of secrecy, but had resolved to abide the consequences. In the Cabinet, as in private conversation, he often broke out in a wild

The successes of the Hungarians *after* all their defences had been broken in, and Austria's forces assembled in the champaign centre of their country, does appear incomprehensible: but Russia had not made the Revolution for Austria: her agency was at work as well in the Austrian Camp as in the Vienna Cabinet: Hungary might be filled with bravery, endowed with patriotism, adorned with genius; she might bring forth armies by hundreds of thousands, and create tens of millions of resources, yet what did these avail? the humblest Russian *attaché* knew from the beginning what was to be done with her. After the event, a British Statesman did indeed connect the fall of Hungary with the mission of Lord Minto: had Sir James Graham only anticipated (time is everything in Diplomacy) he could have prevented the Catastrophe.

Strangely has been overlooked the fact, that the *Russian troops reached the centre of Hungary without firing a shot*. Their entrance had, however, long been of public notoriety; the Poles in the Hungarian service earnestly pressed the subject on the attention of all the Members of the Government; Dembinski who commanded the northern army, had proposed to anticipate the danger by entering Galicia: the Government sent to him positive instructions not to move northwards, and orders to the army to *disobey him*, if he did. To prevent the possibility of any obstacle being placed, by accident or insubordination, to the Russian advance, the Hungarian army was recalled, and marched to the southward.

No great importance will, at present, be attached to the

strain, which was taken to be indications of that madness which afterwards seized him. He would laugh when they spoke of success, sneer at their plans, speak of scaffolds as the issue, of barbarian hordes awaiting but the signal, and yet he continued to share the danger. Twice he attempted suicide. An eminent person, whom I will not name, went mad on discovering the treachery of Jellachich, as did the Austrian Minister, Count Stadion, on being made acquainted with the purpose of inviting the Russians.

fact, because there is no one who has not decided that the struggle was desperate, and that a victory, more or less, won by the Hungarians, and a check or defeat, incurred by the Russians, could noways alter the issue, and only swell the list of casualties; but the fates were then balanced. Had the Russians been once beaten, the war would have revived—Russia taking the place of Austria, retired from the ring. Whatever the chances in military operations, there was another in this duel in favour of the Hungarians. In various quarters, statements have appeared of the disposition of the Russian troops to desert. These could not be inventions, because such a notion has no existence amongst us. I believe them to have been founded, because perfectly analogous to other circumstances within my knowledge. In contact with Europeans the armies of Russia are intractable and unimpressionable as lumps of iron, or masses of clay; but many ties unite the populations of the East of Europe; the men composing them belong to different races, very variously affected to the Russian Empire and to its neighbours. The fact is notorious, that the Russian army of occupation in the Danubian Provinces had rendered itself so much an object of suspicion to the Government, that when it was withdrawn, the regiments were broken up, and dispersed to remote parts of the Empire. This was in consequence of its contact with the Turkish troops, against whom its animosities may be supposed to have been most vehemently excited. Under these circumstances, it was not improbable that a check, or a defeat suffered by the Russians might have been followed by the desertions even of entire corps, and it has been stated, that overtures to that effect had been positively made as an encouragement to the Hungarians to offer practical resistance.* At all events the withdrawal from the passes, of the Hungarian force, was a fact, which at the time, excited considerable

* “During the Russian intervention, Russian officers of high rank promised both to Kossuth and to Dembinaki to pass over with the forces they commanded in the event of a pitched battle being won.”—*Letter by the Author of “The Revelations of Russia.”*

attention, and was explained as being a plan to entrap the Russian army. This was the view of the case presented at St. Petersburg to the representative of England, who communicated it to his court.* At a Council held to decide upon the Intervention, it has been reported, that Paskiewitch and a majority of the members was opposed to the measure on the grounds of danger to the Empire, in the event of a reverse.

Are we then to infer that the reasons for deciding on the Intervention, which, as has been stated, "the Emperor Nicholas did not think fit to communicate to the Council" referred to Kossuth, no less than to Görgey? The facts I have mentioned, I first learned from Dembinski at Kutayah: he gave to them this colour, and, indeed, did not hesitate to charge Kossuth with treason. On this I applied to Kossuth himself, laid the statement before him, and asked for an explanation. He, to my amazement, admitted the general accuracy of the facts, and, in respect to them, offered the following explanation, which not having been taken down at the time, I cannot pretend to give precisely in his words, though I believe, that the words I am about to quote were the very ones that he used:

"When I applied to the English Government for its good offices in settling our differences with Austria, the answer I received was, that it could not interfere in a 'domestic concern.' I was astonished at this answer, but at least I took it as assured that England would suffer *no other power* to intrude itself on those 'domestic concerns.' As soon should I have doubted of my existence, as of England's determination never to allow Russia to enter Hungary. I

* He writes on the 7th of August, 1849:—"It is difficult to reconcile the energy and courage which have been shown by the principal Hungarian chiefs and the troops under their immediate orders, with the statements which form the introduction to this despatch, without considering the unresisted march of the Russians on Debretzin to be part of a preconceived plan."

therefore treated all warnings as the visions of idle brains. I did not wish, however, to furnish Russia with any pretext, and I thought also the moment favourable to bring our whole strength against Austria, while she was deceived into the expectation of Russian succour. I suspected nothing but the Austrian Camarilla. I now see that there was nothing but treachery within and without."

This confidence in England had, however, a still more fatal effect than that of leaving unguarded the passes of the Carpathians: it carried their attention away from the only point to which they had to look—from the only Power that could have befriended them; and where, as proved on so many memorable occasions, there was a field for the action of their own intelligence. Their very first business was to send to Constantinople; the first care of any official, deserving the name of a man, was to select for that great, but arduous duty, the first capacity that Hungary possessed. It was not the people* of Hungary that were blind—it was the Kossuths and the Bathyanis. No doubt, as we shall presently see, the Turkish Government had been placed in difficult and embarrassing position by the *prior* occupation of its northern provinces: but the game was difficult on both sides. Without that prior occupation there would have been no Revolutions in 1848; the pivot of the whole diplomatic action, was the Russian force at Bucharest. What was required at Constantinople was an agent able to show to the Turkish Government the collusion of the Western Powers, with Russia. This is the truth, and unless known, nothing can anywhere be done. But the Government of Hungary had not mastered the diplomatic position of Europe, and conceived the matter to be a military one, and the parties to be itself and Austria. After all great science was not required. Excited as was the Turkish nation—alarmed as were its leading statesmen, in-

* In travelling through Hungary I have had the money for post horses returned to me, because I was known to be a friend of the Turks.

dignant and confident as was its army, little urgency was required to bring it to a decision to declare war, that is to say to effect a pacification. But the only Hungarian with capacity for action, had been sent to England, where he was engaged in an attempt, by the offer of a Commercial Treaty, to purchase England's support. They sent to Constantinople a foreigner and Englishman, who had given himself out as a secret agent of the Foreign Office, and was in fact a near relative of the second officer of that department. To the incidents of this mission I will subsequently refer.

When the Russians had thus been let in, the Government with Kossuth, who had now discovered his mistake, retired to Segedin, where he made a remarkable speech, his recollections of which, at my request, he has thus set down :—

“ Now, by the Russian invasion, our glorious struggle is raised to a higher pitch. In our battles henceforth will be fought the battle of the freedom of the world. To be the liberators or the martyrs of the world, that is our destiny. The people of Europe know it to be so. They know our cause to be their cause ; and they would help us—help themselves in helping us, but they cannot do it, because their Governments have enchained their will, and many of them have betrayed their people to foreign domination. Do not be angry for it at the nations of the world—pity them rather. It is their misfortune, not their fault. We stand alone, alone with the Almighty God, and our arms : but though by mischief shaken, still we stand. I don't know if we shall come forth as victors out of the gigantic struggle, because I don't know if my people will stand at my side, like a single man, as it has stood till now. Could I but know this, I could prophecy you victory ; I would tell you, that we will shake the infernal giant, who presumes to impose his laws upon the world—we will shake him to his very foundation in his own home. But, however this may be, this one thing I know, if we be victors we shall have rescued the world—if we fall we shall have fallen martyrs to the world. Will you

accept this saint mission from God—will you fight? Will you vanquish if you can—die if you must—for the freedom of the world?”

It being important to know that Kossuth, whatever may be the opinions entertained of him, had formed his judgment on the causes of his country's subjugation at the time, and on his own grounds; I insert a report of the speech from the journal of Mr. Longworth, with which he has kindly furnished me: that journal was on the point of publication, when he received a Consular appointment, and it was consequently suppressed.

“As far as the Austrians were concerned, and for anything they could do, the war had been terminated; the God of battles had unequivocally declared himself for Hungary; but against that decree they had appealed to the Russian Czar—they had invoked the aid of the eternal enemies of human rights and human liberties. That appeal had been responded to, and the Muscovite masses and wild Cossack hordes were already there to promote peace and order, and to settle a question of constitutional right with their lances and bayonets; while Hungary, deserted by all the world, was left to fight single-handed and alone, not her own battle only, but—shame to England! and double shame to France!—the battles of freedom, justice, and humanity. If such be the will of Providence, be it so—let God's will be done, and as from Debretzin we went forth to reconquer the liberties of Hungary, we will march from Szegedin to restore freedom to the world.”

There is a wild fanaticism in the manner of this self-sacrifice, which scarcely finds a parallel, it recalls the fascination of the devotees of Alamout, and the frenzy of the defenders of the temple of Salem. It scarcely seems to be a historical fact, at least of our times. But the effort, gigantic as it was, was all in vain, and craft prevailed.

As on former occasions, the overpowered Hungarians seek refuge in Turkey. It had never before entered into the thoughts of Austria to demand their Extradition, and no alteration had taken place in the Treaties between the two Empires. Russia was only Austria's friend; no refugees had passed out of her territory, but out of that of Austria. Nevertheless, the two Governments demand their surrender, and on its refusal threaten war.

The Treaties referred to freebooters and malefactors, and contained different stipulations: the Austrian Surrender or Internment, the Russian Surrender, or *Expulsion*. The English Government promised to Turkey support on the condition of her complying with its advice, which was *Expulsion*. *In terms* it denied the right claimed by Russia; *in fact* it admitted it, and it applied the alternative of the Russian Treaties to the Austrian case. The entrance of the squadron into the Dardanelles occurred after Russia had yielded, but had it happened at an earlier period, it could not have altered the despatches.

England exercised no influence for the liberation of the refugees until the middle of April, 1851.

That is to say, not until Kossuth had entered into communications with Mazzini, whose agent (Mr. Lemmi) was his private secretary when he left Kutayah. Liberated at the close of 1850, he would have proclaimed to Europe, "That Russia had in every Cabinet a spy, if not an agent:" liberated in June, 1851, he was fit to write the Marseilles Letter, and unconsciously to play his part in the *coup d'état* of the 2d of December. At the first period his "war" would have been a real one, against the real foe, one of words, levelled at St. Petersburg, not of rockets at Vienna.

I cannot dismiss this extraordinary man, in whom alone have been evolved the convulsions of Hungary, without acknowledging the service that he has rendered in one respect, and which to render required no small amount of fidelity and courage: he uttered in the ears of the people of England the

words, "Secret Diplomacy:" the last sounds upon his lips, as his political existence passed into Buddhistic Nirvana, and as the green glades of the New Forest were fading on his view, were:—

"Gentlemen, *read the Blue Books.*"

I adopt the instruction, I open these Blue Books, to the contents and perversions of which my attention was first called by a letter of his from Kutayah: from them I give the "diplomatic," that is to say, the real history of the transaction, a Comedy in incident—a Tragedy in result; uniting to the action of an epic, the extravagance of a romance.

CHAPTER III.

Diplomatic Review.

THE internal changes which occurred in Hungary in the early part of 1848 must not be classed with the Revolutions of that year throughout the rest of Europe. That country was, indeed, vehemently agitated at the time by discussions, originating in an attempt of the Austrian Government to change the provincial administration and to prevent the Diet from taking measures for the emancipation of the serfs. The events of Paris had the effect of enabling them to carry instantaneously in the Diet these long matured purposes, which were wholly of a constitutional kind. It is true that, in the excitement of the moment, other speculative propositions were introduced, which, had they come into operation, would no doubt have in time changed the character of Hungary, and destroyed that resistance to the encroachments of the Government of Vienna which it had so long presented: but like the Constitution of Spain in 1812, these remained a dead letter, and were, in fact, ignored on both sides. There was, therefore, no Revolution in Hungary.

But this was not all. The Hungarians have no sympathy with the Germans in general, far less with those of Vienna. Neither had they any sympathies with the revolutionary movements of the West. The liberal Constitution which the Viennese Insurrection produced, was to them an object of not less distaste or aversion, than the avowed despotism or the masked intrigues of that Cabinet. This disposition was evinced in their refusal to take any part therein; and, in fact, it was to Kossuth at the critical moment that the Emperor owed the preservation of his crown, and perhaps of his life. So far from the existence of any real animosity towards the legitimate authority of the Empire, the Hungarian Governm ent

recognised the importance of sustaining its military power, and even in the dubious exercise of that power in Lombardy, the Diet did not refuse its contingent of men, although it appended conditions which rendered it unavailable, but conditions which its honour and security required.

In fact, all alarms regarding Hungary had subsequently to the month of April ceased in Europe, and the collision with the Austrians arose out of no internal measures whatever. It was simply an international transaction, originating in an attack on a body of Hungarians by a force under the command of a chief at that very moment publicly proclaimed as a rebel by the Emperor, although immediately afterward appointed his Representative. I subjoin in a note some extracts from the Blue Books,* which will show that in what I have said of the relations between Austria and Hungary, I but re-echo the opinion of the English Am-

* "The Hungarian revolution is now complete."—*Mr. Blackwell* 18th March, 1848.

"Count Louis Batthyanyi has been here during some days, and the Ministry formed by him seems to give satisfaction in Hungary, and will be agreed to by this Government. It appears to me that there are reasons which might influence the patriots who take the lead in the Hungarian Diet, to content themselves with what they have obtained."—*Lord Ponsonby*, March 18th.

"The great object of dread to the Hungarians is the Russian Power; and it may perhaps appear that the measures pursued by the Hungarians, tending as they do to a breach with the Austrians, will prove to be primary means for bringing that Power into Hungary which is the most dreaded by the Hungarian leaders."—*Lord Ponsonby*, 3d May.

"I had the opportunity this evening of ascertaining from Prince Paul Esterhazy and from Count Batthyanyi, and the Chief Minister of Hungary, that the Hungarian Government had not made any such demand, but, on the contrary, the Hungarian Ministry were ready to furnish the Emperor with 100,000 men, if needed; that they had said to his Imperial Majesty, they only wanted to keep in their country some 15,000 to 20,000 men, to maintain order amongst a population amounting to 14,000,000 or 15,000,000. It is impossible to doubt the word of the above-mentioned personages, and giving credit to them, it follows that very much, and indeed most of what

bassador at Vienna, and, as may therefore be inferred, of the British Government. That opinion was that the "Revolution" had not disturbed the connection of Austria and Hungary, and that any danger arising from it was connected with Russia.

In a former chapter I have stated that the existing relations between Austria and Hungary had been, for the last time, settled by a Treaty concluded under the mediation of England in 1711. The two nations were at war. Hungary applied to England for her good offices; these she readily yielded, on the ground of the necessity of supporting Austria, then her Ally against France. Much stronger grounds than those upon which England based her interference in Sicily were here presented, and much graver circumstances than those which had induced her interference in 1711: equally greater were the facilities which she possessed. Then she had to seek Austria's aid; now Austria feared her: at the former period her inducement was the curbing of the Octogenarian ambition of Louis XIV: now it was the closing of the centre of Europe against Russia. She had the absolute command of the whole question, of Austria by her power, of Hungary by her influence; the unexpected and truly wonderful efforts made by Hungary, and the hopelessness of its subjugation by all the power of Austria, combined to furnish every inducement to the British Cabinet to act with vigour, which it is possible for necessity to impose, or advantages to invite.

It was under these circumstances that at the close of 1848, an agent of the Hungarian Government arrived in London, and addressed to the Foreign Office a request to be allowed to communicate with it on the then state of affairs. Before quoting the reply which he received, I must mention that that Office had shown no hesitation to enter into communication

had appeared alarming in the situation of Hungary has disappeared."
—*Lord Ponsonby*, 3d May.

"The Count (Batthyanyi) appeared to think it very necessary to keep up the military power of the Austrian Empire."—*Lord Ponsonby*, 5th of May.

with the insurgents of any country; that it had furnished arms to the Sicilians; that it had saluted there the Revolutionary flag; and that the Foreign Minister himself had requested letters of introduction from Mazzini to the different clubs of Italy for the son of Lord Eddisbury, the Under Secretary of State. I have also to remark that the Hungarians were at the period in question, whatever their former relations with the Court of Vienna, now in possession on unquestionable grounds of belligerent rights. The reply was the following:—

“*Lord Eddisbury to * * **

“*Foreign Office, December 12, 1848.*

“**SIR,**—In reply to your letter of the 15th instant, I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to say that Her Majesty’s Government *can take no cognizance of those internal questions between Hungary and the Austrian dominions to which your letters refer*; but that the British Government has no diplomatic relations with Hungary *except as a component part of the Austrian Empire, and can receive communications respecting Hungary only through the diplomatic organ of the Emperor of Austria at this Court.*

“I am, &c.,

“**EDDISBURY.**”

It had already been suggested by the Ambassador at Vienna, and was of public notoriety, that Austria unable herself to reduce the Hungarians, would call in the armies of Russia, already advanced to the frontier, and stationed in the neighbouring Turkish provinces. This reply must therefore be considered as written with that result in view—a result which the interposition of England could have alone averted. Its effect on the Hungarians must be self-evident, but it is used equally for the Austrians. It is sent to Vienna enclosed in the following despatch:—

"Foreign Office, December 20, 1848.

"MY LORD,—I herewith transmit to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to a person representing himself as charged with communications from Hungary.

"I am, &c.,

"PALMERSTON."

This is the only ostensible communication* made to Vienna during the whole course of these proceedings, that is to say, from February, 1848, down to August, 1849; when therefore the Intervention takes place, the formal communication of which reaches London on May 11th, 1849,† we are quite prepared to find that the British Minister has nothing to say, though perhaps not so for his announcing directly to the Government of St. Petersburg that fact. He writes as follows on the 17th of May.


"Foreign Office, May 17, 1849.

"Much as Her Majesty's Government regret this Interference of Russia, the causes which have led to it, and the effects which it may produce, they nevertheless have not considered the occasion to be one which *at present* calls for any formal expression of the opinions of Great Britain on the matter."

* There is another about the Diet which has no diplomatic bearing.

† It is announced the same day to Parliament in the following terms:—"Her Majesty's Government had this day received information from the Chargée d'Affaires at Vienna, that an application for military assistance *in a war between Austria and Hungary*, was sent by Austria to the Russian Government, and the application had been attended to, and was going to be complied with; and, although no Russian troops had as yet entered, a Russian force was expected. Her Majesty's Government had taken no steps to offer their mediation between Austria and Hungary, and the Austrian Government had no desire for such mediation."—*Lord Palmerston, May 11th, 1849.*

ENGLISH MEDIATION.



The Russian Intervention so prepared for, and so accepted, by the English Minister, appears, however, to have been treated by him in his communications with certain of the Representatives abroad as by no means likely, and as indeed *impossible*, in consequence of the communications he had received from the Russian Ambassador. In the Despatches to and from St. Petersburg there is not a line upon this matter; in those from Vienna, it is repeatedly mentioned, Lord Ponsonby more than once announcing his conviction, but not a word is addressed to him by the Foreign Minister. With Constantinople it is different: in the correspondence as published there is indeed nothing; but an incidental reference in the Despatches of Lord Ponsonby makes us aware of the fact. He quotes (Nov. 7, 1848) a passage from a suppressed Despatch of Lord Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning, on which he proceeds to make comments, showing that he considered it levelled against him no less than against Sir Stratford Canning. The passage is as follows:—

“There are some who imagine that the advance of that force in those” (the Danubian) *“provinces is not wholly unconnected with the events which have been passing in Hungary; and that the Emperor has contemplated the possibility of his being asked by the Austrian Government to assist in restoring order in Pesth.”*

We are left in the dark as to the remarkable passage which must have followed this quotation, but it does not require a very active imagination to fill up the void. Sir S. Canning has to be reconciled to the Occupation of Wallachia, and to be relieved from apprehensions as to the Invasion of Hungary. I therefore supply the omission with as much confidence as if I had before me the archives of the Foreign Office. I have more than once set down beforehand what that minister would say: I may venture after the event on what he has said:—

“Your Excellency is, however, far too judicious not to have observed that these troops, having entered without orders from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, the operation can scarcely have been combined with any ulterior views; that as the corps is not large, its entrance has been sanctioned (as stated in a communication I have received from Count Nesselrode), by the Porte; that having for its object the maintenance or re-establishment of order, and being limited to the performance of that service, Her Majesty’s Government do not feel themselves called upon to make any representation on the subject. Russia, moreover, has certain relations with those Principalities as a protecting Power, by virtue of Treaties, and therefore it is not entirely a case of the entrance of the troops of one Government into the territory of another.”

Every word here is Lord Palmerston’s own.* This is the only possible explanation of his conduct. Why, then, is it suppressed? Explanation! Who inquires into anything? The British nation does not; the world does not. All the Minister has to care for is an intemperate Despatch of one Ambassador (Sir Stratford Canning), and a captious question of one member of the House of Commons (Lord Dudley Stuart). When by a phrase he has secured the reluctant services of the one and the agitated friendship of the other, his difficulties are overcome. The Tyrian Hercules was represented with a closed fist and an open palm: this was the impersonation of art, a type reproduced wherever the science has prevailed; above all, in the Blue Books of the Foreign Office.

The reader may be curious to know why Lord Ponsonby made the quotation, and what he said thereupon. He said this:—“I have little doubt that the Emperor of Russia

* Questioned on the 2d March, 1849, in the House, respecting the entrance of the Russians into Transylvania, he says, they went for the protection of the “frontier towns,” “but they did not, I think, take any other part in the hostilities going on.”

would give the most efficient aid to the Emperor of Austria in Hungary." But he says something more, and hesitates not to tell his chief that, in case of need, the same aid will be afforded *for Italy!*

To judge by the Blue Books, the English Government must have treated the Hungarian war as a matter altogether subordinate and insignificant; not only as of no importance, but as a thing that positively had no existence; for how otherwise explain the total inaction, and next to total silence, of a Government not remarkable for its indifference, and of a Minister not characterised by either imbecility or diffidence, and who at the very time was exerting himself with ceaseless, unscrupulous, and inexplicable activity on every other field, to raise embarrassments to Austria and to furnish facilities to Russia? Now listen to Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, on the 21st of July:—

"I firmly believe that in this WAR *between Austria and Hungary* there is enlisted on the side of Hungary the hearts and souls of the whole people of that country. I believe that the other races distinct from the Magyars have forgotten the former feuds that existed between them and the Magyar population, and that the greater portion of the people have engaged in what they consider a great national contest.

"I take the question *that is now to be fought* for on the plains of Hungary to be this, whether Hungary shall continue to maintain its separate Nationality *as a distinct kingdom*, and with a Constitution of its own, or whether it is to be incorporated more or less in the *aggregate Constitution* that *is to be given* to the Austrian Empire. It is a most painful sight to see such forces as are now arrayed against Hungary, proceeding to a war fraught with such tremendous consequences on a question that it *might have been hoped would have been settled* peacefully. It is of the utmost importance to Europe that Austria should remain great and powerful; but it is impossible to disguise from ourselves that if the war is to be fought out, Austria must, &c.

“If, on the other hand, the war being fought out to the uttermost, Hungary should by superior forces” (what forces?) “be entirely crushed, Austria in that battle will have crushed her own right arm. Every field that is laid waste is an Austrian resource destroyed; every man that perishes upon the field among the Hungarian ranks is an Austrian soldier deducted from the defensive forces of the Empire.

“It is, I say, *devoutly to be wished* that this great contest may be brought to a termination by some amicable arrangement between the contending parties which shall on the one hand satisfy the national feelings of the Hungarians, and on the other hand not leave to Austria another and a larger Poland within her Empire.”

Why was not this written in a Despatch in the previous December, when the communications of Hungary were rejected with scorn, and transmitted to Vienna? Why not in November when Lord Ponsonby had exposed the absurdity of Lord Palmerston’s assumption that the Russians would not interfere? Why not in the previous month or months—why not at the origin of the difference? Why then *was* it said in Parliament in July—after, too, Russia had been told in May that the English Minister had nothing to say.

This speech, delivered amidst peals of applause by the supporters of the Government, filled with admiration their opponents. The unwarped earnestness of its tone, the deep bearing of its judgments, and the balanced arrangement and order of its exposition, made them see in the Minister by whom it was delivered a Statesman of whom England “was proud.” Who now on reading it could believe that when it was uttered, the Russian armies were in the centre of Hungary, and that the cheering audience knew the fact! It concludes in these terms:—

“In the *present state* of the matter, Her Majesty’s Government have not thought that any opportunity has AS YET presented itself that could enable them, with any prospect of

advantage, to make *any official* communication of those opinions which they entertain on this subject."

In the present state of the matter! Could it become better? Not a word till Russia has interfered: he waits to speak until he has an audience cowed. The Russia that never rises to his lips, is all that is in their thoughts, and their honour and courage are redeemed by the considerate "AS YET."

Supposing the Government up to the 21st of July had perceived nothing, and that only on the 21st of July, it had been startled at the awful consequences,—what was there to prevent its interposing then? "Oh," says Lord Palmerston, "Austria is indisposed to admit our Mediation." Were Austria's feelings consulted when the Italian Despatch of the 11th of September, 1847, was written, or her indignation regarded when it was published, without the reply? The question was now with Russia, not Austria: then it was a "domestic affair"—a Foreign Power interposes, and then the *Austrian* question is discussed! Of course, Austria is indisposed to an English Mediation; she has not forgotten Switzerland, Lombardy and Sicily; but that indisposition springing from fear, afforded the assurance of success. But having been informed that *in this case* England will not meddle, she of course presses on, and in all haste.

The checking of a commercial account is an easy matter; not so diplomatic entries, even if given complete, and *in extenso*; how much more so when the real business is done by "private communications," and even the ostensible documents are only inserted in extract? Still we must endeavour to make out the balance sheet.

By the Hungarian war, by the condition of Italy and Germany, by the fears entertained on the side of Poland, and by the excitement prevailing throughout the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austria were both neutralised. England's control over both was entire; without drawing a weapon

she could have broken them to pieces. Independently of these adventitious circumstances, the Foreign Minister was a man equal to carry into effect against the opposition of Russia, any legitimate object of British policy, and that minister had declared that the driving matters to extremity in Hungary, even as between it and Austria, was a matter the most alarming to British interests, and to those of all Europe. These points understood, the value of the "as yet" will be seen: the "as yet" was for Russia and not for England. This is not the first time that such an entry was made. When Austria and France applied to the same Minister for his co-operation in preventing the fall of Poland, his answer was "not yet."* The "yet" came with order restored at Warsaw. Now *it comes with order at Pesth.*

On the 1st of August England proposed to mediate. Had Austria's indisposition been removed? Was it the triumph of the Hungarians, or of the *Russians*, that had brought the change. The Despatch opens historically:—

* The Despatch in question was published by M. Louis Blanc, in his *Histoire de Dix Ans*. It has been several times read in the House of Commons, without its authenticity being questioned by Lord Palmerston. The following is an extract:—"That the amicable and satisfactory relations between the Cabinet of St. James's, and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, would not allow his Britannic Majesty to undertake such an interference. The time was NOT YET come to undertake such a plan with success against the will of a sovereign *whose rights were indisputable.*"

M. Louis Blanc thus mentions the transaction:

"M. Walewski was despatched to sound the disposition of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and that of St. James's: the Palais Royal did not reject the overtures of Austria, but simply declared that it was ready to join England, if England would consent to the project. M. Walewski then proceeded to London; but the answer of the British Cabinet was 'widely different from that of the French.' Lord Palmerston avowed 'without reserve' that *France* and '*no other Power*,' was the object of the '*distrust and fear of England.*'"

This passage I have also read in the House of Commons without a negation.

"This war, which in its outset seemed to be a conflict between a *discontented portion* of the population of Hungary, and the *Executive Government of Vienna*, has gradually assumed the character and proportions of an important European *transaction*." After enumerating the forces on both sides, Russia is slipped in in the following fashion:—"And in aid of this Austrian force, the whole disposable force of the Russian Empire *has been brought up* to take part in the war."

What can mean writing as follows from London to Vienna?

"To such an extent indeed has the Russian army been employed in this transaction, that it has been found necessary that between 20,000 and 30,000 of the Russian guards, who form the usual garrison of St. Petersburg, should be marched to the south, to take up positions evacuated by other divisions which have been sent to take the field in Hungary; and the combined Austrian and Russian forces operating in Hungary are said to amount to 300,000 men."

If Russia makes this effort, analogous ends are in view; but this the reader must not suspect, so he is immediately informed that Russia is "operating for interests *which can only be indirectly and constructively* its own." The subjugation of Hungary, he says, involves two questions: "First, How far the triumph will turn to the real and permanent advantage of Austria." He touchingly replies to himself, "The discontent of the heart will not be extinguished because the hand has been disarmed," and assures the Austrian Cabinet that Hungary will become "a political cancer, corroding the vital elements of the Empire's existence." The second question is, "What will be the compensation to be made for the gigantic exertions by which she will have been enabled to achieve that triumph?" He is here not quite so explicit, and reverts to a familiar formula: "That

the English Government *is entitled to inquire** whether any arrangements are in contemplation at variance with the letter, or the spirit, of the Treaty of Vienna." What! when the interests of Russia have only just been stated as "indirect and constructive." As there was no one who did not see that the Emperor of Russia now commanded at Vienna, so was there no one who had imagined, that a new delimitation of frontiers was required. The Despatch was written not to save the people of Hungary, but to satisfy those of England; not to influence the Cabinet of Vienna, but to stultify that of St. James's; not to put in the hands of Prince Schwartzberg, but in those of the printer of the House of Commons. It continues :

"Her Majesty's Government *would most heartily rejoice*, if they *could entertain a hope*, that this conflict between an entire nation," (discontented portion?) "*and the armies of two great Empires might be brought to an early termination by an arrangement.*"

If they could entertain! They do entertain.

"It appears to her Majesty's Government, that matters have NOT YET gone so far as to render such an arrangement impossible."

"NOT YET" again—with the Russians in the centre of the country—after the abolition of Hungary as an independent State—after their dethronement of the King! You have no remonstrance, or protest, to show at Vienna, you answer the Hungarians, that you know Hungary only through Baron Koller, you send that answer to Vienna,—consequently the wonderful hope is soon turned to joy by the "happy and early return to good order and peace."

* See Despatch, calling Russia to account for her proceedings in Central Asia, October 26th, 1838.

This Despatch pretends to no other character than that of "reflections" on "One of the most important events that Europe has of late years *experienced*." It surely does not require to be a Minister of State to make reflections on important events: if nothing but reflections are to be expected from Ministers of State, the expense is very superfluous, and the secrecy very absurd. These reflections might just as well appear in a leader, when they might be read by the Government to which they are addressed, and if without profit, at least without offence. Then follows the specification of "the best means of carrying into effect the *purposes* of her Majesty's Government," which is by "reading this Despatch to Prince Schwartzenberg, and giving him a copy of it."

A second Despatch, of the same date, directs the Ambassador to state, that he will feel great pleasure in attending, without the least delay, to any intimation which he may receive of the wishes of the Austrian Government to enter into negotiation with the Hungarians. Good God! where is Baron Koller?

It is just, however, possible, that when the proposal of Mediation was sent, the Minister might not have been CERTAIN that the case was desperate. Let us see.

On the 8d of July, a long Despatch was written at the English Embassy, at Vienna, of which the following is the first paragraph:—

"The operations of the Austrian and Russian armies in Hungary are pushed on with vigour, and have been attended with such success, since I last had the honour to address your lordship on this subject, that a *not distant end of the civil war may be confidently looked to.*"

This was received seven days before the Speech in the House, and eighteen days before the Offer of Mediation.

On the 14th of July, a mass of intelligence is again despatched, the first paragraph of which announces *the occupation without resistance of the Capital of Hungary*. This was

received on the day the Speech in the House of Commons was delivered, and eleven days before the Offer of Mediation.

On the 17th of July it is announced that Marshal Pas-kiewitch is advancing on the left bank of the Danube, towards Comorn, to cut off the retreat of the Hungarians—that General Grabbe has passed the mountains from the north—that the Russian corps in Transylvania have repulsed General Bem, and taken twelve pieces of cannon, and that there are “no accounts of any large Hungarian forces in the field except the two mentioned.” This is received seven days before the Offer of Mediation.

On the 21st of July, Lord Ponsonby writes, “the Hungarian army from Comorn is under the command of Görgey, and is said to be about 50,000 strong, with 120 pieces of cannon. Being foiled in their attempt to pass by Waitzen, and from thence by Pesth to Czegled they retreated under cover of the night towards the north, and the third corps of the Russian army under General Rüdiger is now in pursuit of them,” and further reports, “that the capital of Transylvania had been occupied by the Russian corps of General Lüders.”

This arrives three days before the Offer of Mediation.

On the 22d of July, Lord Ponsonby writes, “the Hungarian army under Görgey was by the last accounts retreating along the road which leads from Waitzen to Balassa-Gyarmath and Losoncz, at which latter place it was supposed they would arrive on the 19th instant. They are closely pursued and continually harassed by the Russian corps of General Rüdiger, and the official reports state that the men were deserting ‘in thousands.’

“The second edition of the Gazette of this morning says that the Hungarians under Bem in Transylvania had met with another defeat from the corps of General Lüders; and that the Austrian corps of Count Clam-Gallas was marching upon Cronstadt to occupy the district which had been reduced.”

Now, not a moment is to be lost, and in two days after the receipt of this communication, an elaborate despatch is on its way to Vienna with the Offer of Mediation.

It is curious that the *day before* a messenger should arrive from St. Petersburg without, at so critical a moment, bringing a single line worthy of insertion in the Blue Book.

However, by whoever devised, the plan was inimitable. Under such circumstances a Mediation was a bold and even original conception, but the result entirely depended on the *apropos*; the moment was to be hit between the impossibility of its having effect, and the possibility of proposing it. That moment was calculated with an astronomical precision that would have done honour to a Halley or a Herschel: a day before, it might have been attended to; a day after it could not have been sent. Nor is this all; it is so managed that it is sent and never arrives; and is published in London, without having been received at Vienna!

It so happened, that *exactly the day before* it reached Vienna, Prince Schwartzenberg had started for *Warsaw*. Of course it could not be communicated to any other member of the Austrian Government; Lord Ponsonby has, therefore, to express in reply his regrets that he has had no opportunity "of carrying out your Lordship's instructions:" however, "his Highness will probably *not* return before the end of the week." Before that week ended, Hungary was finally blown up, and, of course, there was no further any need to carry out his Lordship's instructions: the Mediation born in a "Not yet," expired in a "No longer." On the 23d day of the self-same month that had witnessed the Rise and Occultation of this Lunar phenomenon from the Bedford Hotel at Brighton,—

"Baron Brunow presents his compliments to Viscount Palmerston, and has the honour to *communicate*, &c., in the persuasion that he will learn with satisfaction an event which puts an end to the shedding of human blood, &c."

What had Baron Brunow to do with communicating on a subject on which his Government had been three months before informed that England had nothing to say: how

should he usurp the post of Baron Koller, from whom alone communications could be received respecting the "component parts" of the "Austrian dominions," or assume that his information at Brighton was so far in advance of that of the British Minister in Downing-street? But mark how accident helps Russia,—the Foreign Minister positively was without intelligence :—

"Lord Palmerston presents his compliments to Baron Brunow, and must rejoice in *learning*, &c."

The same enthusiastic and hopeful temperament induces Lord Palmerston to congratulate on the same Event the Austrian Government which had not condescended to announce it. Psychologically, the incident is curious, and the Despatch deserves the honour of insertion *in extenso*.

"*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

"*Foreign Office, August 28, 1849.*

"MY LORD,—I have to instruct your Excellency to express to the Austrian Government the satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government have felt at *hearing* that the calamitous war which for the *last two months* has desolated Hungary, has been brought to a close *by a pacification* which Her Majesty's Government *hope* will prove in its results beneficial to all parties concerned. The eyes of all Europe will of course *now* be directed to the proceedings of the Austrian Government in a matter which has excited so deep and general an interest; and Her Majesty's Government *would fail in the performance of their duty*, if they were not to instruct you to express the anxious hope which they feel in common with the people of this country, that the Austrian Government will make a generous use of the successes which it has obtained, and that in the arrangements which may be made between the Emperor of Austria and the Hungarian nation, due regard will be had to the ancient Constitutional rights of Hungary. A settlement founded on such a basis,

with such *improvements* as the altered circumstances of the present times may require, will be the best security, not only for the welfare and contentment of Hungary, but for the *future strength* and prosperity of the Austrian Empire. Your Excellency will read this Despatch to Prince Schwartzberg, and will give him a copy of it.

“I am, &c.

“(Signed) PALMERSTON.”

Her Majesty's Government's hopes, endeavours, and advice, are, however, always exposed to misadventure; Prince Schwartzberg makes the most unbecoming return, and sends a ferocious reply, which concludes in these terms:—

“The world is agitated by a spirit of general subversion. England herself is not exempt from the influence of this spirit; witness Canada, the Island of Cefalonia, and finally, unhappy Ireland. But wherever revolt breaks out within the vast limits of the British Empire, the English Government always knows how to maintain the authority of the law, were it even at the price of torrents of blood.

“It is not for us to blame her. Whatever may, moreover, be the opinion which we form as to the causes of these insurrectionary movements, as well as of the measures of repression employed by the British Government in order to stifle them, we consider it our duty to abstain from expressing that opinion, persuaded as we are that persons are apt to fall into gross errors, in making themselves judges of the often so complicated position of foreign countries.

“By this conduct we consider we have acquired the right to expect that Lord Palmerston will practise with respect to us a perfect reciprocity,

“You will read this Despatch to his Lordship, and you will give him a copy of the same.”

Such are the contents of the first Blue Book. I have, however, omitted two important particulars: first, that the addresses from the cities of England in favour of Hungary are

communicated regularly to Vienna, Constantinople, and St. Petersburg; second, that the Russian Government has been informed that it is the opinion of Lord Palmerston, that "it is highly desirable that the troops of each country should be kept within their own frontiers."

Although, as proof, nothing more is required or need be added, I cannot conclude this part of the subject without recurring to some of the points where prevailing misjudgments facilitated deception.

If we turn to the negotiations of 1792, which preceded the Coalition against France, it will be seen that England attached peculiar importance to the signature of the Emperor of Austria being appended as "King of Hungary;"—England was then under a Tory administration,—not Tory only in the English sense, but Anti-Revolutionary in the European one. It is, therefore, neither in the archives of the Foreign Office, nor in the practice of English Diplomacy, that it was found that Hungary was a "component part" of the "Austrian dominions,"—as the already cited transactions of 1711 show that it was neither unseemly nor impossible to hold communication with a Nation in arms against its Sovereign. In 1711, we wished to strengthen Austria as an Ally; in 1848, we apprehend (as it is professed) the subversion of her independence, and we adopt the opposite course. We reject the application of the one, and adopt as the *rule of our conduct* the unwillingness of the other. Avowed desires remain barren, important interests are superseded, acknowledged dangers incurred, through ceremonious reserve. A reserve, however, unknown in the meridians of Italy and Denmark, where the forms of office and the courtesies of life are forgotten. Was it that subversive doctrines had not as yet taken root in Hungary? Was it that Italy was to be convulsed that Hungary might be put down?

This scrupulousness might still be intelligible, if the Hungarian agent had been commissioned by persons merely disaffected, or engaged simply in plots, but Hungary enjoyed

a *de facto* existence, her flag had been inaugurated by victories ; that flag was neither " fanciful " nor " piratical," like that of the German Empire on the coast of Denmark ; she possessed belligerent Rights and was at war, and is told that she can be communicated with only through the Representative of the Power with whom that war is being carried on !

If this reply was intended to repress inordinate hopes on the part of the Hungarians, the matter of it might be understood, however reprehensible the manner, but then it would have been carefully concealed from Austria, that her pretensions might not be inflamed. Yet a communication so evidently designed to prevent a settlement passes with success as proof that the opposite result had been desired and sought.

The salient features are: vehemence in the House of Commons, silence at St. Petersburg ; contradiction between Minister and Ambassador ; the adoption of opposite sides *in reference to a war* by the British embassies, that of Vienna rejoicing in every defeat of the one party, that of Constantinople exulting in every check of the other, and all combining in one result : whoever recoils from the admission of system, must fall back on incoherence ; but in such a case, to what must incoherence lead ?

The result, however, of the war wholly hinged upon a point excluded from view, or fallaciously disguised under the terms " Turkish Neutrality." He, whoever he was, who reduced the Ottoman Empire to that predicament, and not Prince Paskiewitch, placed Hungary at the " feet of the Czar."

CHAPTER IV.

Turkish Neutrality.

FOR all military purposes Turkey was a party in the war ; she did not send forward Armies, but she lent her territory for the Russian operations, along a frontier of several hundred miles ; opening passages through the mountains of the North and East into Transylvania, which otherwise would have been inaccessible, and giving entrance from the South through the gorge of the Danube into the plains of Lower Hungary. The resources of these Provinces—money, provisions, and means of transport, were also usurped by Russia, and rendered subservient to the war. The Austrians when beaten found refuge there, and supplies, and thence they again issue to attack Hungary. The Russian armies did not indeed enter Serbia, but there also were organised bodies of Invasion, not perhaps dangerous in the field, but calculated to excite intestine feuds by their relationship to the populations of the Banat. The enlistment took place under the auspices of the Russian Consul, and the money was paid at “the Consulate.” These effects were not limited to the period when Russia became a party in the war, but were in operation from its very commencement, and the Russian troops themselves had been engaged in Transylvania three months before the avowed Intervention took place. Had Turkey remained neutral, the Hungarians would have been secure on the whole of their Southern and Eastern frontiers, and could have brought up their entire disposable force to the North ; so that the results in a military point of view, may be said to have been determined by the participation of Turkey in the war.

This participation was, however, not voluntary. Her readiness, after the fall of Hungary, to meet the combined

forces of Russia and Austria to save a few of the exiles from an ignominious fate, dispenses me from the necessity of proving that the Turkish nation was ready to incur the risks, and undergo the sacrifices of a war to save Hungary, and the desistance of those two Empires from pressing their demand after, as I shall presently show, they had received the concurrence of England and France, equally relieves me from the necessity of proving, that its military resources were equal to such an enterprise. Turkey had at the time 212,000 disciplined men, and could have raised, without difficulty, 100,000 irregular horse, the whole of which she could have sent forward without any inconvenience or risk. She could have supplied the Hungarians with arms, of which they were principally in need, and the presence of a single Turkish regiment would have changed the whole face of the contest in Hungary.

If then the participation of Turkey in the war on the side of Russia influenced the result, the assurance of her non-participation on the side of Hungary was requisite for its inception. It was a wonderful plan to combine, and it was settled in anticipation. It entirely depended upon the introduction of a Russian force into the Turkish Provinces of the Danube, which was executed when the Hungarian war was as yet undreamt of, save by visionaries, and when no difference existed between Russia and the Porte. It was, therefore, a direct attack upon the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and a violation of the Treaty of 1840, to which England, but not France, was a party. It could only, therefore, be carried by the concurrence of England; the evidence of that concurrence is to be found, not only in the absence of all opposition but in the effectual support given at Constantinople, and the declarations made in the House of Commons, where the English Minister stated falsely, that it was a measure undertaken with the consent and concurrence of the Turkish Government.* This Occupation was then sanctioned

* See Speeches, 1st Sept. 1848; 2d March, 1849; 22d March, 1849

by a Treaty, against which the Turkish Government, in vain, sought the support of the English Ambassador, and by that Treaty it was to continue to the year 1856. Henceforward the "Neutrality" of Turkey was practicable only by the cessation of the Occupation by Russia, against which such precautions had been taken. That "Neutrality" could be observed only by saying to Russia, "you shall not enter;" it could not be maintained by saying, "you shall not go out." Had the Russian troops been on the Pruth, the Turkish troops would have been at Pesth; but the Russian troops, being on the Danube, it was the Cossacks who arrived at Pesth. And it is England who has compromised the Porte into this false position, who urges upon it the maintenance of its "Neutrality."

Reduced to this dilemma, the "Neutrality" of Turkey had merely reference to the departure of the Russian troops from Wallachia, where alone their presence had been endured on the score of their being required to maintain internal tranquillity; at least, it was not by urging at Constantinople the maintenance of Turkish "Neutrality" no more than by writing to St. Petersburg, that it had nothing to say respecting the "*neutrality*" of Russia, that is, the Invasion of Hungary, that any results could be obtained in the sense of the principles expounded to Parliament on the 21st July, 1849.

The entrance, in June, 1848, of the Russian troops into the Provinces had indeed been, according to the British Minister, "without orders from St. Petersburg." On the 1st of February, 1849, these insubordinate and erratic forces, equally "without orders," enter Transylvania! Immediately, Sir Stratford Canning says to the Porte:—

"I do not doubt that my Government will consider the said Intervention as prejudicing the rights of the Porte, and as calculated to make a most painful impression on the Porte, owing to the serious consequences which may follow." He writes home (4th February) that the French Ambassador had read to him a Despatch, "Which expressed goodwill towards the Porte, and a just sense of all that was objection-

able in the late proceedings of Russia. We separated with an understanding that our respective interpreters should wait on Aali Pasha this morning with instructions *calculated to encourage the Porte in maintaining substantially the view taken by its Commissioner at Bucharest of the Military Intervention in Transylvania authorised by the Russian Government*"*

Lord Palmerston answers, February 28th—

"I have to observe to your Excellency on this matter, that undoubtedly the passage of Russian troops through Turkish territory for the purpose of interfering in the civil war in the Austrian dominions, was an infraction of the neutrality *which the Porte had determined to adopt in regard to that civil war, and was a fit subject of remonstrance on the part of the Porte.*"

As if he were speaking of a theme for a sonnet, or a subject for an essay. Sir Stratford Canning writes again on the 5th April—

"The Porte has not materially *relaxed its preparations* for an untoward contingency. Besides the circumstances which I have mentioned elsewhere, fresh orders have been sent to repair the defences of Varna and Silistria; the Militia is collecting in the adjacent Province of Broussa, and the Pasha of

* The Consul at Bucharest thus details the views of the Turkish Commissioner, Fuad Effendi, 22d February, 1847:—"His Excellency begged General Duhamel to consider the effect of such a departure from all the principles of non-intervention which European Cabinets had laid down, that such a measure might lead to the adoption of a line of conduct on the part of France towards Austria on the Italian question, which France herself would regret to be forced to adopt; that any measure of this nature was an infraction of the law of nations, and of the treaty of 1841, to which Russia herself was a party; and that, in the name of the Sultan, as his Representative, he declared himself opposed to the movement.

"I must do Fuad" (Effendi?) "the justice to say I found him firm and consistent, and resolved to continue so; but very anxious for instructions from Constantinople.

"These are critical and difficult times, and I hope your Excellency will continue to favour me with your kind advice and instructions."

Bosnia is ordered to have in readiness the whole disposable force of his neighbourhood."

Now Lord Palmerston with despatch and explicitness replies, 24th April—

"I have to acquaint you that Baron Brunow has stated to me that it is not the intention of the Emperor of Russia, *in consequence of the retreat* of the Russian detachment from Hermanstadt, to order his troops to advance into Transylvania, or to take any part in the civil war now raging in that province or in Hungary; *BUT that His Imperial Majesty will content himself with bestowing on the commander, and officers, and men of that detachment, his approbation of the manner in which they made their retreat, after having held in check for many hours a very superior force.*" (!)

I have underlined the last sentence, to call attention to the value of a disjunctive particle, in reducing to the soberest dimensions the Intervention of a foreign Power in a "civil war," and in persuading another foreign Power, thereby vitally endangered, to take the matter coolly.

On the same day that this Despatch was written in Downing Street, Mr. Magennis was writing from Vienna :

"The reports from the Danubian Provinces mention the concentration of *large bodies of Russian troops along the Transylvanian frontier*. I can hardly doubt that the *double motive of combating Polish anarchy and of overthrowing revolutionary principles in Hungary* would insure the compliance of the Russian Government with any application from hence for aid."

But Sir Stratford Canning, by the same messenger which brought from Lord Palmerston information of the Emperor of Russia's intention to take no further part in the war, received the official announcement of the Intervention! What must have been the reflections of that Ambassador? Can this incident have any connexion with the sudden burst of indignation, which startled a Christmas dinner party of

the British merchants, when striking the table with his clenched fist, he exclaimed, "*And I serve such men!*"

The "official" intelligence which reached Vienna on the 3d of May must have thence arrived in London in a week. Is Baron Brunow called to account for his imposition, or Russia for her act? No! The Minister, as we have seen, hastens to announce to Russia that he has "nothing to say!"

Sir Stratford Canning nevertheless goes on writing:—

"The signal continued successes obtained by the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Banat are attended with consequences which *threaten to compromise the Porte's neutrality*, and to expose its adjacent provinces to the calamities of war. In addition to the number of private refugees who have poured into Serbia and Wallachia, it is known that General Puchner's army, to the amount of 12,000 men, has again sought refuge in the latter Principality.

"This near approach, or rather actual presence, of a danger *long foreseen and pointed out*, has afforded me an opportunity, which I have not neglected, of again urging the Porte to maintain its neutrality *in a more steady and efficient manner*. My repeated communications upon the subject with Aali Pasha have not been wholly fruitless."

Lord Palmerston replies on the 2d of July:—

"Her Majesty's Government entirely approve *the language* which you describe yourself in it to have held to the Porte, *with the view of inducing it to maintain a strict neutrality* in regard to the contest now going on in Hungary. The Porte ought *for its own sake* to maintain and assert the neutrality of the Turkish territory, *as far as it is able to do so, without coming into hostile collision with its stronger neighbours.*"

Sir S. Canning had fancied that he was able to force his Government by committing it. He is now told to take care how he compromises Turkey.

Stronger neighbours! Austria defeated and requiring Russia's aid—Russia forced to bring up her last resources;* the Hungarian armies still unsundered:—a single movement of the Turks in advance taking the Russians in the rear calling the Cossacks and the Poles to independence,—this is the story of Poland over again.

When charged in the House of Commons with having stopped the preparations of Sweden, Turkey, and Persia, to support Poland, and with having rejected the proposals of Austria and France to the same effect, he answered (1st of March, 1848), "I saved them from a useless and a fatal step, for Russia was stronger than Sweden, stronger than Turkey, stronger than Persia, as she was stronger than Poland." Of course, it was to be inferred, though it was not stated, that she was also stronger than Austria, and stronger than France: she was so, but it was by his means. The argument, however, was *An aggregate of strength is an accumulation of weakness*: by this argument fell, first Poland, and then Hungary,—the fall of the one prepared the way for the fall of the other: they have been laid prostrate not only by the same logic, but by the same logician.

I have already mentioned the mission of a Hungarian agent to Constantinople:—the circumstances, as they were related to me, respecting it are too remarkable to omit:—if true, they require to be known and if false, contradicted.

His arrival, I have been informed, was hailed with delight by the party in the Divan for war, who, though not strong enough to carry such a decision, were able to obtain not only that communication should be opened with him, but also that practical aid should be afforded to the Hungarians by a supply of arms, and by suggesting to them the occupation of the fortress of Orshova, which, standing on an island of the Danube where it breaks through the chain of the

* A month later he himself writes: "THE WHOLE DISPOSABLE FORCE OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP TO TAKE PART IN THIS WAR."

Carpathians, is the Padlock of Hungary on the side of Wallachia, and which, if held by the Hungarians, would have prevented the entrance of the Russian troops, and so far preserved Turkey's honour and "Neutrality." A person of character and distinction was therefore selected to communicate with the agent, who, without circumlocution, informed him that 200,000 stands of arms would be landed on the left bank of the Danube, which the Hungarians would pay for in raw produce; and further, that the fortress of Orshova was at that moment occupied by only a few troops. The Envoy rushed to communicate this unexpected success to the British Ambassador, who, in his well-known zeal for Hungary, disdained to be outstripped, offered to place England in the position which Turkey was about to occupy, and named an English house at Constantinople (Messrs. Hanson) for the management of the speculation. The agent rushed back again to inform his Turkish friends of his "golden achievement" (*J'ai fait une affaire d'or*), and to his astonishment perceived that his joy was not shared; the Turkish Government instantly withdrew its proposals, within three days it was called to account by the Russian and Austrian Embassies, and of course no muskets were shipped from the Thames.

These facts I give as I have received them; I have them under no pledge of secrecy. Certain it is that at this period rumours were generally spread of arms to be furnished by Turkey to the Hungarians, and of her being on the point of declaring in their favour. The name of the agent is Mr. Browne, cousin of Lord Stanley of Alderley.

When the affair is quite over, a day after the demand of Extradition has been despatched from Warsaw, Lord Palmerston indulges in a safe epigram on Turkish Neutrality, which he transmits to the agitated consul at Bucharest:—

"I have to observe to you that *the laws* of neutrality require that *equal measures* should be meted out to both of the contending parties; and that *either* both *or* neither should be allowed to enter and to make use of the Turkish territory"

This is the "Neutrality" of the Dardanelles—all nations are *equally excluded*, but the Russians are *inside*.

There now remained only to exchange the congratulatory notes between Downing Street and the Bedford Hotel on the restoration of "order and peace;" and so closes one chapter of the "union of England and Russia to maintain the peace of the world."*

* Declaration of Lord Durham.

CHAPTER V.

Extradition of Refugees.

TWENTY days after the offer of Mediation has reached Vienna, Sir Stratford Canning writes (28th August).

"TO-DAY, the Austrian Minister has presented a strong official note demanding the extradition of all refugees, without entering into any distinction of offences.

"In point of *fact* the Porte's neutrality has been sacrificed in a *far greater degree* to the military operations of Russia and the unfortunate necessities of Austria THAN to *any* partiality for a people having many traditional claims to their sympathy and goodwill, &c. Under these circumstances *I only anticipate your lordship's opinion*, when I submit that the Ottoman ministers are fairly entitled to support *in continuing to carry out* 'a principle' [what principle, —neutrality, or its sacrifice?] which *it has been my duty*, and *to all appearance* that of General Aupick also, to inculcate."

Any negotiations with respect to this matter had to be carried on in London with the Representative of Austria, or at all events at Vienna; and if anything was to be done not a moment had to be lost. The Despatch reached London on the 9th of September. The matter was one which presented not the slightest difficulty of judgment. I have already stated the case; not only were the Treaties clear, but there were precedents in point. The intelligence had reached London long before this communication of Sir Stratford Canning; the former demand had been expedited from Warsaw on the 14th of August, as from Vienna news could reach London in half the time that it took to travel to Constantinople, the demand must have been known to Lord Palmerston before it could be so to Sir Stratford Canning.

If not, of what earthly use can Ambassadors be? Still even Sir Stratford Canning's communication is left unanswered for *thirteen days*, and then not a single line is addressed to Vienna,—the reply reaches Constantinople after the matter has been settled *at St. Petersburg*.

This single statement disposes of the whole case. The "bottleholding" is simply reduced to being out of the way. It was not for nothing that Kossuth said and repeated so often, "Read the Blue Books!" But the difficulty was to find readers. Of what avail would be the publication of logarithms for a Nation that did not understand arithmetic? No one in England studies Diplomacy, or knows anything of diplomatic action, and then they are knocked down with "Blue Books." The contents are nothing, the volume and cover everything. It suffices then to say, "Take my word, or — read that." No one knows better than the English Minister that the printing of ostensible Despatches is not the way to enlighten a Parliament or instruct a Nation, and that for that purpose explanation and exposition are required, and not precisely of that nature with which a Finsbury deputation is content. Here are the words he once used when in opposition:—

"We should know what have been the principles upon which our Government has acted,—what has been the spirit in which the influence of England has been exerted,—what objects have been aimed at, and by what means we have sought to attain them."^a

These words were uttered in leading an opposition against the Government of which *Lord Aberdeen* was Foreign Secretary, because it was not sufficiently Russian! A man must know what is right, in order systematically to practise what is wrong.

I arrived in Turkey, a few days after the demand of Extradition was made. I was confidentially informed of it by one of the local governors intimately connected with high Personages, who all considered war imminent, and urged me

to proceed without delay to Constantinople. My answer was—'There is not the slightest chance of war. The demand is a feint. The real point is elsewhere.'

I returned in five or six weeks to the same place, and the same Functionary was again the first to announce to me an approaching settlement; and I then explained as follows, the reasons for my opinion which I refused to give on the former occasion, which was that the Sultan could not surrender the Refugees, and Austria and Russia were destitute of power to force him to do so. I had brought a Paris Caricature, representing the President as a Bear's Cub, and placed it before him. 'You mean,' said he, 'that a quarrel is got up to throw dust in the eyes of the Parisians.'

This Functionary had no difficulty in comprehending and admitting the necessity in which Russia stood of disguising from the people of Europe, the collusion with herself of their Governments; but it was with difficulty that he admitted, and never would have done so, unless in consequence of the result, her powerlessness, even when backed by Austria, to attack the Ottoman territory. It is most strange how nations not diplomatic, will mistake their strength and weakness. Here Turkey after the Herculean effort of creating an army of 300,000 men, and filled from frontier to frontier with indignation in which there was no distinction between Mussulman and Christian, believes that it owes its protection from a danger which never existed, not to this real strength of mind and body, but to a Foreign protection which never was given; whilst Europe, being unconscious of the existence of this army and this feeling, attributes the same result to an exercise of its own power, with the "Blue Books" in its hand which prove that no such power was ever exercised. Suffice it to say, that if Russia invaded the Tartarian wilds included in the Chinese Empire, she would only sacrifice an Army, and she has never committed such a folly; but had she in the month of September, 1849, sent an army across the Danube, it is her Existence that she would have sacrificed. These are the

grounds upon which I treated with calculated scorn, justified by the result, the pretended alarming complication in reference to the Refugees; and whether I am right or wrong in assuming that the object of it was to enable Louis Napoleon to wind his horn and blow a blast of simulated defiance, at all events I must be right in the assertion, that the object which the Russian Cabinet had in view, was some other than that which was professed.

The pretence of having given support to Turkey is based not upon the act or declaration of the British Government, which it was impossible that it should be, since none existed, but upon opinions and words of Sir Stratford Canning; who was not kept at Constantinople without an object, that of effectually disguising by his opinions the purposes of his chief, of affording a cloak of his known integrity, while at the same time removing from Parliament an inconvenient Critic.

On the 3d of September, he writes as follows:—

“*On grounds of humanity* not unmixed with considerations affecting the Porte’s character and future policy, I have not hesitated to *advise a decided resistance* to the demand of Extradition. I have further endeavoured to dissuade the Turkish Ministers from pledging themselves to any measure of restraint, not clearly prescribed by the terms of Treaties, and from contracting any engagement not leaving a certain latitude of action for the future.”

Next day, Prince Radzevil arrives with the autograph letter of the Emperor, not given in the “Blue Books.” It is as follows:—

“The leading principles of the Alliance between the two Empires, and which have been signalised so strikingly by the Ottoman authorities on the Danube in their steps against the gangs of Magyars which threw themselves on the Ottoman territory, give me the most intimate conviction that Y. M. will recommend a question which I have much at heart to the most serious attention of your Ministry. Such is the object

of the representations with which I have entrusted my Representative at Constantinople, relative to some Polish Refugees who, having been guilty of high treason against my Government, have lately taken so criminal a part in the events which have ravaged Hungary.

“With the sincere desire that no cloud may rise between the two Empires, I attach a peculiar value to the solution of this affair, fully confident that the representations of M. Titoff will find a favourable reception with your Majesty. I request you to accept the assurance of the feelings of high consideration and inviolable attachment, with which I am

“Your Majesty’s good Brother,

“NICOLAS.”

The French Ambassador sends in haste to inform Sir S. Canning of the menacing nature of these communications, and Sir Stratford, in his Despatch of the 5th of September, mentions that the Internuncio was to have the next morning an audience of the Sultan to obtain an assurance that the Refugees should be “*interné*” and “*surveillé*.” Observe that this is on the *fifth* of September. He goes on to state, “there is no indication of a change in the intentions of the Porte:” that “the impression of every one is, that the Porte is placed in a most painful and dangerous dilemma. . . . *the result of its present isolation*. . . . The ultimate issue will depend upon the prospect of support from England and France.”*

* The complete sentence is as follows:—“In the meantime there is no indication of a change in the intentions of the Porte, though the serious, not to say alarming, nature of the position is deeply felt. The Sultan’s firmness will, however, be put to a severe trial, and so will that of his enlightened Minister; nor can I pretend to say what counsels will ultimately prevail. The first impression of every one is, that the Porte is placed in a most painful and dangerous dilemma, between the conflicting sentiments of honour and humanity on the one side, and of apprehensions, the natural result of its present isolation, on the other. The resource of an appeal to Europe may sustain it for the present: but the ultimate issue will naturally depend upon the prospect of support from England and France.”

Between the 5th and the 6th of September, when Prince Radzevil took his departure, discussions which took place, were regularly communicated to Sir S. Canning, and by him transmitted home.

Now before the documents were published, and when the English Government was taking credit for having supported Turkey, a credit irreconcilable with the concession of internal surveillance which the Porte had made, it boldly extricated itself by a falsehood and a charge—it charged the Turkish Government with concealing from it these communications.

Prince Radzevil came to demand a “Yes,” or a “No,” in eight and forty hours : he adopted towards the Sultan forms the most offensive, language the most haughty. The Porte extricated itself from the dilemma with that dexterity which it always evinces when forced into action : it told the Envoy that the answer would be given at St. Petersburg, to which place an Ambassador of the Sultan was *already* on his way. An autograph letter from the Sultan to the Emperor was presented to him, which he declined to take charge of.

The Porte had now definitively taken its stand in its “isolation,” “without the support of England and France,” and consequently, whether that support did, or did not arrive, it equally had to bear the consequences. It hastily called up its reserves, and an army of 65,000 men was assembled at the capital. Throughout the country, as I can testify, (travelling as I was through it at the time), far from the doubts or apprehensions which appear to have prevailed in higher quarters and to have divided the Ministry, there was but one feeling of indignation and confidence : “every male, from sixteen to sixty ;” such was the reply received in a village when I asked them how many men they would send to the Danube. Nor was the Sovereign behind his People : when it was told the Sultan that this demand was about to be made, he started up and exclaimed : “Shall I, who am Master of the Empire, be denied the right of refuge, which I cannot refuse to the meanest of my subjects, in the

case even of a culprit? Sooner let the Empire itself perish!"

The die was now cast; the honour or disgrace of the course rested alone with the Porte: no despatch had arrived from England.* Here is the view of the case as stated by Sir Stratford Canning on the 17th of December:—

"Allow me to add, my lord, that in proportion as I admire the courageous firmness with which the Sultan and his Government have determined to make this stand in the cause of humanity and of the fair rights of honour and dignity, against a demand alike objectionable in substance and in form, I feel a deepening anxiety for the result of their resistance, and for the degree of support which Her Majesty's Government and that of France may find themselves at liberty to afford, not only in the first instance, but in still graver circumstances, should the present partial rupture unfortunately assume a more serious and menacing character."

Under this alarm for Turkey and doubts of England, Sir S. Canning writes to Admiral Parker, to know whether any portion of Her Majesty's squadron was "available for any *purposes of demonstration*," and whether he was "at liberty, without *bringing attention on the real object*, to place it

* "It ought never to be forgotten that the peremptory refusal of the Sultan to deliver up these gallant defenders of a righteous cause to the base and merciless vengeance of Austria and Russia, was given before he knew whether he should be supported in that refusal by the Western Powers of Europe or not. It must be also remembered, that the conduct of those Western Powers had not always been such as to lead him to the conclusion that they would be sure to assist him. Yet he waited not for the arrival of a British fleet in the waters of Turkey, nor for any intimation of its approach, but at once, without hesitation, decided that the brave sons of liberty who craved the protection of Turkish hospitality, should receive it at whatever cost. But for this noble act, so worthy of a great Sovereign, and of that character which the Turks have always maintained, Kossuth would, beyond all doubt, have been consigned to the same ignominious death as his fellow-patriot, Louis Batthyanyi."—*Letter of Lord Dudley Stuart.*

at once in somewhat nearer communication with Her Majesty's Embassy?" but on this communication the impulsive admiral did not think fit to move.

Fuad Effendi arrived at St. Petersburg, with the autograph letter from the Sultan, and had his audience on the 16th of October. The glacial bearing assumed at Constantinople has thawed in the more genial climate of the North, and as anticipated by Lord Ponsonby,* the adjustment of the matter experiences no difficulty.

On the 16th October, the British Minister at St. Petersburg, however, was *without instructions*; things are so close run that on *that day* he has to announce to Count Nesselrode, that he *has none*,—the orders had been sent to Admiral Parker to sail to the Dardanelles ten days before. Now observe the dates: the Russian demand of Extradition was dated Warsaw, 14th of August: the Austrian, was made *at Constantinople*, on the 25th of August; the Despatch announcing it arrived in London on the 9th of September: the whole case was detailed in Sir Stratford Canning's Despatch of the 3d September, and its enclosures: the final proceedings, including the application of the Turkish Government, both through its own Ambassador, and through Sir Stratford Canning, together with the rupture of diplomatic relations with Austria and Russia, reached London on the 1st of October; on the 3d, Lord Palmerston was in possession of the departure of Fuad Effendi for St. Petersburg. If time and distance interfered to prevent his action at Constantinople, nothing prevented the transmission of his decision to St. Petersburg. He now further delays for six days. A thundering Despatch is then written so as to arrive the day after the settlement, and, of course, never to be presented. These are his explicit words in the House—"It is due, however, to the Russian Government to say, that the day before our friendly representation reached St. Petersburg, the Russian Government had stated, that it

* "I can assure you that there will be nothing worse than dissatisfaction on the part of Austria. No strong measure will be taken."—*Lord Ponsonby*, 2d October.

no longer insisted on the demand for Surrender, but consented to the alternative of Expulsion.”*

Now clearly the matter was ended. Why then despatch the squadron? If not settled with Fuad Effendi, then the question lay between England and Russia, and a declaration of war must have followed; and the squadron would have to be recalled home for the Baltic.† The fact, however, of the sailing of the squadron was not communicated, ostensibly, to St. Petersburg on the 6th of October.

Now supposing any mischance had occurred, and the arrival of the Despatch on the 6th of October had been hastened a few hours, or the arrangement of Fuad Effendi retarded; and the parties had thus been brought up with doubled fists, a show of something more than “bottle-holding” would have been required. How convenient to have the squadron got out of the way! This would not have been the first time when the sacrifice of professed purposes and important interests has been excused on the pretext of the employment elsewhere of the disposable British naval force.

This naval demonstration enabled Russia to regain her haughty position, compromised by her apparent surrender, and Count Nesselrode overwhelmed the trembling English

* 7th February, 1850.

† *Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

“Foreign Office, November 2, 1849.

“MY LORD,—With reference to your Excellency’s Despatch of the 21st ultimo, reporting the feelings entertained by the Austrian Ministers with respect to what they term the menace made by England and France, I have to point out to your Excellency that a movement of Her Majesty’s squadron to the upper end of the Mediterranean cannot be considered as a threat against Austria. If the squadron had moved up the Adriatic and had taken post opposite to Venice or Trieste, the case might have been different.

I am, &c. PALMERSTON.”

The Despatch to which this is a reply is *not given*.

Representative at St. Petersburg with words of contumely and scorn, restraining his laughter, he said :—

“ I am an old man. I hope to end my days in peace : I have laboured to preserve it for Europe ; never did I expect that it would be the Government of England, which by an insolent violation of solemn compact, should again cast upon the world the Torch of Discord. But Russia is prepared ; strong in her position and rights, strong in her power and in her conscience, she accepts a defiance, and lays upon your head the responsibility and the consequences.”

It was this demonstration that paralysed the willing efforts of General Lamoricière, and forced Fuad Effendi to surrender the advantages of the growing indignation throughout Europe against Russia, and admiration for Turkey.

Sir Stratford Canning, who under different circumstances had suggested that the squadron should have been brought to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, no sooner learns that Admiral Parker has violated the atrocious Treaty of July 13, 1841, by *entering* the Dardanelles, than he implores him to depart. He addresses him in the strain of a Guebre, depreciating Ahriman :—

“ With the *deference* which is due to your superior judgment, I would *venture* to suggest as the *more* advisable course, that you should leave your present anchorage, *unless requested by the Porte to stay*, and *transfer* the squadron to some neighbouring station, whence *it may return*, should its *valuable services* be wanted again, without any *inconvenient delay*.”

This is on the 4th of November, but is not given in the “ Blue Book ” at that date. Before it is introduced his Despatch of the 5th; mentioning simply the removal of the squadron from the exposed situation of Bisika Bay to a preferable anchorage. Next comes one to Lord Blomfield rather more explicit, mentioning that the Russian Minister

has intimated to him the embarrassment thence accruing, as now concessions were rendered impossible. Next follow a variety of Despatches, *five* of which are from Lord Palmerston: one of the *24th of November* announced the termination of the question, and expresses the regret of her Majesty's Government that Sir W. Parker *should have taken* this step. It is after all this preparatory matter that Sir Stratford Canning's Despatch is inserted. In its proper order it would have been at p. 66; it is removed to p. 71.*

On the retreat of the squadron, a concentric fire assails the Foreign Office. These Notes and Despatches occupy nearly one half of the printed correspondence, and cast the reader adrift on currents and counter-currents, leaving him stranded on the grave responsibility assumed by the English Government of risking war with Russia, and then floating him off on its dexterity in having without that contingency rescued Turkey!

"Now in the political world grave questions are weighed in the balance of common sense, which between Cabinets sincerely lovers of peace is nothing else than that of *good faith*."

This from the correspondent of the Bedford Hotel.

I have purposely left unnoticed Lord Palmerston's two first Despatches, because like the offer of Mediation at Vienna, and the friendly remonstrance to St. Petersburg, they were never used.

That of the *24th of September*, placed in front of the Correspondence, justified in all respects Sir S. Canning's opinions, and incloses an extract (as if it were not to be had at Constantinople), from the Treaty of Belgrade. But then comes this sentence. "The *UTMOST that could be demanded* would be that they should not be allowed to *reside permanently* in the Turkish empire." This is the rider to a proposition that no demand can be made, and is that with which Russia herself closes:—this

* This is no novel manœuvre; I have had already to point out its employment in reference to the "Maine Boundary," and the "Correspondence with Persia."

communication ought to have been made at Vienna: it is never communicated even to the Austrian Internuncio, at Constantinople, and there is not a word to Lord Ponsonby, notwithstanding his reiterated assurance that Austria was not in earnest.*

We now come to the last stage—the bevy of Despatches, which, on the 6th of October were discharged towards the four winds of heaven.

The Treaties between Russia and Turkey stipulate for refugees, the alternatives of Expulsion or Surrender. The Austrian Treaties, those of Surrender or “Internment.”

To Vienna, the English Minister says:—

“The Sultan is not bound to comply with the application made by the Austrian Minister.”

Nevertheless, he has duties of “good neighbourhood to fulfil!”†

To St. Petersburg he says:—

“Now her Majesty’s Government readily admit that the stipulations of that article *entitle* the Russian Government *to make the application which they have made*; but her Majesty’s Government would beg to submit, for the friendly

* “It is to be observed, however, that the demand of the Austrian Government was made before the surrender of Görgey to the Russian General-in-Chief was known at Vienna, and the demand *seems* to have referred principally to the Hungarian detachment, which was driven into Wallachia from Orshova, on the 17th of August; and it is to be expected that now that the war is over, a demand of this kind will no longer be pressed, but if it is pressed, it ought certainly not to be complied with.”

† “But the Sultan *has duties of good neighbourhood to fulfil towards Austria*; and those duties require that he should not permit his territory to be made use of as a place of shelter, from which communications should be carried on for the purpose of disturbing the tranquillity of any of the States which compose the Austrian Empire.

“The Sultan is therefore bound to prevent these Polish refugees from *hovering upon the frontiers of Hungary or Transylvania*; and he ought to require them either to leave the Turkish territory, or to take up their residence in some part of the interior of his dominions, *where they may have no means of communicating with the discontented in the Austrian States.*”

consideration of the Government of Russia, that this same article distinctly gives to *the Sultan an alternative which he is equally entitled to choose*; for by the stipulations of that article each of the contracting parties is at liberty either to surrender refugees, being subjects of the other party, or to expel them from its own territory. It is clear, therefore, that the Sultan is *not bound by treaty* to comply with the application made to him by the Russian Minister at Constantinople for the surrender of the Polish refugees; and that *he would fulfil* to the very letter the obligations of the Treaty, by requiring those Polish refugees to depart from his dominions."

To explore these mysteries would require a Torch, and to expose them a Volume.

In the Despatch to Turkey, there is a general preface, in which, on the one hand, the obligation of Turkey to comply with the demands appear to be denied; and, on the other, the separate conditions of the Austrian and Russian Treaties are mingled together; so that the stipulation of the Russian Treaty, namely, *Expulsion*, is made to apply to the Hungarians. The Despatch to Austria is a direct contradiction of the Despatch to Russia; the Despatch to Russia a nullification of that to Austria. By the first, the Sultan is "not bound by Treaty;" by the second he is "bound by Treaty," as he must be if only "entitled to choose" between two alternatives. Both of those views are opposed as pole to pole to the Despatch of the 24th September, in which it is stated that the article of the Treaty of Belgrade (to which the others are analogous), "obviously relates to cases of a very different kind from that of the war just ended," . . . and that "such officers and soldiers cannot be deemed to be the persons intended to be described by these expressions, or 'cette sorte de gens,' or to be classed with 'voleurs et brigands.'"

Here are then a series of distinct propositions, by means of which the position which the English Ambassador had taken up at Constantinople is totally reversed, being first adopted and re-echoed by the Minister in London; then by a

series of appended conditions, transpositions, injunctions, modifications, and inferences, the Sultan is declared bound by the very compacts which Sir S. Canning and the French Ambassador, in reply to a formal demand, had declared he was not bound.

This Despatch, timed so as not to arrive at St. Petersburg, till one day, as Lord Palmerston states—till two days, as appears by the Blue Book—after the settlement with Fuad Effendi, is also timed to arrive at Constantinople two days before the arrival of the news from St. Petersburg. Sir S. Canning and the Turkish Government are consequently in ecstasy, and believe with the public of Europe, that it is the backing of England that saved Kossuth from being hung, and the Sultan from being deposed.

To this English friendly remonstrance, Count Nesselrode replies by declaring that he could never admit "the principle of foreign interference in the relations of Russia and Turkey." This is the result of your brave demonstration at the Dardanelles!

It will have been seen that the Hungarians were exposed to the alternative of "Internment," the Poles of "Expulsion." The Hungarians are shut up at Kutayah. But what happens to the Poles? Russia's demands could only extend to the Polish refugees from Poland, who had already dwelt twenty years in Turkey with *French* passports.

It was not then from Turkey that they were to be demanded, but from France; and France, who is with England resisting the demands upon Turkey, surrenders them!

No secret was made of a private letter from General Lahitte, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Nesselrode, in which he entreats that minister to accept the concession which France had made as sufficient proof of the absence of all sympathy with Turkey, and thus spare the French Government the humiliation of their immediate Expulsion. He only asks for delay until "the affair has blown over."*

* I recollect this phrase in the letter "*Si la Turquie ne s'exécute pas.*"

As to steps taken by England for the liberation of the refugees, there were absolutely none during eighteen months; that is to say, till April, 1851. Why she acted then I have already explained. Kossuth had fallen into the fangs of Mazzini.

Had the English Government been with Turkey, the detention of the exiles could not have endured one hour; if their subsequent liberation was by its influence, it would have been effected eighteen months before. A communication was at an earlier period made to the Porte by the British Ambassador, and believed by the Hungarians and their friends to have been to urge their liberation. But it turned out afterwards to be for their transfer from Kutayah to some other place.

It was at the time a common remark at Constantinople, that Austria received no backing in her endeavours to retain them from her Ally. In fact, the interests of Russia and Austria were now opposed: Austria dreaded—Russia desired—revolution.

If it stood alone, this general belief in Europe, after the publication of the 'Blue Books,' would be utterly inconceivable. To its infatuation there is *no* bounds: they are equally incapable of disbelieving a falsehood, and of believing a fact. This reflection is forced upon me by a debate which occurs as these pages are passing through the press, in which Lord Dudley Stuart (5th May, 1853) speaks of the "glorious course taken by the Noble Lord for procuring their release," and this was a speech in which he charges that Noble Lord with having pursued with respect to them in England, a course the very reverse, and again, as usual, ends with the "expression of his satisfaction at hearing the statement of the Noble Lord." A statement in the House of Commons!

I have already quoted Kossuth's judgment of the connection of the Diplomacy of Great Britain with the fall of Hungary. I must now give the first impressions made upon him by the perusal of the "Blue Book" in reference to the case of the refugees. The letter indeed presents in small

compass the whole matter, and it was the perusal of it which first induced me to look into the documents.

“As another gift to the fatal anniversary, I got this very day a letter giving me charming notices out of your Parliament’s “Blue Books”—very charming indeed. There I have the pleasure to read the Despatch to Lord Ponsonby (6th October, 1849); where my Lord the Secretary of the State for the Foreign Affairs of Her Majesty is the first who professes the Sultan to have duties of good neighbourhood to fulfil towards *the States which compose the Austrian empire!* I wonder how his Lordship is at home with history, and chiefly its diplomatic parts,—how he has to give the sanction of England to the incorporation of Hungary, whose independence was in the 18th century guaranteed by England itself,—to give the sanction of England to the incorporation of Hungary by Russian arms,—but no! not arms,—by Russian diplomacy. To be sure, his Lordship must have given like warm recommendations to Austria and Russia, engaging them to fulfil the duties of good neighbourhood towards the Sultan—proof of the incessant revolts stirred up in Bosnia and Bulgaria by Austrian agents and Russian gold—proof of it, Milosh, who is pretty near to upset poor Karageorgievich—in Servia. A pretext is wanted for the non-evacuation of Moldo-Wallachia, and for the occupation of Servia. You will have the pretext, be sure of it.

“I read with equal pleasure in the same Despatch, that the Sultan is bound to give us our residence in some part of the Interior where we may have no means of communicating with the discontented in the Austrian States. A fine circumscription of our Kutayah Casarna, is it not?

“There is still more to be found. The instructions to be given to Sir Parker by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, whence we learn that the gallant admiral was *not* directed to support the Sultan in his generous opposition to the insolent pretensions of Russia and Austria; but that he *was* directed to take us on board if, and only if, he should

be invited by the Sultan, through Sir S. Canning to take up his squadron to Constantinople to the very purpose of giving us a fine beefsteak on board an English man-of-war in the Bosphorus; a thing rather a little difficult, as we happened at the very time to be somewhat closely guarded at Widdin, on the northern verge of Bulgaria. Of course, Sir S. Canning did not invite us, and so the formidable squadron had nothing better to do than to hoist sails for Malta.

“ Well, after all, the ‘ Blue Book ’ taught me nothing new. I have known this by heart long ago. The only thing I would be anxious to know is, how Faraday or Liebig would find out the chemical affinity between these Despatches and the Declaration of his Lordship in the House of Commons, that he was very much dissatisfied with the issue of the refugee question, but that he could not help, as the Sultan made the offer to give us a residence in the interior without any previous knowledge, not to say, approbation of the British Ministry. As also the chemical affinity between Sir W. Parker’s instructions and the compliments on the energy of his Lordship having sent the gallant Admiral to support the Sultan in our behalf (see Mr. Roebuck’s Vote of Confidence Motion), and the toast of Admiral Napier at the diplomatic dinner, after compliments which his Lordship acknowledged with pride.

“ But enough; it is with a bitter smile that I write these lines—you will excuse me. I am a poor exile, Sir, and there are mighty men who are able to do me more wrong in a day than I can digest in a year. For myself I would not care, but for my poor country, which I might yet help to become once more, if not great and glorious—greatness is relative, and glory is vain—but free.”

That the whole, was a concerted game may be inferred from this alone, that France and England were acting in concert. What I have above stated in reference to the Polish Refugees, can leave no shadow of doubt as to the collusion of

Louis Napoleon and the Cabinet of Russia; but that fact does not stand alone; what influence, what coin placed him in the Presidential chair? By whom was concerted the *coup d'état* of the 2d of December? It was recently mentioned by the *Times* Correspondent from Paris, that he had avowed his connection with Russia to a Republican Deputation, which came to him from the Continent. It is impossible to conceive a country in more absolute dependence than France. Russia can knock down the Puppet she has set up. In 1848, M. Tocqueville, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, met arguments urged by a Deputation of the Opposition with these words:—"Gentlemen, remember there are the Cossacks!" The French Ambassador at Constantinople has not hesitated to speak of the Russian Army as the Ally of his Government against the "Red Republic." The French Consul, at Belgrade, when applied to for support against his Russian colleague, said, "You seem not to be aware that my President has no other support than the Emperor of Russia." At the period in question, when he was expelling the Poles from Paris and sacrificing them at Constantinople, and at the same time inculcating "Turkish Neutrality and urging resistance to the demanded Extradition," Louis Napoleon had to dread the Revolutionists on the one side, and on the other a formidable Pretender in the Comte de Chambord. Russia had both in her hands, and was parading her support of the latter. He was held not only by his fears, but by his hopes;—she could make him Emperor, or cast him into the mire; we have, therefore, general grounds and special acts, which prove the collusion of France, and render anything else impossible. All this is known to the English Minister. What then is his position between France as his confidante and Russia as his antagonist? If it be a Comedy played by France, is it very monstrous to suppose that it is also a Comedy played by England?

In fact if France had been really acting against Russia, would England have been acting with her? We have seen what happened in 1806: what again happened in 1831:

and what again in 1839, when Marshal Soult really did resolve to send a squadron through the Dardanelles. M. Odillon Barrot once used these words, "The events of half a century prove that, whenever France has decided on taking a course contrary to Russia, she is certain to find England against her."

So soon as by Russian aid Hungary was pacified, Hungarian regiments were sent to the Baltic (where Russia could not as yet show herself) in furtherance of the design upon the Crown of Denmark. We are thus conducted by the chain of events, no less than by the limits of geography, from the West to the North.



THE NORTH.

PART I.—SCANDINAVIA.

PART II.—THE DANISH SUCCESSION.

“It was quite enough in delivering Finland to the Russians to have afforded them the means of a step in advance towards the Sound, as a point from which they will not be less menacing at a future day, when, the Russian Colossus with one foot on the Dardanelles and another on the Sound, will make the whole world his slave, and liberty will have fled to America. However chimerical all this may seem now to narrow minds, it will one day be a cruel reality : for Europe, unwisely divided like the towns of Greece in presence of the Kings of Macedonia, will have probably the same lot.”—THIERS.

These Chapters were written and partly appeared in 1842 and 1844. I preserve their original form because of the anticipation which they contain of events which have subsequently come to light,—the best proof of the accuracy of the views put forward, and the best disproof of the events being the result of mere chance.

PART I.

SCANDINAVIAN KINGDOMS.

CHAPTER I.

Internal Constitution.

WHILE the attention of Europe has been fixed on the Progress of Russia in the East, it has overlooked regions within her own bounds. This Empire, and its more colossal Ambition threaten, however, the fishermen of the icy North as well as the shepherds of the Torrid zone. Within a few hours' sail of our coasts lies a richer and an easier prey than the plains of Zungaria and the valleys of the Oxus. Three kingdoms still intervene between her frontiers and the ocean, and inclose between the arms of two promontories the Euxine of the North. Their shores are washed with the very waters which guard our island; they are inhabited by the races from whom we have drawn our origin—who speak almost a common language with ourselves—with whom we are most nearly connected by the ties of faith, in addition to those same political interests which have associated us with the people and kingdoms of the East.

DENMARK.

It was the original Constitution of this Government which was transplanted to England; its laws have descended from a monarch who was also king of England. This of all the Teutonic kingdoms is the one in which the power of the

Aristocracy raised itself highest, and spread its roots deepest, extinguishing the authority of the Crown, and repressing the energy of the People. It had, however, undergone a change, which brought it into close affinity with the Aristocracies of the Slavonic nations. Nobility, unrestricted to the tenure of land, was perpetuated by descent. To it indeed was exclusively reserved power, and the faculty of possessing real property, but in its excessive expansion it had commingled with the nations, and like the Shlachsitz of Poland, was to be found in every profession, and in the humblest grades.

* The geographical position, however, of Denmark, its unrivalled facilities, amounting almost to a command of the trade of the North, raised from parallel causes, though with varying effect, a powerful Burgher class, on the same basis on which had arisen the Sea Kings of earlier times. The descendants of these were now doomed to be displaced by their more vigorous though more modest successors. An unfortunate and unprovoked war with Sweden, in 1657, brought the matter to issue; the inability of the nobles to defend the state over which they domineered was exhibited in the loss of nearly a half of the kingdom, the strength of which was thus proved to consist in the capital alone. The burghers thus established their right to rule the country they had saved; and consequently at the close of 1660 that remarkable revulsion which it has taken three centuries in Europe to accomplish, was effected in almost a single day; the Aristocracy was put down by the middle classes, and instantly that class put itself down before the Crown. Thus was brought into existence the celebrated *Lex Regia* of Denmark, wherein the king, Frederick the Third, acting by the authority of the nation, declared himself and his successors, each for himself, possessed of full, absolute, and despotic power, with legislative faculties affecting church and state, taxes and troops, and constituted responsible under no circumstances to any human tribunal, but "to his conscience and to God alone."*

* The majority of the king was reduced from twenty-eight to fourteen.

But by the very care with which Despotism was rendered complete, a counterpoise was provided.

The monarch could dispense with laws no less than enact them; every successive king so found himself unshackled by the past, and thus the power was constituted personal and not legislative, being limited by the condition of self-transmission. This Constitution has proved one of the best, if not the best, in Europe, for in fact it may be said to be no Constitution at all. Administration, which is so weighty a task to modern politicians, is only difficult in consequence of the Concentration in the capital of impossible functions. Denmark having its ancient local bodies, had only to apprehend new laws, and, above all, the existence of a body arrogating to itself the right of making them.

As regards the Central Government, arbitrariness is no doubt an evil, but there may be still worse evils, and the worst are those that are systematic. Naked absolutism may coerce the will, but it does not pervert the judgment of nations, and even if it degrades their character, it does not destroy their common sense. Under such a system there might be a few servile dependents, but there was no multitude of brawling patriots. It did not engender the class of politicians, nor with them habits of pretence and facilities of imposition. There was no fictitious responsibility to destroy the fear of consequences, no majorities to cloak schemes of a Cabal—no cunning or overbearing associations could instal themselves as Ministries—no wavering hallucinations transform themselves into public zeal: there was no permanent lie respecting “servants of the crown;” for all that was done, and in the eyes of all, the king was responsible, and being so, the public functionaries were in truth his servants.

It was not, therefore, for special reasons, but on general grounds, that with a Constitution the most abominable which theoretically could be conceived, Denmark enjoyed contentment and well-being, and acquired riches, and, having a national character, possessed freedom.* Therefore, could the Danish

* “From this allusion to the chief articles of the new Constitution,

Monarch truly declare that "Denmark had no interest in the war against France, as the Danish crown had nothing to fear from the dissatisfaction of its people."

The people are, nevertheless, not of one race, nor are they under the same laws or governing systems, nor have they been united from time out of mind. This harmony is, therefore, simply the result of the absence of legislation. Each section limited its activity to the bounds of its own existence, respected the habits, customs, and laws of its neighbours, or, what was better still, never thought upon the subject, and when there were troubles it was because of passions, not propositions. Denmark Proper constitutes no more than three-fifths of the whole monarchy, the remaining two-fifths being Holstein, which is German, and Schleswig, which is in part German and in part Danish. These Duchies possess distinct laws and rights, with their peculiar "Land" and "Stadt" Administration: these privileges have been maintained during four centuries, no less by their own strength than by the interest of the reigning dynasty, the roots of which were in the Duchies. Their importance is not only great in themselves, but also as linking Denmark to the Continent, and superadding so to say, a territorial and military, to its own maritime existence.

When at the close of the fourteenth century the Crowns of

it will be seen that Frederick arrogated to himself a power which no other monarch on earth ever claimed—not even the Czar of Russia. Here was boundless, irresponsible, unmitigated despotism, without a single provision in favour of the life, the substance, or the liberty of any subject, high or low. In China the Emperor is restrained by the laws, which he can neither violate, nor change. So it is in Thibet; so in all Mahommedan countries, where the Koran is the unchanged and unchangeable law, alike for rulers and people. So it was in ancient Persia, in Egypt, in Assyria, in Greece, in Rome. So it has been in the great middle age Empires—in Tartary, Mexico, Peru. It was reserved for the most limited, and the most insignificant (so far as territory and revenues are concerned) king in Europe, to establish a despotism such as the world had never seen."—*Danham's Denmark, Sweden, and Norway*, v. iii, p. 180-1.

Sweden and of Norway were united with that of Denmark, under terms which required that they should be always placed upon the same head, Schleswig and Holstein were not so united. When under Frederick III the tenure of the crown was altered to one of hereditary succession, with the admission of females, it was not attempted to introduce the same law in the Duchies, where the feudal right of male succession was established.

The separation apprehended on the failure of the present direct line arises solely from the supercession of the Salic law in Denmark. But, by his amplitude of despotic power, the King of Denmark may annul that provision. However, in an age when the gravest concerns are transacted in secret, and the concealed hand is the one that wins, this is not to be expected, as a neighbouring power covets the Sound with her whole heart.

Constitutions had been promised to the nations who had enabled their sovereigns to overthrow Napoleon—a promise which was forgotten for fifteen years, until the people took for a time the matter into their own hands. The people of Denmark had had no share in this service, had made no such demand, and received no such promise. The despotism of the other kings of the Continent was by usurpation—the despotism of the kings of Denmark was by law; yet Frederick VI determined to concede to his German feof of Holstein a Constitution; but not to make any invidious distinction, he conceded the same to the remainder of his States. It was carried into effect in 1835.

We have seen an overbearing Aristocracy tranquilly set aside; we have seen a powerless king transmuted into an absolute one: now we see a Constitution freely conceded to the people by that Crown to which its people had before freely conceded arbitrary power.

The authority allowed to the Representative Body was, however, no more than Consultative, which, in the circumstances of the country, was a more valuable security than that nominally absolute control over the Finances which we

have seen so unprofitably exercised in the great Constitutional Governments. But the value of this Constitution resided in there being no general representation, but Provincial Diets—two for the Duchies, and two for the remainder of the Monarchy.

This distinction is of the highest importance in a diplomatic point of view, and it is one regarding which the study of former ages (from which alone our mental habits are derived, and with the events of which our memories are stored) affords us neither maxims nor facts. The great change and experiment now in progress, and the consequences of which can only be evolved in future times, is the assimilation of people to people by the process of thought. I enter not into its causes, its general character, or abstract effects: I point to the facility which it affords for action, greater than in other ages could have been acquired by armies; for it is more important in a view to ultimate incorporation, to disorganize a people by its own laws, than to prostrate it by external blows, however heavy. If then you have at once a spirit of imitation, whether of modes of dress or forms of Government, and a vicious maxim afloat, it becomes as easy to ruin an empire as to set a fashion.

Notwithstanding the variety of disorders to which the political body is exposed within, and of accidents from without, scarcely since the invention of "Constitution," has a grave misfortune befallen any people which has not been infected with it. The convulsions of Europe, for the last thirty years, have sprung out of the agitations of Spain, and those agitations were created solely by a surreptitious Constitution: Europe might now be tranquil and at rest, if the Spanish Constitution had resembled that of Denmark, for then it would have restored, instead of destroying, the Cortes of the kingdoms of the Peninsula.

It is then to be inferred that Russia was able to exercise in Spain an influence in 1812, which she was not possessed of in Denmark till 1835; after that country had existed for nearly two centuries under a despotism which

has been designated the "disgrace of the human race." It has already been remarked by a king of Sweden—Gustavus III, that "opposition rises constantly upon the steps of Russia, in the hatred engendered in the new subjects she acquires, and the new neighbours she presses upon; but this resistance is always conquered by the influence she manages to obtain over Cabinets at a distance." This is true of Nations no less than Cabinets.

These Provincial Diets were composed of the Representatives of three classes—the large landed proprietors, the small landed proprietors, and the burghers—following in this respect pretty nearly the ancient Constitution of England. The members are elected for six years, and they sit only once in two years.

Up to the present time they have justified the confidence reposed in them. They commenced with the disordered finances, and indeed may be said to have confined themselves to that branch. They have obtained the yearly publication of a detailed Budget, and within six years the change effected by their supervision has been so considerable, that in 1842 there was a large surplus in the Treasury, which, in 1836, had before it the prospect of Bankruptcy. Out of a revenue of a million and a half, they have contrived to squeeze a Sinking Fund for the extinction of the permanent monstrous debt of £12,000,000 sterling.

The press is entirely free in respect to the discussion of home affairs, but under strict *surveillance* in respect to foreign politics: by the most sensible of all evidence, Denmark might have known that these are the first of *domestic* concerns: she has seen by their means her maritime power annihilated, her territory reduced by dismemberment to half its size; she is now divided between German and Danish parties, trifling as yet, but *incipient*; whilst the precariousness of the Royal Line opening eventual claims, which bring Serfdom as their consequences, casts a gloom over the future which reflects itself by anticipation on the heart of every

Dane.* By the deficiency of this one element of public character and Administration, Denmark is exposed not merely to lose the fruits of its internal prosperity, but its very existence as an independent Crown and a free People. The favourable picture of the present thus encourages no satisfactory prospect for the future. There is no country so destitute of precedent and sequence of Law and Institution in any sense; and if she were cast into new convulsions, there is absolutely for her no shelter, and no holding ground. Despotism has lost its traditions; Constitutional Government lives only day by day on the breath of Despotism. *The Lex Regia is not abrogated*; there has only been introduced a contradictory system, indeed the two are woven together, and this state of things cannot long last without impairing the common sense, and destroying the judgment of the nation. When we have arrived at this point, we have arrived at the end of a subject,—when that point is turned the affairs of a nation become only news, and can further interest only journalists, diplomatists, and cynics.

NORWAY.

Norway and Denmark were united in 1380, by the hereditary succession in the former kingdom of Olaf the Second, who had been elected for Denmark. This connection is generally referred to the great Union of Calmar, when, under Margaret, the daughter of Waldemar IV, and mother and successor of Olaf, the three Scandinavian Crowns were declared to be forever conjoined. The link was of short duration as regards Sweden, and productive only of present suffering and permanent ill-will; the separation is attributed to the oppressions of the Danish kings, for the common kings residing at Copenhagen were regarded as Danish. But if no such effects

* See 'Morning Herald,' 12th September, 1842.

followed in Norway, and if that Union by absence of interference * and disloyalty has subsisted down to our times only then to be broken by foreign violence, the cause of the difference must be looked for not in the dispositions of the kings of Copenhagen, but in the character of the Norwegians and Swedes. Faction will invite Despotism: without it Despotism may remain an abstract virtue, but never become a fountain of events for history. The Swedes were factious, the Norwegians were not.

The Norwegians are a people to whom the word primitive may in its most emphatic and valuable sense be applied—simple and upright; at a distance from the wars of the great European States, without losing their bravery or their spirit;—at a distance from the contaminating commotions of internal discord, without losing public zeal and patriotic affections; strong in their mountains, and rich in their splendid harbours, they pursued their various mountaineer and maritime enterprises with industry, patience, and frugality; visiting the remotest regions of the earth, they returned home, bringing with them the profits only of their intercourse with the world—innocent gold, not corrupting thoughts.

It was a union thus consecrated by time, by benefits, by affections, that the Cabinets of Europe undertook to dissolve, in a Conference undertaken to restore the nations to their rights: it was an allegiance so rooted in time, a loyalty so approved by affection, that the kings of Europe resolved to shatter; commencing with the fiction of a usurpation, they said, “We shall do this with Norway, our possession: we shall take her from one king, and we shall give her to another:” and they did so; and they told their own people that the one king had offended them, and that the other had pleased them, and the people were content! But indeed, in this case, the Congress of Vienna was only required to ratify

* A civil code had been compiled under Christian IV, but it was from the local usages and ordinances of former kings. In ecclesiastical matters there was a Canon copied from that of Denmark.

a measure in the previous year enacted and accomplished. England *alone* undertook to perform this service, which she accomplished at Kiel on the 14th January, 1814, and to which, as the prototype of the Treaty of May, I shall have to treat of particularly when I come to the external relations of the Scandinavian kingdoms.

The people of Norway were not, however, like the people of Europe,—they would not be disposed of like animals. They armed to resist. The Crown Prince of Denmark, then their viceroy, put himself at their head, and, reverting to their ancient rights, they elected him their king. The odds, however, against them were terrific; in fact, they were a protocolised people,—one which wakes some morning and finds all the world its foes, and not a friend on earth. They, therefore, provided against the possible execution of the Ukase of Kiel, by establishing a general order for the government of the kingdom, which I am reduced to designate by a hateful word. But this Constitution did not subvert the internal liberties of the people; and so good a countenance did they show, that the prudent King of Sweden thought it best to accept it together with them: not having been copied from the democrats of Paris, nor guaranteed by the Congress of Vienna, it exists to this day; in fact, it was a wise, and not a foolish one.

The Storting of Norway was a body resembling what the Parliaments anciently were in England, that is to say, of the Peers and a delegation of the Communes, to whom every matter was referred. There was now but a sole chamber, with the controlling veto of the king; this power was reduced in practice to a nullity, as it could be exercised in respect to any measure but twice. The Storting thus possessed whatever legislative power was to be exerted in the country, and held also the administrative functions: the army, navy, and exchequer, were under its control. After the Union with Sweden was settled, a modification took place by the introduction of a Stadtholder, or Viceroy, who might be a Swede. Having been before ruled by the *Lex Regia* of

Denmark, Norway thus suddenly passed from the purest Absolutism to the purest Democracy. In this soil both trees have borne fruit equally good.

On these conditions, Norway was no great boon: the apparent sacrifice of their independence as a nation had only the effect of engendering the sense of independence as a people. They were armed too to maintain it. The Swedish map, indeed, exhibits a large accession of territory: statistical returns a large increase of maritime and military force; the budget an augmentation of resources, but of this increment the Swedish king could not dispose. In attempting to form a party in Norway, and to open it to regal and ministerial corruption, results have followed the very reverse of the experience of all other modern countries, and the Norwegian, not the Swedish, element has prevailed. The common flag has undergone a change expressive of the increased consideration of the former; the Swedish kings have relinquished in practice their faculty of appointing to the Stadtholdership one of their Swedish subjects; and nobility as an order of the state, and as a class, has been abrogated, notwithstanding the exercise of the veto of the King in two successive *Storting*s. The Bill was first passed in 1817, again in 1821: the *Storting* by a wise provision is only assembled every third year; in 1824 it became law by the course of the Constitution. Bernadotte, when he accepted the Convention of Moss, had complacently remarked, *Nous changerons tout cela!*

By the transfer Denmark lost strength, but Sweden acquired none: the power which in the former case was positive, becomes negative in the latter. But Norway was given to Sweden as a compensation; thus at the same time strength was withdrawn, and weakness conferred. Denmark and Sweden can now no longer cooperate for their defence; and Norway, instead of rallying in the common cause, will rejoice in the peril of the Crown, by which it has been betrayed, and of that by which it has been annexed. Let it, however, be remembered that this has been effected by a stipulation of that Treaty considered the public law of

Europe, violated indeed with impunity, wherever further "Progress" is practicable in the wolfish ways of our times, but firm and binding in so far as it crushes worth and perpetuates disorder.

SWEDEN.

The Diet is composed of four estates, sitting each by itself,—the Nobility, the Clergy, the Burghers, and the Peasantry, each being represented by individuals belonging to itself. The head of every noble family has the faculty of admission to the Assembly of nobles: here, as formerly in Denmark, nobility descends to all the issue.

In the early Gothic States whilst the primitive order still remained unbroken, no inconvenience arose from multiplicity of Councils whether general or local, but with administrative concentration and indirect taxes, the case is widely different, and instead of opposing obstacles to bad measures, encumbers the march of necessary business, interposes delays, affords endless occasions to successful intrigue and disappointed ambitions and maintains a permanent struggle of organised and co-ordinate interests. Political life in Sweden was a school of corruption, and the soil was adapted for the growth of that rankest of intellectual weeds—the idea of change, although by law capital punishment was the penalty of innovation: thus since the accession of the line of Oldenburg, Sweden has presented a scene of continual struggles, in which the king looked abroad for support against domestic faction, and which opened to foreign influence the mass of politicians. Stockholm was divided between the *Hats* and the *Bonnets*: the first representing the Aristocracy, the second the Democracy; but which have acquired historic importance from the connection of the one with France, and of the other with Russia.

Sweden, like Norway and Denmark, has had its Revolution; but, unlike these, it had reference solely to foreign matters. Gustavus III, on his succession, having beforehand planned

the emancipation of his country, avoided taking the ordinary oath to observe the existing laws and their interpretation by the Senate, and managed to effect a Revolution, at the time considered the annihilation of Faction, and which both of these, sick of themselves, combined to celebrate. It amounted, however, to no more than vesting in the hands of the king the prerogative of peace and war. The result, however, was not fortunate, the Russian Cabinet (which had bound itself by the Treaty of Neustadt to take no concern touching the form of the Swedish Government) found means to upset an order of things, which the endeavours of Prussia and Austria were exerted to support, and which, if maintained, would have prevented the partition of Poland. *

* "His (Gustavus III) new Constitution, in fifty-seven articles, was received as the perfection of Legislation. They conferred considerable power on the Sovereign; enabled him to make peace, or declare war, without the consent of the Diet; but he could make no new law, or alter any already made, without its concurrence; and he was bound to ask, though not always to follow, the advice of his Senate, in matters of graver import. The form of the Constitution was not much altered; and the four orders of deputies still remained. On the whole it was a liberal Constitution. If this Revolution was agreeable to the Swedes themselves, it was odious to Catherine II, who saw Russian influence annihilated by it, and who expressed her resolution to restore the system of Government which it had subverted: but the representations of Prussia and Austria induced her to rest satisfied with a barren menace."—*Dunham's History of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway*, iii, p. 293.

CHAPTER II.

External Relations.

THE internal and external condition of the Scandinavian kingdoms are so closely interwoven, that it is difficult—indeed impossible, to separate them. All which in this rapid sketch I have attempted to do is to separate Diplomacy as acting on Institutions and as acting on Dismemberment, and the play of anterior Alliances leading to it. To the latter point I shall now more particularly address myself.

Whatever pain the decay of the two other Scandinavian kingdoms may occasion, still more lamentable is the sight of the degradation of that people who has placed in the highest historic rank the name of Scandinavia, and which is distinguished above all other European nations as the chivalrous foe of the enemy of Europe. A line of heroic princes has made the name of Sweden familiar even to our schoolboy recollections; the genius of her monarchs and the valour of her soldiers have largely influenced the destiny of Europe; and to Sweden is Protestantism indebted for its triumph at the Treaty of Westphalia. But if the name of Sweden is illustrated by great and chivalrous acts, by trophies of just arms and sacrifices to honour, her name is also rescued from oblivion by others of a different character—she has marked her career in Europe by ambitious projects. Here, as everywhere, injustice abroad has borne its fruits at home—if unsuccessful, ruin; if successful, fetters.

That point in Swedish history which chiefly bears on the present subject is that of Charles XII. By an instinct common to Frederick II and Napoleon, he felt that in the Eastern world lay the strength that could be evoked against Russia. It was this thought that carried a Swedish army to the Ukraine, and which left Scandinavian bones at Pultava.

This apparently insane march spread through the East the fame and the name of Sweden; thus magnified, it was reflected on Europe with enduring splendour. It was this struggle which developed Russia's military power; Charles rendered to her the same service which the Lacedæmonians did to the Thebans, and further, by his failure first spread the delusion of her inaccessibility.

Gustavus the Third seized the occasion of the war of Catherine with the Turks to retake the provinces wrested from Sweden, and to check the power of the Czarina. The windows of her palace were shaken by his cannon, and a large proportion of the Russian navy sunk; but she knew how to raise up enemies to him at home in Faction and at sea in Denmark, and it was this enterprising Monarch who put his hand with her to a Treaty to "*maintain the Principle of the BALTIC AS A CLOSE SEA, with the guarantee of its coast against all acts of hostility, violence, or aggression whatever, and further to employ for that purpose all the means in the power of the respective contracting parties.*"

It thus fell to the lot of Gustavus the Third to establish the maritime, as of Charles the Twelfth, the military power of Russia. Gustavus now having learnt that Ink was worth more than Gunpowder, threw the idle Sword away and took to the Printing Press.

In one of the most remarkable works of recent times,—“The Danger of Europe,” he exposed the worthlessness of carnal weapons against a Cabinet, versed in every evil art, which knew how to contaminate and circumvent. It appropriately replied by the Assassin's Bullet.

The fleets to be excluded by the compact with Gustavus III. from the Baltic were those of England. It was Sweden who had implored, and implored in vain, their presence. The power of Sweden and of Denmark was now given to her as protection,—when at length Retaliation came, it fell, not on Cronstadt, but on Copenhagen! Who will not mentally revert to more recent events in the Black Sea and at Constantinople? The fates and events of these kingdoms are so closely inter-

woven that the catastrophe of Copenhagen affected Sweden as much as if it had occurred at Stockholm.

Copenhagen had been bombarded, not merely as a remote effect of the Armed Neutrality of Catharine, but as an immediate one of that of Paul. Whatever the cause, by the fact, England was momentarily rendered supreme in the Baltic; but a letter from Alexander, who had just succeeded to the possession of the crown, to Nelson, who had just succeeded to the command of the fleet, sufficed to turn the bows of the English vessels westward, and to leave again Russia dominant over that now prostrate Sea. She then concluded a peace with England of which Denmark was the sole sacrifice.*

Denmark, not having a chivalrous monarch nor a factious people, saw in the French war no field of enterprise and no necessity of exertion; she therefore remained at peace, profiting by the convulsions around her, increasing her trade and restoring her marine. It was necessary to smite her with a second blow; the ready hand of England was again available. But Russia herself was at war with France and the Ally of England: how was this to be effected? Shortly before the second Bombardment of Copenhagen, Napoleon desired to make peace, and after the Battle of Austerlitz all Europe desired peace, Russia excepted. Negotiations between England and France had been opened and carried to a successful conclusion, even at Paris itself, and every matter pending between the two Powers had been adjusted. But England and Russia at the beginning of the war had agreed not to make a separate peace, and England, faithful to her engagements—she always is faithful to Russia—broke

* "The Expedition" (*against Copenhagen*) "was imposed upon England by the frantic and deceitful conduct of Paul."—*Bell's Russia*, vol. iii, p. 260.

"Denmark alone had any just reason to be dissatisfied with these arrangements: she was compelled to submit to the abandonment of those principles for the maintenance of which she had expended so much blood and treasure, and saw herself forsaken by the very power who forced her into that confederation which plunged her into the war with England."—*Ibid.*, p. 264-5.

off the negotiation, because Russia wanted and Napoleon would not let her have, Moldavia and Wallachia. The French armies consequently march to the North and extinguish Prussia. The reasons now redoubled on the part of France for desiring peace, but Russia encouraged Napoleon to go on by sacrificing to him 60,000 Russians in the short campaign of Dantzic and the battle of Friedland; and then, having just before frustrated his peaceful overtures, she made this the pretext for partitioning Prussia, whom she had forced to continue the war, and betraying England, whom she had pushed into it. A faithless ambassador of her own then betrayed to England the secret article of the Treaty of Tilsit.* The English Cabinet, thus enlightened, bombarded Copenhagen the second time. Russia now declared against England, engaging Denmark in a reciprocal guarantee for the tranquillity of the Baltic, which, as she asserted, had been established with the PRIVACY of the Cabinet of St. James's.†

* The secret article referred to Denmark only generally, in common with Sweden, Portugal, and Austria herself; it applied in like manner to Turkey, whose Capital England was also induced to attempt to bombard, and with the same effect as in Denmark.

† "Wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people, in his engagements with the Courts of the North, by this act of violence committed in the Baltic, which is an inclosed sea, whose tranquillity had been for a long period, and with the privacy of the Cabinet of St. James's, the subject of reciprocal guarantee, did not dissemble his resentment against England, and announced to her, &c."—*Manifesto of the 20th October, 1807.*

The same document contains this passage: "Then it was that England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she had abandoned herself: but it was to cast upon the North of Europe new firebrands, which were to enkindle and nourish the flames of war, which she did not wish to see extinguished. Her fleets and her troops appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence, of which history, so fertile in examples, does not furnish a single parallel. A tranquil and moderate Power, which by long and unchanging wisdom had obtained in the circle of Monarchies a moral dignity, sees itself assaulted and treated as if it had been forging plots, and meditating the ruin of England; and all to justify its prompt and total spoliation."

Sweden, however, remained true to England, and thus found herself at war with Russia, who offered to her peace, "on the condition that the King of Sweden will without delay join Russia and Denmark in shutting the Baltic against England."* The offer was however rejected, and England proffered, for the second time, the *transfer to her of Norway*. Sweden's participation in the war only enabled Russia to occupy one half of her territory, Finland.

We now come to the great Event of the North, in which the Tribunal of Vienna exercised the high and double functions of grace and justice—where, passing from the meaner occupation of restoring rights, it proceeded to the higher duties of awarding punishment and conferring recompense; taking a kingdom in its hand, it abstracted it from the delinquent and conferred it on the meritorious, — Denmark being punished for being on the unfortunate side, Sweden being recompensed for being on the other. But strange to say, the punished Government had been by the judges themselves forced in its option, and had voluntarily abandoned its party, and the recompensed Government was itself simultaneously dismembered!

This transaction, unparalleled in the atrocity of its avowed purpose, but almost incredible in the perfidy of the agency employed, has been brought to light in all its details in works of unquestionable authority; "the facts," says the continuator of Bignon, "have been irrevocably acquired for history:" recent events show that they have not been acquired for instruction. Since the above quoted words were written further light has been thrown on the matter by a Swedish publication, which has, indeed, attracted no notice beyond the limits of Scandinavia. I content myself, however, with the exposition as it is given by the historian of French Diplomacy.

When Alexander met Bernadotte at Abo, in 1812, it was secretly arranged between them that Sweden at the general

* Manifesto, 10th February, 1808.

pacification should not reclaim Finland, and that Russia should obtain for her Norway, as an equivalent. Into this arrangement England entered, and engaged, if necessary, to assist in an active manner with her fleet, to carry it into effect: Norway being soon after afflicted with famine, an opportunity was afforded which the British Government did not neglect.

The reasons put forward for the transfer breathed, however, nothing but goodwill, and an anxious regard for the well-being of the countries concerned. The British Government had only in view the advantages that were to be secured by "the reunion of the Scandinavian Peninsula, and the re-establishment of the natural limits between the two states." The Danish Cabinet replied that "it considered as *sufficiently natural* the limits which, for two centuries, had separated its States from those of Sweden. No power had made greater efforts than Denmark to assure its independence, and the King was resolved to resist every new design against the security of his subjects. He could not adopt the principle that they were susceptible of being bartered against strangers, as furniture or flocks might be trucked against others—a doctrine destructive of the independence and happiness of nations, the avowed object of the Coalition."

To these arguments the English Minister replied by the appearance of an English fleet before Copenhagen. One of the vessels anchored at the entrance of the port, and the British agent, Mr. Thornton, landed from it. He gave the Danish Government forty-eight hours before commencing hostilities, to sign a Treaty of which the principal conditions were the concession of Norway, the instant surrender of the province of Drontheim, and a contingent of 25,000 men to conquer the *indemnities*, which might afterwards accrue to Denmark.

Denmark this time was not prepared to succumb, and England thought it more prudent to desist. Denmark's alliance with France had neither been the result of sympathy, nor of conquest; but solely, as appears on the face of the

negotiations, because of the "resentment which she nourished against Great Britain," because of her previous conduct. Now the only obstacle to her joining the Coalition was her dread of the dismemberment of Norway. She even dispatched Envoys to London and to St. Petersburg; but in the meantime a Russian Envoy was sent to Copenhagen. Count Bernsdorf's mission to London was not less to prevent Norway from being starved, than to negotiate for its preservation. The English Cabinet interposed calculated delays, apparently with the object of insuring success to the mission of Prince Dolgorouki,—a mission which was one of the most unworthy diplomatic rascalities (indigne rouèrie diplomatique) of which history has to preserve the accusing memory; by it the Cabinet of Copenhagen, lulled into a fatal security, suffered itself to be compromised against France:* then the mask was dropped. Count Bernsdorf was frankly informed that England considered Norway only in the light of a Swedish province, and summarily dismissed without being suffered even to transmit to the Prince Regent, a letter entrusted to him by his master. Count Moltke fared no better at St. Petersburg: on his first audience, the Emperor Alexander told him that Prince Dolgorouki, if he had guaranteed to Denmark the possession of Norway, had exceeded his powers, and that "the engagements contracted in that respect with Sweden, and in concert with England were for ever inviolable."

The Treaty was signed in the beginning of 1814, as a contract between *Sweden and Denmark alone*. On the same day, however, England figures as signing at the same place a Treaty of Peace with Denmark. By the 13th Article, the

* To Denmark, the Hanseatic Towns were offered as a compensation if she would join the Allies. She refused the bribe, but joined the alliance, and a collision actually took place between the Danish and the French troops; after recording the fact, M. Bignon proceeds, "The Danish Government by an odious machination, thus found itself at once at war with the Coalition, and with Napoleon who had just triumphed at Lutzen."—*Hist. de France*, t. xii, p. 81.

King of Sweden engages to exercise his authority with the allies, to obtain at the general pacification that indemnity for Denmark, which he has evinced his disposition to afford by the cession of Pomerania and the Isle of Rugen.*

England revives the former Treaties of Peace and Commerce, but not of Guarantee : Denmark, independently of the former Guarantees, now naturally demanded one for the possessions that had been left to her ; the omission was therefore not one of inadvertence ; indeed England took to herself Heligoland, a portion of the Gottorp territory, the possession of which she had guaranteed in 1721. Russia signs no Treaty at Kiel.

It now remained to settle matters with Norway. Here there was no capital that could be threatened with Bombardment ; but a dispensation of Providence, which might have softened the heart of an enemy or a tyrant, was taken advantage of by these diplomatic spoilers, and as already said English cruisers intercepted the grain destined for Norway, while the King of Denmark prohibited its exportation under *penalty of death*. That people could not be brought to believe that England was acting by a settled purpose, and despatched envoys to London to implore justice and mercy. They contrived to smuggle themselves into England, but the Government, dreading still the Public or the Parliament, had them seized and sent home.

The Swedish and Danish Commissioners were empowered to use the following language (7 July, 1814) to the elected King of Norway.

“The cession of Norway has been guaranteed by the great

* Art xiii. S. M. le Roi de Suède désirant contribuer, autant qu'il sera possible et qu'il dépendra d'elle, à ce que S. M. le Roi de Danemarque obtienne quelque dédommagement pour la cession du royaume de Norvège, ce dont S. M. donne une preuve manifeste par la cession de la Poméranie Suédoises et de l'île de Rügen, elle employera toute son autorité auprès des hautes puissances alliées pour obtenir indépendamment de cela, lors d'une paix générale, un dédommagement proportionné pour la cession de la Norvège.

powers,* the *Allies of Russia*. This decision is irrevocable. The High Powers consider this reunion" (P) "as one of the bases of the new system of political equilibrium, and in case of refusal the Russian General Benningesen (the same who had betrayed to destruction the Russian army in the campaign of Dantzig) who occupies Holstein with 50,000 men is authorised to invade Schleswig and the Prussian troops will march to the succour of the Swedes. The undersigned find themselves therefore in the position of having to announce that they are not mediators between Sweden and Norway but rather **HERALDS OF ARMS**, whose duty it is to insist on the execution of the Treaty of Kiel."

This array of power and resolution, of cruelty and astuteness had, however, one salutary effect in breaking that bond of servility and dependence by which the smaller states are cursed and the greater tempted. The fortunate conditions which Norway obtained depended, however, not alone upon her own dispositions, but also on the repugnance felt in Sweden itself to the annexation. The patriotic portion of that people held the acquisition to be both dangerous and unjust, and were shrewd enough to suspect even the purpose for which it was forced upon them, namely, the dismemberment, at the general pacification of a province far otherwise important—Finland. The party entertaining these views was powerful, and numbered even members of the Administration. The annexation was carried so to say by a Russian faction as it was forced on Norway ultimately by a threat of Russian intervention; yet Russia is innocent of the whole transaction. Russia, be it remembered, was the patron of Denmark, and it was because of the alliance of Denmark with her that England had first devised the dismemberment.

At the first treaty of Vienna the powers therefore found Norway transferred to Sweden, Swedish Pomerania, as an instalment of compensation, transferred to Denmark; and

* In Bignon, vol. xiv, p. 184, the word is *Quatre Puissances*, but on reference to the Swedish documents it appears to be a misquotation.

Russia in possession of the Swedish province of Finland. This was not the state of things before the war; they do not restore Finland to Sweden, or Norway to Denmark; or even afford to the latter the promised compensation. However, Sweden has yet energy enough to become a party to the secret Quadruple Alliance with England, Austria, and France, against the further encroachments of Russia. On this Napoleon is brought back from Elba.* After the Battle of Waterloo Russia has everything her own way: Sweden no longer joins in Secret Treaties on that side; the principal part of the pecuniary indemnity stipulated at Kiel is surrendered to Sweden for the expenses of the Norwegian expedition: Prussia takes possession of Swedish Pomerania and the Isle of Rugen equally guaranteed by that Treaty to Denmark, who has to content herself with a portion of the Duchy of Lauenburg.

This is the simple state of the case. The dismemberment was settled privately with England; but as such a proposition could not be ventured at the final pacification, and as, during the war, it was impracticable while Denmark and France were united, Denmark had to be entrapped into breaking with France. A private transaction between Sweden and Denmark remains, therefore, at the General Settlement the basis of a transfer, which is accepted on the plea of Denmark's alliance with France. It may be well now to contrast the view of her own conduct, which England receives from her public Instructors:—

“Although history cannot contemplate without regret the violent transference of a brave and ancient people, from the Government of their father's to a stranger rule; yet the *mournful* impression is much alleviated by the reflection that Denmark obtained, to a certain extent at least, an equivalent, adjacent to its own territories, that the Scandinavian

* Some of the evidence upon which this statement rests, will shortly appear in a work on the Diplomacy of England since 1792, by a German writer of high authority. Some of the facts will be found in a letter published in the ‘Morning Post,’ in February, 1847.

Peninsula was thus for the first time united under one dominion, and a power all but insular* established in the Baltic, which, with the support of the British navy, may possibly be able to maintain its independence in future times, even beside the colossal power which overshadows the North of Europe." †

The participation of Bernadotte in this spoliation is the great blot upon his name; but even his panegyrist can be very differently candid from the historian of Russian ambition and the apologist of British subserviency. After justifying the robbery from Denmark by the robbery of Russia, and balancing the blow of the compensation against the shock of the dismemberment, he proceeds in these terms.

"If regard be had only to the geographical position of Sweden and Norway, can it be denied that nature designed the Scandinavian peninsula to be united under the same government? In this, however, as in many other instances, proximity of situation appears to have produced anything but goodwill. The Norwegians have never loved the Swedes, and they regret, to this hour, their forcible separation from their ancient protectors, the Danish Kings, whose truly paternal sway had ever been gratefully acknowledged by them. *To dis sever a connection which had subsisted for so many ages, and been consecrated by the dearest recollections of history, was equally arbitrary and cruel; time will prove whether it was less impolitic.*"

The object of Russia in the Scandinavian kingdoms was to

* Strange qualification! the ice in winter allows Copenhagen to be attacked by a land force, as in the memorable Siege, whilst the Danish ships are blocked up: in summer the Belts place Zealand at the mercy of a superior naval force. In the secret project of Coalition between Sweden and Russia, in 1718, the sixth article is as follows: "The two fleets shall endeavour to stop the passage of the Belts, that the Danish troops in Holstein and Jutland may not return into Zealand; and do all that is possible to keep the Danish fleet shut out, and to cut off all communication of Denmark with abroad."

† Alison's Hist. of Europe.

disarrange (how it mattered little) their political structure, and to weaken them in such a manner as to keep alive or to awaken jealousy and animosity, and, by estranging them from each other, to raise up that bitterness which is strong in proportion as associations are near and ties consanguineous: and all this has been done for her. The settlement of Europe leaves Sweden, the chivalrous ally of the Coalition, and whose Prince was first designated to command its armies, whom the Powers had undertaken to recompense by the dismemberment of one neighbour, and to strengthen for protection against another, with its Capital menaced by a Fortress, reared upon soil recently its own—seeing the powerful Capital of its enemy established where it had ruled—deprived of half its territory—oppressed by a hollow compensation—prostrated by internal faction—exhausted by military preparations, digging ditches and building walls only to reveal its fears and hopelessness.

Now let us turn back to a former century, and contrast the conduct and anticipations of England and Russia. The following is the separate article of a Treaty signed between England and Sweden, 1st February, 1720:—

“As it is important for the Protestant Religion and the commerce of Sweden and Great Britain, and of all Christendom, that the Tzar should not dominate over the Baltic Sea, the King of Great Britain will not only give the succours promised in this Treaty, but will induce also his Allies to succour Sweden against the Tzar, if the latter will not restore to Sweden *that which is indispensable for her security*, and for guaranteeing the liberty of commerce with the Baltic.”

On that occasion the mischief which this useless Treaty was directed to cure had been done by England herself, who, five years before, had assisted Russia to the possession of those very provinces, in consequence of the desire of George I to add Bremen and Verden to Hanover. But these schemes not being grateful to the English nation, Russia turned to

France, and the following remarkable propositions were made, and judgments expressed by the Czar Peter :—

“The system of Europe is changed; the basis of all the Treaties of France is that of Westphalia. Why has France united herself to Sweden? It is that it had possessions in Germany, and thus her Alliance balanced the power of the Emperor. But to-day Sweden *is almost extinguished*, and can be of no further service to France. The Czar therefore offers himself to France, to take for her the place of Sweden, and to afford her not only his alliance, but his power, and at the same time that of Prussia, without which she cannot act.”*

Thus had Russia equally used war and peace; prompted the rage, directed the arms, and triumphed in the victories of all the nations in whose affairs she mingled, being secure of advantage wherever there was strife, and certain of reaping the victory wherever blood was drawn.

The difference in the fate of Bernadotte, and that of the upstart monarchs imposed on Naples, Spain, Holland, &c., justifies, no doubt, his election by the Swedes, but it is not the less true that that event shakes the future securities of the kingdom. Of all questions which can endanger a country without, and distract it within, that of succession is the first, and that insecurity is greatest in cases where there is allowed to subsist a conflict between succession and election. There remains a Pretender on the ground of hereditary right, but what is more ominous, there is in some form a Russian Guarantee for the present elected Dynasty. On the demise of Bernadotte the fact was revealed by the then organ of the British Government, and the consequences thence to be drawn were thus stated in March, 1844 :—

“Russia is *understood to guarantee* the succession in Bernadotte’s family, *in return, no doubt*, for Sweden’s adhesion to the system of Russia’s predominance in the Baltic. When,

* Frassan, Hist. de la Diplom. Française, v. iv, p. 448.

in addition to this, we learn that a marriage has taken place between the heir to the throne of Denmark and a Russian Princess, we cannot but feel that the Sound is equally menaced with the Bosphorus, and that the Baltic may become, like the Black Sea, a Russian lake."

Formerly the parties of the "Bonnetts" and the "Hats" at Stockholm, were the Antitypes of the present foreign factions of Athens. This suffices to show that France in the course of the last century maintained a permanent competition with Russia, and exerted herself to prevent her ascendancy on the Baltic and in the North. The fact is not less singular because unnoticed, that no French party now exists at Stockholm. Under the Administrations which intervened between Louis XIV and the Revolution, no influence could be exerted by France in any foreign country. By the Revolution her party was finally extinguished in Sweden, and that country became one of the most active of those engaged in the war against her. At the peace it might have been restored, because, on the one hand, France under any intelligible system must have been the basis of resistance to the encroachments of Russia, and on the other, Sweden had for king chosen a Frenchman, distinguished alike in the council and in the field, and who had in the time of France's grandeur separated himself from her policy as prejudicial to the interest of the country whose Crown he wore; but Russia ruled at Paris. She had removed the only man in France, who could have given a rational direction to its policy (Talleyrand), and filled his place by a servant of her own (the Duc de Richelieu). Again, it was not in France that she obtained this victory, but at London and Vienna, the Cabinets of which she induced to relinquish four millions sterling of the indemnity money, on the condition of removing from the French Foreign Office the obnoxious individual, who, at the first Congress of Vienna, had prompted the defensive Treaty between England, France, Austria, and Sweden.

From the peace of 1815 till 1830, no event occurred calculated to influence opinion or acts in Sweden; but on the

breaking out of that Revolution the old spirit revived, and Sweden prepared itself to take its share in securing Poland. It made overtures to England, which were treated in the same style as those of Turkey, and its generous impulses curbed in the same manner as was arrested the Persian army already on its march to the Russian frontier. Bernadotte indignant turned round to the very Power that he had attempted to resist, and a secret Convention was settled between him and Russia, which, however, was not executed until the close of June, 1834. This prostration of Sweden concurred in date with the submission of England and France to the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi, against which they had paraded their fleets. In 1836, again were hopes awakened in Sweden by the fallacious appearance then assumed by England. Sweden made overtures at Vienna, in Paris, and in London; but in Vienna and in Paris, they watched but the conduct of England, and were guided by her decisions. What these were may be inferred from the manner in which she received an overture then made by Turkey in reference to the entrance of an English fleet into the Black Sea. The British Minister who treated this proposition as an act of hostility "to the Independence of Turkey," could not fail to regard any support of England given to Sweden as a blow to the "Independence of the Baltic," which as the Russian Manifesto against England had declared, had for a long time been established "with the *privity* of the Cabinet of St. James." This was Sweden's last attempt to escape from the gripe of the Bear.

In the small states there is generally little faction; against them must be used the factions of the great states, through their Diplomacy; but independently of events Diplomacy exercises a silent and permanent influence on ideas. The Scandinavian kingdoms having no business to transact at any of the European Courts nevertheless have their accredited agents. The expense is considerable, and their revenue small; they must find something to do; and the work they invent is the making of abstracts of speeches in Parliament, and of leaders in the Journals, which are transmitted home

as oracles of wisdom and lessons of statesmanship. The sphere of this Correspondence is indeed limited, but it is influential, and the emasculation of a few leading men suffices to carry the prostration of a whole people. The position of Russia is such, that in the words of Cardinal Gonsalvi, "her watchfulness cannot slumber a single day." Her command of the Diplomacy of the great states can only be of service in so far as the dissension in the smaller ones suffer its application; to this end in each the appropriate seeds must be sown. What, as regards Persia, would have served her influence in London, without a dispute respecting the Succession of the Crown? what in Turkey, without a dispute between a Pasha and the Sultan? what on the other hand would have profited her, the one or the other, unless she had already ruled in Downing Street? Who before the event could have deemed it possible that England should have set up in Persia the Russian candidate; or that a dispute respecting the frontiers of a Turkish Pashalic should have ruptured the alliance of England and France? With this experience before us we must anticipate that in the Scandinavian kingdoms she will prosecute the task which she has so far effectually accomplished, that day by day the Shuttle of Dissimulation will weave backwards and forwards the Web of Deceit, exhibiting figures adapted to the fancy of each, and local colours pleasing to their eye. Can it be doubted that on these she will bring to bear the foolish interference, or the insaner rivalries, of England, France, and Germany; and that some morning we shall find Sweden in Revolution, and Denmark Protocolised? Let us then endeavour to anticipate the peculiar facilities which she possesses in each.*

Amongst the Scandinavians, no political capital could be worked out of "Legitimacy," or "Liberalism," "Papacy,"

* A new complication has arisen, which may be woven into the Web of future Discord. It is proposed that Denmark should be united to the German Union, and that her Navy shall be restored in order to place a maritime force at the disposal of the Union.

or "Protestantism," "Protection," or "Free Trade." The political, religious, and commercial "isms" and "ites" here slumbered in happy forgetfulness. Those of Nationality alone could be quickened; and the monster "Scandinavianism," appeared on the stage. Simultaneously "Panslavism" was infecting the middle and Eastern portions of Europe: its purpose was to incorporate with Russia the surrounding States—"Scandinavianism" was to scare Russia away! The transfer of Norway had prepared the ground by awakening fears and exciting expectations. On this came to act the general dread of Incorporation by Russia, and the students and journalists exclaimed, "Let us have a Scandinavian Union to protect ourselves." Alas! not understanding the value of the human mind, they looked to size and number, knowing not that it is sense, not territory, that makes nations strong; justice, not adjustment, that is the bulwark of states. Thus were exchanged fraternising visits and addresses of infatuated men, glorying in the not unfounded anticipation of a "future common fate." Then was asked the question, "*which nation is to rule the other?*" then arose the maxim, "*the interest of the king must not stand in the way of the well-being of the people.*"

The effect on the Governments was just the same as of Revolutionary Conspiracies,* but by this common danger the

* A leading Statesman of Denmark writes thus, March, 1843: "You have heard, I presume, about the 'Scandinavian Union.' I have to remark with regard to this, that the Government was mistaken in supposing that there were any secret or avowed political objects connected with it, at least in the minds of the greater number of the members, though I confess that the few individuals who did make political speeches and allusions, have done much harm. The suppression of the Society is a material injustice, added to that which there is in taking such a step, without any appeal to existing laws, without any observation of the usual forms, thus throwing everything into uncertainty. I am persuaded that this deviation from the usually observed forms—a deviation which is so likely to be attributed to Foreign influence—will do much more harm than the 'Scandinavian Union' ever could have done, had it even been a political Society."

two Courts were not united; for to the question of Revolution was superadded that of Confiscation. They had to hurry to St. Petersburg to deprecate extinction and to bid for accession. The narrow affections of race and locality, were thus changed to plots and intrigues, the vague pretexts of patriotism and independence made to colour treason and conspiracy, and every scheme and every expectant servilely waited upon that foreign ambition resistance to which had brought this agitation into existence.*

The favourite theme of the Apostles of the new Creed was the Union of Calmar. Now if any event could have taught the futility of fictitious means of creating that strength which a sense of right can only confer, it was precisely this fact. The Danes and the Swedes had been rival tribes from the earliest times, but these hostile dispositions, the result of

* I subjoin an extract from a letter from a Danish lady to a Swede: "When you spoke to me of the Union of the Scandinavian countries under one Crown as highly desirable, and indeed as regarded resistance to Russia absolutely necessary, I listened without concurring, but also without opposing, because I felt that I was unable to judge. It is now otherwise. I see in that idea the greatest danger that threatens Scandinavia, and in you who promulgate this doctrine the tool of the Power whom you think to resist. 'Scandinavian Union' is to produce for her in the North the same results as Slavonic nationality is intended to bring about in the East; the same results as union under Prussia is to produce in Germany, as separation in the case of the Ottoman Empire, as the hope held out by her to the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, that each shall unite under his sway the Dominion of the other: these results are discontent with the existing state of things, vague agitations for the undefined object, distrust between sovereign and subjects, ill-will between man and man, and all those innumerable means of corruption which she knows so well how to profit by.

"Men who know their own rights, and respect those of others, and stand forward in defence of them, have nothing to fear from Russia. But does this strength dwell in the hearts of Swedes, who are seeking to incorporate with their own country the possessions of another sovereign? How different would it be were you longing for a right, and not for a proposition."

conflicting predatory enterprise, had faded away, and been replaced by sentiments of goodwill, and a consciousness of community of interests founded on their common competition with the Hanseatic towns in trade, and the necessity of resisting the pretensions of the Germans and the Emperors in the North. But this union reopened the Fountain of Animosity which had been closed, and became the source to Russia of her actual preponderance: she first appears upon the scene, invited by Christian I of Denmark, to attach Swedish Finland; she is then invited by Sweden to attach Norwegian Lapland: and thus like a vessel working against an adverse wind, has she made her way board and board through the Baltic, by knowing how to use the tiller.

In April 1837, an important step was taken in this direction. I refer to a despatch, written by Count Witterstedt, Foreign Minister of Sweden, and a Russian Partisan; he had signed the Treaty of Kiel. It was addressed to the Governments of Denmark and Norway and gave the utmost possible importance to the Scandinavian agitation by announcing it as a matter capable of embroiling the various Governments; and as leading to the "overthrow of the existing order of things in the three kingdoms of the North."

The source of this Despatch shows that Sweden, humbled and dismembered, and to whose Crown the family of Wasa furnished a slumbering Pretender, that was the kingdom selected as the instrument, and that the Mistress of the Sound was the one marked for attack and threatened with extinction. It was Denmark that had already been dismembered: it was its rival Sweden, on whose behalf the dismemberment had been effected: beyond this there were approaching differences as to the succession, in which Russia herself had claims. That this is no visionary fear, may be gathered from an insertion in the 'Court Almanac of St. Petersburg' (1844), where the Czar is styled "Reigning Duke of Holstein and Schleswig," and the King of Denmark is entered simply as "Duke of Holstein and Schleswig."

On the extinction of the male line of Frederick III,

Denmark, according to the *Lex Regia*, is assumed to go to Prince Frederick of Hesse, and Schleswig-Holstein to the Duke of Augustenburg. By the marriage of a daughter of the Czar to Prince Frederick, the whole may be secured to Russia, on the pretext of preventing a partition.*

The prospects for the future are thus exposed by the organ of the Foreign Office (the 'Morning Chronicle'), its words are prophetic, and a warning to Denmark of the—hopelessness of resistance.

"Prince Frederick William is married to a daughter of the Emperor Nicholas, who has already shown his zeal for the interests of his son-in-law by negotiating for him the succession of the Duchies of Holstein, which, in the ordinary course of events, would fall to the ducal family of *Holstein-Augustenburg*, and not to the Prince of Hesse. Holstein is not properly a part of the Danish dominions, but belongs to Germany, and it is as Duke of Holstein that the King of Denmark is a member of the Germanic Confederation. The law of succession for Holstein is different from that for Denmark; and Germany would, we believe, witness their separation with no small satisfaction—the more so, as it would probably secure the accession of Holstein to the

* The following letter is at once explanatory and authoritative:—

"I only heard of the marriage between the Prince of Hesse and the Grand Duchess of Russia being finally arranged after I had sent off my letter to you, but you may be assured that my feelings on the occasion were similar to yours, and the more so as our countryman who communicated the news to me regarded it as a most fortunate event, and a great achievement. 'It will keep Denmark together,' said he, 'and is the best way of disappointing those Scandinavian fools.' This proves that the project, with its real or presumed conditions, has been extolled by him in his usual exaggerated way; and the joyful acclamations with which he now hails its realisation will, of course, by the high personages with whose views he coincides, be received as new proofs of his ability, his devotion, and his patriotism. One of his expressions was, 'We have thus secured the guarantee and friendship of Russia, that of England I think we already have, and may hope to preserve. Russia will follow, and we shall be safe against all partitions.'"

Zollverein. *But Russia is believed to have precluded this result, by having induced the Duke of Holstein-Augustenburg and his family to cede their rights of succession, in consideration of a large pecuniary indemnity.* Thus Denmark and Holstein are to be preserved as an entire inheritance for Prince Frederick William and his heirs, by means of *Russian gold*; and family ties will give Russia a natural and preponderating influence *in that monarchy, which holds the keys of the Baltic, the Sound, and the Belt.* The arrangement we refer to is, no doubt, a matter with *which England has at present no just pretension to interfere*; but we know too much of the far-seeing policy of Russia to regard with indifference" [!] "the progress of events which tend to the future establishment of a Russian Protectorate—or something more—over the Danish territory."

The intellectual audacity of this Invasion of the Earth is from no other point of view so striking. It is now a thousand years and more, since the Russians sent an embassy beyond the sea to the Varangians to address them in these terms: "Our country is wide and fertile, but we are the prey of anarchy—come and rule over us." The Scandinavian Rurick and his brothers obeyed the summons, and proceeded to constitute the Russian State. Their dominion was soon spread to the South,—discriminating in the village of Kief the appropriate seat of a new Empire, they redeemed it from the Khozars, and thus did the metropolis of the future Russia pass from Cossacks to Danes. Between that powerful and energetic race of Northmen possessing all the Coasts, Harbours, Promontories, and Islands of the North, together with the power at sea, and that other race which reckoned the land their own,—the Cossack and Tartar horsemen sweeping the plains of the South and East,—has the Colossus sprung up crushing and appropriating the strength of the one and of the other; she then interposed her immensity with its barrier of ignorance to that concert between her antagonists by which alone the ambition of states as of individuals can be

thwarted. To that pitch has now reached the morselling of the mind, that if to a Scandinavian it were told that his sole allies and only hope are to be found on the Euxine and the Bosphorus, he would open eyes of stupid wonder or incredulous contempt.

The imagination of the nations is dazzled and bewildered by the seizure of Constantinople, which they admit to be within her grasp—by the prospects of an Indian campaign, by her appearance on the heights of the Himalaya, or her establishment along the Persian gulf; but what are such prospective achievements compared with the fracturing and crushing already accomplished in Scandinavia—what danger is to be contemplated in her occupation of Constantinople by nations who have no terror for her settlement on the Sound?

POSTSCRIPT.

July, 1853.

Whence, I may now ask, did the Foreign Office derive its foreknowledge in March, 1844, of an event (the renunciation of the Duke of Augustenburg) accomplished only on the 30th of December, 1852? Why did it deprecate it at the one date and effect it at the other? Europe is in the habit of learning some dozen years afterwards secret arrangements such as this—is it then the astuteness of English Diplomacy that is alarming?

The Archduchess, however, dies; Prince Frederick of Hesse is then cast aside. The new scheme devised is no other than a war. The Memoir which follows was drawn up during its course, and circulated in manuscript as a warning against the Treaty with which it would conclude, and which was in fact signed on the 8th of May, 1852.

The statements in anticipation are, however, nearly what they would be as narrative, except, indeed, that I could not have anticipated such an abjectness in the statesmen of Europe that, in a Treaty given to them to sign, the establishing of a MALE SUCCESSION is assigned as the reason for introducing one through a Female.

As this sheet is passing through the press I received a letter from Stockholm, of which I subjoin an extract, which shows that the Swedes have not yet forgotten Finland. To the commercial value of that country for Russia I had not referred, it is here indicated :—

“Yesterday we had a visit from a young Swede, who surprised me by deeply regretting the loss of Finland. I said, ‘but surely, beautiful Norway is more than an equivalent for Finland.’ He replied, ‘that they would gladly give up Norway for the sake of again possessing Finland; that a great part of the revenues of Sweden were derived from Finland; that it is a more fertile country than Norway; that it was their market for procuring the produce of Russia—tallow, hemp, flax, &c., which they can now only get at a much higher price.’ He said that the Finlanders and the Swedes were much attached to each other, and that even now Sweden sends, amongst other things, quantities of buttons to Finland, as the inhabitants of that country will only wear on their coats the buttons that are made in Sweden. So it seems that Denmark suffers from the loss of Norway. The Norwegians hate the Swedes; Sweden suffers from the loss of Finland, and Russia, as usual, gains.”

PART II.

THE DANISH SUCCESSION.

CHAPTER I.

The Rupture.

THE Duchies were heard of for the first time in 1848 ; but the Schism preceded the great events of Europe, and has extended beyond their term. Elsewhere a few months of agony, or at best an Army of Invasion, and all was over ; but this pitiable Denmark, and these miserable Duchies return again and again upon the surface like the bubbling of a quagmire. A matter which might have been settled in five minutes, and States which could have been devastated from end to end in a week, have kept Europe in suspense for three years, during which it might have been supposed that frightful catastrophes had exhausted the susceptibility of men.

A member of the old Dynasty of Oldenburgh sits on the Throne of Russia, and she of all the Powers of Europe alone holds back ! It is the Government which has pursued a course of the most undisguised violence in the remotest regions of the East, that is careless of its political and dynastic interests in a European kingdom of such close neighbourhood and such vast importance ! But has she not renounced her Rights, and having given this proof of disinterestedness, is not her abstinence a delicacy which deserves respect ? Let us see.

Charles Frederick, Representative of the Junior or Gottorp

line, having, during the Swedish war, lost Schleswig, and retaining only a portion of Holstein, but being according to the peculiar and anomalous practice of these Duchies co-regent with the king, sought in 1720 the support of Peter I of Russia.

That monarch hastened to profit by an opportunity so favourable for obtaining at once the control over both the Scandinavian Kingdoms, for the Duke of Holstein had claims, or rather pretensions, on the Crown of Sweden which were not unfavourably regarded by a powerful party in that country. By espousing his cause Peter hoped to advance the two great objects he had then at heart—objects intimately connected, though apparently most incongruous—the acknowledgment of the assumed title of Emperor, and the emancipation of Russian vessels from the Sound dues. Prussia had at once acknowledged the title, and appears to have done so under the belief that it was to confer some supremacy in the North in regard to communications by water, such as belonged to the old Emperors of Germany in regard to those by land; and that consequently the navigation of the Baltic would be opened. Under similar impressions Denmark had refused to concede the title. The two demands had been simultaneously pressed at Copenhagen and equally resisted by the Danes; matters being in this position, Peter required the reinstatement of the Duke of Holstein—and by threatening a descent expected to exhaust Denmark by preparatives, or to threaten her into submission.

“His Majesty,” says an old writer, “had seen himself the Court of Denmark, and was acquainted with her genius and ministry, which made him seem resolved to pursue the matter he had in dispute with her. He had two pretensions on that Crown: one was the restitution of the dominions taken from the Duke of Holstein; the other the freedom of his ships in the Sound. The Russian Emperor imagined that he now saw a favourable opportunity to strike this double blow; for if he beat the Danish Squadron built by his example, or by way of precaution, nothing could hinder his making a descent

in Jutland and Holstein; but be this as it may, by this management he obliged Denmark to run into such expenses every year as very much drained their coffers.”*

Peter, however, saw that something more might be made out of the case than a mere temporary embarrassment to Denmark; and that by connecting the claims of the Duke with the Imperial House, he might extend the bounds of the inheritance of ambition which he left to his successors; he therefore conferred upon the Duke the hand of his daughter, and the solemnization of this marriage was the last act of his reign and life. This was the first alliance of the Czars with a Princely House, and even if the event proved not as brilliant as might be anticipated, the concession was small of a daughter doubly illegitimate. †

Catherine, his widow and successor, was well disposed to carry out his views in this respect, when she too was removed from the troubles of this earth. The dissensions of the House of Russia entirely altered the dispositions of her successors, and the Gottorp claims found no longer support in the policy of that Government.

The King of Denmark now negotiated with the Emperor as head of the German Empire, of which Holstein is a fief; and a Treaty was signed between them, by which the claims of the Duke of Holstein on the Duchies were set aside, and a compensation of 1,000,000 crowns allowed (if claimed within a certain time). To this Treaty ‡ the Empress Anne of Russia acceded. Nevertheless, the Duke rejected with scorn the indemnity, and indignantly protested against this attempted interference with his Rights. His son, afterwards raised to the Imperial Throne on renouncing Protestantism,

* Motley's *Life of Peter I*, v. iii, p. 336.

† The husband of Catherine and the wife of Peter, Eudocia Lapoukin, were both alive when she was born; and therefore she and her son and her sister Elizabeth were not so much as mentioned on the succession of Anne.

‡ The prototype and antitype of the Treaty of the 8th May, 1852.

under the name of Peter III, in like manner rejected the offered compensation, and refused to admit the validity of the Treaty. So soon as this unhappy Prince obtained possession of the sceptre, he prepared to recover his paternal inheritance. His suspected Lutheranism, his paraded "Germanism," had rendered him obnoxious; however, he had recovered by the first acts of his government the heart of the Russians, when these measures against Denmark* afforded to his wife (afterwards Catherine II) the means of casting him from a Throne to a Dungeon and a Tomb.

That Revolution which changed the face of Europe was thus connected with the Duchies. The Danish minister and party (for Denmark then had a party at St. Petersburg) lent, in common with those of Vienna and Versailles, their aid to Catherine, and were initiated into the Conspiracy; on the moment of its triumph she conveyed to the Danish minister the assurance that he need be under no apprehension as to the Duchies; but she carefully avoided concluding anything, and sent her husband's uncle, Prince George of Holstein, as Governor to Kiel. "Though she employed neither fleets nor armies, she kept that Court floating between hope and fear," † and so domineered no less imperiously at Copenhagen than at Warsaw: it was enough to whisper the word "Holstein," to solve every difficulty, and to cause every obstacle to bend to her will.

This course had, nevertheless, its inconveniences and limits; the other powers were seriously indisposed, and at times resentful. The Incorporation of either Duchy was

* In a despatch (not published) from Mr. Keith to Lord Granville, July 12, 1762, giving an account of the dethronement of Peter III, it is stated that "the discontent among the guards was heightened by the resolution his Imperial Majesty had taken of carrying a great part of that corps into Germany, in his expedition against Denmark, which was a measure disagreeable to the whole nation, who stomached greatly their being drawn into new expenses and new dangers for recovering the Duchy of Sleswick, which they considered as a trifling object, and entirely indifferent to Russia."

† Castéra, vol. ii, p. 239.

impracticable without war, and more might be gained by cession than by possession. So in 1767 Catherine bargained for a conditional surrender of her son's rights, which was ratified by her son, afterwards the Emperor Paul, in 1773,—eleven years after her accession and pledge. Great were the rejoicings at Copenhagen: the event was celebrated by festivities, and commemorated by a medal; the victory was attributed to the talents of Bernsdorf, but the honour was shared with the gold he had lavished at St. Petersburg. It soon, however, appeared that a price had been paid in another coin, that of a *Secret Alliance*; in consequence of which Denmark soon found herself constrained to join Russia against Sweden, and henceforward bound in subserviency never afterwards to be broken.

The "renunciation" amounted therefore to a bargain, and that of a flagitious nature. In reviewing the transaction, the disgusted reader will conclude by exclaiming, "so then this matter is settled;" it is but the commencement, and the discussions which are to ensue take their departure from the now admitted point of Denmark's obligations and Russia's magnanimity.

The claim of Russia was twofold: it affected a portion of Schleswig, and a portion of Holstein; the first was dropped entirely and unconditionally. The father of Peter had been even constrained to drop the title of Schleswig. England and France had bound themselves in a treaty of guarantee* to defend the King of Denmark in the possession of Denmark against "any foreign Power whatever who should come and attack it." Prussia, Austria, and even Russia herself had acceded to this arrangement; therefore no pretensions in 1773 could be set up upon Schleswig, and yet it is her acknowledgment of the state of things that has been interpreted a *renunciation*.

* See Treaty with Sweden, 14th July, 1720; British Guarantee, 16th July, 1720; of France, 18th August, 1720, severally renewed and confirmed, 16th April, 1727, and 15th March, 1742.

As to Holstein, the claim itself bore but on a little more than a quarter of the Duchy, and was by no means a clear case. Its admission involved a division of the fief, the Indivisi- bility of which was a fundamental part of the Law by which Holstein could alone be inherited. Denmark had, therefore, open to her one of two courses,—that of resisting the claim, or of negotiating for its abandonment. She took neither; she admitted the claim, and submitted to its super- cession,—“*hoc fons malorum.*”

The claim was to slumber so long as the male line of Frederick III survived; then would arise the question of Agnatic and Cognatic succession between the Duchies and the Kingdom,—here Russia waited for Denmark: that question could not fail to arise as she had an interest in raising it. The claim which she could not have enforced at the time, she gets acknowledged by postponing, and thus reserves to herself all the chances of a future disputed suc- cession for the Kingdom itself.

It is not, however, the Secret Treaty which alone she obtained as immediate compensation; she received another infinitely greater than the matter in dispute, giving her territory further to the west, lying between Germany and the sea, namely, the counties of Delmenhorst and Oldenburg. She did not alarm Europe by annexing them to her own dominions, but caused them, indeed, to be forgotten as Russian territory, by another act of generosity: she erected them into the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, and placed them under the apparently independent sway of the Junior Branch of the House of Gottorp.

It so happens, however, that these counties were not absolute Dependencies of the crown of Denmark, which could cede in them no more than the rights which itself possessed. That Tenure was limited to the male line of Frederick III, and so in like manner was Russia's Renunciation; the bargain was therefore temporary on both sides. These countries had been transferred to Denmark in 1667 in consequence of an arrangement with the Duke of Ploen, the next heir to Gunther,

the last Count, who died in that year, and on the condition that "if the male line of the Royal House should become extinct, that the two counties should return to them and their male descendants, and likewise to the Agnates of their princely house."*

I may here parenthetically observe that Bremen stands in the territory of Oldenburg as Hamburg does in that of Holstein; that it commands the entrance of the Weser as Holstein does that of the Elbe. These two rivers are the sole outlets of Germany, and the possessor of them, if equally possessed of the Sound and the Eyder, holds the communications of the whole of the North.

The arrangement with Paul as to Holstein had therefore reference solely to the male descendants of Frederick III. On their extinction the Holstein equivalent reverted to Russia, and the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg to the Duke of Augustenburg.

With such claims and after such preparations, how are we to account for the fact that in the recent troubles we neither see her troops, nor hear her name, and that all the Powers of the world, she excepted, are there interposing by arms, or interfering by Mediation.† By this prudent reserve what fields are opened for adjustment—what a harvest spread for ambition.!

It is now assumed that on the failure of the male line of Frederick III, no pretensions can be put forward by the Agnatic line, and that the Duchies follow of right the same order of Succession as the Kingdom. It may be so, but so recently as 1843 the perturbation of the Danish Court and of the whole Monarchy on this score was so extreme that they hailed with delight the marriage of Prince Frederick of Hesse with a daughter of the Emperor of Russia, as a means of escaping from Partition. This combination, however, failed by an accident such as even the best laid schemes are

* Grüner, p. 109.

† At the time this was written Russia had not articulated a word in public.

exposed to. The Archduchess died in giving birth to a dead child, and the Emperor was at once afflicted with the loss of a daughter and a Crown : * the daughter indeed could not be restored to life, but other means remained for securing the Crown.

Shortly after the death of the Princess, a Royal Ordinance appeared, which became the signal of discontent for one portion of the possessions of the King of Denmark, and falsely directed the theories and ambition of the other. From that hour Denmark and the Duchies were established as having hostile interests in which were woven up on the one side the succession of the Crown with Local Rights, and on the other, the integrity of the Monarchy with Popular Privileges : I refer to the Letters Patent of 1846, which declared the succession according to the *Lex Regia* to be extended to the Duchies, but at the same time acknowledging that respecting " Holstein " there are circumstances which oppose our asserting with equal certitude the title of all our lines to this Duchy." Supposing this step to have been perfectly legal its effect was destroyed by this admission ; but it doubly unsettled the matter : first, by the manner in which it dealt with the Duchies ; secondly, by letting in the pretensions of a third Power—Russia, while exciting the opposition of a neighbouring state, the German Confederation. The results of the measure were so unmistakeable that they must be assigned as its object, namely, the encouragement of the Duchies to resist, and the excitement of Denmark by their insolence and extravagance. To render this matter clear I must revert to the antecedent circumstances.

The House of Gottorp, so long as it had been in possession, had done its best to assimilate Schleswig to Holstein, and to introduce German ideas together with the use of the German language. The University of Kiel had been established with that view, and education followed that impulse long after the

* " Poor Emperor ! he has lost by one blow a daughter and a kingdom."—*General Skrzynski*.

family had been swept away. The same policy had been recently revived by the Duke of Augustenburg, through a mere personal agency, partially making use of the Press. The Danish Government at both periods regarded this movement with indifference, and in fact, so late as the year 1842, no proposition of a specific kind had been uttered on either side. In that year the States of Holstein were the first to raise the question of succession by the simple declaration that it was uncertain, and the Royal Commissioner undertook to transmit to the Government the wishes of the Assembly that it should be settled in such a manner as to prevent any possible separation. On this the Diet of the Insular portion of Denmark declared itself for the application of the Succession according to the *Lex Regia* to the Duchies. Now the States of Holstein were violently disturbed; they protested against *the pretension of the Government to decide by itself the question of the Succession*; and declared that Schleswig and Holstein were independent states hereditarily following the Agnatic Line.

Such were the short and trifling antecedents, but they suffice to remove any possible delusion as to the peaceable submission of the Duchies* to an act of authority so injudiciously exerted.

It is further to be observed that at the very moment it was transmitted, the Lieutenant Governor was the Prince of Schleswig Holstein, and the Duke of Augustenburg, who has acquired the character of the first intriguer in Europe, held supreme influence in those Dependencies. So totally was neglected every precaution, that the Grand Duke of Oldenburg instantly transmitted his protest against the act to the

* "Is it supposed that the Duke of Augustenburg will sell his birthright for a mess of pottage? or is it expected that the people of the Duchies will yield? They will not be coerced, nor will they be menaced into unworthy submission. They do not want any compromise, but they want that 'separate and equal station,' to which in such an event they are entitled by the laws of their 'common country.'"—*Germanicus Vindex*, in the *Times*, January, 1846.

Germanic Confederation. That body declared that the King of Denmark never could have intended what he had said, and that monarch politely acknowledged the correctness of their interpretation. Had the measure been a *bonâ fide* one, must not the sentiments of the Diet have been previously ascertained—must not the adhesion of at least the Gottorp Line been secured—and would not a Lieutenant Governor have been despatched to the Duchies qualified to cope with the influence of the Augustenburgs, and to carry out the ordinance?

But if the Duchies were intemperate, they were not revolutionary, if they were irritated by the letter of the King, they were attached to the succession of the Crown. But we have nothing to do with the Duchies, the power was in the hands of Denmark; she therefore was responsible for the errors and acts of the Duchies no less than for her own; everything was in her hands. That very agitation for the "Indivisibility" of the Duchies for which the war was made,* if unfounded in right, presented to the Danish Crown the most important securities, for it protected Denmark, or properly handled would have protected her, from the invasion of Germanism, as formerly the Governing Union of these Duchies had protected her against Germany.

The suggestion of the Letters Patent did not of course come from St. Petersburg, but from Paris; it was offered as a means of escaping from Russia.† At the time I was

* Mr. Wegener, after showing that Schleswig and Holstein were separate Duchies originally belonging to different countries, and conjoined and disjoined through many centuries in various degrees by acts of violence or motives of expediency, exclaims, "And it is for this doctrine of Indivisibility that our country is deluged in blood, and Europe threatened with war."

† At that moment the Spanish marriages were in preparation, and Louis Philippe was accused of seeking to gain Russia to secure himself against the effects of his rupture with England. The *Times* said he was ready, in return for some show of countenance from a Russian ambassador, "to sacrifice everything from Cracow to

made aware of the scheme by a letter, of which I obtained knowledge, from Christian VIII to the Duc de Cazes, who had been sent for this purpose by Louis Philippe to Copenhagen. The Memoir of Mr. Bunsen has, however, since established the fact, as also that of an engagement on the part of France to support by arms the Danish Government if necessary.*

The object of Christian VIII was to preserve the "Integrity of the Succession," a maxim soon converted into "Integrity of the Monarchy." Thus was let in "Union of Administration," then came "Unity of Representation." On the one side the sense of right was strained, on the other, the chord of ambition struck,—the passage was short to marshal glory, and that involved diplomatic composition. If you wish to lead an individual into a false course instil a fallacious maxim: how much easier with millions and with fallacious terms.

The "Integrity of the Succession" might have been secured in two ways: the establishment of the Cognatic Line in the Duchies, or of the Agnatic in the Kingdom. There was no difficulty in either.

Before 1660 the Duchies and the Kingdom had been ruled by the same line of monarchs for two hundred years, that line being hereditary in the Duchies, and maintained in Denmark in succession, although there only elective. In consequence of the Revolution of that year, the Crown there was also rendered hereditary, but with the admission of females, and hence arose the difference between the succession of the two portions of the United State: but the *Lex Regia* of 1665,

Constantinople;" and the *Morning Chronicle*, the official organ, pointed to the scaffold as the consequence of his betrayal of the interests of France and Europe.

* "It was only too much to be feared that the plan now proposed was nothing but the execution of the project which the late French Government had recommended, and as it appears with a decided promise of French support against any claims of the Germanic Diet and the German Nation."—*Bunsen*, p. 81.

was not a fundamental law, beyond the establishment of despotic power, and any successor of Frederick III could "alter, repeal, or dispense with" every existing law. Christian VIII succeeded to this unlimited power and by a stroke of the pen could have brought back the old "Unity of Succession with the Duchies."

Were it not so, the Law itself has been virtually repealed by being broken in two points, and these its principal provisions. It settles conjointly the succession of Denmark and Norway, expressly stating, in section 19, that both kingdoms "shall remain undivided in the possession of one absolute and hereditary King of *Denmark and Norway*." In section 26 it is enacted that the Kings of Denmark and Norway enjoy "uncircumscribed and unlimited power and authority in the strongest sense that any other Christian hereditary and despotic King can be said to enjoy the same, * * * * and for the further strengthening of the same, we WILL and COMMAND that whosoever presumes to speak or act anything which may be prejudicial to our absolute power and authority, be proceeded against as a traitor to our Crown and dignity, and be severely punished, as usual in cases of High Treason."

Thus then the *Lex Regia* has been extinguished by the Congress of Vienna, and there no longer exists the Potentate from whom it emanated, viz. a King of *Denmark and Norway*. If it did remain in force Christian VIII would have been, and Frederick VII would be, together with the ministers of both, liable to the pains and penalties of high treason; having plotted to subvert "that absolute sovereignty," by the introduction of a Constitutional form of government.

It is to be remarked, that the hereditary and absolute character and quality of the Monarchy were essentially combined; that the hereditary was auxiliary to the absolute; that the absolute was the aim and purpose of the State reasons of that time: whence it is to be inferred that the absolute character cannot be attacked without destroying the hereditary, either in regard to the legal or the political view of the case.

The object of the Revolution of 1860, was the establishment of despotic power : the introduction of a Constitution vitiates the proceeding, and nullifies all its consequences. It remained to revert to the anterior state, or to create a new one. In the one case the Crown of Denmark again becomes elective ; in the other, you must deal with the succession of the Crown as you have with the Institutions of the country.

But supposing that Denmark had been indisposed to accept the Line of Augustenburg—a supposition not entertained at the time, it then would have remained to obtain the consent of the Duchies to the Cognatic succession under the Line of Hesse ; but in that case, it had to be proposed to them, not enforced on them. By this course it certainly was possible to fail, but by the course adopted it was impossible to succeed, except indeed by civil war. The integrity of the succession had therefore been sacrificed to Prince Frederick of Hesse, * the son-in-law of the Emperor, who was himself excluded so soon as he lost his wife. No one has denied the facility of this adjustment.

“It is clear,” says Mr. Bunsen, “that the late King of Denmark might have easily prevented the disruption of his Estates, by establishing, in virtue of his absolute power, the male succession in Denmark. But whether an overthrow of the male succession in the Duchies flattered certain *dynastic propensities* (!) and *national vanity* (!), or offered the additional attraction of the prospects of getting rid of ancient inconvenient *constitutional liberties* (!), this very simple means has not been adopted.”†

A manner so lax of dealing with a question so grave, in a document purporting to be a State paper, put forth in justi-

* What can be more strange than the dropping of this candidate? Would he not have served the purposes of the Treaty as well as Princess Louisa and her husband? Is it not clear that the object was the displacing of the intervening heirs : who Russia chooses to put out of the way of course is never after heard of. There are circumstances, however, of a delicate nature affecting the legitimacy of that family which have placed them at Russia's mercy.

† Memoir to Lord Palmerston, p. 25.

fication of an Invasion, and in prospect of an European war arising out of the event, fills the mind with astonishment. The only conclusion to be drawn is, that the case was intentionally embroiled. Every passion and every frailty of humanity, had been called forth to obscure the judgment of the parties in a matter in which a Foreign Power had so great an interest at stake. It was, in fact, a contest between the Russian and Danish Cabinets: Denmark having no man equal to cope with those employed by Russia, the consequences which have followed must, under similar circumstances, follow in every transaction, public or private.

We now pass to the second stage: we have closed the chapter of "Integrity of Succession;" we come to that of "Integrity of Monarchy,"—the generous concession of Legislative Amalgamation, replaces the abortive act of Arbitrary Power.

It is in the spirit of our times, not by ambition, but on principle to concentrate power; customs, rights, are held to be only distinctions which separate men and impair the strength of Governments. This is the blight on every political experiment; by it despotism reaps the victory, whenever the people wins the battle. It does not therefore suggest of necessity any profound or malignant purpose to hear of a Constitution proposed by the Danish, or any other monarch, for "the whole of his States;" yet a prince like Christian VIII, could not have fallen into such a scheme either through liberalism or inadvertence, which were neither to his nature, antecedents, nor his circumstances. In the case of fractions nearly equally balanced, the vulgar doctrines of Centralisation could not apply, and he had before his eyes the experience of surrounding nations.

The last event which had disturbed the tranquillity and threatened the peace of Europe was an attempt to impose on a population of 300,000 souls, in the Pyrenees, the benefits of a liberal Constitution; and although the Queen of Spain at the head of ninety-seven and a half per cent. of the Spanish people, against two and a half per cent. was backed by the active interference of England, France, and Portugal, yet did she run a narrow risk of losing her Crown, and after

the expenditure of forty millions sterling, and the periodical devastation of Spain during six years, did these ancient liberties of that trifling population triumph in the Convention of Bergara over the power and the wisdom of civilised and Constitutional Europe.

Or going back to the last century, did not a similar cause bring on those disturbances of Europe which ended in the great Revolution of France, and caused to England the loss of her magnificent Transatlantic possessions? Was not this a result of her wishing to concentrate Administrative power, and giving undue extension to Parliamentary authority?

A more recent and apposite experience is presented by Russia herself,—a fact which, though hidden from the eyes of Europe, could scarcely be unknown to Christian VIII. The Cossacks, little as it may be suspected abroad, are not a mere troop of irregular horse, but a constituted Republic separated from Russia in a far more distinct manner than the Duchies are from Denmark; they admit no Russian to civil or military rank or post, and utterly repudiate the Ecclesiastical pretensions and usurpations of the official Russian Church. An Ukase was published assimilating their Administration to that of the other provinces of the empire: their contingent had by precaution been already despatched to distant frontiers; nevertheless the Deputy Hetman instantly sent orders for the regiments of reserve to rendezvous at the point of their territories nearest to Moscow. The Emperor did not accuse them of beginning the war, but with an army of 1,200,000 men at his disposal explained the Ukase as a mistake.

It is possible to conceive that Russia should seek to get rid of a Constitution which interfered with her military system and religious unity—that the *doctrinaires* of Madrid should attempt to efface a contrast that put to shame their constitutional freedom when sustained only by a population insignificant in numbers—that England should have erred in estimating the strength and dispositions of a colonial population, unarmed, unorganised, unrepresented, and only an outlying portion of her immense domains; but that Denmark

should have, out of her own head, devised an Administrative union with the Duchies is too preposterous to believe. The Government of Copenhagen had neither project of conquests nor of religious concentration with which their rights or creed interfered; these provinces were neither insignificant nor remote; there could be no mistake as to their disposition or their power to resist; they compose two-fifths of the population of the kingdom, and constitute one half of its wealth; without them Denmark is nothing—less than nothing with them in arms against her. Denmark furnishes exclusively the maritime force of the kingdom, of little or no avail against the Duchies: and a contest would assuredly give to them powerful allies, and draw down on her the chances of a terrible retribution. Dismemberment was not then the limit of the consequences to be apprehended from such a design, but was one so evident as not to escape the penetration even of a child.

Christian VIII is gathered to his fathers, and Frederick VII reigns in his stead. The dying King addresses a letter imploring him to walk in his footsteps; the successor with Oriental deference kisses the signature, and with filial piety obeys the command. Within three days the benevolent intentions of the new monarch are announced by a Proclamation.

The Constitution was not, however, absolutely enacted. The King called on the different portions of the kingdom to elect in common with himself, men of trust and experience to advise respecting it. He declared at the same time that the "existing Laws and Institutions of the Provincial States" should be respected, and also "the existing union of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein." The Duchies were not seduced by the offer of equality, the temptation of controlling the Exchequer, or of seeing the Parliament held in their territory alternately with Copenhagen: but they did not conceive that the case was desperate, and proposed to comply with the orders of the King to select advisers; these were not empowered to concur in any centralized representation, and were intrusted to speak and advise in an opposite sense.

Up to the middle of February, 1848, nothing had been done that could not be recalled. The caution of the mode of procedure, the determined manner in which it was met, alike gave promise of the adoption of a course which should prevent the catastrophe of civil war; and this solution was the more to be expected from the fact that, in the then reigning agitation of men's minds, the Crown of Denmark, which had ever had a leaning towards those Dependencies which, in the Chancery style of Denmark were "personal" to itself, had in the Duchies a sure support. The Dews of Faction, however, watered the Seeds which an Enemy had sown, and the popular party prepared the way for Russia's Combinations at Copenhagen no less effectually than at Berne or Bucharest, Paris or Palermo. We must now glance at the internal events which reversed in a few days the relative position of the parties.

There were on the accession of Frederick VII, three parties: that of the Court, that of the Liberals, and that of the Duchies. The Court looked to the Duchies as a Bulwark against the popular Invasion, and deprecated an amalgamation which would reduce them to a powerless minority. It sided therefore, with the Duchies, and both were united against the Radicals. The objects of the Liberals were the diminishing of the Royal Prerogative, the establishing of a Representative Constitution, and a Centralized Administration; with these views, the facsimile of those of Paris, they associated "Danism," the counterpart of the "Germanism" of Frankfort. In both points the obstruction they met, and the danger they had to apprehend, proceeded from the Duchies: there was an army of which the King could dispose—there a place of refuge whither in a possible contingency he might fly. The Duchies at once presented a popular triumph to achieve, a Danish territory to assimilate, and a German principle to subdue.

The practical point was the rupture of their Federal Bond.*

* Their watchword was "Denmark to the Eyder." No doubt, Denmark extended to the Eyder and beyond it: it was not the question of power that was raised, but the figment of uniformity, and this

Holstein, backed by the German people, and linked to the German Confederation, it was dangerous to attack, and hopeless to subdue; Schleswig could be attacked and subdued only by isolating it. The plan was therefore simply this—to incorporate Schleswig and cut Holstein adrift; hence the anomaly of a simultaneous proposition of “Incorporation” and “Separation.” By this single blow they expected to get rid of German interference, to extend Danish nationality, to deprive the Crown of a German fief, to take from it the support of the Aristocratic Duchies, and place it in a position in which it could no longer resist the elevation of Parliamentary Privilege on the ruins of royal Prerogative and Popular Rights.

How had such a debate been reserved for the fourth century of the co-existence of these Estates? for one half that period the Danish Crown had been sufficiently despotic and not moderately ambitious. Had they become more powerful, or the Duchies more weak? No, “Germanism” and “Danism” had arisen.

Now will be understood the object of the proposal of the King, in the nomination of “men of experience.” He was himself to nominate sixteen, eight for Denmark, and eight for the Duchies; Denmark was to choose eighteen, and the Duchies as many. The sixteen nominees and the eighteen men of the Duchies secured to him a majority against the Radicals.†

Now came the news from Paris. Everywhere it is the same story: be it Bucharest—be it Palermo—be it Presburg—be it Vienna—be it Berlin—be it Copenhagen—be it Rendsburg; at each events are, at the close of February,

furor of “Denmark to the Eyder” has deprived of all terror, “Russia to the Sound.”

† The Royal Power was attacked through the Duchies: the Court Ministry were held up to public odium as “*Danish* Schleswig-Holstein.” In the *Fædrelandet* (the movement paper) the Ministry of Count Moltke is denounced for having for its principal object “the preservation of Holstein,” and he is charged with being equally ready to sacrifice “*Danism* in the one Duchy, and *Germanism* in the other.”

1848, conducted to that point where the narrator has to say, "Now came the news of Paris, and the explosion took place:" "Preordinations of good luck" * too systematic to be misunderstood!

The Moltke ministry fell. The men of the Clubs, the men whose watchword was "Denmark to the Eyder," who had threatened to write with the sword the laws of Denmark on the backs of the Duchies, came into power. There were no longer three parties: the Court was absorbed into the Liberals, and nothing stood in the way of the plans of the Casino. Schleswig was now to be a Danish province, and Holstein cast to Frankfort, or any other monster, with an appetite for the meal.

These measures were of course no justification for the revolt of the Duchies, but is it to be expected that the people of the Duchies should be more wise than the people of Copenhagen? the insanity was in the air, and each has load enough of shame without added thereto that of criminating the other. The Danes deny to-day that intimidation was used to their Sovereign; the Duchies, that they had claimed anything beyond their former privileges; in fact they both had a fit of delirium which they have now forgotten. If both were wrong, so both were right; for the wrong of each was the justification for the other.

The following statement has been furnished to me as explanation and justification of the proceedings of Denmark:

"On January 28th, 1848, the King signed an ordinance, by which he conferred a *Constitution* on his States, with a common Chamber for the Kingdom and the two Duchies, to be assembled regularly at fixed periods in places to be determined afterwards, and alternately in the Kingdom and the Duchies.

"The Constitution was to be submitted for examination to Deputies, of which the majority should be elected by the Provincial States, the same number for the Duchies as for the Kingdom, though the population of the former was not equal to that of the Kingdom.

"The Separatist party in the Duchies did not conceal

* Lord Malmesbury.

their dissatisfaction at this *Royal act of favour*. On the 17th of February, 1848, an assembly was held at Kiel to consult on the steps to be taken, and it was decided to choose Deputies opposed to the Union.

“Whilst parties were in this position of *mutual apprehension and embarrassment*, intelligence arrived of the events at Paris, and the Schleswig-Holsteiners regarded the opportunity arrived for realizing those projects. A meeting of members of the States of the two Duchies took place at Rendsburg the 18th of March, 1848, when it was determined to send a deputation to Copenhagen to represent to the King the desires of his subjects in the Duchies, and the state of the country.

“The establishment of a separate Constitution for Schleswig Holstein, based on universal suffrage—formation of a civic guard—complete freedom of the Press and of meeting,—immediate union of Schleswig to the Confederation—immediate dismissal of President Scheel : such were in substance the demands addressed to the King.

“Messrs. Beseler, Reventlow, Preetz, and Bargum, were authorised again to convene the Assembly in case of emergency. The Deputation left Kiel the 21st.

“The news of the Assembly at Rendsburg reached Copenhagen early in the morning on the 20th, together with the intimation that the Deputation would arrive two days after. The sensation it caused was very great. That evening (20 March) *there was a great meeting at the Casino* (club), when it was determined to solicit the king to change his ministry and elect another who had sufficient determination and energy to defend the rights of the crown in regard to Schleswig, whilst yielding to Germany what should be demanded in regard to Holstein. The following morning a deputation presented an address to the King, who replied that the Ministry was dissolved, and another should be formed, which did not take place until three days afterwards (24th). It is superfluous to repeat that the King could not give an answer to the Deputation of Kiel before the formation of the New Ministry. They therefore could not leave Copen-

hagen before the evening of the 24th. But before their departure the revolt had already broken out in Holstein. The night of the twenty-third or twenty-fourth, without waiting for the reply of the King, it was decided at Kiel to appoint a Provisional Government. The Prince of Augustenburg immediately repaired to Rendsburg on the morning of the twenty-fourth, where he seduced the garrison to embrace the side of the revolt, on *the pretext that the King was a prisoner at Copenhagen.*"

This *ex parte* statement of Denmark may, if we except the opinion respecting the Royal Act of Favour in the conferring of a common Constitution, be taken, also as that of the Duchies.

. After all, Denmark has lost the Duchies and herself; what satisfaction can she derive from saying we can demonstrate the Divisibility of the Duchies *—we can prove that the Agnates had no right.

About the same time that the Duchies elected Christian I the Principalities on the Danube gave themselves to the Sultans of Turkey. In the course of the four hundred years that have since elapsed, that Empire has passed through the extremest vicissitudes; the Provinces in question have been the field of furious wars and the object of the fiercest contention. There is no region, probably, of the earth that has more severely suffered, and that under circumstances which might justify the people in charging their misery upon their Sovereign. Contrast now the dispositions of Wallachia and Moldavia towards Turkey, and those of Schleswig-Holstein towards Denmark: "Turkey to the Pruth" was never a watchword in the Streets of Constantinople.

"These provinces were not a conquest of the sword, they

* Mr. Wegener lays great stress on the change that was made in the Arms of Denmark in 1721, by removing those of Schleswig from the Shield of Pretence, and placing it in chief in quarter with the Danish Arms. The argument is indeed conclusive against the case set up by the Duchies, but it establishes against Denmark all that it is requisite to establish.

ence which had been acquired over him by the Duke of Augustenberg, &c. No doubt that the movement was popular at Berlin; but will this account for the conduct of the King of Prussia? Without the encouragement which he had afforded, and of which the evidence is to be found in his autograph letter to the Duke of Augustenberg, never could the Duchies have hazarded that step; the declaration of his resolution to maintain the rights of the Agnatic Princes and the Duchies, had it been a *bonâ fide* one, would have been transmitted to Copenhagen, not to Augustenberg. He prolonged the war, by ensuring the defeat of his own troops and his allies; he sacrificed at the settlement all he had contended for by arms; not being thereto constrained, but acting as a party to entrap others. To understand, then, the motives of Prussia, we must revert to antecedent transactions explanatory of her permanent interests, engagements, and necessities.

At the close of the last war, Prussia had been reduced to the condition of a third-rate Power; at the peace, she was reconstructed into one of the first order, through the influence of Russia. All her neighbours were dismembered for her advantage,—Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Hanover, Saxony, and Poland. It was to coerce the resistance of the Congress in this respect, that the Emperor Alexander spoke of the “million of bayonets confided to him by Providence.” Russia did not act by caprice, but by careful and profound calculation; she was, in fact, securing to herself a “German Empire under a second name.” Talleyrand so successfully strove at the first Congress of Vienna to convince the other Powers of this danger, that he induced England, France, Austria, and Sweden to enter into a secret defensive alliance against Russia and Prussia; to counteract which, as already stated, Russia had recourse to the opening to Napoleon of his prison doors at

order to prevent the movement in Lombardy, from taking a Republican direction.”—Note by the Sardinian Minister Pareto to the British Ambassador at Turin, March 23, 1848.

Elba. From that time the conduct of Prussia has invariably confirmed, alike the fears of Talleyrand, and the expectations of Russia.

During the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-9, a Memoir was drawn up by Russia's ablest diplomatist, on her relations with the different Powers of Europe; that memoir has been published, and removes every ambiguity; Prussia is disposed of in a single and short paragraph, as a Government which can give to Russia no umbrage. "Prussia," says he, "*a son rôle tout fait.*" Her rôle is that of encroachments (*empietemens*), "*and the objects of her ambition under her hand.*" It was in Germany that these encroachments were to take effect—she was to balance, then subvert, Austria. The present King did not yield to his predecessor in those qualities and in that ambition (if the word may be so employed) which had been signalled in his predecessor. To him was made to apply the old monkish prophecy,

Pastor expectat gregem,
Germania, regem.

And it failed not to be remarked that his accession had occurred in the corresponding year of this century to that of Frederick the Great in the last, and of the great Elector in the one which had preceded it. Prussia was one of the first victims of the explosion of 1848; she was not only swept internally, but was nearly driven, by the revolutionary fury, against her northern Protector. The King succeeded in turning on the Poles the popular frenzy excited against Russia; then a diversion was furnished in the Duchies for the young fervour so troublesome at Frankfort, so alarming at Berlin. But it was not that a door was to be opened to military enterprise; revolution was to be shamed by discomfiture, and to be put down by disgrace.

It thus happened that the immediate objects at home of the King of Prussia exactly tallied with Russia's objects in Denmark; and the service which would have been required from his unwilling obedience was no less grateful to his character than convenient for his position.

An Invasion is, however, a war; and although we have dispensed in these days with the forms requisite to legalise war, there has, as yet, been no such act without a printed gloze of some description to cover it; an Ultimatum—a Proclamation—or, at all events, a Treaty, or a Protocol. Here there was nothing of the kind. It is the first point that presents itself, and it is of the deepest importance, because such a document must have appeared unless there was an impossibility in the way; the impossibility was that of adducing any specific statement whatever. The Prussian Government could have committed itself, then, to no assertion, either in respect to what it claimed, or to what it purposed. A declaration of war required a previous demand of redress, and there was none; a manifesto required at least an enunciation of principles where the purpose was to betray the very cause that was professed; the Prussian Government could march its troops, but could not open its mouth.

In this dilemma it adopted the expedient of publishing a pamphlet in London, to which importance was given by calling it a Memoir addressed to Lord Palmerston by Mr. Bunsen. But even this pamphlet does not professedly undertake to explain the Invasion and to justify the war—it is a long, rambling piece of special pleading, and the Invasion is slipped in in a post-script, as if a mere piece of news, confirmatory of the writer's apprehensions. The Prussian Minister is careful privately to throw discredit upon his own production, by describing it as the child of enthusiasm and zeal, in the parturition of which, he had obeyed the mere instincts of his generous nature, and which was likely to compromise his official, and to extinguish his diplomatic, existence. Mr. Bunsen has at least proved that in this age devotion is not extinct, and that men are to be found ready, like the Persian of old, to undergo any mutilation of face or fame, when there are despots to serve and Babylonians to circumvent.

Stripped of misrepresentation and other verbiage, Mr. Bunsen's argument is this: Schleswig and Holstein are inse-

parable; therefore, Holstein being a German fief, Schleswig is German also : and thus, Prussia is justified in making proposals to cut Schleswig in two ; because the Danes reject the proposal they make an "attack on Germany," and Prussia is justified in "repelling force by force." When *in the Postscript* he learns that this force has been employed, the Prussian troops are described as having entered to support the "BASIS OF MEDIATION," and because "TO HAVE WAITED ONE MOMENT LONGER WOULD HAVE STULTIFIED GERMANY." *

After this the King of Denmark is frankly told that he has been befooled from the beginning, "for that nothing was easier than to have settled the succession, without mixing up with it other matters." Why was not this stated in 1846, or in 1844? Why is it urged in 1848 as a railing accusation?

But this is a Diplomatic Document : where is the reply? what did England say to it — what to its publication? Here is an enigma. Did England accept this view of the case, or did she not? two months solved the difficulty ; after the parties are fully compromised, England steps in with an offer of mediation, which is the echo of Mr. Bunsen's Memoir, and the counterpart of Russia's proceedings. †

Now let us see in what strain Mr. Bunsen deals with Russia. It is utterly impossible that here we shall not detect him if he be playing false. He begins by asserting (at p. 8), that the question possesses no European interest because of the generosity of Russia in renouncing her claims. Was this true? If false could he be mistaken. Further on (p. 19), he contradicts himself, not by saying that Russia had not renounced, but by asserting that she had no claims to

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—Lord Palmerston's Proposal of Mediation, June 23, 1848.

An Invasion is, however, a war; and although we have dispensed in these days with the forms requisite to legalise war, there has, as yet, been no such act without a printed gloze of some description to cover it; an Ultimatum—a Proclamation—or, at all events, a Treaty, or a Protocol. Here there was nothing of the kind. It is the first point that presents itself, and it is of the deepest importance, because such a document must have appeared unless there was an impossibility in the way; the impossibility was that of adducing any specific statement whatever. The Prussian Government could have committed itself, then, to no assertion, either in respect to what it claimed, or to what it purposed. A declaration of war required a previous demand of redress, and there was none; a manifesto required at least an enunciation of principles where the purpose was to betray the very cause that was professed; the Prussian Government could march its troops, but could not open its mouth.

In this dilemma it adopted the expedient of publishing a pamphlet in London, to which importance was given by calling it a Memoir addressed to Lord Palmerston by Mr. Bunsen. But even this pamphlet does not professedly undertake to explain the Invasion and to justify the war—it is a long, rambling piece of special pleading, and the Invasion is slipped in in a post-script, as if a mere piece of news, confirmatory of the writer's apprehensions. The Prussian Minister is careful privately to throw discredit upon his own production, by describing it as the child of enthusiasm and zeal, in the parturition of which, he had obeyed the mere instincts of his generous nature, and which was likely to compromise his official, and to extinguish his diplomatic, existence. Mr. Bunsen has at least proved that in this age devotion is not extinct, and that men are to be found ready, like the Persian of old, to undergo any mutilation of face or fame, when there are despots to serve and Babylonians to circumvent.

Stripped of misrepresentation and other verbiage, Mr. Bunsen's argument is this: Schleswig and Holstein are inse-

parable; therefore, Holstein being a German fief, Schleswig is German also : and thus, Prussia is justified in making proposals to cut Schleswig in two ; because the Danes reject the proposal they make an "attack on Germany," and Prussia is justified in "repelling force by force." When in *the Postscript* he learns that this force has been employed, the Prussian troops are described as having entered to support the "BASIS OF MEDIATION," and because "TO HAVE WAITED ONE MOMENT LONGER WOULD HAVE STULTIFIED GERMANY." *

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renounce. What right had Mr. Bunsen thus to dispose of the claims of Russia; and if it be the Prussian government that speaks, how has it not ascertained the views of the Russian government respecting its own claims. Can any one believe that the Minister of a Power so dependent, and an individual so astute, should venture such a sneer on such an assertion of his own caprice? Such language on the part of Prussia and such conduct could never have been endured had it not been commanded.

While Mr. Bunsen relieves the mind of Europe from any anxiety in regard to Russia in respect to this special case, he is far from blind to her general purposes; in this respect no man can be more watchful, or alert. He places before the Danes and the Duchies, who, of course, had never dreamt of such a thing, the appalling fact (after the quarrel is made) of the longing to possess the Sound * by a neighbouring sovereign who "never yet refused the appeal of a king whose despotic tendencies had aroused his subjects against him."

It never rains but it pours; Mr. Bunsen might have done something if he presented his one Giant to the undivided gaze of his audience, but he manufactures a second; Russia is ambitious, but France is active. If Russia covets the Sound and loves Despotism, these after all are mere affections of the mind,—the practical danger is from France, who has prompted the schemes of the King of Denmark—who in fact has created the Schism in the Duchies!

* Mr. Bunsen, on philosophical grounds, namely, the civilising and the "Japhetising" of the Orientals, professes his anxious desire to see the power of Russia established on the Bosphorus. On Germanic grounds, he devotes himself to preventing her ascendancy on the Sound. He is, no doubt, not destitute of valid reasons by which to reconcile the apparent discrepancy, if discrepancy there be. To his diplomatic management Russia is chiefly indebted for the present result: she is possessed of no agent more indefatigable or tortuous; none have worked for her with more consciousness or premeditation; he is to be found at every corner with a different story, and able to effect for her what her avowed agents could not accomplish.

How, it may be asked, could bare decency permit the introduction into a State paper of propositions so unseemly and contradictions so preposterous? It is managed in this manner; the "Memoir" is preceded by a "Preface," and that "Preface" is under another name. The anonymous individual, if I may so call him, is the introducer of Mr. Bunsen to the British Public; it is Mr. Bunsen who publishes the Introducer and the Introduction; the Memoir attacks France the Introduction Russia.

Although it is anticipating events, yet with a view of presenting connectedly the part which Prussia has taken I shall here introduce her share in the conclusion of the matter. After being a belligerent in two campaigns, having taken up arms for the defence of the rights of the Duchies and of the Duke of Augustenburg, she withdrew from the contest, making a separate peace with Denmark in which nothing was stipulated in reference to the causes of the war. It would have been natural that such conduct should have been cloaked by some form of conditions, however deceptive—some pretext of negotiation, however hollow; but exactly the opposite course was pursued. She paraded, and in an epigrammatic form, her treachery to the Ally whom she had compromised; and the peace she signed was known throughout the World as the "Paix pure et simple." This "Pure and simple peace" was a peace with a secret article, and that secret article was an engagement to sanction beforehand whatever the King of Denmark chose to do.* Why was this article secret?

Having thus tied up her hands, she ostensibly figured in the conferences as a recusant. She refused to sign, with England, Denmark, and Russia, the Protocol originally proposed, and while she thus held out to the Duchies the semblance of protecting their interests, she made her adhesion to the Protocol

* "Article Secret, le 2 Juillet, 1850.

"S. M. le Roi de Prusse s'engage à prendre part aux negociations dont S. M. le Roi de Danemarck prendra l'initiative a l'effet de régler l'ordre de succession dans les etats réunis sous le sceptre de S. M. Danoise."

contingent on the modifying of one of the original phrases in such a manner as to exclude the very mention of their existence, and the substitution of another which implied that "Integrity of the Monarchy" which has been construed to signify the extinction of the Duchies.*

When this Protocol was converted into a Treaty—the Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852, her Minister in London was actively employed at once in extorting the reluctant adhesion of the English Ministry and in threatening the parties whose rights were disposed of into submission and silence.

A course so systematic could not have resulted from mere blindness. The Cabinet of Berlin must have been fully possessed of the bearings of the case as affecting no less the interests of Prussia, than of Denmark, and of Europe. These I am able to give in the words of the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs when the Treaty was signed.

"Having been for some time occupied with this affair, I have come to a most intimate conviction concerning the embarrassments and positive disadvantages to which Prussia would expose herself by the signature of the London Protocol. No human intellect has as yet been able to devise any advantage that might be obtained for Prussia by such a proceeding, for there is not a fable in the range of mythology less credible than the supposition, that the policy of Denmark should more closely join the North of Germany and Prussia in consequence of the union with the Duchies being rendered perpetual. On the contrary, it is the irrational hatred of the Duchies against everything that is German, more especially against Prussia,

* *Proposed Draught of the Protocol.*

"S. 2. En conséquence Elles reconnaissent la sagesse des vues qui déterminent S. M. le Roi de Danemarck à régler éventuellement l'ordre de succession dans sa Royale maison de manière à faciliter les arrangements aux moyens desquels [les liens qui rattachent les Duchés de Holstein et de Slesvic à la monarchie Danoise demeurent intactes."

Proposed emendation by Prussia.

"l'intégrité de la monarchie Danoise demeurera intacte,"

which will be perpetuated by such a lasting union. Why then increase hostile influences in the North of Germany. The policy of Prussia will at last be all but shut out from anything like free movement in its proper territory. Would your Majesty have chosen to labour for a perpetual union of Hanover with England? or would your Majesty have chosen to interfere in hostility to the Basque Provinces, which were then defending their *Fueros*, and their Male Succession? Sire, the Duchies, too, had their *Fueros*, and they will in future stand up to defend their Male Succession. In attempting to break the Legitimate Succession in the Duchies, *violently and without a free renunciation* on the part of those concerned, the dangerous principle of Arbitrary Power is installed in the place of positively existing Hereditary Rights; numerous Pretenders, and families of Pretenders will be established, the seed of future insurrections and those in *favour of Legitimacy* will be liberally sown. If your Majesty should give orders to sign the London Protocol, your Majesty will at all events sooner or later be obliged to interfere in favour of the *illegitimate course*, against the right and the interest of the Duchies, and even against the interest of your Majesty's own dominion. I pray to God that your Majesty may, *at any risk*, keep yourself free from establishing the Principle of 'Integrity' which is *not in existence*, but *which is only intended to be artificially created*. The right of Denmark with regard to such "Integrity" has hitherto no other foundation than her own desire. And your Majesty can find no difficulty in keeping yourself thus free, if you shall think fit to *adhere* to the old declaration given once by Prince Metternich, and by the late M. de Canitz, and which has since been maintained, viz. that the proposed principle of 'Integrity' is not to be preferred, but that it is to be postponed to the Principle of Legitimate Succession,—that is to say to the Right of the Agnates, and that *it is only after all the parties concerned shall have freely renounced*, that there can be any question of the Principle of Integrity." *

* Memoir to the King of Prussia, by M. Usedom, 4th Feb., 1851.

That these objections were not considered frivolous, nor their views visionary, is proved by the fact that M. Von Usedom was not dismissed from the service, and that he was selected to conclude this very negotiation. What a picture have we not here of the public morality of Prussia!

No doubt can be, I think, now rationally entertained that every step taken by Prussia was collusive. Such indeed is the present universal impression of the people in favour of whom she appeared to interpose; the first words that saluted me in the Duchies* were, "the Prussians were our enemies, not the Danes; they came with orders to spare the Danes and sacrifice us." We must now turn to the military events which have left behind them this impression.

* This chapter on the Interposition of Prussia is now added.

CHAPTER III.

The War.

THE war was, so to say, extinguished at its birth. Scarcely had the insurgent forces assumed an attitude and occupied positions, when the Danes, already prepared for the Invasion of the Duchies, entered and drove them before them. In fact the Danes consisted of a well-conditioned, equipped, and commanded force of 10,000 men. The hasty gathering of the Duchies amounted to but half the number; but when on the 23d of April they met in their flight 14,000 Prussians crossing the Eyder to their support, and learned that all the neighbouring States were pouring forth their thousands to join them, matters assumed a different aspect, and the desperate and triumphant causes changed sides,—that is to say, the army so lately in pursuit was exposed to being annihilated, finding itself hemmed in in its sudden retreat between a dyke and a defile on the North of Schleswig; but the first exercise of the Prussian authority was to sound the recall, the reason assigned being that it was the hour for dinner.

The soldier on the battle-field is not the best judge of the combinations by which battles are won, or of the blunders by which they are lost; and the reputations of generals are not staked upon the evanescent impressions of a camp: but there are cases in which he who runs may read, and where a camp follower may see as clearly as a strategist. Such was the case at present; and beside the fact of the impression made upon troops as yet destitute of experience, we have had of the result. Moreover, a vehement altercation took place between the Commander of the troops of the Duchies and

the Prussian General, to whom the latter replied in these terms: "The responsibility rests with me, and not with you. Nothing is lost. The Danish army will be annihilated in a week; and it is but fair to reserve some of the laurels for the troops of the Confederation."

The Hanoverians, Mecklenburgers, Oldenburgers, Brunswickers, pour in by railways, and General Wrangel found himself at the head of 50,000 men, five-fold the number of the retreating foe, and dispositions were made for a hot pursuit the following morning. At four o'clock A.M. the infantry were under arms, and the cavalry mounted, but no word "march" was given. There they stood, the men under their accoutrements, the cavalry on the backs of their horses, hour after hour looking on while the Danes quietly defiled. At nine o'clock, that is to say after five hours' fatigue, the pursuit commenced. The Prussians were pushed out so as to *outflank the retreating force*, on the right and on the left. The Confederates however, under the Duke of Brunswick and General Halkett fell upon them. Immediately was sounded the Prussian recall! In this multitude of nations it was difficult to prevent liberties being taken incompatible with military discipline. The General was urged at least to send a body to intercept the retreat of the Danes to the Isle of Alsen, where they would take refuge under the guns of their ships. He is reported to have replied "God only knows where they will go!" The Duke of Brunswick was so indignant, that after a stormy discussion with General Wrangel, he refused to take any further part in the Campaign, threw up his command in disgust, and returned home. The Danes had positively been suffered to return, and carry off the baggage they had abandoned, bringing their horses to reyoke to the waggons and guns.

The Danish force being expelled and the Duchies freed, what remained to be done? Surely it was to open negotiations with Denmark. No, Denmark was to be invaded; General Wrangel entered Jutland by orders from Berlin, and in defiance of the Protest of the Schleswig-Holsteiners. *

* "Prince Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein, the then Commander of

At least then the object must have been to press the war to a conclusion ; there were no Danish forces in Jutland, the Danes, at the utmost, amounting to 15,000 men, were in the Isle of Alsen, where they were observed by a superior force of the Confederates, who mustered in all 53,000 men, whilst the main body of General Wrangel, who had taken care to carry with him the Schleswig-Holsteiners, were in Jutland. Nothing, therefore, prevented his occupation of the whole mainland, but he remained perfectly inactive.

Notwithstanding the superior force under General Halkett, stationed opposite the island of Alsen, the Danes were allowed to cross the strait, to establish a *tête du pont*, to construct a bridge, to seize on the heights which commanded it, on them to build redoubts, and plant heavy artillery ! When these works had been completed, he commenced operations, by besieging them, he placed his troops in a half circle round Duppel ; this point being in direct communication with the *tête du pont* and the island, could in a single night be occupied by the Danish force which would then find itself in the centre of the Germans, and be able by a sortie to beat and destroy them in detail. This was foreseen by the whole army of the besiegers, except the General, and it was executed with equal facility and success by the besieged.

On the 28th of May, at the dawn of day, the Danes fell upon the Germans with their entire force. Halkett sent aides-du-camp to order one division after another ; each in succession arrived too late.

But where was General Wrangel ? in the north of Jutland ? No, he had returned into Schleswig ; and had entered it *four* the Troops of the Duchies, *protested* and *remonstrated* against passing the frontier of Jutland on the 1st of May, 1848. This measure was not only suggested, but 'imperatively ordered by General Wrangel.' Prince Frederick represented that the Duchies carried on a wholly 'defensive' war, and not an 'offensive' one. He then wanted his corps to be left as a reserve to the Confederate Army on the northern frontier of Schleswig. This too was overruled, and this forced step furnished one more argument to prove the rebellious intentions of the Duchies."—*Note by a Schleswig-Holsteiner.*

days before the catastrophe of Duppel; the distance was but twenty leagues; he was marching to the support of the Germans but he also arrived too late.

The murmurs of an army beaten and baffled at every turn by an inferior force were not to be restrained,—something had to be undertaken. An attack was now made on the Danish redoubts, and the Prussian guard was led to the storm, but fortune did not favour them; at all events it could no longer be said that the Prussian General had orders “to spare the Danes and expose the Confederates.”

Their reciprocal position having now been rendered sufficiently interesting and dramatic, Denmark and the Confederation come to an arrangement; surely then the affair of the Duchies is settled. No, it was not for this that M. de Cazes had been sent to Copenhagen, M. Bunsen’s horn winded in London, and the Prussian recall so often sounded in Schleswig. In this arrangement the Duchies are entirely forgotten; England is, however, at hand to take up their cause; she strides into the arena as Mediatrix.

Nothing can happen in Europe, Asia, in the New World, or on the coasts of Africa without a London Protocol—could the Duchies escape?

The case was sufficiently grave and sufficiently urgent, nor had the English Government been taken by surprise, yet the matter to this moment had been wholly ignored; whilst the war had raged her minister had been called upon for explanations—had admitted that England was bound by the old Treaties of Guarantee, which as we have seen had been dropped in 1814; it was consequently expected that he was taking measures for carrying that Guarantee into effect; when this hope had proved delusive, he explained his conduct by saying that the Guarantee, though it did exist did not apply to the present case; by this ambiguity both parties were encouraged and each believed it had the support of England. After the campaign had worked itself out, then England interposes to mediate. From that mediation the results are that six months are afforded to the belligerents to recruit their strength.

This course of England is perfectly parallel to that of Prussia, who secured victories to Denmark while she lent armies to the Duchies: and as the military failures of the one are explicable by no inexperience of the General, so are the diplomatic mistakes of the other referable to no incapacity in the minister.

The Campaign of 1849 opened by the entrance of 20,000 Danes into Schleswig. The Duchies mustered a nearly equal force, consisting, however, in a considerable degree of German volunteers and Prussians; they were commanded by a Prussian General—Bonin, who had been sent by the Cabinet of Berlin to supersede the General of the Duchies.* There soon arrived 50,000 troops of the Confederation, of which nearly the half were Prussians; in fact, the Duchies furnished to the King of Prussia a Siberia and a Circassia, where the turbulent found occupation and the seditious repose.

The Danes were speedily driven back, and, following them, the Schleswig-Holsteiners entered Jutland, and were soon joined by the Prussians, under General Pritwitz, who had succeeded General Wrangel. He divided this powerful Army into two bodies: the one, composed of Prussians and Hessians, was sent in pursuit of a body of Danes, a third of their number;—the Schleswig-Holsteiners, to the amount of 14,000, were despatched to blockade Fredericia, which was *open to the sea*, of which the Danes had the command! The heights of Goulsk, three leagues from the fortress, were crowned with redoubts: these were taken by assault, and

* Whilst Prince Frederick, General-in-Chief of the army of the Duchies, was in Schleswig trying to reorganise his troops, a deputy at the Diet at Kiel observed, that "Fortune favoured the Duchies by giving them the opportunity of obtaining a distinguished Prussian officer as their general, whose appointment would avert such disasters as those which had occurred." The Prince on this sent in his resignation, and two days after General Bonin arrived, empowered by an order of the Prussian Cabinet, to accept the command of the army of the Duchies.

the victors pursuing the fugitives might have entered the fortress with them, when again the Prussian recall sounded. A blockade being perceived to be of no possible use, it was resolved to besiege the place in form: the Army sat down before it. Now Fredericia lies on the sea, which was commanded by the Danish Navy. Into the place which you propose to besiege the enemy can throw at pleasure any amount of men, and remove from it, if necessary, the garrison! General Bonin was perfectly familiar with the nature of the place, having been stationed there for four weeks during the preceding year. There could not have been a point selected more available for wasting the time and exhausting the strength of the Confederates, and affording to the Danes the opportunity of striking without risk a fatal blow. This is what happened.

Each party has three pieces on the board: the Confederates, the besieging fort at Fredericia, opposed to the Danish garrison, an army opposite Alsen and another at Jutland, the two latter being opposed to two Danish bodies: they had on the three points an overwhelming numerical majority, everywhere acting on the offensive. The two Danish corps in Jutland and Alsen give their several antagonists the slip, and the whole Danish army is concentrated in Fredericia. The Confederates do not march to support the besiegers, nor is the siege raised and the force concentrated: it is left scattered round the place in its trenches, and, consequently, one fine morning it is cut to pieces; its camp is taken, and fifty guns fall into the hands of the Danes.

These operations were not conducted in a sudden and secret manner; the reinforcements were daily seen entering the place, and, after the besieged were known far to outnumber the besiegers, still were the men kept in the entrenchments, *but the fire ceased*. The explanation offered was that it was not advisable to exasperate the enemy, whose fire, however, never ceased. The discontent and the alarm of the troops could not be restrained, and the General attempted

to justify himself and to allay apprehensions, by explaining that his measures were concerted with General Pritwitz, who would be on the spot to support them when necessary.

Notwithstanding this disaster, the forces of the Confederates were still greatly superior to those of the Danes. *Fredéricia* is in Jutland: the Danes had, therefore, only maintained a post of their own, and had not a man in Schleswig. The Confederates had either to pursue their attack against Denmark, or to bring matters to an accommodation. But neither course is adopted: again the military operations cease; again an armistice is introduced to prepare for the resumption of hostilities in the following year. There is, however, a separate incident of this campaign, which must not be overlooked.

The Germans were enthusiastic about ships, and resolved to have a navy, not because they had a coast and colonies, but precisely because they had none. The first event in their maritime annals occurred on the 4th June, 1849, when three steam vessels built in England, with gunners taught on board the "Excellent," and carrying 68-pounders, issued from the *Weser* to amuse themselves with firing at a mark on the tranquil ocean. When about to begin this exercise, they perceived the smoke of a steamer coming out of the *Elbe*, and they soon made her out to be a Dane, and gave chase. The steamer distanced them; but they fell unexpectedly on a Danish corvette, under *Heligoland*, where she was enjoying the sunshine, and drying her sails. The little steam squadron dignified itself with a broad pendant; the "Commodore" was *Mr. Brommy*,* who, after some shots were exchanged, steered away. The astonishment of the inhabitants of *Heligoland* at such desperation on the part of the "pirates" †

* *Mr. Brommy* began by being a cabin-boy on board a Hamburg vessel, and after several changes of fortune found himself lieutenant of a corvette taken from the Turks by Lord Cochrane during the Greek war, and afterwards commander of a steamer; but he arrived in Greece only after the close of the struggle.

† Lord Palmerston wrote to the Senate of Bremen to demand how

may be easily imagined; the Governor, himself a sailor, had just exclaimed, "Poor corvette, five minutes more and she must strike!" The "Commodore" obtained the decoration of Commander of the Order of Merit of Oldenburg, of the Guelph from Hanover, and some others. This is the beginning, progress, and termination of the history of a German fleet, unless the following fact is to be added as an appendix: Bromimy was created Admiral, and thereupon the German empire expired.

We have seen that Mr. Bunsen, in his Memoir, had proposed cutting Schleswig in two, we have also seen of what importance was this step for the workers of confusion. This is the result of the Campaign of 1849, by which the Danish troops were driven out of both Duchies, and it is effected by an *Armistice!* A line is drawn from Tondern to Flensburg, to be occupied on either side by neutrals, the parties having to evacuate entirely. These neutrals are to be Swedes and Norwegians on the North, Prussians and Oldenburgers on the South; and while England and Prussia are occupied in these inconceivable monstrosities, the Muscovites are pouring down the Carpathians, and the Czar is allowed quietly to appropriate, by propping up, the crown of the Cæsars, which he had first cast into the mire.*

But, in all this, what part does Denmark play? Does she not expose and denounce to Europe this scandalous violation of all form and of all law? She had been made safe; and besides, what did she know of law.†

A Triumvirate is now appointed for the government of the Duchies, and again the Duchies are altogether excluded from the arrangement of a matter in which they are the principals. Denmark is to name one Functionary, Prussia another, and

three pirate steamers under an imaginary flag had issued from the Weser to attack a Danish ship in the neutral waters of Heligoland.

* "Pas une couronne ne tombe dans le boue, qu'un de mes cousins de Cobourg ne la ramasse."—NICOLAS.

† A Danish class-book defines "Declaration of war"—"a formality formerly considered necessary but now generally omitted."

the third is to be appointed by *England*. As the third must in reality be the umpire, the Conference appended a condition to his nomination, that of his being acceptable to both parties. The person whom the English Minister did appoint did not fulfil these conditions; he was accepted by neither, and was protested against by both. We must glance at his previous career.

Colonel Hodges distinguished himself, (if the expression may be so applied,) amongst the mercenaries sent to Spain to put down the Basques; he was then selected for an important and delicate post which had just been created—that of British Consul in Serbia, (1837.) At this time the “entente cordiale” reigned between England and France, there had been then no Syrian war, no Pritchard affair, and no Spanish marriages. Serbia was of all points in Europe that where the opposition most displayed itself of Russian schemes and English interests, and with a view to this very antagonism the post had been created. Yet the verbal instructions which Colonel Hodges received, ambiguous indeed in form, but unmistakable in effect, were to act with Russia and not to act with France! The precise terms addressed to him were: “You deceive yourself if you expect to receive a real support from France, and you will see that it is not Russia that England will have occasion to distrust.” It is needless to say how Colonel Hodges acted under the impression of these prophetic words, what troubles he raised in Serbia, what embarrassments he occasioned to Sir Stratford Canning, not equally confided in by their common chief; so well did he do his patron’s work that when the country cast out the creature of Russia, their then Prince, it cast out also the Consul of England. Mr. Disraeli on the 8th March, 1842, said: “When he arrived he found his consular duties slight; but events were stirring of the greatest importance, and he threw himself into the heat of every political intrigue, so that in the course of eighteen months he had produced such a complication of circumstances as would take two ambassadors extraordinary to resolve. The Noble Viscount

did not recall him, and for this reason Colonel Hodges was driven out, the Prince he had supported lost his throne, the house of Colonel Hodges was burnt, and he fled to Vienna." His zeal was soon rewarded by a better post, the Consulate-General of Egypt; when in course of time a cooler one again became requisite, he was transferred to Hamburg.

When the English minister proposed Colonel Hodges as the third Triumvir for Schleswig, Prussia, in condescension to the public feelings existing in the Duchies in respect to that functionary, protested against the nomination. The protest was final according to the terms of the convention, and consequently, in any ordinary transaction, Colonel Hodges was *ipso facto* excluded. But this transaction, as evinced in every step, was not an ordinary one. The Danish minister protested against him also, and Colonel Hodges (who could not be accepted if disagreeable to one of the parties), is accepted because disagreeable to both. With these documents, Lord Palmerston could present himself to his colleagues and say, "Here I can offer you the best evidence of my impartiality. In this hand I hold the protest of Prussia, in this, that of Denmark: as to the terms of the Convention, we who have settled them have surely the power to alter them." His colleagues, with a courtesy become habitual, bow to his decision.

At length the Armistice reached its term, and the Campaign recommenced its course; but how different are now the circumstances. Prussia has withdrawn from the contest—Prussia, a first-rate Power—Prussia, by whose encouragement it had been commenced—by whose troops it had been sustained—by whose Generals it had been directed. How could Prussia abandon her fond ally? How could the Duchies persevere without their powerful protector? If they did, it is wonderful; but it is impossible that they should not be troubled with misgivings, if not overwhelmed with fear. This is what it would be reasonable to expect, but the facts throughout this whole business defy expectation. The Duchies were rejoiced at this result, and considered

themselves not deprived of strength, but relieved from an oppression, and expected now to be allowed to fight it out with their antagonist. Diplomacy, however, with generous providence, looked to holding the balance even, and the Swedes and Norwegians were also embarked and sent home.

Denmark, with great efforts, had been able to assemble 40,000 men with ninety-six guns: her maritime strength need not be reckoned, being of little or no avail. With this force she could not expect to conquer the Duchies, and she had the certainty before her eyes that their defeat and her triumph would reawaken enthusiasm and exasperation in Germany, and excite another tide of Invasion. How was it, then, that no thought arose of an accommodation? New incentives and stimulants had, however, been found requisite at Copenhagen. France sent a distinguished general, the celebrated Philhellenist Fabvier, to discourse of campaigns and suggest plans of operations, and Russia herself had come forward at length to smile on the undertaking. She allowed hopes of a subsidy to be entertained, sent a squadron to hover on the coasts, and, together with the use of steamers for the transport of troops, lent to the enterprise that great modern invention—"moral support."

The renewal of hostilities took place, indeed, by the act of the Duchies, who crossed the Eyder,—that is to say, who entered their own territory. Their object was to anticipate the Danes in securing that important line of defence, which crosses the isthmus at Isted.

Schleswig, the field to which this contest was circumscribed, is one hundred miles in length and not fifty in breadth; but in fact the arena was furthered narrowed to its southern extremity, and consisted in the maintenance of those strong positions, which from the remotest times had been the barrier of the Northmen against the Germans.

The forces employed were, in proportion to the means of the parties, enormous. If England in a civil war made a similar effort, her armies in the field would amount to a 1,000,000 men. Denmark, as I have said, mustered 40,000

with ninety-six guns: the Duchies moved across the Eyder 30,000 men with eighty guns, chiefly of large calibre, leaving four battalions of reserve.

A causeway and military road leads from Flensburg, (where the Danish troops, entering from Jutland, or arriving by sea, would effect their junction,) southward through the centre of the province to the town of Schleswig. On both sides the country is difficult from broken ground and defensible positions, but principally because interspersed with bogs and marshes: some five or six miles in advance of Schleswig, a natural line of defence composed of lakes, marshes, steep banks of rivers, and forests extend across from east to west. The causeway passing by the village of Isted is inclosed in a gorge, the heights on the left being backed by the long lake of "Lang Sö," and on the right by almost continuous marshes. The heights on both sides were crowned by batteries of which the crossing fire enfiladed the passage, and these were strengthened by fieldworks and redoubts. Here was stationed the mass of the forces of the Duchies and of their artillery. Had the Danes been repulsed in an attack upon this position, they must have abandoned their offensive attitude, and the war would have terminated by their inability to effect anything, for the Duchies, relieved from the Prussians, would not have entered Jutland, but have stood merely on the defensive.

On the 24th July, 1850, the Danish army appeared before Isted, and drove in the outposts. On the 28th, at two o'clock, they made an attack at every point, sending out detachments right and left, to attempt the passages beyond the marshes and beyond the lake. They were, however, repulsed on all points, and at Stolk lost four guns and their best General, Shlepppegrell, who had led the *sortie* at Fredericia, beaten Wrangel at Duppel, and commanded on every occasion on which the Danes had been successful. After such a check it was not to be supposed that the attack could be renewed with discouraged troops, and without any necessity; but at nine o'clock,—that is to say, after seven hours'

fighting—they were on every point brought again to the charge and again repulsed. The troops of the Duchies were inferior in numbers by 10,000 men, and their sole business was to defend their strong position; they had been under arms for twenty-four hours, and had had to sustain one assault during the night, and one in the morning, and though excited by success, were exhausted and disordered,—reasons for delay, even had an advance movement been on other grounds imperative. They were led out into the plain to *pursue their advantage*. When well advanced, a fresh body of 10,000 Danes falls upon them, drives them back, and enters the entrenchments with the fugitives.

As no General with the commonest qualifications could have been guilty of so gross an imprudence, it might be inferred that Prussia having now made peace with Denmark, had withdrawn her officers of experience, and left the Schleswig-Holsteiners to the conduct of some provincial Hannibal; but Prussia was not so unmindful of her friends, and if prudent had not ceased to be considerate. She had not left them in so hopeless a predicament, and the catastrophe was, therefore, not to be laid to the charge of inconsiderate patriotism and inexperienced valour.

General Willisen won his spurs at the Battle of Leipzig; during the peace he devoted himself to tactics, was professor of the military art, and published several works, which have become class-books in Germany: but this branch did not suffice to absorb his talents. In the convulsions of 1848, the King of Prussia was in want of a "Pacifator" for Posen, and upon him fell the Royal choice. It may be recollected, though in these days memory is short, that in the first outbreak of revolutionary enthusiasm, the German people took it into its head to war with the Czar, and seriously proposed to drive Russia into the deserts of Asia and the snows of the Pole.

Revolution in the south and west presented only a local colour; but to the north and east, although it failed not to

articulate the watchwords of freedom there was associated therewith the idea of independence. They saw Russia near and imminent, beetling like an iceberg over their heads, and menacing at every hour an avalanche. They well knew that no form of internal government could resist her invasion, or subsist if hostile to her views, so that the Revolution in Prussia was just as much directed against the Emperor at St. Petersburg, as against the King in Berlin. It turned consequently to the Poles as its natural allies, and whilst calling out for "Free Press," "Free Meetings," "National Guard," and "Representative Chamber," it called out also for "Restoration of Poland:" it adopted as its philosophical conclusion that its triumph was but temporary and incomplete till it had succeeded in disabling the Autocrat from interfering in the forms of government of other countries. This it is which explains the momentary enthusiasm throughout Germany in the cause of Poland, and the expectation of seeing the outburst of revolution pour itself from that country over the north. This direction of the public mind would have united, had they not been so before, the domestic and dynastic interests of the Kings with the political ends of the Russian Cabinet. That of Prussia saw no safety save in those very auxiliaries which the people of Prussia looked upon as their deadliest foes. But that aid could not be obtained directly; the means of safety lay in establishing a schism between the Poles and the Germans. Some estimate may thus be formed of the qualities required for a "Pacifator" of Polish Posen: a man was requisite who knew how to combine heart with head.

Willisen played his part to admiration: he succeeded in presenting the King as the patron of the anti-Russian enthusiasm, and then returned to Berlin, apparently to counteract some secret machinations by which his royal master had been overreached: he left his apartment after a long conference, at two o'clock in the morning, when the king addressing his court, which awaited, said, "Gentlemen, you want

war with Russia; well, you shall have it;" and on this, the secret order was despatched for disarming the Poles. The shock of contradictory propositions, passion and mystery, exasperations and uncertainty, effaced all anterior impressions; the public was at sea and so the Anti-Russian projects fell, the revolutionary spirit evaporated, and the royal diplomacy triumphed at Berlin and in Posen, as at Duppel, and at Fredericia. Willisen was, it is true, accused of treachery by one party, he was therefore admired for patriotism by the other: he himself published a voluminous defence, which everybody devoured, but which no one could digest. It was, however, said to be much to the taste of his master and the Emperor.

Willisen now took the road to Italy, and directed his steps to Piedmont. His liberal sympathies and Polish antecedents opened to him every door and every heart: he was conducted from position to position, from army to army. Passing from the military to the diplomatic branch, Ministers underwent his examination; public offices opened themselves to his inspection. His review completed, he posted to Peschiera, and soon after returned with Radetzki, to visit his Sardinian friends: he so interested the Field-Marshal by his conversation, that even with the pre-occupations of the field of Novara, he did not allow him for a moment to quit his side.*

This adventure completed, Willisen again turned his face

* Already has the defeat at Novara been attributed to *one act of treason*, but the treason was much deeper than that of one General of Division. The Austrian and Piedmontese governments were both betrayed, the one to the other. The independence of Lombardy, which Austria offered through England on the 22d of May, was fished away by the same process; and the victory, secured by management to the Austrian arms in the south, was the signal for the blow struck at Hungary, where all was already prepared to sacrifice to Hungary the Austrian armies, and then Hungary to Russia. The warlike operations of these years were all made safe like those we have been examining. The Spanish marriages, the Confiscation of Cracow, the Swiss mediation, the disturbances of Italy and Sicily, the French, with its concomitant revolutions, are all facts which are

northwards, and opportunely reached Berlin at the very moment that the Peace with Denmark constrained the King to recall General Bonin. The successful "Pacifator" of Posen was exactly the man required. It is true that the objection which had caused the recall of his predecessor equally applied to him. He too was Prussian officer and Prussian general: but seeing how Conventions are executed, and armistices observed, we must admit as good a distinction between General Willisen and General Bonin, as between the two sides of the demarcation line from Tondern to Flensburg. Thus it will be readily conceived that though at Isted General Bonin was no longer in command of the troops of the Duchies, the "Pacification of the North" lost nothing by the change.

After losing a strong position by an ambuscade, and sacrificing about 4,000 men, continuing to apply the maxims of strategy which he had been so long engaged in teaching, he fell by mathematical gravitation on the south, never stopping until he had placed behind him the fortress of Rendsburg. Evacuating or abandoning the whole of Schleswig, he withdrew behind the Eyder, which the neutrality of Holstein forbade the Danes to cross. His army, though defeated, had received reinforcements, which raised it far above its complement when it took the field, whilst that of the Danes, which had suffered nearly as severely as its antagonist, received no reinforcement whatever. It was in a hostile country, and had to strengthen and to fortify its various positions. In extending its operations, it was liable to be at any point attacked by the whole force of the Duchies from behind the Eyder, which is a river or canal cut from sea to sea, and across which it did not dare to venture, nay, not even to fire. General Willisen was a great admirer of the Napoleon

linked together, and the process laid bare in regard to any may be assumed to exist in respect to all.

I have been informed that I have mistaken General Willisen for his brother. If so, the King of Prussia is lucky in having *two* Willisens instead of *one*.

combination of concentration, the art of which consisted in inducing the enemy to radiate his forces. Here the enemy had laid out for him the positions. He could attack them at any point with his whole force, and annihilate them separately; and he selects their two exposed positions to the extreme right and left; marching under cover of the Eyder, he attacks at both and is repulsed. Thus ends the campaign; Willisen* returns home; and for the Duchies, of course, we will have an armistice.

This time the armistice is replaced by 20,000 Austrians. Why Austrians? Have we not had neutrals and belligerents enough? If not, why not *Russians*? Austria had just required the aid of Russian troops in her own territory. They could have reached Kiel, their ancient possession, in twenty-four hours, without traversing or disturbing Germany. Let any one consider what before the event he would have said, if he had been told, that because of some petty troubles in an unknown province on the Baltic he had been told that troops should have been called in from Drontheim on the North, and from Peterwardein on the South? What again, if such a contingency being admitted as possible, it were then asserted that the troops of Russia should alone be wanting?

Clearly the matter is now about to be concluded; Austria owes Hungary to the Czar: her occupation will not cease till a diplomatic act, bearing no longer on the disputes of the parties but on the *succession of the Crown*, shall have decided that matter according to Russia's views,—to the suppression of all the rights for which the antagonists have been contending, and withdrawing from the Danish people all faculty of disposing of themselves.

* I have received various denials of the accuracy of the statements here made with regard to this battle: these I have carefully weighed, but cannot admit. A pamphlet has been also sent me in which I have been assured I should find the proof of the reverse. I have added some extracts from it at the end of this Chapter, that the reader may judge.

NOTE.

BATTLE OF ISTED.

Extracted from a Pamphlet by Hammerich, Chaplain to the Danish Army.

“Le moment décisif de la bataille était arrivé. Depuis quelques instants on s’apercevait qu’il y passait dans le centre de Willisen quelque chose d’extraordinaire. Des divisions entières avaient epuisé leurs provisions de poudre ; on se plaignait que le Général en Chef ne donnait pas d’ordre ; de temps en temps des soldats de différents bataillons se trainoient péniblement jusqu’ auprès des autres harassés de fatigue et incapables de continuer le combat. Ils se couchaient par terre ne songeant plus qu’à se reposer et à se rafraichir. En vain les officiers les exhortaient à marcher. Nous n’avons pas d’ordre à recevoir de vous, répondaient ils. Beaucoup d’autres personnes des environs se joignaient aux officiers pour piquer leur amour propre, en les engageant à aller aux secours de leurs frères d’armes. Oui, disaient ils ; quand nous aurons mangé. Tout semblait devenir de plus en plus contraire à l’armée ennemie. Enfin Willisen apprit que le Colonel Schepelern était à Schuby et menaçait sa ligne de retraite.

“Le Colonel Schepelern selon le plan de la bataille se trouvait vers onze heures et demi à Schuby sur les derrières de l’ennemie. On a vu rarement un mouvement circulaire réussir si complètement.”—p. 32.

“La confiance qu’on avait dans les talents militaires de Willisen était encore si grande dans les rangs de l’armée, que l’aile droite de l’ennemi qui avait souffert de moins, *prenait la retraite pour un stratagème.*”

“Les Hólsteinois qui d’ailleurs se battaient bravement eux-mêmes, disaient avec raison, ‘ Les Danois ne se battent pas, ils ne font qu’avancer.’

“Willisen chercha à sauver sa reputation du grand Capitaine en disant que la bataille n’était pas finie. On ne m’a pas fait abandonner ma position par des manœuvres, disait il ; c’est et nous écrasant qu’on nous a fait quitter le champ de bataille.”—p. 39.

“Après la bataille d’Isted il (Willisen) comprit qu’il avait mal jugé les Danois. Son entourage l’avait forcé malgré ses principes stratégiques de perdre les avantages d’une position

défensive pour prendre l'offensive au risque de s'exposer à mille dangers. Et maintenant il était poussé malgré lui vers Missund et Frédérickstadt; son honneur était engagé il ne pouvait plus s'arrêter.

“ Le Général Wrangel se trouvait ceux aux lorsque la nouvelle de la victoire lui arriva. Il était en compagnie d'une noble famille Danoise, avec laquelle il était très lié. Il fit bonne contenance, félicita les Danois et parla de Willisen *comme d'un homme à qui l'on ne pouvait se fier.*”

The subjoined extract from the public news, as printed in London on the 25th of May, will fully justify the qualifications as tactician of this Prussian General: other men win honours by gaining battles, they by losing them.

“ *Berlin, May 22.*

“ The Russian Imperial Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, sat opposite the Emperor and the King of Prussia, the President of the Cabinet, M. von Manteuffel, *General von Wrangel*, whose next neighbour was Count Orloff, the Russian *Minister of Police*. During dinner, the King himself called on the guests to fill their glasses to the brim (*bis zum Rande*), and gave the following toast:—

“ ‘ In my own name, *and that of my army*, and in the name of all true Prussian hearts, I give the health of His Imperial Majesty of Russia! God preserve him to that portion of the world which God has given him for an inheritance, and to this age, to which he is **INDISPENSABLE.**’

“ The Emperor replied, ‘ *Dieu conserve votre Majesté,*’ adding immediately afterwards in German,—‘ I drink to the welfare of the King of Prussia and *his admirable army.*’

“ The toast was drunk with the utmost enthusiasm, and the hall re-echoed with oft-repeated ‘ *Hochs!*’ ”

In the same paper in which the above is reported, the “Times” observes:—“The continent is governed literally, if not symbolically, by Colonels in Russian uniforms.”

CHAPTER IV.

Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852.

THE anticipations with which the foregoing chapter closes, and which were written at the end of 1850, were soon after realised. Whilst the war continued, not a whisper transpired respecting the succession: all the ostensible negotiations had reference to the position of the parties, and closed by totally ignoring the matters for which the war had been ostensibly made. To an unexpected question in the House of Commons, the Minister for Foreign Affairs confusedly replied by admitting that there were communications affecting the succession; but this was all that ever was extracted. In the course however of 1851, the Protocol of Warsaw of the 24th of May was printed in the papers; but the public mind, fatigued with the subject, heeded it not. That Protocol was calculated to leave the impression that it was an affair which concerned no foreign power and injured no positive rights: it was between Branches of the House of Oldenburg alone; it assumed a complete right to deal with the matters in question; it specified the renunciations of the persons set aside; engaged that the King of Denmark should charge himself with the indemnities to be afforded to any other claimants; and the only innocent reference to Foreign Powers is, "that his Majesty shall make known his determination to the Powers, friends of Denmark."

But it so happened that the statement of the Protocol in reference to the renunciations obtained was not true: not a letter of renunciation had at that time been expedited or signed. These renunciations, as appears by the documents subsequently submitted to the Diet of Copenhagen, were only

obtained in the course of the subsequent months of July, August, and September.* It may be said that if not obtained there was at least a moral certitude of obtaining them, but observe that they are invalidated by the very date. A pretender deriving from any one of these persons may clearly allege coercion, and deny the validity of the act.

The promise of indemnities to any other claimants was not kept: the sum paid to the Duke of Augustenburg was only equal to the value of the property he has since ceded, and the entail of that compensation has by an illegal ordinance (13th January, 1853) been cut off, excluding his own immediate descendants and his collaterals; the renunciation which he has given is ambiguous, and he also and his family may in like manner plead coercion; the very claims of Russia to-day are in opposition to a European Treaty, in which Russia herself was a party against the then Duke of Gottorp.

But the King of Denmark had no power to dispose of the Succession. The Protocol was a fraud from beginning to end.

As already stated, Russia had abstained from all apparent interest in the transactions of Denmark, and allowed the Minister of Prussia in London, in the only diplomatic document then avowedly published by any Court, to declare simultaneously, that she had renounced her rights and that she had no rights to renounce. Now she reasserts those claims, to make again a temporary renunciation, whilst declaring her intention of enforcing them, "should the present Combination come to fail."

Whoever perused the document must have supposed the matter concluded, and when he came to the final passage that "in London the necessary negotiations must take place, to give to this act the character of a European Transaction," he would only thence derive the gratifying perception of the compliment intended to Great Britain, by Russia and Den-

* Three on the 18th July, two on the 3d of August, one on the 16th August, and two on the 18th September.

mark. Any further attempts to comprehend the mystery, would be shipwrecked upon "European Transaction."

What was assumed to have been done in Warsaw was, however, to be effected by what was to take place in London, and this was to be done in London, because it was to be assumed that everything had been settled at Warsaw. It was not that a measure of internal policy in Denmark was by a complimentary notice in London to become a "European Transaction," but that a Conference in London was to interpose in the internal concerns of Denmark; and arrangements, which if the averments had been true might have been quite innocent in a Protocol between Russia and Denmark, become most criminal in a Treaty signed by England and France.

Will it be believed that this Warsaw Protocol between Denmark and Russia was but the echo of one already secretly signed nearly a year before between the Powers in London, obtained after prolonged and arduous struggles, unconsciously confessed by Lord Clarendon when he spoke of the thousands of folios to which the correspondence had extended! The facts which I have stated can leave no doubt that the English Minister was acting in concert with Russia; Denmark was her mere tool: Prussia, in the secret Article of the "Paix pure et simple," had bound herself to back any proposition of Denmark: the Russian troops were at the time in Hungary: the Prince President was in the hands of the Czar. Whence then arose the necessity of any toil? The credit of the resistance is evidently due to the Cabinet of Lord John Russell, and in those statements which have transpired, it is Lord Palmerston who figures as the recusant. He is represented as having yielded only to the necessities imposed upon him by the embarrassments occasioned by his proceedings in Greece,*

* The representative of a Foreign Court in reference to this matter used these words: "Lord Palmerston has explained an act which disgusted France as one which was necessary to upset the influence of Russia in Greece. Why then did he not associate France with himself, the two Powers having been just before engaged in re-

and the danger of a rupture with Russia, only be averted by the appending of his signature to the London Protocol of the 4th of July, 1850.

Such is the view of the case inserted by a leading German Statesman in a Pamphlet which he has left as a record of the transaction, and it corresponds with the statement from a semi-official Prussian source, which appeared in the *Weber Zeitung* in April, 1853. I append extracts from both in a note to this Chapter.

When then Lord Derby's Administration came into power, it found a matter so complicated and voluminous, that it would have required months to master the details,—so perplexed and yet adjusted, that years of labour upon the materials so furnished, would not have sufficed for fathoming it; unless indeed the new Foreign Minister had been a man capable of comprehending it at a glance there was no escape; in the words of the *Times* "the transaction was brought to that point where the Conference had only to append their signatures." The merits of the case were consequently set aside, the matter was looked upon simply in a practical point of view—that is to say, with reference to the convenu of the Cabinet, and "its policy was made up" accordingly. Lord Derby is indeed reported to have inquired—"Who is to come in after the Line of Glücksburg?" and M. Brunnow to have answered, "Time will show!" There the matter closed. So absolute was their confidence in the affair being concluded, that Members of the Cabinet itself were not even aware that such Treaty had been signed, and remained in that ignorance until the month of March of the following year. The article in the *Times*, which M. Brunnow had launched immediately on obtaining the signatures, was considered a hoax.

I confess that, notwithstanding my long anticipation of cuing the Hungarian refugees? and why did he attack the commerce of Greece and not its Government. He is too astute a man not to have perceived that by one blow he was giving to Russia the alliance of France and the control of Greece."

such a Treaty, I was influenced by these statements, confirmed by the failure of my attempts to obtain a copy of the Treaty so announced: I only became acquainted with it ten months afterwards by a communication from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to one of the excluded Princes, who, begging to be informed regarding the nature and conditions of the instrument by which the ancestral rights and honours of his House, the independence of his country, and his private property and possessions were disposed of, was referred to the henceforward memorable shops, No. 6, Great Turnstile, Lincoln's-Inn Fields, and No. 32, Abingdon Street, Westminster, where the Treaty was to be obtained for a penny. English diplomatic correspondence is generally of a heavy description, but there are occasions upon which it can become lively, that is, when it happens that in "making up the policy of the Cabinet," there is incidentally a nation to crush, or an individual to insult.

The article in the *Times** proceeded from "authority;" the Treaty was signed on the 8th; it appeared on the 11th, and required at least two days for composition; it did not proceed from an *English* authority; for while stamping the responsibility on Lord Malmesbury it refers all the honour and credit to others. It contains, moreover, details with which the English Government could not have been acquainted, and falsifications of which it could not be guilty. † According to the *Times* it is a truly British Document, it is not only a Treaty, but it is one of native manufacture. Inquiring one day in a shop for a travelling bag of Russian leather, some domestic calf skin, slightly perfumed, was offered for my admiration and acceptance: demurring somewhat, the shopman haughtily replied: "Sir, I warrant it!" Thus it is with the British public; it must accept as the occasion may be, a "warranted" bag, or a

* The article will be found *in extenso* at the end of the Chapter.

† For instance, it represents the Princess Louisa as granddaughter of Frederick VI.

“warranted” Treaty, from the tradesman of Bond Street, or Printing House Square. There is however this difference, that it is equally difficult to obtain a bag that is Russian, and a Treaty that is not.

This Article in the *Times* might appear to indicate a very superfluous care for the enlightenment of the English Nation, but in fact it was not to instruct England in respect to Denmark, but to overawe Denmark in the name of England. The slips of type, incomprehensible to the British public, were to be the declaration of England’s judgment, and the exposition of her policy. Not a line appeared in any other paper. Well has a Russian diplomatist said, “The Press is a Power which no intelligent Government will neglect;” with what ease is it wielded when one Monster Journal, like Aaron’s rod, has swallowed up all the rest. Now let us look at this Treaty.

It commences as a Treaty of Guarantee for the maintenance of the “Integrity of the Danish Monarchy as connected with the general interests of the balance of Power;” so far the counterpart of the Treaty of 1840 in respect to Turkey. Now the maintenance of the Integrity of a country has no reference to internal laws, but foreign aggression. In this there is no Guarantee given for the Integrity thus introduced. The Turkish Treaty of *Integrity* was to effect, as far as it could, the hereditary Separation of Egypt and to sanction the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian military force. The Danish Treaty of Integrity is for the transfer of that Integrity to Russia by the subversion of internal law.

It goes on to state that the means of securing this Integrity is by the devolution of the Crown “upon the MALE LINE TO THE EXCLUSION OF FEMALES:” that is, it abrogates the *Lex Regia*.

Article first declares, that with the assent of the various Cognates, and by their Renunciations, the Crown is to devolve upon Prince Christian of Glücksburg. This is in a breath admitting and denying the *Lex Regia*; for though the Princess Louise and his descendants might come in by the

renunciations of those that stood before her, for which no Treaty was required, her husband could not so come in. But in the preamble the Male Succession is introduced to the exclusion of Females, whilst Prince Christian is made to renounce (in the letters of Renunciation *not* presented to Parliament) every claim in his own right, and to acknowledge that he comes in merely in virtue of the rights of his wife. The Article then goes on to declare the Princess Louisa to be "born a Princess of Hesse *by order of Primogeniture from Male to Male,*" (What on earth has this to do with the matter?) and thereafter the Succession is to follow the "*Issue Male in the direct Line*" of this Marriage.

But why is Prince Christian necessary to secure the Integrity of the Danish Monarchy? What superiority has he that he should be preferred before Prince Frederick, or the others who stand above him? What excellence is there in his direct Line that all behind it should be cut off? Why should a daughter, or a granddaughter of his be less qualified than a son, or grandson, to wear a Crown, transmitted through a female, and the integrity of whose possessions has been secured by the care and wisdom of all Europe? The meaning of the Integrity is the supercession of Russia's Holstein claims; those having been admitted, she drives her bargain. Prince Christian suited her on account of these various reasons which render the Treaty monstrous and contradictory. By fixing on him she forces seven renunciations from the Cognates, that of Princess Louisa included, and cuts out the whole of the Agnates, who would come in after her and before her husband as Cognates. She admits him on the condition of excluding the Females and the indirect branches of his own line, so that on their failure the whole of the ascending and descending Lines are utterly excluded. These are the grounds upon which the Protocol of Warsaw asserts that the "*Integrity of the Danish Monarchy can be realised under no other consideration.*"

But Prince Christian has to accept the Crown on conditions the most extraordinary. He has first to renounce all

right in his own person ; he has secondly to accept the office merely as a delegation from his wife—a delegation in itself illegal, since by the *Lex Regia* no princess married to a reigning King can succeed.

He however contributes his share to the figment of conjoint succession. Princess Louisa brings the inheritance exclusive of Holstein ! Prince Christian brings the Holstein inheritance ; but here again he is only a *Locum tenens*.

“What,” says the Danish report, “has been brought into effect by this transaction ? His Majesty, the Emperor, has deigned to transfer the EXERCISE of the rights which he may have on *Holstein* to the Prince of Glücksburg and his male descendants.”* Thus, in the person of Prince Christian of Glücksburg, does Russia enter into virtual possession of Denmark, not only by the power she has exercised through her Allies in disposing of the crown at her good pleasure, but, also, by the very terms on which that crown is to be held, elaborately set forth in numerous acts of renunciation reciprocally obtained from the very parties who are put in possession, no less than from those who are excluded.

When in 1773, Russia first devised her renunciation in favour of the male descendants of Frederick the Third, at least no violence was done to the established order of succession ; yet the two renunciations are accepted as identical in nature. By the one she bided her time, by the other she has seized it.

There is an old maxim, “crawl to get up, and stand when you are on the top :” it is not, however, applicable to Prince Christian. The hill-top to which he will ascend is itself commanded, and it is depressed by his elevation. Denmark, long sunk under the weight of protection, has, by recent events, especially the war and the enormous debt which it has entailed, and then by the Intervention been wiped out from the number of independent States. But this is not all. In all the adjustments, care has been taken to ensure

* Report, p. 33.

invalidity ; Pretenders can be raised up against him on every field and on every principle. Russia holds them in leashes in her right hand and in her left ; and she can upset a Dynasty of Copenhagen as easily as one of Paris.

By the second Article, the high contracting parties, on the failure of the House of Glücksburg, "engage to take into consideration the further propositions which his Majesty the King of Denmark may deem it expedient to address to them." This King of Denmark will be the one so set up. While the rights of inheritance are laid prostrate, the faculty of the People of Denmark to dispose of itself in like manner disappears.*

When I first advanced this view of the case, I was not aware that the Archivist of the Danish crown, the strenuous advocate of the Treaty, in so far as regards the line of Glücksburg, went to the full extent of my objections on this point. He says, "should Prince Christian and his sons die without male successors, who would then inherit? *no one is able to answer that question.* Denmark would be disinherited by the abolition of the *Lex Regia*, Holstein would invite a crowd of Pretenders—Augustenburg, Glücksburg, Imperial Russia, and Oldenburg Princes."

It is very possible that these Pretenders may arise, but there is another possibility which comes first, and that is, that Russia shall herself claim as Heir-general. As the Gottorp line branches off from Frederick I, that is to say before the establishment in Denmark of Hereditary Right, such a pretension might have little weight in a court of law ; but with this Treaty before us, it must be evident that in the Court where this matter will have to be decided, the objection

* "We are not ignorant that the arguments which may be drawn from strict right to prove that the election of a successor by concert of the King and the Danish Diet, would in that alone be obligatory on the countries dependent on the Danish Crown. But these arguments are not generally admitted, and above all it appears that *the Government does not acknowledge their force* : it is therefore to be desired that they should never be advanced."—*Report*, p. 54.

will have none. Thus she reserves the threefold chance—nomination to the Crown, Pretenders to be set up, and Heirship-General; to be used according to circumstances.

But before these comes another, which is a certainty. Before the Treaty of the 8th of May, the Holstein claims might as a last resort have been disposed of by the cession of the district; *now* it cannot be got rid of, it is a millstone fastened round Denmark's neck. All other claims are abolished by Treaty, all other Succession interdicted, all right of the Danish people to act for themselves destroyed; the Holstein claims alone maintain, admitted by Denmark, recognised by the Powers. When then the Male Line now set up comes to be extinguished by the course of nature, or the decree of fate, the Heir to the fraction of Holstein will find himself Heir to the entire monarchy, the maintenance of the Integrity of which, as the Treaty tells us, is so intimately "connected with the general interest of the balance of power in Europe," and of such high "importance to the preservation of peace."

As was natural, this Treaty, which "stultified"* the Governments which signed it, produced a similar effect upon the people for whom it was intended. The Danes, lost in its contradictions, while crushed under its weight, vainly endeavoured to fathom the purposes for which it was signed, or to discover the principles upon which it proceeded: to such a pitch did confusion rise, that the opposition in the Diet was based upon the Treaty itself. The learned writer to whom I have already referred, speaks as follows:—

"Neither this London Treaty, nor the Warsaw Protocol, however little we may admire the pen of the publicist who excogitated the latter, really contains anything which compels the Government to throw up the succession for the kingdom of Denmark according to *Lex Regia*. The contracting Powers

* "This Treaty is a masterpiece; it has compromised and stultified every Minister and every Cabinet that has had anything to do with it. Thank God it was no work of mine!"—*Words attributed to Lord Malmesbury.*

undoubtedly executed these Treaties under the supposition that this law of succession would remain as before, only the person of Prince Christian being temporarily and for the nonce inserted. They could never dream of the Danish Government in direct contradiction to the 'note' laid before them, wishing to sacrifice the hereditary right of the Danish dynasty, and thereby transfer all legitimate claims into the hands of the Russian Gottorp house. The contracting Powers are therefore justified in complaining that the unexpected plan now laid before the Parliament constitutes a new Danish State-right, one which they were by no means prepared to support when they concluded the Treaty in question."*

He continues :—

"The abrogation of the Succession by Lex Regia makes the House of Gottorp the sole legitimate Pretender to Holstein: THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE 'INDIVISIBILITY OF THE MONARCHY' ENABLES THIS PRETENDER TO EXTEND HIS CLAIMS TO THE WHOLE OF THE DANISH KINGDOM. Could the Great Powers have signed a Treaty to change first principles and make the Danish monarchy a Russian Gottorp secundo-geniture."

Up to the time that the Treaty was signed the question was never mooted as to Russia coming in as Heir-General, or as succeeding to the whole in virtue of the fragment of Holstein; the piece had been a travesty of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out: there had therefore been no necessity to argue against an objection never raised; in fact Russia was heard of as renouncing claims, not as advancing pretensions. It was not till after the 8th of May that this view was presented, in this country, in my own pamphlet, printed and circulated within the same month, and towards the end of the year by Mr. Wegener's pamphlet, circulated in the Copenhagen Diet. These opinions gradually found their way to the public,

* C. F. Wegener's 'Defence for the Full Hereditary Right,' p. 21.

raised opposition in the Danish Diet, and created considerable alarm in influential quarters in this country; Russia now found herself under the necessity of counteracting the effect, and her manner of doing so is highly characteristic of the power of secrecy. Individuals have sought explanations from the Russian Representative, and after having received them have altered their tone. I speak not of solitary instances; the very same words have been repeated at remote points:—"I can assure you, that after the Line of Glücksburg Russia WILL NOT come in." Pressed for explanation, they have refused any; invited to state what it is that is to prevent her coming in, or who it is that is to come in in her stead, they have declined to open their lips.

The uninitiated will, no doubt, be startled by such a statement; they may suppose that money is the argument in such cases employed. No doubt money is there if necessary, and in heavy sums too; but that, I say it by no means to the credit of the parties concerned, is seldom required. A government *that has an object* is so entirely master of those which have none, that it can work with the most trifling means: it only can meet with intelligent opposition in the case of an individual in a position of authority or influence, who combines in his own mind the faculties, and has worked out for himself the elements of knowledge which accrue to her from the long operations of her system. Such incidents must be exceedingly rare, if indeed they can be said in any case to be possible; as well expect that a man, by natural intuition, should be able to lay down a railway, as that a European Statesman should be able to cope with a Russian Diplomatist. The individuals to whom in the present case I refer, when under the necessity of making a public declaration, speak in this fashion: "The designs of Russia are very alarming, and consequently all Europe is on the alert, so that no apprehension need to be entertained that she will be allowed to come in for Denmark:" the Danish minister expressed himself thus in the Diet. Such is the theme

of the 'Fødrelandet,'* which plays at Copenhagen the part of the 'Times.'

Mr. Wegener's pamphlet above quoted was made the subject of a note from the Russian Government calling upon Denmark to declare herself; to avow, if she entertained them, her suspicions, or to punish the traducer. The author was disavowed, and although not displaced from his official situation, criminal proceedings have been taken against him before the Courts. This, then, is the point upon which Russia dares not explain herself. Before adverting to its solution I must notice two general maxims enunciated in the Treaty.

The succession in England is Female as well as Male, and so is by law the Succession in Denmark : why should England

* The day after my arrival at Copenhagen, that paper in a vehement article, of which I got the credit, dwells on that feature of the Testament of Peter the Great, which prepares the double inheritance for Russia of the Black Sea and the Baltic : it tells a story of a miraculous image of the Virgin Mary being constantly kept in a travelling carriage and four horses waiting in the Palace Yard for the moment when it is to start with the cortege of a Russian army for Constantinople; it continues: "With regard to the Sound, it is a different business altogether. Here there are no religious grounds. Doubtful and unpopular hereditary claims are not possessed of the power which religion exercises on popular passions. In the Sound instead of Legends, there are but hereditary pretensions; instead of the Holy Virgin, we have but Holstein-Gottorp; and in the place of the travelling carriage and four, the second article of the Treaty of London. More powerful agents will be required to render Denmark and the North, Russian. The remainder of Europe besides will look with jealousy on such views on the part of the Czar; the evidences of that jealousy are getting more numerous from day to day (!) In the mean time it is well enough that we should all of us watch and pray lest we fall into temptation, and it is more especially the bounden duty of every Danish administration with the utmost care to avoid even the semblance of a Russian Protectorship. It is by such means that Russian policy in our days, like the Roman policy of old, encircles the minor states by ties, which will in a short time cost them their independence."

adopt the principle of exclusive male Succession? I put aside for the present, the results, and I ask on what English principle could this declaration be founded—does not a Queen sit upon our throne? On what Danish principle could it be founded—is the Princess Louisa a male?

What Interest has England in the Integrity of the Danish Monarchy? I speak not of the Holstein claims, but I ask how, after proposing the separation of Schleswig into two parts, and treating during three years the Duchies as independent of the Succession of Denmark, you can suddenly proclaim the maxim of "Integrity?" Is this to be accounted for by anything that has appeared? Even if you had in nowise sanctioned the pretensions of the Duchies, and if these pretensions were groundless, what right have you to interpose and decide the matter? * Let us look at the case with the help of the map. Supposing Russia to extend her dominion, or her influence, over Denmark, then if the Duchies were separated, the present Canal of the Eyder might be enlarged for the passage of sea-going vessels, and not only would the controlling power of the Sound be destroyed, but a channel opened, saving a circuitous navigation of nearly 400 miles; it must, therefore, be a primary object for England, from the moment that the substantive independence of Denmark is perilled, to separate from her the Duchies. †

* See note at the end of the chapter on the "Distinct Succession of Denmark and the Duchies."

† "The question of the Sound Dues is more closely connected with that of Succession in the Duchies than may be evident at first sight. By the new Tariff of the Schleswig-Holstein Canal, to commence from May 1, 1850, the number of articles subject to duty has been reduced from 518 to 240. The preference can only be expected to be given to the Canal passage, if the expenses of the latter, compared with the Sound Dues, will hold out the prospect of a clear saving to the shipowner and merchant. This reasoning will hold good in the case of these parallel water communications being placed under the control of two different governments, when the Canal duty on the one hand, and the Sound duty on the other, will

Before you had wiped out the intermediate Lines, before you had limited the Glücksburg Line itself, before you had established the principle of "Integrity," you had, if you interfered in the matter at all, one thing to do, and it was the only intelligible object for the interference of Foreign powers, to obtain, or enforce, Russia's renunciation of her claims on Holstein. This was the bar—the only bar to the union under the Cognatic Line, or to the separation; this was the only ground of Russia's interference, and consequently the only danger which it involved. In 1773 the renunciation was made, but with a limit; in 1852 it is again made, and again with a reserve. Why did not the Powers require that it should be absolute? the Transaction in 1773 was between Denmark and Russia alone; then there was no "additional pledge for the security of the peace of Europe;" in 1852, this "additional pledge" is a sanction to these groundless claims.

The claim, I say, is groundless, and if it were not, the Powers had no right to admit it since they had not examined it. If they interfere for "the peace of Europe" they cannot proceed upon Denmark's voluntary submission.

It is groundless in feudal law, except as a claim upon the whole Duchy of Holstein, which is not advanced.

If grounded, it is extinguished by compensation already received. The renunciation of 1773 was purchased by a *Secret Treaty* which gave to Russia the faculty of disposing of the military and naval power of Denmark for her own aggrandisement: this faculty has been exercised in a manner to ensure that aggrandisement, and that not only at the expense of others, but also at the expense of the territory

reciprocally act as a regulator upon each other. Rival interests will secure every facility to the public; whereas, in the opposite case, any further reduction of the Sound dues would depend upon the issue of the repeated negotiations, in which Russia would once more enlist on the side of Denmark; or to say more justly, of that client of hers whom she might have succeeded in raising to the joint dominion of the Kingdom and the Duchies."—Professor Würm to Lord Palmerston on the Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 16-18.

and power of Denmark itself. It was first called into operation when Gustavus III of Sweden was waging a successful war against her in the north, and the Turks waging one which might otherwise have issued favourably for them upon the Dnieper. She made use of the Treaty to cause Denmark to attack Sweden; breaking the power of that State, she was enabled to terminate the war in the east in a manner which soon put her in possession of the Crimea and the Euxine. The results were still more profitable in the north: the armed Neutrality followed, the prostration of the Scandinavian Kingdoms, the dominion of the Baltic, and finally the annihilation of Denmark's maritime power by England's retaliation. These results are permanent; they are not offered back, now that she resumes her right to a fragment of Holstein by a new renunciation a thousand times more profitable than any possession. Let it be remembered that these Hereditary claims of Russia flow from an *illegitimate* daughter of Peter I married to the heir of the line of Gottorp, whose son ascended the Russian throne by a *revolution*.

It may indeed be said that these consequences of the Secret Treaty depended upon the possession of other means and their use, and that if ability had been on the side of Denmark, and inability on the side of Russia, as it might have been, the Treaty would have borne no such fruits. I can admit to its fullest extent the objection, and place the issue solely on the next count.

She got Delmenhorst and Oldenburg conditionally on her renunciation. On her resuming her claims they were to revert to the Agnatic Line, or say, to Denmark. Can she simultaneously use the renunciations and possess the equivalent? Was not this the point which the Powers had to examine; until they had decided upon it could they have treated with her at all?

In the negotiations not a word is dropped respecting the grand Duchy of Oldenburg, it is ceded to her absolutely by silence. If so, what claim can she have on Holstein?

Was there then any difficulty in treating for her renunciation, leaving it even at her option to retain the one, or to retake the other?

But I am understating the case; it is no longer a *portion* of Holstein, but Holstein altogether. In the three Reports presented to the Diet on the 10th January, 1853, the expression of "portions of the Duchy of Holstein" is never introduced except when speaking of the King of Denmark; when the claims of the Emperor are mentioned, it is as bearing upon the "ancient Duchy-fief of Holstein." In reference to the Grand Ducal portion acquired by the cession of 1773 this expression occurs: "*doubts prevail* as to the validity of the said right of inheritance, the pretensions of the Gottorp Lines, and the Royal Danish House being in conflict. It would appear, however, that the best means to *preserve Holstein* to the Monarchy is to *renounce* the pretensions of the Royal House to this Duchy."*

Those at Copenhagen who dare to avow their apprehensions say that, it is not the direct succession of Russia that they apprehend, but her dominating influence; it is not her flag flying at Elseneur, but her control in the councils of the king whoever he might be. No doubt this is true, but not as a prospective case; this is already secured. What can mean those multiplied arrangements, if Russia contemplated nothing more than an influence and a control? She wants possession; she has never stopped short of that, one hour after she could obtain it. If the line of Glücksburg did, as it is possible, come in and go out within the year, a Russian governor would occupy Fredericksburg just as he has occupied Baktché-Serai, Teflis, and Warsaw.

The Treaty is, however, signed in total ignorance, and the Administration which signed it, if it discovers gradually the deceptions practised upon it, is at all events in that position which is rendered by the word, committed. It falls from power, a new Ministry comes in. They are no longer in the dark; now the error will be retrieved, the fraud repudiated;

* Report of the Commission. p. 41.

the infamous compact torn to shreds, and England released from the chain of subserviency. Not in the least : they too were committed by their acts—in *opposition* ; while free they had not exposed* it, bound (every man in the Foreign Office is so), they must adopt it ; adopting it, conscious of its character, they will pursue it with bitterness if not with desperation : scarcely a milder term can be used when they persevere after the knowledge that the Constitution of Denmark is under the process of being crushed by successive dissolutions, in order to force the acceptance of a Treaty purporting to be only the acknowledgment of an internal and spontaneous act.

But another circumstance has brought into evidence the spirit, or rather the abjectness, of the new government. The brother of the Duke of Augustenburg, like the father of Peter III, has protested against a Treaty which deprived his House of its rights. This protest has been rendered all the more galling by being accompanied by an offer to resign every claim, he being the last who held out, in case that measures were taken to secure the Succession against Russia on the failure of the Line of Glücksburg : this was putting the finger on the blot. After manifold endeavours to prevent the protest by compromising the parties, the Foreign Minister absolutely declared in Parliament that no protest had been made.*

Lord Aberdeen has, however, one relief, and it is a standing ground—"I have never said a word in favour of the Treaty." Lord Aberdeen is always saddled with the carrying of Treaties which he will not approve, the responsibility of acts which he repudiates, and the execution of prophecies which he never made. He will not justify, but he will execute ; he will not predict, but perform. He is the only survivor of the band of spoilers who partitioned Denmark. In the next great European event, the Treaty which led to the Battle of

* Lord John Russell had stated that it had been received, but refused to produce it, on the grounds of "inconvenience to the public service."

Navarino, we see him rehearsing to the letter his performance of to-day. The following words were uttered in the House of Lords, on the 19th of June, 1829.

“Marquis of Clanricarde—The noble Earl (Aberdeen) laid great stress upon the fact of the Emperor of Russia having waived his rights as a belligerent in the Mediterranean, *as affording facilities for the execution of the Treaty of London* (6th July, 1827). All that we are yet acquainted with is, that Turkey is in danger, and that the Emperor of Russia has broken his engagements with impunity,” &c. &c. &c.

“Lord Aberdeen—It is quite enough for Government to have it on their hands *to execute the Treaty*, without being obliged to *prophecy how it is to be executed*. *I have never given any opinion as to this Treaty.*”

“A first crime inoculates,” says Machiavelli, “an endless series of un contemplated crimes.” A first heedlessness in responsible station, instils in like manner a virus, which will break out on all the members, and finally settle on the heart;—it may show itself, too, in morbid fortunes, and in putrid fame. This is the least deplorable of its consequences; should the secret disease invest itself with the halo of hectic health, then the very air is polluted; and nations breathe the infection.

The game is Russian: the play, English: being upon the same line, both must equally cultivate perfidy and cowardice in the members of these devoted families; the interest is indeed more immediately English, it being the British minister who would be incommoded should there be found amongst them honour or character. It is not to St. Petersburg that the victims of persecution will rush: it is not the Nestor of Russian diplomacy whose equanimity will be shipwrecked between the rocks of conscience and the shoals of office; it is not from his lips that will distil the milk of sourness, or the honey of insanity; it is not the chief of the House of Romanoff who will have to writhe under a family insult, or to cower under a Cabinet incubus. On the banks of the gelid Neva no scandalous exhibition will be made of heretical

him from the Foreign Department, avow their concurrence with the Queen in their judgment of his character.* But again I refer to the fact and not to the experiment.

Now, this Minister is the man who planned the Treaty of the 8th of May, without whose concerted activity or measured inaction, neither could Denmark have been compromised against the Duchies, nor the Duchies against Denmark, Prussia and Germany involved in the war, or the war itself prolonged until the occasion was afforded for that restoration of the "Integrity of the Monarchy" which we have before us. Is it to be supposed that these transactions had no share in the judgment and act of the Queen? is it safe for a subsequent Minister to pursue a scheme planned under such auspices, to the persecution and downfall of Princes of the House of Guelph, and no less connected with her Majesty by the ties of blood, than England is connected with them by those of interest?

What, if it did apply, would be the value of the argument—"Sanctity of Treaties." With what wonder would such words, issuing from the lips of an English Minister, be listened to by the Rajahs of India, the Ameer of Scinde, the chieftains of Afghanistan, the Shahs of Persia, the nobles of Poland, and the burghers of Cracow. Shall the Dukes and Princes of the Baltic receive as a holy word that which the rest of the world knows to be a lie? Or are they treated exceptionally, not being barbarians. Yes! there barbarism—here civilization, justifies perfidy. England is equally dexterous at keeping and at breaking words—breaking that fairly pledged in honour, keeping that filched from her by fraud; but true in both to a simple rule—the service of the Czar.

Russia is a monster that devours; but it is one also which

* "Where he is, he can do no harm;" such is the consolation of his colleagues, when they have resigned to him the Post Office, through the instrumentality of which, even when not directly under his control, he obtained in former years the exclusion, or "descent," of Lord Grey from office. But wherever that minister is, he must of necessity become everything.

exists only by its voracity. Around its den it has thinned the hunting grounds, and it has long remained with spring too short to reach, and growl too fierce to allure. It then got keepers, who, in dread of being devoured themselves, began to foray for its wants. Of those keepers, the individuals called "Foreign Ministers" in England have been the most venturesome and persevering. "What now is to be done with the monster?" exclaims the simple and agitated mind. The answer is easy: starve it; cease to heap its trough with lacerated laws—cease to cast fractured sceptres and diadems into its sty, and, like the wolf, it will die in silence.

The plains of Europe have been ensanguined to bar heraldic claims, affecting a German fortress or an Italian dukedom; the case never arose of a union through Hereditary succession, of powerful kingdoms. Since the time of Charlemagne (that is to say, in the course of a thousand years), the prospect of such an event has presented itself but once, and that prospect, centuries before the contingency could occur, moved all Europe as by a present danger, namely, the testament of Charles III.

England, though discomfited in the war which ensued, and forced to recognise Philip V as King of Spain, still refused to lay down arms until he on his side, and the King of France upon the other, renounced every claim which the descendants of either might have to inherit simultaneously the two Crowns. This was carried into effect, not by a Treaty between England, Holland, and Austria, but by *legal instruments executed by these Monarchs*, and confirmed by the Cortes of Castile. These acts are recorded and incorporated in the Treaty of Utrecht, their validity does not depend upon any national stipulation; and although the Treaty of Utrecht has lapsed by incidents these Renunciations are as binding as on the day on which they were signed.

Judging by events, so far from concluding the convictions of Europe in this respect weakened within a century and a half, we must infer them to have been strengthened. Only

six years ago when the power of Spain had ceased to be alarming, and after the hereditary principle had been swept away in France, Europe was all but plunged in a war (the dynasty in France was upset) by the marriage of a princess of Spain to a junior son of Louis Philippe, because it was supposed that that alliance might invalidate the non-existing Treaty of Utrecht.

Here then is the precedent for the course to be pursued in reference to Denmark. If Russia has no designs, there can be no difficulty in obtaining such a renunciation; if there be difficulty, then is the necessity proved. But having obtained her enfeoffment of the Sound she keeps the attention of Europe fully occupied about the keys of the Church of Jerusalem.

NOTE I.

MOTIVES OF ENGLAND IN ACCEDING TO
RUSSIA'S PROPOSALS.

(See p. 235.)

From the 'Weser Zeitung,' April, 1853.

Never has Denmark been in more absolute dependence upon Russia than at present, and in such rapid downward progress from the summit of imaginary success. Count Reventlow, the active Minister of Denmark in London, had long been preparing the first London Protocol, in which the Integrity of the Danish Monarchy was pointed out as a thing to be wished; Russia was seconding, England was temporising; and Prussia at that time kept so far aloof, that the Chevalier Bunsen, on August 1, 1850, even handed a note of protest to Lord Palmerston. Russia availed herself of the confusion brought about in the Piræus by Lord Palmerston and of the favour shown by him to M. Pacifico, to instruct M. Brunnow to demand his passport. Lord Palmerston, apparently surprised, demanded whether there was not any means of adjusting the difference. To be sure, was the reply,—the signature of the London Protocol. *That*

signature was given,—and this was the first triumph of Russia. In enacting the bully against diminutive Greece, Lord Palmerston became the instrument through which on the Baltic the dominion of Russia was increased and established more firmly. But Russia was a gainer—not on the Baltic only, but also in Greece and Turkey. * * * On the 23d of August, 1850, the Austrian Plenipotentiary joined the Plenipotentiaries of Denmark, France, Great Britain, Russia, Sweden, and Norway. His accession, it is true, contained a reservation of the rights of the German Confederation; but these rights had already been most deeply violated by the very fact of the Protocol.

Extract from "*A Protest against the Theory of the Danish Collective Monarchy, and against the attempt at realising it by means of the Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852.*" Mannheim, 1852. Attributed to *Heinrich von Gagern*:—

(See p. 255.)

Denmark, Russia, and France had, from 1846, been active in urging the institution of the *Collective Monarchy*. In the spring of 1850, a favourable conjuncture had arisen, which Russia was the first to perceive, in the unfortunate division of the German Powers; secondly, in the disgust of the English Ministry at the long delay of the negotiations of peace at Berlin; and last, not least, in the personal embarrassment of Lord Palmerston, whose ministerial position had been endangered.

In consequence of the intervention of England against Greece, in behalf of the sordid claims of a M. Pacifico, a pseudo Englishman, resident at Athens, and generally speaking, in consequence of the extent to which England, under Lord Palmerston's guidance, thought itself warranted to carry the support given to Englishmen in foreign parts, England had got into so serious a scrape with Russia, that the Russian Ambassador in London had, in solemn indignation, announced his expected recall. At the same time, Lord Palmerston's foreign policy had been in Parliament submitted to severe criticism, and at the close of the debate the ministerial majority was so small that the victory was almost equivalent to a defeat. Some diplomatic access, to assuage the Tories, the adjustment of that difference, and an apparent

réconciliation with Russia, was under such circumstances what Lord Palmerston could not do without if he wanted to remain at the helm.

The accession of England to that Protocol was the first *desideratum*, and Lord Palmerston, under the circumstances, had declared himself ready to sign, thereon Brunnow preferred to accept the satisfaction demanded by Russia in the shape of the signature by the English Minister of the Protocol, in preference to his departure from London.

After the readiness of Lord Palmerston had been intimated, the thing was delayed for several weeks, ostensibly in consequence of some modifications proposed by England, which, without neutralizing the poison of the nut, were intended to soften somewhat the taste of the shell, and which at last were agreed upon without any great difficulty. That it would oppose, that not only the draught of the Protocol, but the plan itself had been kept as a perfect mystery from Prussia, and even from Austria, until within a few days previous to the first conference. The foreign powers appear to have been conscious that the German powers, as representatives of the German Confederation, could not in honour have signed a Protocol which was exclusively calculated to injure that Confederation in all and any claims and rights which had proved the object of the negotiations, and of the war, a war, in which Germany had not been vanquished, and could not therefore have lost the object at stake.

At last, in July 4, 1850, a Conference was summoned together in order to come to an agreement on the Protocol, and to this conference were the representatives of Austria and Prussia invited in their turn.

It must, however, be granted, that the Protocol was but of trifling signification compared with the Treaty of May 8, 1852, the signatures of which, on the part of England, Lord Palmerston has not officially to account for.

The main points of difference are the following:—

1st. The Protocol of June 2, 1850, in its first article, merely conveys the *unanimous desire* of the powers, which the present status gave of the possessors of the Danish Crown may be maintained in its integrity, whereas by article 2d of the Treaty of May 8, 1852, the *principle* of the “integrity of the Danish Monarchy” is laid down and recognised as a permanent one.

2d. The Protocol of June 2, 1850, in its 2d article, does

not *actually* alter the right of succession in Denmark and in Schleswig-Holstein, as it is announced to have been altered by article 1 of the Treaty of May 8, 1852; but it is only declared to be a very wise view of the King of Denmark to intend to alter the succession in the Royal Dynasty, in order to facilitate those measures, by means of which the Danish Monarchy may eventually be kept together.

At all events, Lord Palmerston, in signing the Protocol of June 2, 1850, was acting *contrary to the duty of England and contrary to the honour of a statesman*; for, while that was going on in London, England was still enacting the *part of mediator* at Berlin, and the negotiations for peace, which only attained this conclusion on July 2, 1850, the Conference taking place in London on July 4th, before that event (the signature of the peace of Berlin) could be known in London. If the part of a mediator is to be exempt from the character of perfidiousness, it presupposes a certain degree of impartiality.

NOTE II.

TREATY RELATIVE TO THE SUCCESSION OF THE
CROWN OF DENMARK.

Signed at London, May 8, 1852.

[Ratifications exchanged at London, June 19, 1852.]

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST HOLY AND INDIVISIBLE
TRINITY.

PREAMBLE. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Prince President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, taking into consideration that the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, as connected with the general interests of the balance of power in Europe, is of high importance to the preservation of peace, and that an arrangement by which the succession to the whole of the dominions now united under the sceptre of His Majesty the King of Denmark, should devolve upon the male line, to the exclusion of females,

would be the best means of securing the integrity of that Monarchy, have resolved, at the invitation of His Danish Majesty, to conclude a Treaty, in order to give to the arrangements relating to such order of succession, an additional pledge of stability by an act of European acknowledgment.

ARTICLE I. After having taken into serious consideration the interests of his Monarchy, His Majesty the King of Denmark, with the assent of His Royal Highness the Hereditary Prince, and of his nearest cognates, entitled to the succession by the Royal Law of Denmark, as well as in concert with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, Head of the elder branch of the House of Holstein-Gottorp, having declared his wish to regulate the order of succession in his dominions, in such manner that, in default of issue male in a direct line from King Frederick III of Denmark, his Crown should devolve upon his Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, and upon the issue of the marriage of that Prince with her Highness the Princess Louisa of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, born a Princess of Hesse, by order of Primogeniture, from male to male; the High Contracting Parties, appreciating the wisdom of the views which have determined the eventual adoption of that arrangement, engaged by common consent, in case the contemplated contingency should be realized, to acknowledge in His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, and his issue male in the direct line by his marriage with the said Princess, the right of succeeding to the whole of the dominions now united under the sceptre of His Majesty the King of Denmark.

ARTICLE II. The High Contracting Parties, acknowledging as permanent the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, engage to take into consideration the further propositions which His Majesty the King of Denmark may deem it expedient to address to them, in case (which God forbid) the extinction of the issue male, in the direct line, of His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, by his marriage with Her Highness the Princess Louisa of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, born a Princess of Hesse, should become imminent.

ARTICLE III. It is expressly understood that the reciprocal rights and obligations of His Majesty the King of Denmark,

and of the Germanic Confederation, concerning the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenberg, rights and obligations established by the Federal Act of 1815, and by the existing Federal right, shall not be affected by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE IV. The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the other Powers, and to invite them to accede to it.

ARTICLE V. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of six weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the eighth day of May, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two.

(L.S.) MALMESBURY. (L.S.) BILLE.

(L.S.) KUBECK.

(L.S.) A. WALEWSKI.

(L.S.) BUNSEN.

(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

(L.S.) REHAUSEN.

NOTE III.

ARTICLE OF THE *TIMES*, MAY 11, 1852.

(See p. 236.)

It is a fortunate circumstance for the Earl of Malmesbury that, within the short period that he has held the seals of the Foreign Office, he has already had the opportunity of signing a Treaty with all the great Powers which *restores peace* to an important part of Northern Europe, *secures the integrity* of the Danish monarchy, and *provides* upon a safe basis and by an equitable compromise, *for the eventual succession to that Crown*. But, in fact, this question had been so fully considered for the last few years, and the negotiations had already been so actively carried on in all parts of Europe, that, upon the arrival of M. de Bille, the Danish Plenipotentiary, in London, *nothing remained to be done* BY THE CONFERENCE *but to complete its work by signing the instruments already agreed upon*. This act was concluded on Saturday, the 8th of May, at the Foreign Office, and, as the Treaty was immediately forwarded to Copenhagen for ratification, it may now

be considered that every part of this *harassing controversy* is brought to a close, and that the future peace of the country is secured, while the causes of past irritation and hostility are removed. For nearly six years the question of the Danish succession in the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein has disturbed the tranquillity of Northern Europe, for it was in 1846 that the late King of Denmark published his letters patent on the order of inheritance in the Duchies. But the *train had long before been laid* by the intrigues of the Augustenburg family, and the explosion was *greatly assisted* by the convulsions which soon afterwards took place in Germany, followed by the temporary ascendancy of revolutionary principles at Frankfort and Berlin. We need scarcely remind our readers, that throughout the chances and perils of this difficult period, *we never despaired* for an instant of a cause which was supported by the whole authority of public law, and defended by the spirit of the Danish people. The odds against them were overwhelming, but right has prevailed. Denmark owes her success to no Foreign Power, for throughout the contest she received no active military or naval succour. But she had the goodwill and the respect of Europe; she was upheld by public opinion, to which, we trust, we may have in some degree contributed; and *when* at length Lord Palmerston was *induced to lay down* the principles which were established on the 2d of August, 1850, by the Protocol of London, the rights of Denmark were saved.

It will be remembered that the cause of this dispute was, that in the probable event of the failure of issue to the eldest male line now reigning in Denmark, the several dominions of that Crown *would pass*, according to different laws of succession, and the monarchy *would consequently* have been divided. Denmark Proper would have descended through a female branch to the Princes of Hesse Cassel; Holstein would have followed the strict line of male succession, because it was a fief of the German Empire; and the succession of Schleswig was disputed, one party contending that it followed the descent of the Crown of Denmark, the other that it was indissolubly united to Holstein. *To meet these difficulties, the course which has now been successfully adopted was to select one scion of the Royal family as its common heir; to obtain renunciations of the conflicting and collateral interests of all other parties, and to place the whole of these arrangements under the collective sanction of Europe.* The next heir to the

Crown of Denmark, in the event of the King's demise without issue, is His Majesty's uncle, Ferdinand, a Prince of sixty years of age, married, and likewise without issue. On his death it is presumed that the reigning line will become extinct. The present Treaty, therefore, recognises as the next heir after him *Prince Christian*, of the line of Sonderburg Glücksbourg, who is married to Princess Louise of Hesse Cassel, a *grand-daughter of King Frederick VI of Denmark* (!), by the eldest daughter of that Sovereign, who became the wife of Landgrave William of Hesse. The issue of the marriage of Prince Christian and the Princess Louise of Hesse consists of four children, the eldest a boy about nine years old; and *this young Prince*, therefore, represents *both the male and the female line of succession to the Kingdom and the Duchies*, THOUGH not in the *first degree*. The line of Augustenburg is senior to the line of Sonderburg Glücksbourg, *but it is attainted* for the part it took in the late contest, which was mainly fomented by those Princes in order to secure and *extend their own exclusive pretensions by the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy*. The Duke of Augustenburg has, therefore, forfeited his rights, *and stands excluded from the amnesty*; BUT an arrangement has now, *we believe*, been concluded between him and the King of Denmark, by which his estates in the Duchy of Schleswig *are to be purchased at a high valuation*, and the proceeds will suffice to provide liberally for his subsistence and *station*. No further difficulty is, therefore, to be apprehended in that quarter, and it is *comparatively immaterial whether his renunciation has taken place*. But the elder members of the Hessian branch had *undoubted rights* to the Crown of Denmark, which they have honourably renounced in favour of the husband and children of the Princess Louise, without exacting any compensation. The Emperor of Russia, as representative of the line of Holstein Gottorp, had rights on one portion of the Duchy of Holstein; for the act of cession, confirmed and executed by the Grand Duke Paul, on his coming of age, in 1773, was exclusively in favour of the *male line* reigning in Denmark, and in the event of the extinction of the male line that renunciation so made by the father of the present Emperor Nicholas would have become null and void. *Far from showing any eagerness to avail himself of this circumstance to acquire a preponderating influence in that part of Europe*, IT IS DUE to the Court of Russia TO STATE *that*

they have never attempted to sacrifice the general welfare of the Danish monarchy to any petty interest, and that the Emperor has been constantly foremost in promoting this negotiation, of which a renewal of his father's cession of all claims on Holstein forms an essential part. Throughout this transaction Russia has acted with *great judgment* (!) and good faith, and, although her own interests are deeply involved in all that concerns the entrance to the Baltic, she has sought to gain no advantage for herself, but simply to strengthen and preserve the independent rights of Denmark. In like manner France, under the successive Governments of Louis Philippe, Lamartine, Cavaignac, and Louis Napoleon, has pursued the same frank and consistent line of conduct towards Denmark. The difficulties came, as is well known, from the side of Germany, for this question was curiously intermingled with the political passions of the time, and the song of "*Schleswig-Holstein mecrumschlungun*" was for many months the *ça ira* of the German revolution. At length, however, *the restoration of the legitimate federal authority in Frankfort terminated the hostilities in the Duchies*; and, in spite of the scorn and resentment with which our announcement of the Danish Protocol of 1850 was received in Germany, when the Prussian Envoy in London declined to sign that document, we have *now* great satisfaction in recording the fact, that all differences of opinion between the great Powers *have disappeared*, and that Chevalier Bunsen *himself* has placed his name by the side of the Plenipotentiaries of all the other Powers in this final arrangement! We may, therefore, now invoke *his high testimony* to the soundness of the policy which that Protocol was intended to establish; and if any sacrifices have been made by Prussia before she arrived at that conclusion, we sincerely hope that she may be rewarded for them by the establishment of a *cordial alliance between herself and Denmark*, whose geographical position and maritime power make her a neighbour of the *utmost value to the Prussian dominions*. Upon the whole, this Treaty is another proof that in spite of the *most serious obstacles and the most violent passions*, the active, intelligent, and pacific diplomacy of our day does contrive to avert the calamities of general war, and even when hostilities are raging, to confine them, as far as possible, within a narrow compass! In any other age, it is highly probable that the Danish struggle would have led to far more formidable

results (!) and, although it was too long protracted, *because vigorous means were not early employed to check it*, the termination of the whole negotiation proves that the great Powers will see justice done and peace preserved.

(Whilst the correspondence, amounting to thousands of folios, was passing between the Governments, not a whisper reached the public of any plan for altering the succession of Denmark. So soon as the matter is concluded the Article appears: no other paper has a word upon the subject. If any body does give it a moment's consideration, it is to console himself with the belief that this Treaty has "restored peace to Denmark," and "removed the causes of past irritation.")

NOTE IV.

DISTINCT SUCCESSION OF DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

(See page 245.)

The male succession in the Duchies, whether mediate or immediate, has always been assumed up to the negotiations ending in the Treaty of May; amongst the documents presented to the Danish Diet, there is an argument against the Agnatic Succession: but the matter has never been brought to any judicial or diplomatic solution. In the Treaty of May, the question is wholly evaded, and the Agnatic Line is passed over without mention, whether as to claims upon the Duchies, or as to Cognatic claims upon Denmark; it may, therefore, be desirable to point out the documents, containing the data, requisite for a decision.

In 1232, the Duchy of Schleswig appears as a Hereditary Male Fief of the Crown of Denmark.

In 1326, an investiture took place, in express terms as an Hereditary Fief by tenure of Knight service, the *Dominium directum* and *utile*, being vested in the Court, the *Dominium supremum* being alone reserved to the Crown.

In 1459, the Duchy reverted to the Crown as an Escheat on failure of right heirs of Duke Athol.

In 1460, the right of electing a Duke and Count from amongst the heirs of Christian the First was established.

In 1553, stipulations were entered into, fixing the means of adjustment by Arbitration, in cases of differences arising between the Crown of Denmark and the Duchies.

In 1570 and 1642, Imperial diplomas for the counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst to the Danish Kings and the Dukes of Holstein, with reversion to their Agnates.

In 1580, the division took place into Royal and Ducal, or Gottorp portions.

In 1581, a partition of the succession of John Duke of Schleswig and of Holstein was made between Frederick the Second and Adolph, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, by Arbitration of the Elector of Saxony.

In 1608, Duke John Gottorp, with the sanction of Christian the Fourth, as Suzerain of Schleswig, entailed the succession in the Gottorp portion upon his eldest male heir in right of primogeniture.

In 1610, Frederick the Third established an analogous family statute for the Royal portion.

In 1636, Defensive Treaty between Christian the Fourth and Frederick Duke of Schleswig-Holstein.

In 1658, the Treaty of Copenhagen, sanctioned by the Danish Senate, ceded the Sovereignty over the Gottorp portion of the Duchy of Schleswig to the Duke of (Holstein-Gottorp) and granted a diploma of Sovereignty by which the Duke and his male descendants were released from all feudal obligations as vassals of Denmark, and the Sovereignty was ceded to them. The King at the same time ceded to himself as Lord of the Royal Duchies of Schleswig the Sovereignty over it, with an express reservation of the reversionary interests of the Crown of Denmark in the Duchies upon the extinction of the respective Male Lines. The cession of the Sovereignty was then limited to the *male* descendants of the Duke, so that the Fief was not abolished, but the sovereignty sub modo transferred. The King of Denmark, however, had no power whatever over the Sovereignty.

In 1660, the succession to the Crown of Denmark, which was till then elective, became hereditary in the male and female descendants of Frederick III, subsequently regulated by the *Lex Regia* in 1665.

This change in the succession to the Crown of Denmark could only affect the succession in the Sovereignty of the

Germanic Confederation of Denmark never could and that monarch political their interpretation. I must not the sentiment ascertained—must not Line been secured—and have been despatched to the influence of the Act ordinance?

But if the Duchies were revolutionary, if they were if they were attached to the have nothing to do with hands of Denmark; she errors and acts of the I everything was in her I "Indivisibility" of the I if unfounded in right, p most important securities properly handled would have Germanism, as formerly Duchies had protected her

The suggestion of the come from St. Petersburg a means of escaping from

* Mr. Wegener, after she separate Duchies originally conjoined and disjoined through by acts of violence or not for this doctrine of Indivisible and Europe threatened with

† At that moment the and Louis Philippe was against himself against the effects of said he was ready, in return Russian ambassador, "to

are various considerations which coincide to render this ambiguity desirable. The first of these is the opportunity of a new Civil War in Denmark: this is a matter which affects not Denmark alone, but Prussia also and Germany. Here is a lever for the convulsion of those countries, and from it may not be improbably worked out a Russian intervention at Berlin. Independently, however, of those ulterior objects, there were reasons so strong as to amount to a necessity, for excluding the discussion of those claims at the present moment: they consist in—

1. The Agnatic Succession in the Duchies.
2. The Cognatic Succession in the Kingdom.
3. The Reversion of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst.
4. The Heirship-General.

The first point would have raised the question of the Integrity of the Monarchy, which Russia had to settle as a preliminary matter, so as to get the Duchies through the Kingdom, or the Kingdom through Holstein.

The second would have interfered with the nomination of Prince Christian, the Agnatic Line coming before as Cognatic (the mother of the present Duke had indeed given a renunciation, but we know what value attaches to such instruments).

The third is of the gravest importance, for, if only raised, the Holstein claims fell to the ground.

As to the Heirship-General it was impossible for Russia to have pronounced herself either way. If she admitted the claim she acknowledged a branch that came in before herself. If she rejected it on the plea of the Line having come off before Hereditary Right was established, she deprived herself of that ground, should it prove to be desirable to advance it.

The civil war enabled her, through the animosity of the parties, to put aside at once those inconvenient discussions and a numerous line of claimants. The powers of Europe were, however, not under the influence of local passions, and whatever the part taken by the Augustenburgs in the civil war, no judicial steps have been taken to deprive them of their rights. The shield of the Duke of Augustenburg is suspended amongst those of the other Knights Commanders of the Danish Order of the Elephant.

CHAPTER V.

The Diet of Copenhagen and the Danish Constitution.

THE resistance of the Danish Diet, which has already led to three Dissolutions of that Body, was not made to the Treaty, but arose entirely out of the manner in which the measure was presented to it.

The Diet itself was Provisional and Provincial; the Duchies were not represented. On the 28th of the previous January, a Royal Proclamation had promised the Institution of a General Diet: there was no reason why this promise should not have been fulfilled, and every reason for fulfilling it before submitting a fundamental matter which as every one felt could not be settled in a partial assembly. The Constitution required that no change in the succession should be adopted except by three-fourths of the votes; the Body which had to vote required to have existence. This objection was put forward as a preliminary one.

It may have been very unwise to force so grave matter in so indecorous a manner, but from this fact alone, a sinister purpose need not be inferred. If the Danish Government had no other object than the adhesion of the Diet to the Treaty, it could have floated over the preliminary objection by rendering the measure in other respects acceptable. It, however, treated this Constitutional body harshly and insultingly; told it that no advice would be accepted at its hands; informed it that the measure to which its assent by anticipation was required, should not even be presented to it; * and

* "Although the communications which the Government has made to us allow us no ground to hope that the act will be presented for the adoption of the Diet, &c."—*Report*, p. 61.

that it was required to utter a simple "Yes," or a simple "No" to the Royal message,* which Royal message in *express terms* abolished HEREDITARY RIGHT!

We have not to seek far for the object in view. A Constitution was very necessary for Russia in Denmark, generally for the creation of faction, and immediately for giving an apparently national sanction to the Treaty: but it was not desirable that that Constitution should have or acquire, vigour, or that a sense of independence, or a consciousness of power should arise amongst the people. Here was an opportunity of crushing that Constitution by the weight of Europe. The objects of the Danish Government, though distinct, coincide; they could not fail to profit by the occasion thus afforded them, of bringing into coincidence the dispositions of the Diet with the will of the Cabinet. In fact the Cabinet was absolute from the moment, it would say "unless you answer by an unconditional 'Yes,' we dissolve, and will go on dissolving till you have said it." It is England whose influence is called into action in this matter; and it is exerted in reference to a measure, into which the British Parliament has never inquired, and respecting which it has received neither documents nor explanation.

The first Dissolution took place, nominally indeed, in consequence of the failure of another measure which the government might have easily carried. This was a bill for the extension of the Custom Lines, so as to include Holstein, to which the Diet objected solely because the Duchies were not represented; the government was beaten on some details in the Lower House by three, and the Upper was known to be

† "That if the male issue of King Frederic III should fail, *all hereditary right according to the articles 27—40 of the said royal law shall be abolished*, and the succession for all the territories which are now united under the Danish crown be transferred on the head of His Highness Prince Christian, in this way that His issue, male after male, of lawful marriage, shall succeed to the crown in accordance with the law of primogeniture, and the Agnatic lineal succession."—*Royal Message, 4th Oct., 1852.*

favourable, but it was never submitted to them. By means of a conference the trifling objections of the Lower House would have been removed.

The new Diet was elected with a view to the message, and the government was favoured in an extraordinary manner by an internal schism. Denmark has long been distracted by an agitation which may be rendered intelligible to the reader by the term "Tenant-Right," although it more properly belongs to the class of dissensions which formerly afflicted Galicia and Hungary, and still afflict Wallachia and Moldavia. The popular party had the command of the Lower House, and having been the most violent in the war, it was now most zealous for the Royal message.

The new Diet which met in March, 1853, was, nevertheless, prepared for resistance, and surrender was imperiously required by the government in the name of a "European necessity,"* and they were unambiguously threatened in case of contumacy, with the withdrawal of a Constitution which they were so little qualified to possess; lest such menaces, should be mistaken for the mere desires of a faction, or associated with the purposes of Russia, the *Times* lent the willing aid of its thunders to batter unhappy Denmark in the name of constitutional freedom and the enlightened opinion of the British people.†

The previous Diet had appointed a Commission of twenty-

* "At the opening of the Reichstag, at Copenhagen, the Prime Minister read the Royal Address of the 4th October last, respecting the regulation of the Succession. As the Ministry presumed that the proposed succession was the right one, it would not admit of any alteration, as that would appear as if the King intended to break the engagements he had contracted with the Great Powers. To show to the Diet the opinion of Foreign Cabinets of the former discussions, he would lay all the correspondence on the unconditional approval of the motion was a European Necessity."—*Altona Mercury*.

† For instance, on the 12th of February the *Times*, after speaking of the Danish Constitution as one of the satisfactory results of 1848, says:—

"But it is not less essential to the maintenance and success of these

five members to examine the small pamphlet of forty pages, which is all that was considered necessary for their enlightenment, and which has not even been presented to the English Parliament. That Commission drew up three separate Reports: the first two signed by sixteen members was unfavourable to the absolute "Yes." All accepted with joy the nomination of the Duke of Glücksburg. Opposition took their chief stand upon the *Lex Regia* abolished by the message, and presented the singular anomaly of opposing the Crown by means of a charter of unlimited despotic power. But the most remarkable part of the story is, that they appeal to the Treaty against the Message!

These opinions were echoed in the New Diet, and the government measure was opposed by forty-five to ninety-seven votes, which, as three-fourths was required, was its rejection. On this the Diet was again dissolved.

Having been present at the election of the next one, I can speak from personal observation. The prevailing sense was that of fatigue, the intimate conviction that of helplessness. "In God's name let the matter be settled:" such was the expression on every one's lip. In Copenhagen there were out of nine districts but two contests, and one of these was a mere personal competition. In those districts where there was a contest but a small number of the electors voted:

institutions that the elective Assembly should pursue a rational and practical course with reference to the important questions which have recently occupied not only the Danish Cabinet, but the great powers of Europe; and nothing is more calculated to weaken the due authority of the representatives of the nation than a disposition to sacrifice the public engagements and common interests of the monarchy to a spirit of narrow and exclusive party feeling. We have taken so much interest in the gallant struggle of the Danes against the party which sought to effect the dissolution of the monarchy, and in the establishment of those liberal institutions in Denmark which no people is better qualified to enjoy, that we hope the observations we may venture to make on this Parliamentary crisis in their affairs will be favourably received before the country proceeds to the business of the elections on the 26th of February."

it was a matter of surprise that *one* opposition member was returned. Such being the state of the capital, judge of the provinces. Not a single landed proprietor was returned for the Lower House. The rancour of the Tenant-Right question combining with the rage for the Glücksburg succession, excluded the distinguished men who had figured in the former Diets, and not one of the liberal members who had voted against the government was re-elected.

It is different with respect to the other House. It is also elected, but indirectly, that is to say, by electoral colleges, as in France. In this body the proprietors are represented, and consequently the two bodies are balanced against each other, or will be so upon the Tenant-Right question, where each will vote separately, while on that of succession, the two being united, the opposition of the Upper House will be overpowered. Thus then whilst the process of rapid and reiterated dissolution is employed to coerce the Diet into a concurrence of will with the ministry, the forms of a constitutional assent are obtained to a measure extorted by violence; and the authority of the powers of Europe is employed to effect a violence not contemplated in the act by which it has been produced.

Had the Government still been despotic, commiseration might have been awakened; but now, when in consequence of this act, Denmark comes to be used against England, she will no longer be looked upon as a suffering victim but treated as a willing instrument, and we will proceed as heretofore to complete her subjection, by partition, if need be, or by bombardment.

Denmark had a beneficent Despotism, that has disappeared; she was gratified with a liberal Constitution, that is trodden down; she had an established Succession, that is broken up: by the blood she has spilt in a civil broil fifty millions of dollars have been added to her debt. Such are the results of Constitutional Diplomacy!

If the past conduct of the Diet did encourage abroad the hope that by its means the errors of the London Treaty

might be repaired, that hope is now extinguished: if the matter is now to be taken up, it can only be by England herself. There is now no possibility of mistake on any point; the statement of the case, which appeared so incredible when first made, is now re-echoed from every quarter.*

* "Lord Clarendon's declaration in the Upper House is here [Berlin] declared to be utterly false. He stated that 'the Emperor of Russia had acceded to the London Treaty settling the Danish Succession without bringing forward the slightest undue pretension.' The state of the case is exactly the reverse of what Lord Clarendon stated. By the London, as well as by the Warsaw Protocol, the whole of the Danish dominions are menaced with falling under the Russian sceptre. Germany may look forward to see Russia a member of the German Confederation in respect to the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg. It is wonderful how people can shut their eyes to anything so evident."—*Aachener Zeitung*, June 24th.

So much for Berlin: now for Vienna:—

"No man can shut his eyes to the tendency of the reigning House of Russia to introduce itself into the Germanic Confederation in its quality of Sovereign of the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, over which it pretends that it will have to exercise power after the death of Prince Christian of Glücksburg. The danger for the future fortune of Prussia is consequently imminent, and that is the reason why the Cabinet of Berlin would be most unwise to remain neutral in the Eastern question." (!)—*Wanderer of Vienna*, 24th June.

The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 23d, has the following:—

"There appears to be a settled resolution at Copenhagen to despatch all the pending questions as rapidly and *sine strepitu* as possible. The royal message has indeed been read for the first time at the second meeting, in spite of the opposition of Lindberg. The former prime minister, A. W. Moltke, has actually adopted the motion formerly brought in by Oersted. But there is considerable scruple as to its effect; hence in fact that motion will not settle anything, for the Danish Diet is but a *provincial* diet; it cannot resolve for Schleswig, nor for Holstein either, and the Succession will not be settled for the collective Monarchy any more than for the Duchies. The Treaty of the 8th of May will step in with all its difficulties and embarrassments. There is in fact no doubt that England has of late attended very seriously to the Sound, and although David Urquhart is not properly to be considered as an agent of the Administration, yet you may rely upon his being the representative of no inconsiderable share of public opinion on the

The Danish nation has just spirit enough left to pretend to assume as its own will, the violence it suffers, and thus loses the only chance of that support on which in their hearts they yet rely. "Surely England will at last see to what she is bringing us," said one of the leading men in a conversation which had commenced with the stout assertion that the Treaty was an excellent measure and calculated to heal the wounds of Denmark. The answer to this melancholy avowal and pitiable appeal, could only be: "England acted when she was ignorant: now she is informed, but *committed*; three Administrations and five Foreign secretaries are partners in the deed." The Danes too are committed. Terrible word is that "*committed*"—dead lock of a political mechanism, possessed of functions and destitute of ends.

other side of the German Ocean. The new English minister, Mr. Buchanan, arrived at Copenhagen on the 15th inst., and he is understood to have very decided instructions. An English squadron is expected in the Baltic. In consequence of all this, Count Charles Moltke is said to entertain a desire of resigning as minister for Schleswig. It is supposed, and no doubt the supposition is founded in fact, that the measures which for upwards of a year have been showered down upon the Duchies, and the almost desperate complaints which are echoed back to the capital will only tend to embitter and to alienate the minds, and will necessitate the Government to fall back upon Russia. The late prime minister, all but in plain words, proclaimed this dependence upon Russia, in his place in the Diet."

CHAPTER VI.

The position of Austria in the North and in the South, as affected by the Treaty of the 8th of May.

AUSTRIA, above half a century ago, exchanged the Netherlands for a position on the Adriatic; from the North, where the increasing consistency of an Extrinsic Power closed the door to ambition, she turned to the South and East, hoping to reap in the expected dissolution of a great Empire a harvest of maritime power and military strength.

Her retreat from the North has enabled Russia to extend over Germany a controlling influence, and her advance on the South has brought her into collision with Turkey, now perceived to be possessed of great and increasing strength.

Placed by an internal distribution of a few Turkish soldiers at the mouth of the Cattaro, under the necessity of having to struggle to gain back, through external and compromising aid, the cession made to her formerly by France, she has discovered that the Ottoman Empire, instead of an inheritance to be divided, affords the basis on which to construct a system of defensive policy for the future.

The events of Poland, those more recent and alarming of Hungary, the usurpation of the Danube, and the habit of subverting Governments introduced amongst the Nations of the West, present so many additional reasons for seeking to escape from the control of her ally, and for looking in Turkey for friendship which will afford real support upon honourable conditions.

In a word, aggrandisement must be abandoned abroad, and

the doctrine of uniformity surrendered at home. Nor is this idea unfamiliar to the Austrian Cabinet. Prince Swartzenburg has told Germany that she "has nothing to fear from the strength of Austria, but much to apprehend from her weakness." Austria is only weak because her own subjects dread her doctrine of uniformity, and her neighbours her designs of aggrandisement.

The Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852, for the Danish Succession, has now recast the relations of the Powers of Europe, by the prospective union of that Crown with the Crown of Russia, and indeed the fact of having used the Powers of Europe for effecting this arrangement, gives her a present ascendancy not far removed from possession. It is important, therefore, for Austria to consider, before it is too late, the consequences to herself of this change.

Like the Dardanelles, the *aggressive Power* of the Sound, from its possession by a weak or inoffensive State, has remained latent: we have to look at that position now no less in its offensive than its defensive character.

The Russian frontiers springing across Prussia will be brought to the West of Berlin and Vienna, to within 400 miles of Paris, and two days by steam to the Thames. To these frontiers she will be able, by steam, to transfer in a couple of days, regiments and armies, which a few hours can bring by rail to Berlin, and a couple of days over the whole of Germany.

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the Northern as well as the Southern Scandinavian Peninsula, and the North, in a block, falls into her hands.

It is not merely Denmark which she is to acquire, but *also the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein*, which, even if Denmark had been singly inherited, might have afforded a check upon her: the Treaty, declaring those to be inseparably united, places the whole in her hands.

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It will be evident, that what may remain of independence in Prussia will now vanish, and that that government can be no more than a Subsidiary Office wearing the deceptive mask of a distinct existence.

If, then, Austria had prior and independent reasons for a change in her policy, there is every reason not to delay its adoption until the accomplishment of the Treaty of the 8th of May deprives her of all power of giving to that change effect; in that case the object to be attempted, and one presenting no great difficulty in its realization if undertaken at once, is the breaking of the Treaty. One generous word uttered to the Porte secures her in the rear; one well-adapted phrase gives her Germany, and then she can meet the common enemy on a favourable field; an able and incorruptible envoy in London brings at once the fall of the Treaty, and the co-operation of a secured and strengthened England. Unless Austria possess such a man, the attempt is of course impracticable.

If not, Austria and Turkey will mutually be involved in projects of dismemberment, and the one used to pull down the other. To them will be applied the injunction of the will of Peter in regard to Austria and France, namely, the inspiring of each with the design of universal dominion, by which such an amount of hatred shall be engendered between them as must finally destroy them.

For the adoption or prosecution of any defensive measures against Russia, the basis must be the knowledge of the East, at least in regard to the following points :—

1. The inherent vitality of Turkey.
2. Facility of co-operation in this sense with the Turkish government.
3. *Its inassailability by the Military Power of Russia.*
4. The elements of convulsion throughout the South of Russia to be of necessity used by Austria or against her.
5. *The facility of the extinction of Russia's aggressive powers by the emancipation of the export trade of Turkey and the Danube.*

The effect of the concentration of the power and thoughts of Europe on the South is at once to expose the North to Russia, and to break down the Ottoman Empire by converting it into a field and object of contention—effects strikingly illustrated at the present moment when squadrons of England and of France are sailing to the Levant about the Parish Church of Jerusalem, and the governments of London and Paris are actively engaged in their despatches in procuring for Russia the Sound.

Whether by accident or design, the displacement which has occurred in respect to Austria finds its parallel in the other States. Prussia has extended a preparatory and vicarious dominion over the South of Germany, and appears hand in hand with England in Syria, furthering a scheme of religious propagandism.

England, who in 1800 drove France out of Egypt and restored it to the Porte, is now casting on it an eye of cupidity, and turning one of jealousy on France. She is also herself become a proprietor in the Levant by the acquisition of Malta and the Ionian Islands.

France has forgotten her fervour for the frontier of the Rhine in her African dominion, her Egyptian schemes, and her projects of religious supremacy ; whilst, by the acquisition of a Piratical State of Barbary, she has become the Algiers of Europe.

In the course of this great and universal propulsion towards the South, the character of Europe has been changed ; in this resides, more than in any special diplomatic transactions or territorial acquisitions, the present security and the future hopes of Russia. Whenever in any Cabinet there arises a man equal to cope with her, to this first of all will his attention be given. Revolution comes from the disorder of the judgment of nations : they misjudge when governments have mismanaged. Mismanagement resolves itself into injustice, and so justice has a restoring no less than a preserving power.

The Danish nation has just spirit enough left to pretend to assume as its own will, the violence it suffers, and thus loses the only chance of that support on which in their hearts they yet rely. "Surely England will at last see to what she is bringing us," said one of the leading men in a conversation which had commenced with the stout assertion that the Treaty was an excellent measure and calculated to heal the wounds of Denmark. The answer to this melancholy avowal and pitiable appeal, could only be: "England acted when she was ignorant: now she is informed, but *committed*; three Administrations and five Foreign secretaries are partners in the deed." The Danes too are committed. Terrible word is that "*committed*"—dead lock of a political mechanism, possessed of functions and destitute of ends.

other side of the German Ocean. The new English minister, Mr. Buchanan, arrived at Copenhagen on the 15th inst., and he is understood to have very decided instructions. An English squadron is expected in the Baltic. In consequence of all this, Count Charles Moltke is said to entertain a desire of resigning as minister for Schleswig. It is supposed, and no doubt the supposition is founded in fact, that the measures which for upwards of a year have been showered down upon the Duchies, and the almost desperate complaints which are echoed back to the capital will only tend to embitter and to alienate the minds, and will necessitate the Government to fall back upon Russia. The late prime minister, all but in plain words, proclaimed this dependence upon Russia, in his place in the Diet."

CHAPTER VI.

The position of Austria in the North and in the South, as affected by the Treaty of the 8th of May.

AUSTRIA, above half a century ago, exchanged the Netherlands for a position on the Adriatic; from the North, where the increasing consistency of an Extrinsic Power closed the door to ambition, she turned to the South and East, hoping to reap in the expected dissolution of a great Empire a harvest of maritime power and military strength.

Her retreat from the North has enabled Russia to extend over Germany a controlling influence, and her advance on the South has brought her into collision with Turkey, now perceived to be possessed of great and increasing strength.

Placed by an internal distribution of a few Turkish soldiers at the mouth of the Cattaro, under the necessity of having to struggle to gain back, through external and compromising aid, the cession made to her formerly by France, she has discovered that the Ottoman Empire, instead of an inheritance to be divided, affords the basis on which to construct a system of defensive policy for the future.

The events of Poland, those more recent and alarming of Hungary, the usurpation of the Danube, and the habit of subverting Governments introduced amongst the Nations of the West, present so many additional reasons for seeking to escape from the control of her ally, and for looking in Turkey for friendship which will afford real support upon honourable conditions.

In a word, aggrandisement must be abandoned abroad, and

the doctrine of uniformity surrendered at home. Nor is this idea unfamiliar to the Austrian Cabinet. Prince Swartzenburg has told Germany that she "has nothing to fear from the strength of Austria, but much to apprehend from her weakness." Austria is only weak because her own subjects dread her doctrine of uniformity, and her neighbours her designs of aggrandisement.

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It was to emancipate Russian trade that Peter the Great espoused the cause of the Duke of Holstein, and commenced a system of exhausting Denmark by preparatives against a constantly impending attack. This policy slumbered for a while in consequence of the internal dissensions of the Russian family until the reign of Catherine, when Denmark had so fallen that Russia's purposes were reversed. The demand was still pressed, to afford by its withdrawal, as in the case of the Holstein claims, the opportunity of imposing new obligations.

The negotiation to which I refer is not indeed to be found in any history, nor are the documents inserted in any diplomatic collection. It occurred at the close of 1766, at St. Petersburg. The Danish Government was at the time in the greatest alarm respecting the Holstein claims, which were adjusted only a few months later. It could refuse Russia nothing. It threw itself on her mercy, avowing that one half of the revenue of the state depended upon the non-pressing of the demand, which it did not resist. It represented that the remission of the Dues to Russian vessels must entail remission for the vessels of all other Powers, and that it would be utterly impracticable to devise any effectual means of concealment;* but, continues the Danish minister, if the Russian Government will concede this point, there is nothing which Denmark will fail to do "to render, in as far as it is permitted and possible for humanity, that union indissoluble to which, this point excepted, everything else invites, and nothing opposes." Catherine graciously yields to Denmark's necessities and entreaties, and replies "that the King of Denmark cannot do better than attach himself to Russia as an ally, who will exact nothing from him, and can and will do everything for him."

The matter did not rest here: again we have *Secret Articles*, six in number; with one alone we are acquainted; it

* In two notes, one confidential and one public, of the 6th of September, 1766: see *Memoirs of Baron Asseburg, Danish Representative at St. Petersburg.*

refers to Prussian Navigation, and in it the "indissoluble union" is defined as one which is "to subsist in all time to come, in every case and circumstance, without any dependence whatever on alliances, defensive and occasional, temporary or permanent, or any Treaties whatever, whether with Russia herself, or with other Powers." *

At the Congress of Vienna the States of Europe established the most perfect freedom of navigation for rivers passing through different territories, providing that no regulations should be made by any one save with the concurrence of all the rest. The Sound, however, was left shackled; the reason assigned was, that some compensation was required for the wrongs which Denmark had suffered! When in March 1848, the Prussian troops were about to invade the Duchies, one of the incentives administered to the popular enthusiasm, was the shame of submission to the Sound Dues; this aspiration met the same fate as all the other professed objects of Prussia.

But the Sound is not the only access to the Baltic. The Peninsula which stretches to form this passage in the South is low and narrow at its base, traversed by a river nearly from sea to sea. The Peninsula which advances from the North affords like facilities for internal navigation, by a succession of lakes, irregular, but almost connected between Gottenberg and Stockholm. Either of those passages lay at a more direct route for the commerce of the Baltic and St. Petersburg than the Sound, which involved a lengthened and devious navigation, first stretching to the North and then to the South. Without reference to political objects, and merely with a view to expedite communication, it was most desirable to open one or other of those passages, or both; that of the Eyder shortening the distance to the coasts of Prussia and to the Bothnian Gulf by nearly four hundred miles, and that through Sweden, shortening the distance to the North and the Gulf of Finland by about three hundred.

* For Treaties bearing on the Sound Dues, see Collection of Hauterive and Cussy.

These enterprises were further prompted by local interests, and in fact a canal has been cut through both; but those canals are not large enough for sea-going vessels. The interests of Denmark suffice to explain the limited dimensions of that of the Eyder, but it is the interests of Russia which alone can explain the parallel restriction of that of Gotha.* It is, however, the canal of the Eyder which is of importance, and in case of the separation of the Duchies from Denmark, it is natural to expect that it should be enlarged; in fact, the inducements would be too strong to be resisted. In this competition not only would the Commerce of the world be relieved from the Sound Dues, but the navigation of the Baltic would be facilitated to an extent exceeding even the remission of those Dues. This chance is now closed, by the "Integrity" article of the Treaty of the 8th of May, and Denmark is placed in the doubly invidious position of preventing the opening of one passage that she may levy a contribution at another.

We have now, however, to consider the matter no longer as Danish, but as Russian. Will the Government which has blocked up the Danube, and actually exacts in its own Consulates of London and Liverpool duties amounting almost to a prohibition on the few vessels that leave these ports for that river, deal differently with the Eyder, the Gotha Canal, the Sound, the Elbe, and the Weser? Shall we allow the occasion to pass by of resisting an impost soon to be paid directly into the Russian Exchequer? We are, indeed, bound by treaty, and so are the other Governments of Europe, but there is one government which is not; the United States are under no obligation to pay an impost wholly lawless, and by resisting it would place a fulcrum in the very centre of the

* A Company has just been instituted to build small vessels for the Baltic Trade, to pass through the Gotha Canal. It will be seen in the chapter on the Canal of the Danube, that I had already proposed the same plan for the navigation of the Black Sea.

interests which agitate the Old World, where it is so ambitious of exercising an influence.*

The suggestion alone, it will be said, suffices to throw Denmark absolutely into Russia's hands, for what is she to do if half of her revenue is withdrawn, now that her debt by the recent war has been doubled? I answer, can her position be worse than it is. Is it not now essential to throw upon Russia the burden of her support? By the act of her Diet, Denmark has now assumed upon her own head the responsibility of her own degradation; it is the consequence of the exercise of a hollow Constitutional Power. Not a man has raised his voice to protect against a foreign Treaty disposing of the Succession, or against this fiction of a Constitution. Shall a degraded nation fare differently from a degraded man? Virtue has its rewards even in this world, although these may often consist in its very trials:

It is not on me that reproach can lie for the suggestion, or it is now ten years since I have earnestly laboured to awaken the Danes to a sense of the coming evil; that I have spared no toil, there are those who can testify, who themselves at the time concurred with me in apprehensions, and in the means for averting their realisation. Those very men, since raised by the confidence of their King and their country to the highest posts, have become servile instruments for the deception of the one, and the betrayal of the other. In fact there is not a politician in Denmark that does not inspire pity as a man, and contempt as a functionary.

It is well that Denmark should learn without delay the penalties of her present course; she can never be gratified like Poland, or Circassia if prostrated, like Turkey or Persia if deprived of their own independence, with the prospect of vengeance, or the lust of conquest; she will be placed simply between the upper and the nether millstone.

* An American frigate has recently entered that Black Sea from which England holds herself excluded.

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THE SOUTH.

PART I.—THE DANUBE AND THE EUXINE.

PART II.—THE COMMERCE OF THE
LEVANT AND THE RED SEA.

“ I offer you the half of Europe, I will help you to obtain it, secure you in the possession of it, and all I ask in return is the possession of a single Strait, which is also the key of my House.”—ALEXANDER TO NAPOLEON.

PART I.

THE DANUBE AND EUXINE.

CHAPTER I.

The Commerce of Europe and Asia.

“Peter had long meditated the project of the occupation of the Caspian, thus to draw the commerce of Asia and a part of India within his dominions.”—VOLTAIRE.

WHILE so many lives are risked to find out the sources of the Niger, and the currents of the Pole, what discoveries in the centre of Europe await the enterprising navigator in his library chair! The course of the Danube is indeed laid down upon our maps; the volume of its waters, and their velocity minutely determined on our statistical tables; but mystery, deeper than Colchian darkness, envelopes the hidden sources of its fictitious nullity, and the frigifying processes of its Arctic obstructions.

The paramount importance of the freedom of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the well-being of the people, and the independence of the nations, of Europe, none will deny. The Black Sea linking these to the Danube, and that river joined by railway to the Rhine, we have a system of communication by internal waters, which armies can span and batteries close, capable of realising the old maxim of Neptune's lordship of the land. That ancient supremacy rested upon the joining of rafters and the man-

ning of ships : this was no commonplace or practical affair ; the element itself was to be created. The Danube pursued its tranquil course through the picturesque Teutonic valleys, the vast plains of the descendants of the Avars, and the teeming granaries, the inheritance of the Dacians ; the Euxine nestled in the bosom of the Othmanic King ;* the Bosphorus and Dardanelles bisected his states. These water courses, dispersed to many nations, were clung to by each, and all had to surrender up their patrimonies before this unity could appear. It was not by any of the partners that this new edifice was planned ; a stranger conceived it ; possessed herself of the ground for its erection ; has gone on from foundation to parapet, from story to story, buttress to buttress ; the covering in is all that is now wanting to this creation of enchantment, surrounded, as it has risen, by that cloud of invisibility which conducted Eneas into the Tyrian citadel ; here has been surpassed the invention of the bards of Etruria and Samos, and by illusion the means have been found of acquiring such command of the will of the world as they have achieved of its admiration.

At the time that this project was first formed the frontiers of Russia on the west were restrained behind the Dnieper, and on the east fell far short of the Caucasus ; she had no port whatever, or outlet, upon the Black Sea, and touched the Caspian only by uninhabited wastes. Yet the first basis of operations required that she should be in possession of the Danubian provinces and of the control of that river ; that she should be in possession of the trans-Caucasian provinces, and have the control of the Araxes ; also that rival flags should be excluded from the Caspian and the Euxine.

The sudden expansion of Russian power under Peter the Great does not require repetition. Sir John M'Neill has traced it with a masterly hand, and after referring to the disaster on the Pruth, and the recovery of Persia under Nadir Shah, he concludes his sketch in these words : "The

* "Populum late regem."

projects of Russia were thus for a time abandoned to be renewed at a later period with better success." The events of that later period I now propose to trace in respect to the Danube and the coast of Circassia, referring the curious reader to the above-mentioned author for the various histories of her advances in Georgia and Persia, and her establishment on the southern banks of the Phasis, the Cyrus, and the Araxes.

In 1812, Turkey had the opportunity of recovering all the ground she had lost; but England, who only thought of the war with France, induced her to sign the treaty of Bucharest; by it Russia got possession of nearly a half of Moldavia, and reached the Pruth.

Her advance eastward alarmed England, who, on that side, concluded with her neighbour a defensive treaty. Nevertheless, under the mediation of England, she extorted in 1814, from Persia, the exclusive navigation of the Caspian, and overstepped, despite her own and England's pledge, the Araxes.* Her usurpation of a further district brought the war of 1827; then England broke the engagement of her defensive treaty, left Persia single-handed, and abrogated the treaty itself.† Her frontier was again advanced, and the

* "General Ritescheff—then Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in Georgia, and Plenipotentiary—solemnly pledged himself, if the Persian Ambassador would accept it (the basis of *uti possidetis*), to procure from his Court the restitution of Talish, and deliberately held out the hope that other provinces also would be restored. The British ambassador felt himself justified in confirming the confidence of the Persians, and in undertaking that the good offices of his Government should be exerted at the Court of St. Petersburg to procure an adjustment of the stipulation respecting the territory, which might fulfil not only the positive promises of General Ritescheff, but the larger hopes he had held out.

"The Persians, accustomed to place the most implicit reliance on the honour of Europeans, and not ignorant of the liberal assistance that England had extended to Russia in the hour of her humiliation and distress, never for a moment doubted, &c."—*Progress of Russia*, p. 64.

† It applied only in case of Russia being the aggressor, and that

suppression of the Persian flag on the Caspian as, *ab antiquo*, was stipulated in the Treaty of Turkman Chai.

In 1829, in defiance of solemn engagements to England and France not to acquire territory, she did extort, and by their aid, from Turkey, the mouth of the Danube. In 1831, she established a nominal quarantine on the Caucasian coast *not in her possession*. In 1833, by threatening the lives of the Ministers of the Sultan, she obtained the exclusion from the Euxine, *in time of war*, of foreign men-of-war. In the same year, she obtained a new accession of territory in Asia, bringing her frontier within nine miles of the route by which English commerce reaches Persia. In 1836, she established a quarantine to intercept vessels entering the Danube, and arrogated the right of sending them to Odessa to perform quarantine.

In 1838, she found means secretly to frustrate a Treaty between England and Turkey, which would have diminished the export, and abrogated the transit, duties in the latter country. The same year she frustrated a Treaty between England, Turkey, and Austria, which would have secured and opened the navigation of the Danube. In 1841, by a Treaty signed at London, she made all nations exclude their men-of-war in peace as well as in war from the Black Sea, the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi having then lapsed *one week*. In 1844 she frustrated, by bribes, a proposal of Austria to open by canal the old mouth of the Danube. In 1849, she made Turkey sign a Treaty for the occupation of the Provinces during seven years by her troops. In 1850, she frustrated the revived project of the Danube Canal. She is now endeavouring to impose on the Danubian Principalities

case is made out in the 'Progress of Russia in the East.' The authorities there used are official: the author at the time of its publication was the designated Envoy to the Shah; the pamphlet was as official as any mere publication could be. Yet on the 1st March, 1848, Lord Palmerston said:—"Now, what had happened to Persia? In 1827 she had, very foolishly, and thoughtlessly, *against advice*, rushed into a conflict with Russia, &c."

the English Commercial Treaty, from which they have hitherto been exempt, and which must extinguish their exportation.

Several of these steps have been infractions of general law; several of positive treaty engagements; all have been in opposition to the avowed interests and declared policy of England. The subordinate agents of the British Government have been unremitting in efforts meanwhile to thwart and expose her, and have been advanced or rewarded for zeal displayed in urging that course.

In one character alone do the systems of England and Russia correspond, and that is in extent. There is no point where the one has an interest that the other has not an object, and defeat or triumph upon any one field, affects the relative balance between the two upon every other. In the unit, England is vigorous and intelligent; in the mass, passive and inert. Russia, individually, is sluggish and incapable; but as a state, active and able. England pursues the profits of speculation, and looks no further than trade; but in both cases Russia is exactly the reverse.

The feelings with which they regard every other country are exactly the converse the one to the other. England rejoices in the prosperity of all countries which supply raw produce; Russia looks on them with hatred, because with fear; wherever there is a land which does produce, or is fitted to produce, grain, timber, oil, tallow, hides, or hemp, thither England sends her merchants to buy; Russia her emissaries to convulse. The contest, however, will be determined, not by their respective interests or power, but according to their respective characters.

Europe contains two great basins, watered by two magnificent streams, which present in their natures a corresponding contrast to that of the two systems. From the mountains of Switzerland to the mouths of the Scheldt extends a mechanical reticulation, identical with that of the manufacturing counties of Great Britain. From the reverse of the mountains which supply the Rhine, down to the mouths of the

Danube and the Black Sea (a vast region of unbounded exuberance), there is a total absence of mechanical power. This region competes with Russia in the production of the sources of her wealth, as the basin of the Rhine does with England. It would be in the interests of England to thwart the enterprise of the one no less than to call forth the energies of the other; but neither is in her character. It is in Russia's character to do that which her interests require, and while turning to account the activity of the one, she has almost exterminated the producing power of the other.

The banks of the Rhine, inhabited by a free people of Germans, divided into distinct governments, may appear to be little exposed to the action of diplomacy, as far as material interests are concerned; but, in fact, these populations have, as regards duties, been united into one system, professedly organised with the view of giving strength to Germany against foreign aggression; but the agent of this unity is a Government, described by a Russian diplomatist "as seeking to strengthen, with Russia, the already existing bonds of blood by those of policy." Indeed, the "Customs Union" could not have come into existence if Russia had thought proper to prevent it, which is equivalent to saying that she suggested it. A *German* as distinct from a Saxon, or a Prussian trade, is called into existence, and finds itself hampered on every side; it is cut off from England, and stopped by Russia; its competition being thus with the first it must turn to Russia; seeking to propitiate her, it will argue, demonstrate, and project; Russia will gradually yield to be brought to understand, that being unable herself to supply the demand of Asia, she may exclude England by favouring German exports. Germany, desiring the commercial progress of Russia eastward, becomes associated with her against England's political power in the west: the establishment of Russia on the Bosphorus, the Christianising of the Turks and the "Japhetising of the Orientals,"* will become the profound aspiration of the labouring German mind. All this

* Chevalier Bunsen.

was urged on the English Government at the time the Zollverein was preparing, when a word from her would have sufficed to have frustrated it.*

Since that period a semi-official work has appeared at a German Court under Russian dependence, which so undisguisedly reveals the whole scheme that I hesitate not in quoting it:—

“The Asiatic commerce of Russia stands both directly and indirectly in competition with the intercourse which the western countries, including North America, entertain in various ways with that quarter of the globe, which surpasses all the rest in size, and density of population. The Levantine, East Indian, and Chinese trade of the English, North Americans, French, and Dutch, has not yet so deeply felt the effects of the competition of the Russian land trade extending far into Asia from the frontier walls of the Chinese Empire to the Caspian and Black Seas, as it ultimately must, from the vastly increasing means of this colossal empire.

“The acquisition, in 1829, of a district of 10,000 square miles, inhabited by nomadic tribes, has promoted its connection with the interior of Asia, and particularly with Bukharia; and though the British East Indian trade has not been much decreased, yet in the opinion of many even the position of Russia threatens the British dominion in that quarter. Its speedy destruction is not probable, and the contingency, when it arises, will spring out of internal disturbance; but it is to be hoped that the active emulation in peaceful undertakings of the two Powers will promote progress in the East, and that the balance shall preponderate in favour of Russia.

* See ‘The Prussian League,’ in the first number of the ‘British and Foreign Review.’

Mr. Poulett Thompson quoted false figures in the House of Commons to prove that it would be beneficial to British Trade, and Lord Palmerston vouched for its having no political end.

“England, who turns all Asia into a source of profit, supplying, by means of Smyrna, Trebizond, and the Persian Gulf, the markets of Asiatic Turkey, Persia, and the neighbouring countries, now seeks to extend her China trade even to the Northern coasts of that Empire, while for the longer passage of the Indian Sea she substitutes the Euphrates, or a railroad across the Isthmus of Suez. *In opposition to this*, Russia will not fail to take advantage of every facility presented by her position, and the extension of her dominion in Asia. But the most effectual means is to open a passage to German commerce, so as conjointly to reap the harvest of British commerce which contributes nothing to the Russian transit and carrying trade. By handing it over to Germany, its own transit and carrying trade would be much benefited, and the means are in her hands by the navigation of the Danube, in connection with Trebizond.

“It is clear that to obtain this end, there must take place *a decrease of mutual duties between Prussia and Russia*. Russia will find an equivalent in the produce of its trans-Caucasian provinces, particularly silk and cotton; and in the increasing demand for the produce of those countries it will find the surest means for a more rapid development of its production and its power. The Russian *land trade*, will rival the sea trade, only in so far as it can offer European goods cheaper in the Asiatic market, and the more active the intercourse upon the whole line of transport, the more economical will be the exchanges. The time is come which invites to this concurrent enterprise, and a series of favourable events promise rapid results. These are: the *extension and the strengthening of the Russian dominion on the Black Sea*, the acquisition of the *eastern ports of the same sea*, confirmed by the peace of 1829; the *decided dependence of the Persian empire*; the *exclusive navigation of the Caspian*; the recently-effected *complete subjection of the Caucasian tribes*; and finally the extension of the Russian dominion, which within these few years has spread its frontiers

eastward from the Caspian, and nearer to the British possessions in the East Indies, 280 leagues.

“The re-establishment of that ancient channel of commerce through the Black Sea, and in connection with the Danube, would give to EUROPE the important advantage in its intercourse with Asia of having entire independence of the Naval Powers. Should ever the time again return in which Great Britain shall rule the ocean, and enact a maritime law, dictated by her own exclusive advantage, the Black Sea, at least, will be closed to her, and commerce with that division of the world will not only remain undisturbed, but furnish us in great abundance with all the produce she can offer us herself, or prevent us by a blockade from procuring. We need but call to remembrance the years 1808-1812, particularly with respect to cotton, to perceive the full importance of this matter.”*

It was said by one of the plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Reichenbach that the Black Sea was more important to England than all Asia: this is no paradox; in the words of Sir John M'Neill, “the policy of Russia is based upon the certainty of spoiling England of her Indian dominion:” this spoliation can be prevented only in the Black Sea. Were the space filled by that water, dry land, or were it, like the Caspian, girt round with coasts, England would probably have had nothing in Asia to possess; at all events, she would be now without the means of defending what she has. If you stop up the passage by a parchment chain, it is just as if in the Euxine there remained no water to float your vessels, and in the Bosphorus no soundings for them to pass.

To close the entrance against you, is to open the passage to the Indus to Russia. To that end it is that the fabulous darkness of the ancient Pontus has been diplomatically extended over the modern Euxine, and that no Jason is to be found in the British Navy. How resolute and intent has she been during your languid slumber, or somnambulant

* These extracts are from Dr. Nebenia.

convulsions! During the great European war, in which her very existence seemed at stake, Russia would not concede one point in reference to the Danubian Principalities. In 1812 she would not, when struck home by Napoleon, relieve herself from the Ottoman Empire as a foe by the slightest surrender.* The pertinacity with which she clung to what appeared useless and unintelligible clauses bearing upon wilds and deserts, so far from awakening the curiosity of European statesmen, raised only a smile of pity at her expense.

Up to the year 1833, no direct trade had been carried on between England and the Euxine. Whether, however, a large quantity of her goods were sent by Constantinople and Germany, at the fair of Leipsic alone, the demand amounted to £300,000. In the following year two British vessels entered the Danube, in the next year fifteen, in the course of 1836 twice that number were expected; the native traffic in small vessels amounting to between 700 and 800 cargoes. This rapid development roused Russia to the adoption of decisive measures, which were as minute as they were daring, as intricate as comprehensive; now discrediting a firm, now firing on a brig, now fingering kegs of butter and skins of tallow, now grasping an estuary: at last came the "crowning work,"—the robbery from Europe of its principal river by care for its health!

The exports are raw and heavy produce, for which water carriage is essential. The return manufactured articles might bear the charges of land carriage, but the demand is limited by the amount of exportation. The Danube is not only the only water communication, but it is the only road. *Ores of metals* (its mines were the richest of the Roman empire); *rocksalt* (of which it contains mountains); *timber* (with which the sides of its mountains are clothed); *hides, wool, tallow, sheep, goatskins* (flocks and herds may be multiplied to any extent), *grain* (in 1833 and 1834, when Russia, suffering from famine, was supplied by them, although

* In 1806 she made these Principalities the occasion of replunging England and France in war, and in 1812, *gained Bessarabia.*

recently relieved from occupation, and still suffering from the effect of a war, which had drawn from them five millions sterling, and destroyed one quarter of the cattle); *hemp* of the finest quality (in the year 1835, it competed in London with that of St. Petersburg, notwithstanding the quadruple charge of transport): such were the products they could offer to England. Nor are these all: the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, were anxious to rival the Pasha of Egypt in the production of cotton (upon the importance to England of multiplying the sources, and augmenting the amount of that raw material, it is needless to dwell), and a vast region is available for the culture of the mulberry.

This traffic would have been of peculiar advantage to the English shipping interest; the freight to the Danube is 60*s.* when that to the Baltic is 15*s.* and to Canada 30*s.*; thus the hemp, tallow, grain, or timber, coming from the Provinces, would have given, as compared with Canada, an increased employment of shipping of *one-half*, and as compared with the Baltic of *three-fourths*.

The natural difficulties of the navigation were indeed great, but capable of being easily removed; and notwithstanding their existence, this commerce, till arrested by extraneous means, was rapidly increasing, and might by this time have exceeded that which we carry on with France. If it has not been entirely crushed, it is owing to the enormous resources of the country,—its exuberant fertility, the lowness of price, and the laboriousness and parsimony of the people.

The basin of the Danube producing, as we have seen, exactly the same articles as Russia, every ton exported from the Danube was a ton less exported from Odessa or St. Petersburg. But besides the difference in the source, competition would have affected the price; one shilling reduction on the cwt. of tallow or the quarter of grain, is a loss to Russia of from £50,000 to £100,000. A document published at Odessa under the authority of Count Woronzow, at a time when no danger was anticipated, is plain and conclusive on these points.

“Although the three principal mouths of the Danube are in the power of Russia, it is only a small number of her products that are exported by the two ports of Bessarabia,—Ismail, and Reni. The towns of Galatz and Ibrail, the only ‘débouches’ of Moldavia and Wallachia, pour the superfluity of these rich provinces into the commerce of the Black Sea. The protecting sceptre of Russia has created these formidable rivals of herself. If the obstacles which have hitherto impeded the navigation of the Danube come to be entirely removed, this will much facilitate the vent of Austrian articles of merchandise in the provinces, and will *open up for some of them a way to arrive at other countries.*

“The advantages of this navigation for the trade of the Principalities, which consists principally in exchanges for the products of Austria, are incalculable. Galatz especially will gain by it greatly as an entrepôt for Austrian goods, which will be sent thence to the Levant and to the ports of the Black Sea. *Austria may even export by the Danube the wheat of the Banat, which can be bought on the spot at eleven roubles the tchetwert, and is said to be of a superior quality.* The hemp of Hungary, of which the English have already made great purchases and formed depôts at Apathin and at Eszek (whence it is sent by water to Siszeck and Carlstadt, and from these places by land to Trieste), might here find perhaps an easier route than by Trieste, as well as timber, which is at present sent with difficulty to Fium. Galatz and Ibrail are about to cultivate virgin countries and of great extent. Ismail and Reni (the Russian ports) must of necessity attach themselves to these giants who threaten to overwhelm them. *So long as those who are engaged in the trade of Ibrail and Galatz shall be free from every impost,* it would be necessary at least to reserve to the merchants of Bessarabia the same immunity, to prevent their leaving the country, as many of them have already done.

“Trebizond has always been of importance as the port nearest to Erzerum, and its commerce may be estimated at twenty million roubles per annum. By this route, England

and Germany supply Persia and Anatolia with cloths, ladies' cloths, calicos, cotton yarn, paper, sugar, coffee, glass ware, porcelain, iron, tin, and steel goods. France takes but little share in this trade; but England will soon have crushed her rivals by the great establishment which she has formed at this point. A single caravan, despatched for Tabriz in 1834, was composed of 650 camel loads, 450 of which were pilaged by the Kurds on the road from Erzerum to Tabriz. What means can Russia adopt for rivalling the English in this locality?"

These last words indicate the purpose of all Russia's commercial efforts. She is no rival of England, as far as manufactures or commerce go; her rivalry is political. The question really means, "How can an end be put to English commerce, and what other commerce is to be substituted in its place?" This, like the statement I have before quoted, is addressed to Germany, and it says—Russia is open to an offer.

I shall now proceed to the means of execution. No history has recorded, no fable has devised, things more marvellous than the events connected with this river. Here will be seen how Russia bends every will, Procrustes every measure to suit and fit her purposes. I shall have to record my own failures; but, in this case, failure, of necessity, is parent of success. It was not her sight but our blindness that was terrible. There is a time when evil measures prevail, but that time comes, too, when they are brought to light. The series of facts now completed—disconnected during their course by time and distance, here brought together, may furnish that light, and enable eyes to see that have long been closed.

CHAPTER II.

Russian Quarantine on the Danube, and the Coast of Circassia.

THE marshy islands forming the Delta of the Danube are uninhabited and utterly valueless, except as a station commanding the river in war, and for that purpose only in so far as they are fortified. They were ceded to Russia at the Treaty of Adrianople, by which any fortification on them was prohibited. The plague, however, is in those countries the fierce enemy of mankind, and it was an interest common to the contracting parties, and indeed to all Europe, to arrest its ravages. Provision was therefore made for effecting this purpose at the mouth of the Danube, and quarantines were excepted from the sweeping restriction against all constructions whatever within six miles of the river, and so on the uninhabited and useless islands a lazaretto was built. But if sanitary regulations are established, they must be enforced; and the method of enforcing them is by guns. These were, therefore, placed in such a manner as to command the vessels passing up the river.

The Treaty by which these islands were obtained closed a long series of negotiations and warlike operations in which Russia was allied with England and France; consequently, reciprocal engagements existed as to the terms of future settlement. It is necessary to recall the outline of the events to explain the nature of these engagements.

In 1821, an armed force crossed the Pruth, headed by a Russian general. This was the Greek Insurrection. She required the Porte to withdraw its troops, offering her own

to put it down. On the refusal of the Porte, she appealed to the Sanctity of Treaties, and recalled her ambassador, entrusting her interests to the ambassador of England.

For five years the Greek war and the Russian differences go on; an adjustment then takes place at Ackermann, on the pledge of Russia not to interfere any more in Greece: she had just signed a Protocol (secret) with England to interfere in.

The Greeks had applied for protection, not to Russia, but to England; not against Turkey but Russia.* Mr. Canning sends the Duke of Wellington to concert measures at *St. Petersburg*. Thus was imposed on two litigants the mediation of the very power whom both charged with being the source of their ill will. The Protocol of the 4th of April, 1826, is the record of this infatuation.

“His Britannic Majesty having been *requested by the Greeks* to interpose his good offices in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte, having in consequence *offered* his Mediation to that Power, and being desirous of concerting the measure of his Government upon this subject, with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, &c.”

By being imposed upon the belligerents as Mediatrix, Russia was constituted Arbitress of the Alliance, which had been called into being only with the view of clogging her separate action, who was dreaded as all-powerful, and had for effect to make her so by subjecting to her control the measures of the allies.†

England took precautions to prevent any misapplication of

* M. Rodios to Mr. Canning, August 12, 1824.—“The Government (of Greece) would have persevered in its system of silence were it not forced to break it by a note proceeding from the north of Europe. This note decides on the fate of Greece, by a will that is foreign to it. The Greek nation prefer a glorious death to the disgraceful lot intended to be imposed upon them.”

Mr. Canning replies:—“The opinion of the British Government is that any plan proceeding from the Cabinet of *St. Petersburg* can be drawn up only with friendly intentions towards Greece.”

† See extract from M. Von Prokesch at the end of this Chapter. Note II.

this unconsciously transferred power; and at least the proof of her good faith shines forth in the following moral and benignant period:—

“His Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty will not seek in this arrangement for any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence nor advantages in commerce for their subjects which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations.”

Russia now proposed that the Protocol should become a Treaty, stipulating in certain contingencies measures of coercion.

Mr. Canning stood aghast. He perceived at a glance the consequences, but it was too late. He had been overreached in the Protocol,* and could not face the threatened exposure to his colleagues. (The despatch instructing the Russian Ambassador, as to how he was to be handled, has been published in the second number of the “Portfolio,” new series.) He put his hand to the Treaty on the 6th of July (1827), and in a couple of months died of a broken heart. Yet that Treaty, be it ever remembered, did bind each of the allies *not to acquire territory*, nor to SUFFER IT TO BE ACQUIRED.

Within a few weeks of the Treaty for the “*Pacification of the East*,” the Turkish navy is annihilated. The Porte demands satisfaction, and suspends intercourse with the Ambassadors. “These functionaries retire, and the Porte believes itself already at war with England, France, and Russia.” Then the Powers “solemnly take upon themselves the obligation that the successes their superiority seems to promise them *in this struggle* shall not lead them to seek any exclusive advantage whatever.”

Russia, however, relieves them from belligerent duties and the care of “exclusive advantages.” She invades the provinces in the beginning of the next year, and notwithstanding the extinction by the allies of the Turkish naval force, to

* Negotiated to prevent the *separate action of Russia*, and stipulating the right of separate action for each. The double infatuation passes belief.

the astonishment of Europe, the campaign is a drawn one. "The experience," says Pozzo de Borgo, confidentially addressing his chief, "we have just made must now reconcile all opinions in favour of *the resolution which has been taken*. If the Sultan has been enabled to offer us so determined and regular a resistance, whilst he had scarcely drawn together the elements of his new plan, how formidable should we have found him had he had time to give to it more solidity."

Her contemporaneous view of her engagements to her allies is rather amusing; the avowal of her agents is frank,* and their language always *naïve*. One sentence will suffice. The two Russian Ambassadors in London write on the 13th of June:—

"The news which Count Pozzo de Borgo has sent us, on the position of the French Ministry, which is every day more and more uncertain, have determined *us not to alienate completely the Cabinet of London* before the answers from Constantinople relieve us from anxiety." They, therefore, assure Lord Aberdeen, "That, in case of success the Emperor would be *under an obligation* to consult his allies, and that a definite state of things would *not* be established without their *assent and concurrence*." On this they *require* a public manifestation which shall "discourage the resistance of the Porte!" Lord Aberdeen strives to extract in the first instance some knowledge of the proposed conditions of the peace, in which he was to concur, but the Russian diplomatists, duly estimating Lord Aberdeen's penetration, confine themselves to generalities; as every "substantive communication on so delicate a subject would draw down real dangers."

No doubt it was toil and embarrassment enough for the

* "With respect to the free navigation of the Bosphorus," says the Russian ambassador to Lord Aberdeen, in June, 1829, "it constitutes one of our necessities, for to it the prosperity of a part of the domains of the Emperor is united by an indissoluble link. We cannot permit the caprice of a vizier, or a favourite sultana, to arrest at will the whole movement of commerce, the whole progress of public and private industry in many of our provinces." This to the British Minister is an argument, not a *revelation*.

English Foreign Secretary to have to deal with one Russian Ambassador; but on this occasion two were sprung upon him, and these not of equal mettle, but the one heavy and the other fleet; so that as "force needs when the devil drives," there was no escape for him either with the hare or with the hounds. The pallid statesman was saddled with the Treaty (he is always burdened with a Treaty)—the Treaty of the 6th of July;* combining perspicuity with integrity, he avows his resolution to carry it into effect, and his inability to comprehend what the effect would be. One assurance he does possess, the disinterestedness of Russia in waiving her belligerent rights in the Mediterranean (which she did not waive) to afford facilities for the settlement of the Eastern question.

His troubles, however, were not confined to the torture of diplomatic discussions, or the toil of despatches. He had to encounter the fire of St. Stephen's and the wordy war that breaks no bones, but sometimes does worse. Like a thunderbolt in a clear sky, opposition to Foreign policy flashes for the first time forth, and in the Peers and the Commons he is exposed to questions, sneers, and denunciations. This energy of the insular mind must be prompted by the danger of Turkey and the pretensions of Russia, the commercial interests of England and the illegal interference with her trade? Not in the least. He is assailed because not sufficiently "Russian," and is imperiously required to give an account of his false dealing with Sultan Mahmoud against Czar Nicholas, because of his antiquated aspirations for despotism, and his inveterate animosity to liberty and independence. He is told that Turkey is the aggressor, Russia the victim, and that the peace of Europe and the honour of England were not to be sacrificed on account of "unpronounceable fortresses on the Danube."† In fact, the opposition of 1829 in the British Parliament presented a parallel

* This is the first of the "July" Treaties which became known at the end of one session to be forgotten before the opening of the next.

† Speech of Lord Palmerston, 1st June, 1829.

to the opposition in 1791, with this difference however, that the collusion of Fox with the Czarina was directed against statesmanlike measures of resistance, whilst the compact between the Russian embassy and the then ex-Secretary-at-War was for the purpose of goading on a sulky beast of burden in its miry path. It therefore required no great knowledge of the world for the two Russian ambassadors, on concluding the report of the interviews with Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington, to write "It is in the midst of our camp that peace must be signed: Europe must learn its conditions only when it is concluded. Remonstrances will then be too late, and it will patiently suffer what it can no longer prevent."

The declaration of war (26th April, 1828) had asserted that Russia was far from cherishing ambitious projects, sufficient people and countries acknowledging already her sway; already sufficient anxieties were connected with the extent of her dominion.

In the manifesto at its close (1st of October, 1829), she declares, "that she has remained constantly a stranger to every desire of conquest, and to every view of aggrandisement." She announces, as the consequence of her triumph, the freedom of the Dardanelles "to the commerce of all nations," and the arrestation of the plague by the occupation of the left bank of the Danube.

A doubt has been raised whether the stipulation forbidding acquisition did apply in reference to Turkish territory, insomuch as the Porte had not accepted the Treaty of July 6th (she had objected only on the ground that *Russia was a party to it*); but on the 9th September, 1829, that is, before the signature of the Treaty of Adrianople, her formal adhesion was given in these terms:—

"The Sublime Porte declares, that having already adhered to the Treaty of London, it now further promises and pledges to subscribe entirely to *all the decisions which the Conference of London shall adopt* with respect to its execution."

The letter of Pertef Pasha to the Pashas of the Empire,

which Russia made the pretext of the rupture, his countrymen are now pleased to censure with misjudging bitterness. The rupture, as seen by the words quoted from the Despatch of Pozzo de Borgo, was determined on other grounds, and had been for two years prepared for with unceasing activity.

All this had come out of a false term. Mediation is Arbitration, and can be undertaken only at the request and with the consent of both litigants. A *forced* Mediation is a *War in disguise*.

England determines to mediate; but, instead of communicating with the parties, she communicates with the Government obnoxious to both, and which actually was on the point of rupture with one of them. This communication is *secret*. Having concerted measures, they apply not even then to the parties, but to another Foreign Power. This is a *conspiracy!* The three then draw up a Treaty to enforce by arms, if necessary, the common decisions of their ministers. They commence, indeed, by placing one limit to their omnipotence—they shall *spare the sovereignty of the Sultan*. Their first act is to destroy his fleet; their next, to make Greece independent. With a heroism that found no appreciation, the Porte prepared to perish, and accepted the war. The two associates then hold back, and Russia makes her separate war—but the Conferences continue! The Porte, though not again attacked by the Powers, except through Greece, lies under all the effect of a suspended invasion, and thus at last does England constrain her to accomplish the Treaty of the 6th of July by forcing her to submit to the decisions of a Mediation with **ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF WHICH SHE WAS ACTUALLY AT WAR.**

To the inhumanity of her acts England was blinded by her philanthropy and integrity; to the consequences of her policy, by her trust in her ally. She had proceeded upon the faith pledged, that the stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th of July should ever be sacred in the eyes of that Government. When she made at last the discovery that these stipulations had in its eyes no value, when she found herself betrayed at

the close as she had been duped at the beginning, then she "reserves" her judgment!

Some credit is due to Lord Aberdeen for having, at the conclusion of the war, ventured to pen a despatch to St. Petersburg, reserving to the King, his master, the futile and superfluous right "of judging of the sacrifices which Turkey would be called upon to make," a right which, it is needless to say, was never exercised, and a despatch which, it has been asserted, by some course of necromancy, has disappeared from the archives of the Foreign Office. Russia knew that England was as destitute of knowledge to restore as of ability to construct, of courage to avenge as of foresight to prevent; at least it is not necessary now to misjudge. Let us learn one lesson from our shame—that to associate ourselves with Russia is not the way to counteract. As regards the mouths of the Danube, the advantage which she secured was solely of value to her by *their* exclusion, and the injury which thereby she was enabled to inflict upon *them*. The following is the article of the Treaty:—

"The frontier line will follow the course of the Danube to the mouth of St. George, leaving all the islands formed by the different branches in the possession of Russia. The right bank will remain as formerly, in the possession of the Ottoman Porte. It is, however, agreed, that that right bank, from the point where the arm of St. George departs from that of Souline, *shall remain uninhabited* to a distance of *two hours* (six miles) from the river, and that no kind of structure shall be raised there; and in *like manner*, on the islands, which will remain in the possession of the court of Russia. With *the exception of quarantines which will be there established*, it will not be permitted to make any *other* establishment or fortification."

Of what toil have we not here the fruit—of what purposes the germ! Observe the limitation to the navigation of the Danube assumed in the form of a concession: here is the announcement of the intended quarantine so long after established.

The attitude and language of Russia now changes. She has no longer to draw us on: she has only to prevent us from escaping. In our conduct a similar alteration appears; the cold fit succeeds to the hot, and we are now all apathy and endurance. She waits nearly two years before the next step; it is, of course, Quarantine, but not on the Danube, she turns to the fabulous regions beyond the Euxine.

On the 8th of August, 1831, the Russian Cabinet addressed a despatch to its representative at Constantinople, informing him of the "constant care devoted by our government in order to preserve the *neighbouring foreign countries* from the contagious disease arising from Turkey," and of its intention to subject to sanitary regulations "the communications which freely exist between the inhabitants of the *Caucasus and the neighbouring Turkish Provinces.*" This admission of the Caucasus being a "foreign country" has in view the establishing of a case applicable to the Danubian Provinces. "It becomes indispensable that you should communicate the *above mentioned regulations* to the foreign missions at Constantinople, as well as to the Ottoman government itself."

Now was the time come for the exercise of the right reserved by the English Government to judge of sacrifices to be imposed on Turkey. It could not by silence escape from a decision; there was no alternative between protesting and publishing the Notification in the "Gazette;" all such Notifications of Quarantine being published in the "Gazette; indeed the minister is personally liable in the courts of law for damage accruing from such suppression. But mere silence sufficed so far as Russia was concerned, for thereafter no step could be taken against the Treaty, and, therefore, while the Protest was not made, neither was the Notification published. To avoid this last difficulty, the communication was *not made direct*, but through the minister at Constantinople; while suppressed in England, it was exhibited by the consul at Constantinople and so all vessels were warned off the coast. The Foreign Secretary was no longer Lord Aberdeen, but his vehement Parliamentary Antagonist.

The curious part is that these "Regulations" had no existence. They are referred to as enclosed first by the Russian Minister, then by the Russian Ambassador, and lastly by the British Minister at Constantinople; yet are they not to be found in any one of the three despatches.

But that is a small matter. The Quarantine in itself had no existence. I visited the whole coast in 1834, and found none. From Nicolai, the frontier Turkish port which was in quarantine, I sailed for the Russian station at Gelengick, where Russian officers, after a few words *about* quarantine, came *on board*; and I was received on board the Russian brig of war, which captured the Vixen; thence I went on shore; accompanied by the commandant of the fort I went to the place of intercourse with the Circassians, which had, indeed, the form of a *Parlatorio*, but where no measures of quarantine whatever were observed. I then sailed for Soujouk Su, where I landed, and then to Sevastapol, and was put in quarantine because coming *from the coast of Circassia*. The Admiral came alongside and was informed of our intercourse with the Russian authorities on the coast, and of our landing there; no exception was taken to their conduct.* It follows that Russia's doctrines on contagion was of the same texture as her opinions on politics and framed exclusively for the good of "Foreign Countries."

It has been argued *for* Russia, that the regulations existed for Anapa and Redout Kale where there were quarantines, and that as to the rest of the coasts the prohibition to approach was a Regulation. Then why does *she* approach? A sanitary Regulation that is not good to stop a Russian is surely bad for the other inhabitants of the earth.

* I visited Silistria when occupied by the Russians; "travelers" had to perform fifteen days' quarantine, but Russians were liable to infection only by a graduated scale: ten days for a private, five for a captain; a field officer had three, a superior officer none. Foreign despatches were fumigated with much care, Russian despatches utterly neglected.

All this time nothing has been done as to the foreshadowed Quarantine of the Danube; but the sudden development of the trade of the Principalities, which commenced in 1834, when they supplied 500,000 tchetverts of grain to southern Russia re-awakened her solicitude; and on the 7th of February, 1836, appeared the Ukase to intercept vessels "proceeding on their voyage up the Danube," and send them to Odessa! If the Turkish Government, in its proverbial improvidence, had neglected the care of the health of the populations bordering on the Danube, it had at least attended to their comforts so far as to keep open the navigation of the stream by pallisades to narrow the current, and dredges to prevent accumulation of sand. When surrendered by Turkey the channel averaged a depth of twelve feet, in the beginning of 1836 it had been reduced to eight. Thus, says a contemporary writer, "an impenetrable bar will be formed at the mouth of this river, and Russia to her important possessions will add that of an iron gate between the Danube and the Euxine."*

It mattered not whether the vessel came from Liverpool or Trebizond, or was destined for Russian or Turkish Ports, and as in the "Regulation" for Circassia, Custom-house and Quarantine are jumbled together, so here, "This Quarantine, *in so far as regards the Customs*, is to be regulated by the same laws as the present Quarantine of Bazertcheck."

Before adventuring on the Ukase of the 7th February she had felt her way by the forced visit of vessels, the inspection of their papers, the exaction of fees, facts brought to the knowledge of the British Foreign Office two months before the Ukase, and anxiously sought out by that Office. The chief partner of the principal English House at Bucharest writes on the 7th December, 1835; "I saw Mr. Strangways to-day, and told him that I had information to-day from two captains of vessels I have had arrived from the Danube, that they were both required to show their papers to the

* *Times* Cor., March 2, 1836.

Russian Commandant at the mouth of that river, settled with about 100 troops *on the Turkish side*, and they were told that there were three and four dollars to be paid when their papers were returned to them *signed*. They were also required almost by force to desist from tracking their vessels on the Russian side of the river, although Greek and Turkish vessels were allowed to do so. Mr. S. desired me to furnish the details for Lord Palmerston, which I hope to be able to do to-night."

Each of these acts was an infraction of the public law of Europe. The Treaty of Vienna (Art. 109) declares that the Navigation of Rivers "along their whole course, from the point where each of them become navigable to its mouth, shall be entirely free." By Art. 111, "the amount of the duties shall, in no case, exceed those now (1815) paid," and "no increase shall take place except with the common consent of the States bordering on the rivers." By Art. 113, "each State shall be at the expense of keeping in good repair the Towing Paths," and "shall maintain the necessary works in order that no obstruction shall be experienced by the navigation."

The British Nation, and indeed all Europe, was vehemently excited; an indignation was aroused, such as had never on any occasion been manifested since the war with France. The papers were unanimous in their denunciations; the leading commercial cities sent up petitions to Parliament, praying for "protection" and resistance to "the encroachments of Russia." Addresses in the same sense were laid at the feet of the King, who, himself a sailor, was known to "share to the fullest extent in the emotion of his people;" and it was generally understood that a Majority of the Commons were ready to vote an Address, embodying the appeal of the merchants, and further praying for the adoption of measures for the entrance of a British squadron into the Black Sea.

But in what position stood the minister? He had admitted the measures on the Circassian coast; no more than

Mr. Canning could he stand the effects of such a disclosure. The trouble of his position is revealed in a trifling circumstance. I have said that the press was unanimous: there was, however, one exception,—The “Morning Chronicle,” the avowed organ of the Foreign Office. Another, though unavowed organ of that office, “The Portfolio,” took lead on the opposite side.*

The Address was to be moved by Mr. Patrick Stewart, in the Commons, on the 20th of April, and as the Government had reserved every expression of its views, no less curiosity than excitement prevailed. Late on the night of the 19th I was informed that the motion was to be put off. I hastened to Mr. P. Stewart, and found him in bed; he told me that he had yielded to a representation that the Cabinet was “all right and firm,” and likely to be embarrassed by a public discussion. It required but few words to induce him to withdraw his assent to the postponement, and he moved according to notice on the following night.

Mr. Patrick Stewart’s exposition of the case was complete. He justified the demand for “protection,” by proving the violation of natural rights, treaty stipulations, and solemn pledges; he showed the infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, exposed the perfidious character of Russia’s policy, and the alarming nature of her projects. The Minister *concurred in the statement and resisted the Address*. “His Majesty’s Government, he said, had no desire or disposition to submit to *aggression* from any power.” Mr. Stewart, conceiving

* The views of that periodical the following extracts will show:—

“The formation of English establishments in those provinces, and the exportation of raw produce, which are the staples of Russia, by means of British capital and enterprise, naturally inspire her with great and not unfounded alarm. She therefore has proceeded quietly to establish point by point, control over the river. * * * Against this outrage it was *understood that remonstrance had been made by Great Britain*, and we suppose that according to custom the Ukase referred to in the St. Petersburg paragraph is the answer of the Autocrat to this remonstrance! What can England be supposed to say, save ‘*Pour on, I will endure!*’”

that by this declaration he "was as much committed as he could be by any act," withdrew his motion: it entered into no man's mind to doubt, that the quarantine and tolls on the Danube would be removed. In Parliament the matter was never revived: there is no trace of a communication with the Russian Cabinet on the subject: but the quarantine still stands on the Island of Forgetfulness (Leti).

Fifteen days after the debate, the following letter was written to Messrs. Bell:—

"Foreign Office, May 5th, 1836.

"GENTLEMEN,

"In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, upon the subject of the obstructions offered by the Russian authorities to the free navigation of the Danube, I am directed by Viscount Palmerston, to acquaint you that his Lordship *has called upon the law adviser for the Crown for his opinion as to the regulations promulgated by the Russian ukase of the 7th of February, 1836*; but in the meantime, Lord Palmerston directs me to acquaint you with respect to the latter part of your letter, that it is the opinion of his Majesty's government, that no toll is justly demanded by the Russian authorities at the mouth of the Danube, and that you have acted properly in *directing your agents to refuse to pay it.*

"I am, Gentlemen, &c., &c.,

(Signed) "J. BACKHOUSE."

The fact so communicated to a merchant is reserved from Parliament. The reference to the law officers showed that the Government had not made up its mind; how, then, should it concur in the statements of Mr. P. Stewart? The merchant is encouraged to resist aggressions of a foreign state. Why is that Government not required to desist from them? The distinction drawn between similar acts, respecting one of which the Government had only asked an opinion, was not likely to produce collision between the House of

Bell and the Imperial troops. The bold letter of the minister puts an end to all resistance, no opinion of the law officers ever appears; and now a Russian toll is exacted in *London and Liverpool* on every English vessel sailing for the Turkish ports on the Danube.*

Whilst the impression prevailed that vigorous measures were to be taken, the idea arose of sending a trading vessel direct to Circassia.

This matter was being discussed by the chief authorities.† The king so warmly entered into it, that a letter was written

• *Liverpool, March, 1848.*

In shipping goods to the Danube there are fees to be paid to the Russian consul amounting to nearly £100 per cargo. On each bale, or article, even though of metal, two roubles silver are charged (6s. 4d. to 6s. 8d.) There are other expenses for seals, tin cases, and extra coverings, imposed by the Russian regulations, without which vessels would be sent to Odessa, and subjected to forty days' quarantine; interest of money thereby lost, perhaps a market for their sale, &c. The agent complained bitterly of the extortion, but his London correspondent advised him on no account to agitate the matter, as the chief house at Bucharest had tried and had failed, and their vessel had been confiscated without compensation. I have been told that from the Americans this impost is not exacted.

† The following extract from a letter of Lord Ponsonby, quoted in the House of Commons on the 23d Feb., 1848, will show his entire concurrence:—

“I had been led to believe that you had changed your mind respecting Circassia. No! I did not believe it, but I heard it. I am delighted with the manner in which you have treated this subject. It is admirable. *I hope you have approved of what I have done in my despatches respecting it.* I considered it from the beginning to be next in importance to the possession of Constantinople itself: but it is only lately, comparatively speaking, that I have known the facts of the total freedom of that country from every legitimate connection or tie, and therefore the total illegality of any title assumed to it by Nicholas. If we had any man in England worth a straw we should soon settle these matters; but our statesmen, high or low, are pedlars, but without the sagacity that distinguishes the Israelite who carries about his small wares for sale to housemaids and scullions.”

by his private secretary, stating the great service to his country which any merchant might so render. This letter was shown to Mr. Bell, and was the origin of the voyage of the *Vixen*. I owe it to Mr. Bell, who is now dead, to state that in all the misery and subsequent ruin incurred thereby, he never once alluded to that letter, on which alone the step was taken; and yet he had authority to do so.

Up to this time a Blockade had alone been heard of. The Russian cruisers had frequently detained and warned off neutral vessels. Several cases had come before the Foreign Office, and it was urgent in its inquiries respecting the blockade of the coast of Circassia. If there was blockade there was war, and there could be neither quarantine nor custom-house regulations. But it was not judged prudent by Mr. Bell to send his vessel without a specific declaration from the Foreign Minister. This letter, however, merely asked if there were "any restrictions on trade recognised by Her Majesty's Government?" as if not, he intended to send thither a vessel with a cargo of salt. Lord Palmerston answers, "You ask me whether it would be for your advantage to engage in a speculation in salt in the province of Wallachia," and tells him that it is for commercial firms to judge for themselves in determining "whether they shall enter into or decline commercial speculations." Mr. Bell, now advised from the Foreign Office, specifies: he asks, "whether or not Her Majesty's Government recognise THE *Russian Blockade* on the Black Sea to the south of the river Kouban?" Now he is referred to the "*Gazette*, in which all Notifications, such as those alluded to by you, are made." There having appeared in the *Gazette* neither Notification of "Blockade," nor of "Restrictions," Mr. Bell is satisfied, and the *Vixen* sails. Mr. Bell's brother is to go as supercargo, and he is sent to Constantinople with despatches from the Foreign Office. There he is informed by the Ambassador of the "Restrictions," but is told, "that Russia had no right whatever to prescribe regulations for that trade." The vessel sailed, and

was seized for breaking the Blockade,* and confiscated on the 25th of November, 1836. On April 19, 1837, the Russian Government is "requested to state the reasons on account of which it has thought itself warranted to seize and confiscate in *time of peace*, a merchant-vessel belonging to British subjects." All specification of the *place* where this seizure took place is avoided; it is on the Black Sea. The justificatory reasons, according to Lord Palmerston, are: first, the receiving on board a cargo not allowed to be imported at all; second, an attempt to trade *at a Russian port* where there is no custom-house. In the intemperate note demanding satisfaction, it had been forgotten to state where this seizure, "in time of peace," had been made. In the dignified despatch which closes the affair (23d May, 1837), the English Government has discovered the spot where the incident occurred, together with some curious historical points connected therewith.

"His Majesty's Government, considering, in the first place, that Soujouk Kale, which *was acknowledged by Russia*, in the Treaty of 1783 as a Turkish possession, now belongs to Russia, *as stated by Count Nesselrode*, by virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople * * *see no sufficient reason to question* the right of Russia to seize and confiscate the *Vixen*."

Was it by an *unintentional* oversight that the Russian date of 1783 (according to the old style), was substituted for 1784, which must have appeared in any despatch originally drafted in Downing Street?

I have subjoined, at the end of the chapter, the complete disproof of these assumptions. The then British Ambassador,—as will be seen from the note at p. 318—denied the power of Turkey to dispose of Soujouk Kale to Russia from "the absence of any legitimate subjection to the Sultan." Besides, there was no *de facto* possession, no less than thirty-

* "Such documents as will prove that the schooner *Vixen* was employed on a *blockaded coast*."—Admiral Lazareff to Mr. Childs, December 24th, 1836.

six British subjects having offered testimony or made affidavit to the contrary.

Now tear off the lion's skin. What, after the smoke has blown away becomes public opinion—enlightened age—mighty engine the Press—great parties—constitutional mechanism—balance of powers—Royal prerogative—responsibility of Ministers—and OMNIPOTENCE of Parliament? what, with such frauds standing in the place of truth, avails physical strength?

One, himself of no ordinary powers, who had had occasion of making this discovery, observed: "What shocks me, is to think that whilst of us a very few can by any chance be let into the knowledge of such things, and these few can only raise their hands in astonishment, or drop them in despair—a barbarous race knew it all along, and deals with our vices and illusions as with property."

We have passed through three phases, under three Administrations, who, whatever their differences in speculative matters, coincide in the manner of exercising the highest prerogative of the Crown.

In the first period we see the English Minister binding Russia to abnegation. In the second, placing conditions to his co-operation, and reserving his judgment on her acts. In the third, dependent on her forbearance, forced to yield, and—to disguise. Of the grave events which marked the first period, Parliament took no notice. It allowed the surrender of the power of the Crown into the hands of a foreign Conspiracy without one word of approval or disapproval. The second period, that of Russia's "separate war," called forth only an incidental notice, in a debate on Portugal, on the 1st of June, 1829, when the Government was attacked for not being sufficiently Russian. During three years, Parliamentary history runs in a wholly separate channel from the diplomatic and real. In the third period, Parliament is awakened—why did it not sleep on?

On the 17th of March, 1837, Lord Palmerston declared that Russia's acquisitions on the Danube and in Circassia were

violations of her pledges. *Seven years and seven months* had then elapsed from the occupation of the Delta of the Danube; *five years and four months* from the notification in respect to Circassia; *one year and four months* from the admission of the tolls on the Danube; one year and three months from the Ukase for the Quarantine. Since this declaration eighteen years have elapsed without any steps being taken in conformity with it.

On the 6th of July, 1840, Lord Palmerston declared that the Treaty of Vienna did apply to the navigation of the Danube. *Four years and five months* had then elapsed from the communication of the Ukase; *four years and two months* from the assertion in reference to it, that Her Majesty's government was not prepared to submit to any aggression; *four years and one month* from his commissioning a private firm to resist the Russian authorities. Since that declaration nearly fifteen years have elapsed without any steps having been taken in accordance with this or any other declaration of British rights or ministerial intentions.

The debate of the 6th of July, 1840, arose out of an attempt to give effect to a tripartite Treaty proposed by Austria, between herself, England, and Turkey, with a view of overbearing the interference of Russia in the Danube, and which had been frustrated, as shall presently be detailed. It is to meet this attempt that the minister brings in the Treaty of Vienna. What more do you want? says he. Have you not got the Treaty of Vienna? That Treaty forbids tolls, forbids quarantines, and renders impossible all usurpations. Who could answer that question? Mr. Patrick Stewart was dead; who recollected the Ukase of the 7th of February? Messrs. Bell & Co. had gone into the Gazette! Who recollected the letter of marque of the 5th of May?*

The Treaty of Adrianople is one day a bad treaty, and

* On the same occasion the minister assigned as the reason for submitting to the infraction of the Treaty of Vienna at Cracow, the inland position of the place, which did not admit of the employment of England's maritime strength.

another a good treaty.* It is bad when, by merely *saying so*, a river may be shut up; it is good when a pretext is wanted to enable a coast to be shut up. This facility of construction belongs to a state of things in which a Parliament can one day be disposed of, by telling them that a matter is under discussion, and the next by telling them that it has been discussed.†

These acquisitions have been made, notwithstanding the declaration of Lord Aberdeen (6th of June, 1828), that he held his Imperial Majesty to the fulfilment of the Treaty of July, 1827;

Notwithstanding the protest of the King, that after the war he reserved the right to judge of the sacrifices imposed on Turkey;

Notwithstanding the address to the Crown to protect British merchants in the Euxine against such usurpation, (20th of April, 1836,) withdrawn because her Majesty's government "concurred in the object, and was determined to give it effect;"

Notwithstanding the official sanction transmitted to a private firm (5th of May, 1836), in resisting the Russian authorities on that river;

Notwithstanding the declaration of Lord Palmerston (17th of March, 1837,) that the acquisitions of Russia were a violation of English rights;

Notwithstanding the declaration of Lord Palmerston, (6th of July, 1840,) that the Treaty of Vienna applied to the

* "The Hon. and Learned Gentleman said, that the Earl of Aberdeen protested against the Treaty of Adrianople; but when he says that they did not acknowledge it as a part of the law of Europe, he states that which is not borne out by historical facts. *They protest against it.* But does that amount to denying that the Treaty is valid, and that the rights conveyed by it are rights which the contracting parties are justified in enforcing and maintaining?" &c.—*Lord Palmerston, Feb. 23d, 1848.*

† On the 17th of March, in one breath the *Vices* papers were refused because the matter was under discussion, and the Adrianople papers because no longer under negotiation.

Danube, and forbade any interference with it by any one power.

If any Government, lawfully in possession of their banks, were to interfere with the navigation of the Elbe, or the Rhine, Europe would be aroused from one extremity to another. But what is the commerce of all the rivers of Europe compared to that which might flow through the Danube?

When this insolent robbery from Europe of its most important river was perpetrated, Russia was exhausted by the Turkish war, during which Austria had marshalled 200,000 men to oppose her; Poland had not yet been subjugated; cordiality reigned between England and France. That robbery was formally adopted by the English minister, after an interval of seven years, when England and France were united in the most intimate alliance based on the necessity of resisting her encroachments, the press of Europe was ringing with denunciations of her perfidy and designs, and the announcement of the increase of the British Navy, * as the reply to the speech at Warsaw, had been made amidst the acclamations of Parliament and Nation. Such was the moment seized for the perpetration of outrage, such as Spain never dared under Phillip II, or France under Louis XIV.

* It was insinuated, indeed, at the time, in Parliament, that the augmentation was against France, but an explanation was offered to the French government, and with the recommendation, so at least I have been informed by M. Thiers, *to augment its navy*—with what purpose the following passage may suggest. On the 1st of March, 1848, Lord Palmerston said:—

“Of course, also, though I do not recollect the circumstance as having happened in 1835, or 1836, the immense amount of the naval preparation in *France*, must always form an element in taking into account the means which England must possess,” &c.

NOTE I.

DOCUMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE CONFISCATION OF THE *VIXEN* AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF CIRCASSIA.

MR. J. S. BELL TO MR. URQUHART.

"Pera, Nov. 2, 1836.

"SIR,—In consequence of your having referred me to Lord Ponsonby for information respecting any legal impediment that might exist to prevent my projected trading voyage to Circassia, I proceeded to Therapia on Thursday last and obtained an interview with his Lordship.

"I now send you, according to your request, the enclosed copy of the memorandum I took of the conversation that passed between his Lordship and myself, a copy of which I have transmitted to his Lordship also for his approval.

"I remain, Sir, your obedient humble servant,

"D. Urquhart, Esq.

JAMES S. BELL."

"MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH LORD PONSONBY.

"On Thursday, the 27th of October, 1836, I proceeded to Therapia, and having obtained an interview with Lord Ponsonby, I begged of his Lordship to inform me if he were aware of any legal impediment existing to prevent my making a mercantile voyage to the coast of Circassia.

"His lordship in reply observed, that he had lately received a renewal of the previous intimation given by the Russian Government as to trade with that coast being interdicted, except upon certain conditions. But that as he considered that the Russian Government had no right whatever to prescribe rules for that trade, he had not complied with the request of the Chargé d'Affaires to have such notice intimated to our Consul at Constantinople, but had sent a copy of the intimation to the Foreign Office in London, from which he had not received any communication on the subject.

"I then informed his Lordship that it was my intention to proceed in a vessel I expected daily, to a certain point on the coast of Circassia, which I had fixed upon as most eligible for the trade I had in view; and that as I had ascertained

before leaving London that our Government did not then acknowledge any right on the part of Russia to impede trade with the country in question; and as nothing seemed to have since occurred to change the position of affairs; I should endeavour to attain the object I had in view, and should not be diverted from it unless force were employed on the part of the Russian Government, and hoped to obtain his Lordship's aid in so doing.

"In reply to this his Lordship stated, that he perfectly coincided in the propriety of the plan I had adopted, to which he had no objection whatever to offer, as he considered it an indisputable point that Russia had no right to interfere with or prescribe rules for British trade with Circassia; and that, if I adhered to the straightforward course I had detailed to him, he had no doubt of my being enabled to establish a claim for support from the British Government, in which he would be glad to render me all the assistance in his power, requesting me at the same time to transmit him information as to what success attended my enterprise.

"JAMES S. BELL."

MR. STRANGWAYS TO MR. URQUHART.

(Extract).

Foreign Office, 8th Feb.

"I cannot omit alluding to the capture of the *Vixen* without telling you that it has had all the effect on the public that you could have anticipated, and even more than I expected, knowing the temper of the people here. It is now under legal and Government discussion, so I need say no more. Bell's statements and his brother's documents tell very well for him.

"As the public here are very obtuse on foreign matters, *et il faut faire fleche de tout bois*, I wish when the coast is cleared, which I hope it will be by this business, you could send some artist, or better, a gentleman who can draw and write travels, &c., to make a tour in Circassia; it would do admirably for London and be well got up here.

"I should warn you, that in giving any accounts of the *Vixen* transaction, you may be liable to misrepresentation, as it would not be thought proper, if, being Secretary of Embassy, you had incited Mr. J. Bell to make the voyage as a diplomatic experiment; I can answer for its having been the intention of Mr. G. Bell long before in London. This hint comes from high authority."

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. URQUHART,

(Extract).

"March 10th, 1837.

"The present communication [Mr. U.'s recall] is founded upon your letter of the 7th of December last, to Mr. Strangways, which I have lately had under my consideration. It appears by that letter, you took steps with respect to Mr. Bell's voyage in the *Vixen*, which, I regret to say, were in my opinion wholly incompatible with your public duty as a diplomatic servant of the Crown; and I should not think myself properly performing my own duty, if, after a knowledge of such circumstance, I were to continue you in the situation which you now hold."

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. URQUHART.

(Extract)

"June 20, 1838.

"You say in your letter that having up to the moment of your conversation with me considered the voyage of the *Vixen* as a Government measure, and as one which I looked upon with peculiar interest and with great expectation of national benefit, you are naturally surprised beyond expression at the views which I then expressed to you upon that subject. Now, I think that I may be justified in expressing, in my turn, some considerable surprise at this passage in your letter; because while, on the one hand, I am quite sure that nothing which I ever said or did could justify you or any other man in forming the opinion which in this passage you express of my view of the voyage of the *Vixen*; on the other hand, my private letter to you, dated 10th of March, 1837, and which you received before you left Constantinople, and therefore long before our conversation in Downing Street, was calculated, as it seems to me, to have effectually dispelled any illusion which other persons might have created in your mind on this point."

MR. URQUHART TO MR. BACKHOUSE.

(Extract)

"July 20th, 1838.

"Who were the parties who could have misled me? The only persons with whom I had communication upon this subject were, his late Majesty; Sir Herbert Taylor, his Majesty's Private Secretary; Mr. M'Neill, Envoy to Persia; Mr. Strangways, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs; and (by letter) Lord Ponsonby: added to the positive approval

of Lord Palmerston of my own reports and published papers on the subject, and of 'every word' that had appeared in the Portfolio. If Lord Palmerston has considered my conduct in this respect as reprehensible, I have made no remonstrance against such decision; but when his Lordship sanctions in Lord Ponsonby the active and official approval of an enterprise, and punishes me for encouragement of a private kind given to it—when he punishes me in the month of March for what he pretends to approve of in the month of January—when he denounces me as a traitor to my country, while he continues his favour to his own confidential agent (Mr. Strangways), who has commended the act so denounced, and volunteered his testimony against any misconstruction of my conduct respecting it—then do I assert, not indeed that I am unjustly treated, but that the principles of Eastern policy, of which I was the advocate, and which had previously triumphed in London, were to be overthrown through my disgrace. Lord Palmerston was to escape from the consequences of the part he had taken therein by marking me as the guilty victim, by the sacrifice of which harmony was to be restored between his language in 1836, and his deeds in 1837.

That no misunderstanding may possibly exist as to the value of the only allegation against me contained in Lord Palmerston's letter of June 20th—namely my encouragement given to Mr. J. Bell (which rests only on my own testimony, and on a private letter which ought neither to have been communicated nor used)—I must state that the step which I encouraged was entering the territory of the independent Circassians, in violation, of course, of any supposed Russian regulations; that offence, if offence it be, has been over and over again repeated, and as often approved by his Lordship.

In 1834, I, confidentially employed by the British Government, with the sanction and by the advice of His Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, did so enter that country. I was not censured for so doing, but on the contrary my conduct was approved, my views adopted, and I was advanced in a manner that extraordinary services and important views could only justify. In 1836, Mr. Stewart, as alluded to in Lord Palmerston's letter, admitting my statement on the subject, was sent into the same country, equally in defiance of all Russian regulations, by Lord Ponsonby. At the end of the same year Mr. Bell and the *Vixen* were sent by the

joint concurrence of the Foreign Office, and of the ambassador at Constantinople. After the capture of the *Vixen*, Mr. Strangways wrote to me to get some person fitted to describe Circassia, and to send him to that country, which communication has been in Lord Palmerston's possession since September 20th, without leading to the removal of that officer. Finally, Lord Ponsonby has held communication with that country through individuals sent there by himself (one of them a discarded servant of my own, of the name of Andrew, who has recently been accused of abstracting the correspondence of the Englishmen in Circassia), in equal violation of the Regulations under which the illegality of the voyage has been assumed, and English property confiscated.

To this letter there was an elaborate reply from Mr. Backhouse, but no statement or inference here contained was impugned.

Statement of Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, March 1st, 1848:—

“In those circumstances a certain Mr. Bell imagined that he would take a shipful of salt to Circassia, and ‘try the question.’ The Russian Government had *issued an edict prohibiting the importation of salt*, or I believe rather *generally establishing a blockade against the coast*; and Mr. Bell determined to take a shipful of salt, of which the Circassians were greatly in need, and to see what Russia would do; intending, if the ship were seized, to demand restitution from the Government, and that being refused by Russia, that Great Britain should send a fleet to the Baltic, endeavour to destroy the Russian arsenals—in short, that there should be a regular ‘set-to’ between this country and Russia. I have been accused frequently of being too warlike; but I own that my courage did not rise to that point. I did not fancy it. Not liking the matter, I gave to Mr. Bell the answers which were published—which I knew very well would be published next day in the papers—which were charged with being evasive, and like some answers which one gives in this House, when one's official duties prevent him gratifying the curiosity of an hon. Member. However, the *result was that Mr. Bell was so discouraged that he gave up all intentions of going to the Circassian coast*. He had gone to Constantinople;

but he was warned by Lord Ponsonby, our Ambassador, to take care not to violate the Russian blockade. He did then give up his intention of going to Circassia. All of a sudden, however, he took it up again. His ship was seized by a Russian cruiser."

NOTE II.

THE EASTERN POLICY OF ENGLAND AND
FRANCE.

FROM THE BARON V. PROKESCH, PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMANIC DIET.

Note to p. 303.

M. V. Prokesch is not only the first diplomatist of Austria but the first writer, perhaps, I might say, the first German writer. His works not being accessible to the English or French public, I subjoin some extracts from the third volume of his Memoirs, in which he has recorded his contemporary opinion of that Treaty by which England and France first bound themselves *to concert their "policy"* with Russia. The details connected with the Battle of Navarino well deserved to be recalled.

It is astonishing that an individual who has so extensively used the Press should not be disqualified for the highest official stations in Austria, and that in the diplomatic branch; and the more so when we consider the nature of his works, which are not confined within the pale of the abstruser orders of literature, and are addressed and adapted to the most popular portion of the Public. They are not the outpourings of a fertile imagination, nor the accumulation of an unquiet and industrious spirit. Seldom, indeed, is the didactic tone assumed, but throughout there is evidence of a mind at work for an end, to advance which labour is undergone, incidents are accumulated, and pictures drawn, to serve as

vehicles for thought. He spares no toil, and will write a volume to slip in a phrase. The end in view is neither a political purpose nor a speculative theory; it is to urge the mind of his reader to a useful effort, and, himself above them, his war is with the doctrines of our times and the fallacies of our opinion. He has not hesitated to enter upon the transactions in which he has borne so prominent a part, and on the interests and objects of the governments of Europe. He has not disguised what it was important for the nations of Europe to know; he is indeed cautious but not reserved.

M. V. Prokesch has been able throughout a long and laborious life to stand by himself and to suffice for himself; he has advanced from station to station in the government considered the most umbrageous at home and servile abroad whilst incessantly addressing himself to the public and avowing opinions in reference to Russia which severally must have excluded him from public service in England or in France. This in itself is a fact, second in importance to none of those that have agitated the world in latter times; it is a flag of hope held out at a moment when the few who see are crushed by despondency; Austria is not lost when she possesses such a man and dares to trust him; Europe is saved for the present, at least when the policy of any government is directed by a man combining capacity and character.

Baron von Prokesch's Memoirs, vol. iii, p. 588.

Smyrna, Oct. 3d, 1827.

I have, in judging of the future, invariably found that the simple, clear, immediate view, the first impression, carried the day over the best planned scheme for which I have not unfrequently been tempted to give up my original plan. In the same manner, unless I am altogether mistaken, England and France are miserably deceiving themselves and are working out the plans of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. They say they are binding Russia, and see not that it is they who are bound. They desire to prevent Russia's making war, so they endeavour to gain for her objects. I fear that even Greece, the immediate pretext, but in reality a subordinate matter, will not be the gainer, but will deeply rue the Treaty which it

has received with such rejoicing. The news of Canning's death reached us on Sept. 7th. . . . Russia will not rejoice a little thereat, for it makes her success the more certain.

Smyrna, Nov. 3d, 1827.

The London Treaty has led to becoming results. There is now only the Russian war remaining. How greatly will the crime and madness of the battle of Navarin be praised in Europe. How loud will be the accusations and regrets, and how completely will men's eyes be opened. Public opinion is usually led by passion, never by reason, and rarely even by instinct. . . . Every word that appears in the European papers about the battle is false. The battle was necessary as winter was coming on, and the west coast of the Morea is, to say the least, an inconvenient cruising ground. It was necessary since ordinary means of coercion were found insufficient, and because the influence of public opinion was making itself dreaded. Codrington was led by ambition to commit this crime. Rigny looked only at the English, and felt himself a Frenchman. Heiden alone acted as a man who knew what he was about.

As a pretext for the battle, the Admirals on the 19th demanded the immediate return of the Turkish Fleet to Constantinople, and of the Egyptian to Alexandria, as well as the cessation of all acts of hostility within the Peninsula. The grounds given were, that Ibrahim had broken his word in making the attempt to supply Patras with provisions, and that therefore further security was necessary. That Patras had been attacked by the Greeks during the truce enforced by the allies, and that the Turkish Chief sailed from one Turkish haven to another, went for nothing. Equally little did it avail that Ibrahim was in the interior, and that his officers asked for time to consult him. Hamilton had found Kiaja-Bey fighting with the Mainotes in the Gulph of Corinth; he ordered him to desist—the Turk obeyed, yet even this was used as a pretext. Under pretence of taking in water on the 19th an English frigate was sent into the harbour to observe the position of the Turkish fleet; and on the 20th the whole allied fleet with Codrington's ship the *Asia* leading, sailed in and took up a position within a pistol shot of the Turkish anchors, each vessel having a spring on the cable. The Turks anticipating no attack, but at most a menace, and

determined to give no excuse for hostilities, made no opposition. Their land batteries which might have disputed the entrance, were silent as the ships. When all was ready the frigate Dartmouth ordered two Turkish fireships to raise their anchors and move to a greater distance—The Commander replied, that it was the custom in every harbour in the World that the ship last arrived should anchor where there was room and should not disturb ships already moored. The Dartmouth threatened to cut their cables—The Turk replied he would not endure it without exercising his right of firing on the boat that attempted it. The boat was sent the fire ship opened upon it with musquetry, the Dartmouth replied with cannon—Codrington gave the signal, and the attack began along the whole line. . . . The Turks fought with desperation, in spite of their confined position, their being surprised, and their want of men, besides they had only three line of battle ships against ten. The action began at 2½—by sunset the destruction was complete. The Armida had taken three frigates, on board of which the Turkish wounded and prisoners were placed, but prisoners made in peace being looked upon as an embarrassment, orders were given to sink the three frigates, which was instantly done. During the night the Turks destroyed many of their own ships. The rising sun of the 21st shone upon wrecks and corpses, the remains of three line battle ships, three first-rate frigates and eighteen second-rate, the corvettes and six smaller vessels. The first blossoms of the Cairo schools, the Egyptian youth, was destroyed. The victors were embarrassed by no prisoners.

The news of this philanthropic battle reached us on the 27th. We warned the Pasha to prepare for the burst of fury which this treason would produce amongst the Turks both of town and country. The immediate effect was terrific, thousands of Christians, men, women, and children hurrying in wild panic to the ships, fearing that the 80,000 Turks in the city would rise to avenge their countrymen and their faith. The panic was felt through all Asia Minor, but no outrage occurred, and we observed with wonder and respect the bearing and self-restraint of the Turks.

Poor Greece, only a miracle can save thee! Abuse of power, bold arrogance, and the trampling under foot of all rights—these are midwives which can bring nought but a

slave into the world. The independence which you had neither virtue nor courage to gain for yourself is lost for ever. Instead of a Turkish you will find yourself a Russian province; and a thousand times, with tears in your eyes and without hope in your heart, you will look back with regret to your former state. Europe looks on at your destruction and claps her hands, for by the bills posted on the walls the play is called "THE FREEDOM OF GREECE."

CHAPTER III.

Treaty with Austria for the Free Navigation of the Danube.

WHEN the first cargo which arrived under it was seized, this Treaty was discovered to be the "most extraordinary proceeding in the history of this or any other country."* Yet, to the sagacious mind of an Ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer the perusal of the subjoined clause ought to have suggested that conclusion long before.

"All *Austrian* vessels proceeding from the *Harbours of the Danube as far as Galatz, inclusive*, as well as their cargoes, may sail direct for *the ports of Great Britain*, and of all other possessions of her Britannic Majesty, *as if they came direct from the Harbours of Austria*; and, *reciprocally*, all English vessels, as well as their cargoes, shall be admitted *into the Austrian Harbours*, and depart therefrom with the same immunities as Austrian vessels."

If this age is modest as to diplomacy, it is somewhat confident in its geography. Was there no "Penny Cyclopædia" in the House?

Below Galatz the Danube flows between Turkish and Russian territories; above Galatz it flows through Turkish territory, up to the frontiers of Hungary, where the Iron Gate arrests the upward navigation as completely as if the height and foam of Niagara interposed. Neither above nor below Galatz is there an Austrian port.

This is a "Reciprocity Treaty," granting the faculty of importing the produce of their own territory, and the non-enumerated articles, the produce of other countries of Europe,

* Mr. Herries.

on the payment of no higher duties than British vessels ; but in this case the privilege is to extend to all ports of the Danube, as far as Galatz, that is, to ports *not* Austrian ; yet the treaty is with Austria, and admits to these harbours English vessels as Austrian. Every man connected with commerce or politics knew that a Reciprocity Treaty could not have effect in neutral territory ; but, to their minds, "the mistake was too gross to be committed in a Treaty," and credence grew from incredulity. The world is now at least six thousand years old ; but there has never yet appeared, maturity such as this, of contemptuous invention—dotage such as this, of decrepit belief.

When people say that a thing is extraordinary, they would generally imply that to them it is incomprehensible. When, therefore, after the announcement from the throne of this Treaty and that with Turkey, they believe it to be deep as it was dark, it was only that they feared that any one should suspect they had not fathomed it. After a time, however, an adventurous spirit arose among the leaders of the people, and they approached the stream. They stripped and plunged in, and each in turn, baffled by his own lightness, rebounded to the surface, and back to the bank, dry. The darkly-rolling Danube, the while, bore on to futurity, the mystery in its troubled breast.

The first who rushes in, of course, is Lord Aberdeen, who, on the 8th of February, 1839, sought to find "how under this Treaty British vessels could be admitted as *Austrian* into Turkish ports ?"

A voice like Lord Melbourne's answers from the waters :

"*That advantage* must be procured by *another Treaty*."

I am ashamed, yet constrained, to explain.

The professed object was to admit into England Austrian vessels bringing Turkish produce from Turkish ports on the same terms as if they brought Austrian produce from Austrian ports, that could be effected only by a concurrent Treaty with Turkey, and a Bill in Parliament. Lord Aberdeen does not ask how this is to be effected, but some-

thing else which has no analogy to the Treaty, or the facts. Lord Melbourne's answer has as little to do with the question as the question with the Treaty. Indeed, he answers the question that Lord Aberdeen ought to have put, and for which he was prepared. However, the ex-foreign minister is perfectly satisfied, and believes he has suggested, or hastened, a negotiation to confer on English bottoms an Austrian nationality in Turkish ports!

Two days later in the Commons, Lord Palmerston states that the contemplated purposes are to be carried out by "MUTUAL CONSENT."* If the omission of Treaties can be thus repaired, why treat?

What mutual consent could bring Austrian vessels in against the Navigation Laws. Now the "Austrian harbours" have dissolved into "Turkish ports."

Sir Robert Peel, after an eulogium on the document and negotiation inquires, "Whether another Treaty *with Turkey* was not necessary to secure the *full advantages* of the Austrian Treaty?" Lord Palmerston tells him that "Nothing of the kind is required, as to the footing on which ships coming from the Danube are to proceed, and no engagement necessary between *Austria and England*. Sir Robert Peel is refractory, and again asks, "whether *TURKEY* cannot *impose restrictions* on the Danube, unless she is a concurrent party in the Treaty? On Lord Palmerston's emphatic "she cannot," the matter drops.

But one unquiet spirit being settled, another rises: to the knight of Tamworth, succeeds the thane of Haddo, who rides fiercely in, and charges on his adversary unchivalrous tergiversation. But he himself has shifted his grounds, when he asserts that it is clear that without the concurrence of the *Porte*, British vessels *could not be received into Turkish ports*.

* "By mutual consent the benefits of the treaty are to be applied to the ships of either country coming not direct from the ports of the other country, but from any ports *above Galatz*, that is, *the Turkish ports of the Danube*."

Lord Melbourne's answer is worthy of a place in the British Museum. The Treaty was a bad Treaty, the stipulation a worthless stipulation, and he apprehended that nothing repugnant to this view had been said in the other House; it was, in fact, a freak of Austria, who wished to do something impossible, and which the English Government, for peace and quietness, consented to.* So that it was only a schoolboy-romp with the Austrian plenipotentiaries, and a practical joke on the Queen, the Opposition, and the merchants of the Danube.

At least here is the avowal of Austria's anxiety to do something in reference to the Danube which England had frustrated. Lord Melbourne would make it appear that this was a Treaty with Turkey, and that the other Treaty to allow British vessels to enter as Austrian into Turkish ports, was therefore still necessary. Lord Palmerston declares it was not; that everything was to be settled by "mutual consent." All this while no one perceives that the whole question lies in the state of the law at home. They are bandied about from post to pillar, from Austria to Turkey, and from Turkey to Austria, and back again into the river, in order that they may not see that they have got before them, a *Mutilated Treaty*.

The shippers of the Danube dive also; they get through the foam and surge of "Austrian" and "Turkish ports," of "Turkish prohibitions to the navigation of the Danube;" and opening their eyes in the clear water, perceive what the gladiatorial intellects of the British senate had never dreamt

* "That the stipulation complained of was an Austrian stipulation—that it was prepared by the Austrian Plenipotentiary, and insisted upon by him—that those engaged in the negotiation on the part of this country saw that it was liable to this objection; yet, as it was the wish of the Austrian Government, the stipulation was inserted. Therefore there was no question but that there was a stipulation to do a certain thing upon the *part of Austria*, which Austria had no power to do, and therefore which was not binding upon Austria, and he apprehended that *nothing repugnant to this had been stated in the other House*."—Lord Melbourne.

of,—*a relaxation of the Navigation Laws.* Scarcely had six weeks elapsed from the announcement from the throne, and the skirmishing in the Houses of Parliament, when the seizure at Gloucester of a cargo of *Turkish produce*, shipped at a Turkish port, in an Austrian bottom, reveals the hoax.

Did then, the Austrian shippers misconceive the Treaty? Not in the least. But into whose mind could it have then entered that the English Government should set down as a stipulation in a Treaty, a concession which they never made?

Now (25th of March), Lord Aberdeen has discovered “that the advantage of the Treaty cannot be enjoyed without a relaxation of the Navigation Laws.” Lord Melbourne “admits” that this relaxation ought to have been made; “confesses” that he cannot tell why it has not; is “not able” even to ascertain what the reason has been—for Mr. Poulett Thomson is in Canada. But he “supposes” “that *as negotiations were on foot with Turkey,*” he did not think fit to apply to Parliament “*twice upon the same subject.*”—And again the subject drops.

The vessel is released under a nominal fine, and the leaders of the Opposition are satisfied that matters are put straight; but again there is a difference between them and the shippers of the Danube. They will no longer trust to an English Treaty, or take the explanations of an English minister, and consequently no more cargoes of grain are shipped from the obnoxious Danube. A powerful opposition, meanwhile, believe that they had taken steps to realise the “*full advantages*” of the measures which they had applauded to the skies.

This transaction is the counterpart of the one we shall presently have to examine with Turkey. Russia, indeed, did not prevent, by menace, the exportation of Austrian produce; but she stopped its passage through the Danube.

Austrian Ministers were not apprehensive for their lives; but they were hampered by other considerations.* Like

* The highest personages had pensions, and influential ladies were in debt to the Czar.

Turkey, Austria, holding England to be the antagonist of Russia,* applied to her, wishing that the measure should come as her proposal. Prince Metternich and Count Kolowrat adopted precisely the same course as Achmet Pasha and Perteff Pasha. They had the co-operation of the ambassador, Lord Beauvale, and, through him, of his brother, the Prime Minister; the Foreign Minister found himself, as in the Turkish Treaty, placed under the necessity of accepting ostensibly a project which he was resolved secretly to frustrate.

Austria, to remove every possibility of delay or misconception, offered to place her interests in the negotiation with Turkey, in the hands of the English negotiators; and the gentleman who was to have charge of it was hurriedly despatched to Milan, where the Emperor then was with Prince Metternich, the Treaty being to be sent after him the next or the following day. It was delayed and *altered*.

* On the person of Latour was found a letter to M. Prokesch, dated Athens, 30th of August, 1848, which shows this delusion was not universal at Vienna:—"What makes me most uneasy are our *unfortunate relations with regard to Hungary*. I think we ought not to deceive ourselves as to the complete separation of that country, and it would be one of the greatest blunders possible to furnish the Hungarians with the means of effecting their object. *I explain that state of affairs by the co-operation of Esterhazy with Lord Palmerston, and by the influence which the latter exercises with us*. Now, I have for years considered Lord Palmerston our most decided enemy, and still consider him to be so; and to trust to *England*, as long as that man guides her policy, appears to me an anachronism scarcely to be equalled. . . . The Russians gain ground in the Danubian Principalities. We have (in the year 1829), with an inactivity bordering on treason, allowed the mouth of the Danube to fall into their hands, and that at the very moment when the position of the Russian army was such that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg readily would have listened to any proposal. Perhaps even now we shall allow ourselves to be duped by phrases, and we shall assist the Russians in establishing their paramount influence as far as the Drave and Save. The Porte resists, but there is no one to back her. *France follows in the train of England; England is in understanding with Russia.*"

There was no longer to be negotiation with Turkey; and, consequently, the clause respecting Turkish vessels, which belonged to a tripartite Treaty, remained as futile and absurd as Lord Melbourne described it to be. Great indignation was expressed by Prince Metternich, who, as I have it on the authority of the negotiator, did not fail to intimate to Lord Melbourne his suspicions of the quarter whence the blow was dealt. Having failed to obtain the support of England, he from that day resigned himself, and signed with Russia a Treaty for the interruption of the navigation of the Danube.

From the seizure of the "Vallaco," Parliament slumbered for sixteen months. At that period Mr. Herries rudely disturbed its equanimity, by proposing a vote of censure, in the form of an address to the Crown, imploring her Majesty to put an end to such proceedings as these on the part of her Ministers. He demanded "Why a Treaty had been signed in violation of the law, or why the law had not been altered to suit the Treaty?" Mr. Labouchere could only answer on the 6th July, 1840, that "Mr. Poulett Thomson was in Canada." But he, too, has his supposition; it differs from Lord Melbourne's. Some discussions, "he supposes," were going on at the time, which "*it would not be expedient to publish*;" he had consulted with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, *who had agreed with him*, that it was a subject which ought to be brought under the consideration of Parliament by the Government!"

Lord Palmerston—he was not in Canada, the Treaty was his, not Mr. Poulett Thomson's, he was the responsible person, and on the spot, and in the house—no one has troubled him with questions. He rises at the end of the debate, after the opposition had lost the thread and had swallowed "Mr. P. Thomson in Canada;" his task is easy, and is limited to sneering at the traffic of the West of the Euxine, as in 1836 he had scoffed at that of the East. By the Treaty, he informed the house, Austria was *precluded* from seeking, or asking from Turkey any *further privilege for Austrian vessels than were enjoyed by British vessels in Turkish*

ports! Austria, of course, must have been trying to overreach England. "It was *now* said that another Treaty with Russia would be necessary to *prevent the Turkish Government* being moved by any other influence to *exclude our vessels from the Danube.*" The question was the exclusion of British ships from Turkish ports, and Austrian vessels from Turkish ports, and Turkish vessels from her own ports—by Russia; but it seems, that on this, as on all other occasions, it is Turkey who, according to Lord Palmerston, is the aggressor.* He continues, "but according to the old Treaty between England and Turkey, British ships were entitled to enter the Turkish ports of the Danube, and as to their proceeding *to the higher part of the Danube that was secured by the Treaty of Vienna.*" So that the Treaty of Vienna does apply to the Danube, but not to its harbours!

This assertion of the rights which Russia had infringed is adduced as an argument against taking any steps to maintain them—is a denial of the very facts; for to assert that no measures were requisite to maintain British rights was to assert that no obstruction to British trade existed. What would have been said if Russia had argued, "You have no reason to complain of my quarantine establishments at the mouth of the Danube, of my visiting your vessels, or exacting a toll from them, because you have free right of navigation in this river, by your Treaties with Turkey, and by the Treaty of Vienna?" An English Minister can say for her what she cannot say for herself; he can do for her by a word what all her armies could not effect.

Lord Palmerston admitted that the Treaty of Vienna applied to the Danube only when he could declare that Treaty null and of no effect; a Treaty violated in one point is violated in all; and he admitted that it was violated by the confiscation of Cracow,—an act which he then explained by England's physical inability to prevent it. Austria,

* Speaking of the war of 1828 he says, "I say that Turkey had violated her treaties with Russia, and had been induced to commit acts of aggression against Russia."—*23d February, 1848.*

repulsed and betrayed in her attempted federation with England in reference to the Danube, had joined in the confiscation of Cracow. Russia was thus doubly in flagrant hostility against England; yet, at the mouths of the Danube, there were soundings for line-of-battle ships. It was nine days after this declaration that she signed a Treaty sent from St. Petersburg (15 July, 1840) which stipulates the eventual occupation of the Turkish capital by a Russian military and naval force; the Foreign Secretary justified this step by his "entire conviction" of Russia's good faith, and the identity of her policy and interests with those of Great Britain.

But the consequence of the act which more particularly concerns us is the Danube Treaty between Austria and Russia. It stipulates that those vessels only are to enter which belong to countries "having a right to navigate the Black Sea," and who "are at peace with Russia."* In 1822, she in like manner claimed the right of converting the North Pacific into a *mare clausum*: the pretension was indeed abandoned, but only in consequence of the undiplomatic resolution of the Americans to arm their trading vessels. She has obtained the exclusion of the men-of-war of all European countries from the Black Sea: the next step is to make it a *mare clausum* also for merchantmen. As regards any resistance from the Western Powers she has nothing to apprehend; there remains to dare nothing more than what she has done. She has baffled every attempt of the House of Commons, of the Sovereign of England, of the Government of Austria, to open the river which she has closed. She has done so without having to apply force, or to utter threats. Her preponderance and conquests are secured on the prostration of character and honour in the

* Treaty of the Danube between Austria and Russia, July, 1840: — "Les navires marchands Autrichiens, ainsi que ceux de toute autre nation, ayant le droit de naviger dans la mer noire, et qui est en paix avec la Russie, pourront entrer librement dans les embouchures navigables de Danube, le remonter, le descendre, &c."

Parliament of England—a securer ground of dominion than any strength of her own.

The difficulty of credence constitutes here the difficulty of sight: people cannot trust their very eyes. But the same process has been over and over again repeated in the Treaties proposed with Persia, Turkey, the small states of Italy, Naples, and France. In respect to the latter Lord Palmerston, on the 1st of March, 1848, coupled it with that of Turkey, and attributed to me its “details.” The general bearing of all coincided with that with Turkey,—on that the battle had been fought, and that carried, the plan of a general league of free commercial intercourse followed as a matter of course: I had no more than this to do with either the French, Austrian, or Neapolitan Treaties: I was, however, conversant with them in every stage, from the beginning to the end. Well, the Treaty with France was a matter of the gravest importance, it opened the prospect of traffic to the amount of many millions yearly. The gentleman selected for the negotiation refused to go Paris, unless on the assurance that Lord Palmerston would not be allowed to interfere; he received that assurance, and it availed him nothing. All this has been alleged in Parliament,* and Lord Palmerston is

* “Mr. Porter, then of the Board of Trade, has lately been promoted to a higher office. I presume, therefore, that he enjoys the confidence of the colleagues of the noble Lord. Now, on this gentleman’s being selected in 1840,—before the Treaty of July,—by the then colleagues of the noble lord, in consequence of his connection with the Board of Trade, to negotiate a treaty of commerce with France, Mr. Porter informed those ministers that he was confident that, whatever treaty he might negotiate for such a purpose, would be interfered with by the noble lord,—and either brought to nothing, or, as in the case of the Turkish treaty, perverted to the ruin of its objects. Mr. Porter, therefore, demanded and obtained this condition from the then ministry—that the treaty should be kept out of the Foreign Office; and that he should not be called upon to report to, or to receive any instructions whatever from the noble lord, or his department, in the conduct of that negotiation. On the faith of that condition alone he undertook the mission. It is further stated, on the same gentleman’s authority, and in the same document, that he brought

silent; had it been groundless, nothing could have been more easy than a refutation?

Thus were cast away at once the good-will and co-operation of the Austrian Government, which while setting free the Danube, would have unlocked the resources of the Provinces, and, at a time when restrictive barriers were raised against them in the West, have afforded an entrance to British goods into Germany. On the 1st of June, 1829, Lord Palmerston declared an "Austro-Turkish alliance" to be "dangerous" to England; in 1838, *he* substituted for it an Austro-Russian.

But the Treaty was to have been tripartite, including Turkey, so that the three Governments would have been united in a league for mutual defence, their common shield would have been planted on the Pruth, the link uniting the Principalities with Turkey would have been strengthened, the attempts of Russia to implant her influence foiled, and, under the shadow of this security, those resources would be developed, which in course of time would have quietly removed Russia from her menacing position as an ambitious Power.

Considering what England's conduct has been, how wonderful that such a plan should have emanated from its own breast, how much more so, that having so emanated, its own Minister had to thwart it, and most of all, that he should have been successful in doing so by the ignorance of the Parliamentary Leaders, of the commonest geographic facts, and of the application of the Navigation Laws. Though Russia has her all at stake, by that ignorance alone has she saved her venture.

the matter to a happy conclusion—and that in spite of the precautions he had taken, and the conditions he had exacted, that treaty was at length set aside by the noble lord. There is no doubt that the direct act of the noble lord occasioned this failure. I state this on the authority of Mr. Porter, and I refer to the fact of his recent appointment, as showing, that notwithstanding that declaration was made in 1841, the noble lord has not induced his colleagues to disgrace that gentleman."—*Speech of Mr. Anstey, 23d Feb. 1848.*

nience is temporary, and will no doubt cease when its cause has also ceased ; but I am bound to say that, for many years past, the Government have had reason to complain of the neglect of the Government of Russia to perform its *duties* as possessor of the territory of which the delta of the Danube is composed, and to maintain the channel of the Sulina in an efficient navigable state. (Hear, hear.) It was my duty, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to make *frequent representations* to the Russian Government on the subject ; and Russia, although she always admitted that it was her duty to do so—admitting that which we asserted—that as Russia thought fit, by virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople, to possess herself of the mouths of the Danube, that great watercourse and highway of nations, leading into the centre of Germany, it was her duty to see that that great highway was maintained and made accessible (according to the Treaty of Vienna) to the commerce of all nations. (Hear, hear.) Russia *never disputed that statement*, and she asserted always that she was employed in using means to remedy the grievance. The grievance was this—that while these mouths of the Danube formed part of the Turkish territory, there was maintained a depth of 16 feet on the bar, whereas, by the neglect of the Russian authorities the depth had diminished to 11 feet, and even those 11 feet were reduced to a small and narrow channel from obstructions on the side, from sand-banks, and from vessels wrecked and sunk (when sunk ?) and allowed to remain there, so that it was difficult for any vessel to pass, except in calm weather and with a skilful pilot. (Hear.) We were also aware that there were *local interests* that tended to thwart what we believed to be the intentions of the Russian Government. In the first place there was *rivalship on the part of Odessa*, where there existed a desire to obstruct the export of produce by the Danube, and to direct it, if possible, by way of Odessa. (Hear.) There were also those little local interests which arise from the *profits that bargemen and lightermen*, and persons of that class, make by unloading the steamers that come down the Danube, so as to enable them

to pass the bar, reloading them again outside the bar. These local feelings and interests must have obstructed, *without their being aware of it*, the good intentions of the Russian Government, for they always promised they would take the most effectual measures. They said they would send a steam-dredge to carry away all the obstructions on the bar. The steam-dredge came, and the steam-dredge worked, but in two hours it was always put out of gear from some accident or other (a laugh), and they were obliged to go back to Odessa for repairs. (A laugh.) We recommended that the Russian Government should pursue the method by which the Turkish Government kept the channel clear. That method was a very simple one. They required every vessel that went out of the Danube to tack to their stern a good iron rake, and by that means the passage of each vessel kept the channel clear, a depth of sixteen feet being constantly maintained. (Hear, hear.) I understand that, in addition to the representations I made when at the Foreign Office, constant and emphatic representations have been made to the Russian Government on this subject, and I hope that that Government, while they *break through those trammels which hitherto seem to have impeded their proper action*, will see that it is a positive duty which they owe to Europe to maintain free and open that passage which, by force of arms, they obtained and which they believed themselves justified in retaining by the Treaty of Adrianople. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. LIDDELL directed the attention of the noble lord to the second part of his question, which he had not answered.

Lord PALMERSTON.—I apprehend the question of the hon. gentleman relates to vessels which are now confined within the Danube and the Russian territory for want of water. If, by any misfortune, which I cannot anticipate, war should arise between this country and Russia, *it would not be easy for a British ship of war to get up to those vessels without water.* (Laughter.)

CHAPTER V.

Canal of the Danube.

THE face of the earth presents no invitation to enterprise comparable to this. The facility of execution reduces to dimensions, not exceeding the resources of a parish, a work which would unite and enrich two quarters of the globe, which would add in security and wealth to the Empire, more than the conquest of a powerful kingdom.

The Danube, running in nearly a straight line from the centre of Hungary, to within a few miles of the coast, suddenly turns up to the North, and after a devious and intricate course, loses itself through shallower channels, amongst noxious marshes, in the Black Sea. Its useless wanderings extend a hundred and fifty miles, carrying it away from the direction of its usefulness, and bringing its navigation within autumn's fatal miasmata, and winter's icy chains. But the degrees of northing it attains exposes it to worse infection than that which strikes the flesh, and to more benumbing thrall than that of polar snows: the fabled dragon of the Pontine eastern coast, called to-day into virulent existence, guards and covers the inhospitable western shore; guards but to crush, covers to devour. From these to set free the kings of rivers—to open the floodgates of fertility on the heaven-blessed and man-cursed Dacian plains; to cast off—no, to escape from,—the hard dominion of lawless might and direr craft, such are the guerdons of a labour which every consideration of prudence recommends to the wonder-working ingenuity of our Phœnician times.

The exports of the countries watered by the Danube have to pass through the Bosphorus to reach their ultimate destination, so that for commercial purposes, the river may be considered a continuation of those straits and the Dardanelles : in former times these were considered a continuation of the Danube. The winding of the river lengthens the voyage two or three hundred miles but the difference in time has to be calculated by months. The marshy nature of the country through which the crews have to track the vessels to the ports of shipment, occasions loss of life ; and the accumulation of sand at the only mouth, necessitates the unloading of vessels of any size ; political and sanitary obstacles affect vessels of every class and nation, and consequently the freights are so much increased as to amount to a charge of fifty per cent. on the staple produce of the country.

The proposed canal would bring the Danube straight out into the Euxine, clear of obstruction, fever, and violence ; and for all practical purposes, the inland countries of Transylvania, Serbia, and Hungary would find themselves possessed of a maritime coast.

These countries have not yet gone through our laborious experience, in advancing from the pack-saddle to the cart, track-boat and railway waggon ; they have not made even the first step.* They would at once attain to the most perfect communications being destitute of the worst. By reference to the map, it will be seen, that the river passes along the great plain of Hungary, and afterwards takes the very centre of the rich alluvial lands, lying between the Carpathians and the Hæmus : these are the two largest and richest plains in Europe ; they are inhabited by 23,000,000 of an almost exclusively agricultural and pastoral population. The tributary Theisse traverses the centre of the plain lands of Hungary ; the Save comes down almost from the head of the Adriatic :

* Yet springs are a Hungarian invention, first applied by Matthias Corvinus to relieve his gouty leg ; and from the village, where his essay was made, Cotzi, comes our "coach." The Turks still retain the original word.

various small confluent affords limited ranges of navigation transversely through Wallachia; and the Pruth and the Sereth bring down the produce of Moldavia: from the north and from the west all the communications converge to that point where the river is nearest to the Black Sea, and to Constantinople. The river in itself, and its chief confluent, present an inland navigation of two thousand miles; the stream is not rapid; vessels, properly rigged and managed, might aid themselves greatly by sails, but in consequence of its being shut out from the sea every process is rude and barbarous; in fact, nothing has been done by art, to turn to account the incalculable resources of this region, or to profit by the unrivalled facilities of this river.

It would be natural to suppose that this work has been hitherto prevented by obstructions such as rocks, mountains, or sand. There is, however, nothing of the kind; in fact the Danube anciently discharged its water through this channel, and all that is to be effected is the reopening of the ancient mouth, which is indeed through half its course at present filled with water.

The western coast of the Black Sea is difficult and in- boardable; the canal would in a great measure be deprived of its utility if there were no port and no shelter for vessels at the point where it meets the sea; but it so happens that at that very point a headland runs out to the eastward, affording shelter. The ruins, no less than ancient reports, show that it has been a place of importance; although by the shoaling of the waters, and the drifting of the sands, it is now of comparative insignificance, it might however at very little cost be made to serve for the purposes of the canal.

In 1844 the Austrian government, in consequence of the interruption of its navigation for the larger vessels by the shoaling of the waters, and urged by the Austrian Lloyd Company, adopted this project, and sent engineers to make the necessary surveys, who estimated the expense at under half a million sterling. Negotiations were then opened with

the Turkish government ; it was not unfavourably disposed, yet difficulties arose, and altercations ensued, which were carried to such a pitch that the representative of Austria threatened to demand his passports, and the project was finally abandoned. It is said, however, that Russia expended £100,000 in bribes.

The Austrian project was for a ship canal, to enable her large steamers to pass up the river ; the expense was consequently calculated on this scale ; the facilities afforded by the long lake of Carasou had to be neglected. However, it is by no means requisite that the canal should be for seagoing ships ; if for smaller vessels the expense would be reduced one half, and considering the matter from the point of view of Turkish interests, greater advantages would accrue, for a new class of vessels would arise fitted for sea and river navigation. These would penetrate high into the interior, and by short and rapid voyages transfer at small cost the produce of the Danubian provinces to Constantinople, which would thus become the centre of the grain trade of the South, a trade which carries many others along with it. These small vessels would also be capable of being tracked by their crews against the currents of the Bosphorus, where the large seagoing vessels are sometimes detained for months.

The Black Sea contains immense maritime resources in timber, iron, hemp, pitch, at a quarter of the cost in Europe. Around its coasts there is a numerous maritime population to whom an impulse would be given by this new traffic, and a new class of vessels to be built. Meanwhile their enterprise would be let into the Danube and its confluent, where everything connected with navigation is of the rudest and most primitive description. Their barges being of the burden sometimes of 2000 tons are utterly unmanageable, the use of sails is scarcely known, and their oars are unfashioned pieces of wood. With all these advantages Turkey would obtain a nursery of native seamen, strengthening her in her weak point, and guarding her in her exposed quarter :

in this respect alone the Danube canal would be to her more important than Newfoundland to England. The Genoese, when they had their establishments at Galata and in the Crimea, had recourse to the same plan. They had a small class of vessels which navigated the Black Sea, and brought the corn down to Constantinople, whence the vessels from Europe carried it away.

By restricting the dimensions of the canal, the purpose of the larger one would be more than attained, without its expense: works at Kustendji, would be no longer required, for these hoys would be able to enter at once the basin opening on a tideless sea. This coast is not exposed to the dangers of the other portions of the Euxine. Fogs, low invisible coasts, deceptive appearances, or a current setting on shore, render perilous every other frequented port, such as the mouths of the Danube, Odessa, Taganrog, and the entrance of the Bosphorus. The current here sets off shore; the land is not low, and is well defined; against the prevailing westerly and northerly winds there is shelter; with a southerly wind there is no danger in making the coast; the holding ground is good. At the present rate of exportation, 2000 of these craft would be required, making five or six trips in the year; they would employ 15,000 seamen. The enterprise would thus be reduced to very manageable proportions, and the character of the workmanship brought nearer to the level of what the country can supply.

We may then be safe in setting down the cost as not above £2000 per mile for the cutting, or £1000 for dredging, banking, pile driving, &c. on the Lake of Carasou, which would bring the expense under £60,000, for the line itself; the entire expenditure would be amply covered by £200,000.

Everything consumed by 10,000,000 of people, every article produced on 60,000 square miles of arable land, would pass through it. A considerable proportion of what is consumed by other 16,000,000 of people and the larger amount of the exported produce of their 120,000 square

miles would also pass through it; with this latter country (Hungary)—traffic is actually impeded as regards imports by the Austrian Tariff; but this new opening would change that Tariff. The States of Austria, Galicia, Bohemia, the Hereditary States, and Bavaria, would feel, more or less, the benefit of this eastern passage to the sea, affording to them new markets and new supplies.

Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bulgaria produce the finest and the cheapest Indian corn, and if not the finest wheat, at least the cheapest within range of the Black Sea. The charges at present incurred on passing through the Danube amount to three shillings the quarter,* which is equal to twenty per cent. on the cost price of wheat, and fifty per cent. on that of Indian corn; under this charge the export amounts to 1,000,000 quarters, of which 450,000 directly, and 250,000 indirectly, reach England. An agriculturist of eastern reputation (Joanesko) calculates that a rise of price of ten per cent. would suffice to double the production for exportation in the Principalities. To those who have visited the provinces and Roumelia this statement will perhaps be more surprising than to strangers. The processes are so rude, the means of transport so cumbersome, the want of care in threshing and housing so great, the taxes and forced labour in Wallachia and Moldavia so oppressive, that the impression made through the

* *Statement of a London Broker.*—"Galatz and Ibrail are free ports. At Odessa there are great inconveniences from quarantine, heavy charges, uncertainty, venality, and your business is not discharged without some payments, as bribes, which a master must know how to manage; nevertheless we can take charters from Odessa at from 10s. 6d. to 3s. less per quarter than from the few ports of the Danube. These additional charges are incurred partly from the state of the river, partly from the nature of the climate, and from Russia. The lighterage is effected under contract with Russian boats, so that at times they charge what they like, and vessels are exposed to great risks. The climate in the autumn is so bad that great expense is incurred for medical aid: a vessel recently came home, having lost all her crew save two. The other charges are for quarantine, which is vexatious, and in the last degree hampering."

eye on the traveller is that of disbelief in any prosperity, and hopelessness of any amelioration. These impressions, as I know in my own case, can only be removed by unquestionable results.

Russian corn sells at an advance over that of the Danube of ten per cent. for soft wheat, twenty for hard. This difference does not result from the soil, but from want of care in the selection of seed, cleanliness in threshing, attention to housing, &c., all of which would disappear under the effects of a steady demand. The charges by the Danube exceed those at Odessa by nearly one and a half piastres per kilo, or twenty per cent. on the cost price. Russia thus enjoys a fictitious advantage of from thirty to forty per cent.; by it her export trade alone subsists: against it the Provinces not only contend, but have created their present commerce, which only commenced in 1834. The total charges on all grain supplied from Russia are calculated at fifteen per cent. In the Turkish Province of Bulgaria, south of the Danube, grain is charged the tithe, and a local tax (*salian*) which may amount to as much more; but then comes the export duty of the English Treaty, which imposes twenty per cent. more, raising the duty to forty per cent. In the Provinces north of the Danube, the English Treaty is not in operation, but the charges upon the Danube are nearly equivalent to it, yet when a sudden demand arises, Turkey can export from the Provinces north and south of the Danube as much as the whole of Southern Russia and one fifth more. It will thus be apparent that either by lowering the charges on the Danube, or by abrogating the export duty, the only limit to this exportation would be the necessities of Europe.

But grain is not the only produce. Wallachia contains mountains of salt, which would supply the whole of the Levant. Operations of this description, and the impulse given to enterprise, would doubtless lead to the re-opening of the ancient mines of which Russia has already endeavoured to

obtain possession, and to which she proposed to send 40,000 miners to work. Another important freight for the canal would be timber, and staves, from the oak forests of Serbia, and the upper parts of Wallachia. The herds and flocks are worth, at present, little more than their hides, skins, wool, and tallow: with their extension, what limit is there to the supply of tallow and hides? * Already they export 2000 tons of tallow, and it is the best in the world: † Nor must the pigs of Serbia be forgotten, either as live-stock, or cured. Constantinople would be supplied with cattle for slaughter, and at one quarter of the meat consumption of Englishmen, would require 100,000 head; which with the prevailing currents and winds would reach the Bosphorus in forty-eight hours.

Whatever the Provinces gain by their exportation, they immediately expend on foreign goods: the greater portion of which is already from England; but the whole would come from England, were it not for the obstructions so often referred to. In 1849, £539,712 sterling in value, (10,000 tons bulk,) were shipped direct from London and Liverpool, and it is estimated that the Russian Consul's fees thereon amounted to £13,000. I have before me an account of fees paid by a shipping house; the following are specimens:—

Ships.

— 128 tons, Consul fees	£80 18 8
— 155 ditto	83 15 8
— 117 ditto	84 8 4

But these are not the only charges; there are cases and tarpaulins, which are required for making up the packages, by the Russian regulations, of the expense of which I cannot

* The cattle are at present exposed to epidemic diseases, which commit frightful ravages. This is entirely owing to want of winter shelter and provender.

† Those who use the blow-pipe know alone its value; it gives the best light, and clearest flame, owing to the careful application of heat in rendering it.

The Turkish Government if it received nothing, even if it advanced the whole of the capital, without receiving any of the return, would still be a gainer. It would save the money at present sent to Odessa, to buy grain for the capital and the troops, and that expended in the contrivances for regulating the exchange; it would profit indirectly from the increase of wealth of the capital, become the centre of the grain trade; it would feel in every branch of its revenue the £3,000,000 poured in, in yearly repayment for harvests gathered from fields now lying waste, or for grain rotting in the granaries, or actually burnt on the threshing-floor; lastly, it would have the tithe on every object exported, which is equivalent to an export duty of ten per cent.

But to realise these advantages, there must be a relaxation of the export duty as regards grain: not a penny is at present received from this tax, for that exported by the Danube pays none. The duty is only maintained from the notion carefully instilled that they are *bound* by the English Treaty to exact the sum it specifies; yet already they have reduced it, though not indeed on articles competing with Russian produce: they have allowed the free exportation of carpets, reduced the duty by more than one-third on valonia, one-half on manufactured silks from Aleppo, and the Pasha of Egypt has reduced the transit duty from three to half per cent.

This enterprise would augment the military strength of the empire. By means of steam, and with this passage, the contingents of the remotest Provinces, in case of a war, might in a few days be distributed over the whole line of operations. The canal, with the city that would soon arise upon its border, would necessitate the strengthening of that important plain of the Dobroja, so singularly neglected to this day. This channel would bind still closer the alliance between the Danubian Provinces and the Porte, and would connect with the Ottoman Empire the material well-being of Hungary; these populations would find on the Bosphorus

the centre of their commercial activity, no less than that of their political defence.

The Turkish government has expended £40,000 upon a futile and absurd plan, which has ultimately failed, the road from Trebizond to Erzerum. Its ostensible object was to save the transit duties on the trade to Persia. If it was an object to prevent this trade with the centre of Asia from falling into the hands of Russia, surely it is no less, to rescue out of her hands that of the centre of Europe. If Russia can be beaten on the east of the Black Sea, she surely can also be discomfited on the west—if indeed !*

The English government so anxious to further the one project, nay so violent for its execution, can it be indifferent to the other? If England possesses influence in Turkey, and uses it to lead her into the ways of progress and civilisation, surely this was the occasion. When Austria, in 1844, pressed her scheme to the utmost of her power and Russia set to work to oppose her, did England come forward with influence or counsel? No! she left Russian threats and gold to win the day. At the close of 1850 the plan was revived, and the Porte was so favourably disposed, as to appoint a Commission to examine it. *Russia then never moved*, for England awaking from her trance suggested a counter-project—a railway from Silistria to Varna!

Even in Europe, railways are not found to pay for traffic alone. Here the merchandise is of the heaviest kind, and the lowest value; the great export of the provinces being of less value than coal in England. The distance is double that of the canal. The capital required would be at least six times greater, and the traffic of the canal would *not* pass over it: who would advance the money, when in three or four months the canal might be cut. The profits of the enterprise and its value for Turkey, must depend on admitting sea-going vessels in the Danube, or on bringing the vessels

* "The English ambassador has become a Russian engineer." Such was the remark of a person holding a large place in the public eye, when he heard of the military road from Trebizond to Erzerum.

of the Danube to the sea. One of the chief sources of profit would be rafts of timber, which never could support transit by rail. It was this last consideration that induced the Council to negative the project of the railroad, but the end had been gained, the *canal* was dropped.

In this case I have no Parliamentary, or diplomatic evidence to produce, the matter was managed in secret; but it is no secret at Constantinople that it was the English Ambassador who set himself against the plan; and in such points as these the influence of England no doubt is successfully exerted. It is a curious fact that the Foreign Secretary who could not influence, except by his individual vote, and that given openly and under responsibility as a member of Parliament, the construction of any English Railway, however insignificant, should be able by a whisper never in the ordinary course to transpire, to frustrate in a Foreign State an operation of the greatest magnitude and benefit. Having once, in consequence of this and such like acts, asked in Parliament for the production of the instructions which he expedited for the Government of the Ottoman Empire, which as he was not responsible to it, he was bound at least to communicate to those by whose power he acted, he replied:—

“It is obvious that any communication of that sort generally passes between Governments which are on the most friendly and confidential footing, and from the very nature of the case, such communications must not be made by one party, nor required by the other, except with the perfect understanding that they are not to be made the subject of discussion.”

This plan was originally proposed twenty years ago, if carried then into effect the Principalities might have benefited up to this time, to the extent of from 100 to 120 millions sterling paid to them for raw produce, and England might have had, by this time, in the Black Sea, customers to the amount of six or seven millions sterling.

The strength of a nation depends, as we have been told long ago, upon its alliances, or in other words, upon the respect

that is borne to it. In this kind of power Turkey has, in recent times, rapidly progressed; there is no measure which could more raise it in the estimation of Europe than this; it would be looked upon as an evidence of political foresight, no less than as an earnest of the faculty of imitating Europe in things really beneficial. As to the obstacle, it is impossible to offer to the Porte a stronger argument than its own example. If it has braved Russia by forming an army, it can brave her also by cutting a ditch. A canal may be as desirable as an army. In the one case it had enormous difficulties to contend with; in the other, there are none; European capital and science are at its disposal; the goodwill of all Europe, is at the disposal of Turkey, from the moment it is seen that she has resolved to act for herself.

N.B.—The *Times* waited till the 2d of July, 1853, to write:—

“If anything be done by the Russians to intercept that important channel of trade, or to prevent the free export of corn from the Danubian ports, the question will become one of universal interest. * * * This reminds us of the extreme importance, both commercial and political, of re-opening the ancient mouth of the Danube. * * * A ship canal would cut off two hundred miles of intricate river navigation, and place the outlet *far from the Russian frontier*. We shall not lose sight of these countries again until their condition and their political rights are more satisfactorily settled.”

On the 8th of July it had to write:—

“All the money, all the ships, and all the sea in the World cannot prevent Russia from doing what she is now doing—taking military occupation of the Danubian provinces. If we proceed to hostilities now, it must be to stop this process, and we might as well attempt to stop the north wind in its passage from Russia to the Mediterranean.”

CHAPTER VI.

The Evacuation of the Principalities in 1851.

WHILE Russia has been advancing thus gradually and unobtrusively her diplomatic hold over the Danube and the Black Sea, a fact of a very different character and one well calculated to occasion surprise meets us in the evacuation of the Principalities, effected at a moment when she appeared all powerful. The circumstance derives immediate interest from events now pending, and deserves mention if only because it has remained unknown.

The tenure of the Porte has long appeared of the most precarious kind, but it has strengthened itself—certainly not as the result of dexterity and care—in proportion as events occurred which seemed calculated to dissolve it. The Porte seemed to have no task on its hands but to accomplish or anticipate the wishes of its rival. We have seen Russia with periodical regularity marching into these Dependencies without contention or resistance; but it has so happened that she has had with equal regularity to walk back again. It might be that the people, however disgusted with the Turks, had still some disgust in reserve for the Kalmucks, and that at all events they preferred to liberating armies they had to feed, tyrants they never saw. The ill will of the people against the Turks was exaggerated; they could not misrule much, where they did not rule at all; nor be very ferocious where never present. Their haughty carelessness removed deep grounds of opposition, and their subjects could not suspect them of insidious designs, far less of theoretic views, against their independence. Their barbarism was sterling, a barbarism of gold, beside the pinchbeck civilisation of the Russians; it was a

barbarism ignorant and stupid; it inflicted neither conscription nor serfage; warred with no peculiarity of tongue, opinion, or habit; and did not bless the nations with uniformity or centralisation. Now Russia's business was to teach both lessons to the Porte; for, from the day that it proposed to *unite the Principalities*, she became mistress on the Danube,—nay, her sway would have extended, if her flag was not there unfurled, to the heights of the Bosphorus and the fortresses of the Dardanelles. So far she did succeed as to have administrative transformed into diplomatic questions, and thus transferred the decision of all cases to Constantinople, there to be managed by Dragomans, and settled by a FIRMAN: that, is, by arbitrary decrees such as the *Ordonnances* of Algeria. Governing by Firman was a *quasi* “administrative union;” for it was a violation of the guaranteed privileges of the Principalities, subjecting them to the general administration of the empire, without the conditions or guarantees on which that administration rests. However, the people persisted in referring these acts not to the Turks whom they believed to be stupid, but to the Russians whom they knew to be artful. The Principalities, often irritated, were never alienated, and the periodical success of Russian craft prepared the regular return of Turkish apathy.

In presence of the Russian army of occupation, so complete was the ascendancy regained by the Porte in 1850, that while in one of the Provincial capitals the Turkish Commissioner was received with every demonstration of enthusiasm not one even of the Boyards would visit or receive visits from the Russian Commander-in-chief; yet the one is a distinguished general and writer, the other a young untried man, recently filling no higher post than that of clerk in the Foreign Office.

It is supposed that religion gives to Russia here a great hold; the mistake is as complete as it is universal. Everywhere throughout the East, Russia has lost that lever from its too frequent use and its disastrous effects; elsewhere she sends religious bribes, silver chalices, brocade vestments, painted missals, psalteries, and pensions: on the Principa-

lities she imposes a religious tax, amounting to twelve times their tribute to the Porte, £20,000 is paid to the one, £250,000 to the other. It is paid indeed in the shape of the revenues of Monasteries, &c., and goes to Greek Priests, but these are not native; it is Russia who maintains the Impost, and who uses it to repay political services. Thus it was that the priesthood took the lead, in their canonicals, in the ovation prepared for the Turkish troops when they crossed the Danube in 1848; and so entirely are the sympathies of the people and their old traditions associated with Mussulman greatness, that in the popular song for General Bem, he is known as *Murad Pasha*.

It is in these favourable dispositions of the Principalities towards Turkey, and their aversion to Russia, that for the last century has resided the security of the Ottoman Empire. Were these dispositions reversed it would have already been handed over to the Czar to "preserve its integrity and independence." It will suffice to state, that it is impossible for Russia to act by military force upon the Ottoman Empire from the Pruth; and that even from the Danube she can operate only by the aid of the resources she draws from the Principalities.

As regards the future, an attack upon the Ottoman Empire is out of the question; she will operate by means of internal schism and revolt, and will bring herself within reach so as to take advantage of it by a prior occupation of the Principalities, for which the ambiguous position she has created for them by Diplomatic means, will afford the occasion. An attempt of this kind was made in 1850, when her army was there: it was not successful, but the circumstance is too instructive not to be mentioned: the plan was so bold and extensive that, as it has failed, it will with difficulty be credited; it was believed at the time by persons placed in the highest positions, and there are facts too authentic and numerous to admit of doubt.

Nothing less was devised than a revolution in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Serbia, with a simultaneous one in Syria, con-

certed with the Pasha of Egypt: the Sultan himself was to be taken off; a revolution at Bucharest would have justified the reinforcement of the army of occupation by 50,000 men collected at Bessarabia, and so 70,000 Russians might have marched on Adrianople to place a New Sultan on the throne, whilst a squadron dropped down from Sevastapol to the Bosphorus, to *save* the Capital and *protect* the Christians.

The scheme failed, because such schemes are more easy to plan than to execute; because in fact, at the time it was not executable. The Bulgarian revolution was impracticable without the support of Serbia—Serbia acted against it. The Admiral's ship was blown up in the Golden Horn, but the ministers had not at the moment arrived on board. A draught prepared for the Sultan, was swallowed by an Eunuch; * the Syrian insurrection failed because Bem had been sent to Aleppo to be out of the way. The revolution

* There is no secret as to the name of the physician who prepared the draught—Dr. Spitzer. To the indignation of the Seraglio, the Sultan would not allow him to be put to death, but dismissed him to Vienna with a pension. The circumstance having been detailed in a pamphlet which reached Vienna in June, 1852, a mystification was put forth on the 28th of August in the *Augsburg Gazette*, by pretending a new conspiracy in that year and confounding it with that of 1850. I extract a passage.

“The Sultan's physician, Dr. Spitzer, has been suddenly removed, and appointed Councillor of the Turkish Legation at Vienna. There are many stories afloat, the most probable one is that Dr. Spitzer was offered an enormous sum by the reactionary party if he would poison the Sultan, and threatened with a speedy death if he refused. The Doctor showed the letter to the Sultan, and has been removed to save him from danger. Last time it was the Sultan's brother, whom it was attempted to gain over, but who made the Sultan aware of what was going on The journey of the Sultan to Chalki, to visit the new Marine School, was to be taken advantage of to carry out the views of the conspirators, when the Sultana Valide sent a steamer after the Sultan, to make known the conspiracy to him. Many persons have been arrested, and various Pashas have disappeared. People too have recollected that on that very day two years, when the Sultan was to have gone on board, the Admiral's ship blew up.”

at Bucharest did not take place, because Achmet Effendi happened to fill the office of Imperial Commissioner.

At Aleppo, however, an outbreak did take place, and it affords us the opportunity of tracing the conspiracy to its source, and of showing the preparations made in Europe for profiting by the catastrophe had it been more signal and general.

A certain Armenian, named Yazmadji, implicated in the attempt to assassinate Kossuth,* and generally reputed to be a poisoner, arrived at Aleppo, accompanied by eight Hungarian renegades. These men were paraded about the public places in Mussulman costume; in a few days they recanted and publicly reviled Islam, the deadliest offence to Mahomedans, they then took refuge at the different consulates. Other exasperating circumstances were not wanting, and the insurrection followed. It has been attributed to a reaction of fanaticism against the new order of things, but Europeans were not maltreated after Navarino: if it had been so, how should the Armenians and Jews have been spared and the popular fury directed only against the Franks, Catholics, and Greeks?

After the rage of the people had been exerted against the Franks and the Consuls, the Arabs of the Desert, with admirable instinct, arrived. No Yazmadji had been amongst them, but they had gone to Egypt, and had returned, each man, with gold in his sack, some ten, some twenty, some thirty thousand dollars.

Within the shortest time the intelligence of the events of Aleppo could reach St. Petersburg, that capital was astounded at the appearance of a leader in the "Northern Bee," the special organ of the Emperor. There Abbas Pasha was vindicated against charges of treason, whilst at Constantinople everything was explained by the repugnance of the Arabs to the conscription!

* A case into which the English Embassy instituted an inquiry, and concluded for the reality of the charge; at least it allowed that belief to be entertained at Pera.

The alertness of the editor of the "Northern Bee" was not a solitary incident: the instant the news reached London the English Minister wrote to Paris to suggest the necessity of measures against the Ottoman Empire. The English Ambassador hastens to the Foreign Office, General La Hitte listens with profound attention. The Representative of Russia happens to call at the same moment, and is waiting in an adjoining room. The Protocol is in the very act of parturition, when the door opens and a *chef de bureau* enters and places in the hands of the General-Minister the official report of General Bem, which had reached Paris in an unofficial manner.*

By this document the total loss of life at Aleppo was reduced to fifteen, and the explosion of fanaticism was explained as arising from obscure and foreign intriguers; the measures adopted by the Government were stated to have arrested the disorders, and its resolution was declared to punish the delinquents. So fell, still-born, the Protocol, and the Representatives of England and Russia had to return to their respective hotels *re infectâ*. The French Government, which is sometimes given to oscillations, having desisted from smiting the Porte by a "coalition," raised it to the skies in an article in "La Patrie;" and the Government, against whom in the morning was to be evoked a crusade of revolution and Christianity was, in the evening, held up to the theatres and clubs of Paris as a model of firmness and moderation. The *Chef de Bureau*, however, not being sufficiently Russian for the Foreign Department, was transferred to another: and Bem, who had killed both insurrection and Protocol, was despatched to the other world. †

* This statement was made to me at the time in Constantinople; I have no means of testing its accuracy; but it partly rested on a report of Callimachi.

† The English Ambassador at Constantinople interposed to prevent the Porte from conferring any mark of favour on General Bem. Into the circumstances of his death an inquiry was instituted by confidential agents who reported that the treatment of his malady (intermittent fever) had been such as to ensure a fatal issue.

It is no unlikely thing that such events under such circumstances should occur. What else indeed can be expected with a foreign army in occupation—the occupying Power being the most artful and unscrupulous of Governments, and the occupied state the most harmless and negligent? The circumstances which I detail are but the programme to be again rehearsed, and over and over again until it passes from fiction to reality. No wonder that after such an escape Turkey should have endeavoured to get rid of its alarming guests, the marvel only is that it should have succeeded.

The Principalities, however, afford to Turkey the most advantageous of fields for diplomatic contest. There Russia can neither put forward her allies, nor, as in Egypt, Syria, or Greece, play upon their mutual jealousies. Freed from such entanglements, Turkey is morally if not intellectually a match for Russia. It may be difficult to move the Turks, but once they have resolved, they will adhere to their point with more pertinacity, and carry it out with as much dexterity as any people on earth.

The most offensive feature of the occupation was the charge for the support of the Russian troops, exacted without Treaty or Warrant, the expenses of the Turkish troops conjointly occupying, being entirely defrayed by their own Government. The resources of the Provincial Government having failed, the Russian General offered to open for them a credit on St. Petersburg, and so by supplying the Russians, they had become indebted to Russia. It was on this point that the Porte determined to raise the question and she waited for an occasion.

The Hospodar of Wallachia, Stirbey, had proposed to place his son in the Russian diplomatic service: on this Achmet Effendi, Commissioner of the Porte, had taken offence. A Hospodar lies on no bed of roses when the Porte declares itself his adversary; and to regain its good will it was well worth making sacrifices. The Hospodar commissioned his agent to deliver to the Grand Vizier a memoir in which it

was stated that the Province could no longer bear the burden of the Russian troops, and urging the Porte to take measures for their removal, or for the reimbursement of the Provincial treasury. On presenting it, the agent said, "You will see that the Prince is not so black as Achmet Effendi would make you believe." The Grand Vizier replied, "Very well, we will see what we can do for him." A few days afterwards the Russian dragoman, M. Aristarchi, went to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to suggest, that if the Porte was not inclined to withdraw *its troops*, and *its Commissioner*, it need not proceed on the application of the Prince.

The Porte did however proceed, and transmitted a formal demand for the Evacuation, which left Constantinople upon the 15th January. On the 21st, M. Titoff took occasion informally and verbally to communicate to Ali Pasha that the proposal would meet with no obstruction, as he had already received the orders of his Court to make it! No steamer had arrived, and no messenger; no communication could have reached M. Titoff for the eight previous days.

Either M. Titoff had by anticipation been armed with powers to meet this contingency, or he acted under an unmistakable necessity presented by the case. That necessity consisted in the hostile dispositions of the Principalities and in the respectable disciplined force now possessed by Turkey. It must also be observed that the immediate object of the occupation had been accomplished by the subjugation of Hungary, and that the Russian troops in contact with the Turkish, so much better paid and fed, were being inoculated with disaffection to that degree, that the regiments already relieved, had been dispersed and sent in small bodies to remote stations.

If it was requisite to yield—than was it desirable to do so with promptitude and grace, so as to preserve a footing of confidential friendship, which would give her the control of the future measures of the Porte, and *prevent it from taking steps by which her future return would be rendered impossible.*

The Turks having themselves seized and sent away the leading men opposed to the Russians, and the Government being in the hands of her partisans or faction, it would be easy to fire off a revolution; this would be the signal for the return of her army, or it may return on any other pretext—then it will return *alone*, there will be no Turkish army or Commissioner. The political evacuation can take place only when the Porte on withdrawing her soldiers shall cause the provisional system to cease, by giving them a simple and intelligible charter by which to govern themselves. This indeed constituted a part of the original plan of the Porte and would have been carried out if Russia had exhibited any signs of resistance, or even of hesitation; but the unexpected facility of her assent confounded the Turkish Government and made them suspect that they had fallen into a trap. One of the members said “we thought we had hit her a heavy blow—she smiles and thanks us.”

At the critical moment of the negotiation, on the 21st January, the British ambassador, after having been refused a private audience, at a public audience represented to the Sultan, his Ministers as having lost the confidence of England, and being unworthy of that of their master.* As to France, not that her word matters one way or the other, she was sending in an ultimatum, and breathing flames about the Holy Places. Thus Turkey, being relieved from her officious friends, achieved the greatest diplomatic victory which her annals have to record; but that does not prevent the Great Governments of the West from claiming as a diplomatic triumph, the having driven back 50,000 Russian soldiers five hundred miles, and that too, when preparing to sign the Danish Protocol!

* The day before, the Russian Minister sent to the chiefs of the adverse party, to inform them of the step which next day the English Ambassador would take, and of the language he would hold.

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PART II.

THE LEVANT AND RED SEA.

CHAPTER I.

Commercial Resources and Legislation of Turkey.

THE Greek Byzantine Emperors, whom the populace of Constantinople raised at pleasure to the throne, or hurled into the dust, had above all things to provide—*cheap bread*. The neighbouring provinces were consequently prohibited from exporting wheat; but this, like all other attempts against nature, instead of supplying the capital, depressed and exasperated the provinces, and ended by ruining the Empire.

The Turkish system was simplicity itself; it enacted by law, and sealed by religion, that rule of administration which belongs to the earliest times. Unfortunately, however, the Greek system was not entirely blotted out with the Greek Empire, and, without the necessity, the Sultans followed the practice of their predecessors, so far as to prohibit the exportation of grain.

This state of things lasted 376 years, from 1453 till 1829, when, after many ages of security, Constantinople was once more placed between foes on the North and South, traffic by sea was stopped, and she was in want of bread. She had still the two continents open, but the corn administration (Moubaya), invented to feed the capital, blockaded it as effectually by land as the Russian squadrons by sea. Under the presence of absolute famine the old laws were suspended, and instantly plenty reappeared.

Since Russia obtained access to the Black Sea, her attention has been given to the cultivation of wheat. Her soil, her climate, the distance at which she is placed, a difficult navigation, and a frozen sea during several months of the year, presented to such an enterprise great obstacles: the Bosphorus, too, was then closed against this commerce. Her perseverance has triumphed over all, even to the causing of the prohibition to be repealed by the Porte for the passage outward of her corn, while for that of Turkey it was retained in force. Across the narrow seas of the Ottomans, and between their vast uncultivated plains, Russia sent her cargoes to the markets of Europe, and received in return those monies which place her in the position to aim at the empire of a reasoning but stupid age—a warlike but venal world.

The Turkish Empire is composed of countries that in former times were the most flourishing on earth. The conditions of the tenure of land, the relations between proprietor and occupier, present no systematic impediment to prosperity. It possesses the most remarkable natural facilities for transport. The sea, which only washes the borders of other states, penetrates into its centre, and gives it a maritime coast of about 1200 leagues, or twice and a half that of England, and five times that of France. The rivers communicating with these seas traverse the most fertile regions. Egypt has her Nile: the rich plains of Syria touch or approach the sea coast, reaching the Gulf of Acre to the south, and joining the Orontes on the north; to the east flows the Euphrates. The mountain chains of Asia Minor run all east and west, so as to allow the plains and watercourses to penetrate from the sea to the interior; by the four rivers that run to the west and the two that run to the north, the elements are afforded of a system of internal water-carriage through its whole extent. Roumelia is traversed by the great artery of Central Europe, the Danube, which a canal of five leagues would cover with craft, letting the Black Sea into the land, carrying it right up to Hungary, and so uniting to the Bosphorus, the repose and prosperity of the Austrian Empire.

These provinces are placed under the most happy sky: they neither know the rigours of winter, nor the intensity of summer: a frugal and docile population of nearly forty millions is sprinkled over a soil not yet broken to labour, or fashioned by art.

With such a surface for the growth of corn, with such facilities for its transport, Turkey would unquestionably have seized upon the commerce of the world, if the sentence had not gone forth against her: "You shall not traffic in the stores of your granaries, the flax shall dry upon the stalk, the olive shall rot under its tree, the forests shall never descend from the mountains, nor the brass and iron, the gold and silver, emerge from their entrails." This sentence the Sultan Mahmoud undertook to reverse, but the times were no longer when an Ottoman Sultan was his own master. He did not dare to say to his people, "Enjoy the gifts of Providence;" he did not dare to say to the nations, "Come and trade with my people."*

Turkey nevertheless had for the basis of her system freedom of trade: this freedom was avowed and consecrated in

* A recent work on Turkey has the following:—

"If some of our enterprising countrymen, acquainted with commercial pursuits were to visit these provinces of European Turkey, they would find a rich field, as yet unexplored: I found a most anxious desire on the part of the inhabitants to establish a more intimate commercial connection with Great Britain for the disposal of their timber, corn, and cattle, which seemed to lie upon their hands without the possibility of a sale.

"In the interior of Bulgaria and Upper Moesia, the low prices of provisions and cattle of every description is almost fabulous compared with the prices of Western Europe. A fat sheep or lamb usually costs from eighteenpence to two shillings, an ox forty shillings, cows thirty shillings, and a horse, in the best possible travelling condition, from four to five pounds sterling. Wool, hides, tallow, wax, and honey, are equally low. In the town and hans by the road side, everything is sold by weight; you can get a pound of meat for a halfpenny, a pound of bread for the same, and wine, which is also sold by weight, costs about the same money."

the treaties with all countries. The productions of foreigners were not loaded with duties; she did not wage a war of exchange against her neighbours; she did not dream of the protection of national industry; the talons of the fisc did not gripe salt and tobacco; and no *octroi* blockaded the dwellings of men.

Whence the mysterious contrast? Why this monstrous yoking of a living man and a carcass? The cause is explained by its effects: in Turkey nothing could be bought that Russia sold; but for all articles which Russia did not sell, the markets were open without stint or limit. This prohibition has made Russia what she is; it was a singular effect of her greatest military triumph, that the war which placed in her hands the second capital of the empire ended with reversing the balance between the victor and the vanquished; for after the removal of the restriction on the corn trade occasioned by the pressure of her blockade, no European vessel would have passed on to the Black Sea, but would have laden on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The reimposition of the restriction was now a new enterprise, and its accomplishment a new victory: it was achieved in the Treaty of Adnoue, by means of a stipulation *for unlimited freedom of trade*. Every Russian, or every subject of the Porte, who chose to go to Odessa for a passport, or to seek the protection of a Russian consulate, might traffic far and near free from all charges, save that of the nominal Russian tariff. Russia at the time had not one native subject or merchant in Turkey, but soon the whole country was covered with her "subjects;" they possessed themselves of all the channels of industry; they broke through the whole order of administration; every difference was solved in their favour by a threat, for to this commercial stipulation Russia had appended for any remissness or neglect the unparalleled penalty of "reprisals."* The Porte at last fell back on

* VIIth Article of the Treaty of Adrianople.—Russian subjects will enjoy throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as

Prohibition; the old capitulations, while they conferred on strangers the privilege to come to buy and sell whatever they chose, were not enunciations of principles but merely grants of favour, and they specially reserved the right of prohibiting the exportation of any article in cases of scarcity. The revival of such a pretension may appear a very weak device, and one which would only expose Turkey to new humiliations and embarrassments. The prohibition of the article was of course with a view to the sale of firmans for its exportation, those who purchased them stood in the light of servants of the government. As article after article came thus to be monopolised, the dissensions with Russia were brought to a close by the extinction of the trade out of which they had originated, or by the transfer of the individuals from the class of Russian subjects to that of Turkish farmers. The Treaty of Adrianople was now more flagrantly violated than by the small abnormal duties hitherto imposed; nevertheless the terrors of the "casus belli" clause were

well on land as at sea, the full and entire liberty of Commerce which the Treaties assure to them. The liberty cannot be infringed in any case or under any pretext, by any prohibition or restriction of whatever kind, nor as the consequence of any regulation or measures whether of interior administration or legislation. The Russian subjects' ships of merchandise shall be protected against every violence and every fraud. The first will remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and police of the Minister and Consuls of Russia; the Russian vessels will never be subjected to any visit on board whatever, on the part of the Ottoman authorities, neither in the open sea, nor in any of its ports or anchorages, and *merchandise or produce belonging to the Russian subjects*, after having acquitted the duties established by the tariff shall be freely sold, deposited or transported, from one vessel to another, whatever nation that vessel may belong to, without the Russian subject having need to notify the fact to the local authorities, and still less to ask them their permission; and if, which God forbid, any one of these stipulations should be infringed without full and prompt satisfaction being made, *the Sublime Porte recognises, beforehand, the right of the Russian Court to consider such infraction an act of hostility, and to have recourse immediately to reprisals against the Ottoman Empire.*

left to slumber. Russia ceased to be the patron of liberty of commerce, sacrificed her *protégés*, retracted her demands, and smoothed down her countenance. "Her end was gained."*

But at this moment the Ottoman Empire, shaken from without and agitated from within, was floating upon the tide of experiment: if old institutions were in danger, habitual abuses had also lost their hold. The results of 1829 could not be forgotten: the incessant vexations connected with trade, surrounded the doors of every minister with hosts of harassing supplicants; disorder would not be silenced, the precariousness of the position in reference to Russia, by the very measures into which she had driven them, could not fail to obtrude itself upon graver minds. Above all the necessities of the Sultan, then intently engaged in creating an army, forced the Divan to devise, or at least to listen to schemes by which the restoration of commerce might be made subservient to the replenishing of the Treasury.† Thus arose the proposal made by Turkey, who had never before proposed any novelty, and the mission of a special Ambassador to England with no less an object than the revision of the whole system of commercial legislation.

At this time, England's trade with her ancient customers had been cut off, by the avowal of her minister, the ancient channels had been blocked up, and she required to bring new trafficking worlds into existence. The countries of the Con-

* See "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," where these facts will be found published, in 1835, under the sanction of the then English Ambassador at Constantinople. It has been urged on me by persons who would be esteemed the first authorities in the matter that I am wholly mistaken in attributing Russia's conduct on this occasion to such deep design, or indeed to any design at all; and that it is to be explained by the fact that these *Apollators*, were chiefly Russian agents, and that largely profiting in the system, had found means to induce the Russian Government to overlook it. All I can say is, that in this case, as in many others, accident favours the skilful, as fortune does the brave.

† This idea was afterwards followed in the Budget of 1841, when it was proposed to meet a deficiency by a reduction of taxes.

inent had in peace combined to make commercial war on this nation, which, during the last struggle, had saved most of them from subjugation, subsidised while protecting them, and had been in the hour of victory as heedless of her interests, as in that of danger, she had been prodigal of her blood. Mistaken theories in some, political animosities in others, in many both conjoined, had prompted a blockade of custom-houses, inflicting loss, implanting notions inimical to her prosperity and feelings dangerous to her power.

Against this concert we had striven by arguments, professions, statistics, and reduction; we appealed to resemblances of manners, community of science and literature, friendly recollections for benefits conferred, gratitude from Dynasties, who owed to us their thrones or their existence—we planned thirty-two commercial treaties; but all in vain. Repulsed and discomfited, we turned from the East to the West, and from the North to the South. The House of Brunswick arrayed all Germany in a hostile league, sympathetic France rejected our yarns: subsidies, auxiliaries, and all the muskets in the Tower could obtain no hospitality for our wares, from the Houses of Bourbon and Braganza: the new continent, rivalling meanwhile the antipathies of the old, was equally deaf to the charms of Downing Street. At last, sick of defeats, and worn with toil, the President of the Board of Trade exclaimed, amid the cheers and laughter of the House, "Thank God, we have done with commercial treaties."

How now stood the matter with Turkey? What sympathy had we to expect who had attempted to burn her capital, who stood the avowed patron of her revolted subjects and the close ally of her deadly foe? Whose professed community of interest, had ever been exhibited in hostility of act? We burdened with duty her wares, and refused her reciprocity, who alone in Europe, or the world, gave free admission to our industry, who suffered us to enjoy the carrying trade of her coasts, conceded to us the faculty of internal traffic, and permitted to our subjects settled in her dominions the exercise

of every municipal, commercial, and judicial function, unshackled, unwatched, and untaxed.

Turkey and Russia stand in commercial legislation, as the north and south poles. The one prohibits nearly all the manufactures of England, and seeks to enforce the imports of her raw produce; the other admits all the manufactures of England and prohibits the export of her raw produce. The foreign merchant in Russia is surrounded and hampered by the most minute and oppressive restrictions: he is in every point inferior to the native. The foreign merchant in Turkey enjoys the fullest immunities, and is placed above the native. The Russian system is the result of no theories, it is a mere calculation as to how commerce is to be used for political purposes. The Turkish system, in as far as it is restrictive, proceeds from no theories, but is the result of the success of Russia in interfering with her internal regulations. Turkey is engaged in no design against any neighbour to carry thither either political influence or restrictive system. Russia is engaged in designs against all her neighbours, and wherever she establishes her power, there follows her system. Against Russia England takes no step, either to enlighten the people or to resist the Government; but favours her commerce, befriends her political ends, lends to her the whole weight of her power to support her aggressions, and extend her system. Yet these two systems stood in balance because the two empires did so, and we ought have thought of Turkey a little while, serving Russia so much. With her activity pervading the world England had no time to consider what might be effected with the empire through which flowed the Danube, and the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates; which held in its hands the Isthmus of Suez and the Strait of the Dardanelles; which extended from the torrid zone to the snows of the Caucasus, from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf,—whose dominions in Europe, Africa, and Asia (exclusive of Arabia), equalled France, Germany, Italy, and Spain; which was all agricultural, and where freedom of trade was the law of the State. This empire had to come to her to propose that mutual

abolition of restriction which she in vain had been preaching all round the globe.

This appeal, strange to say, was not from the Porte to the English Government, but from Sultan Mahmoud to William the Fourth. The Ambassador was charged to say:—

“The Sublime Porte, who appreciates and esteems at its true value the importance of these relations with one of the most enlightened and powerful nations of the world, knows also, Sire, that they have already secured the attention of *your Majesty*, and doubts not that a benevolent system of reciprocity *will soon come* to be considered by *the Government* of your Majesty as a means of fortifying and increasing that desirable union which exists between these two high Courts.”

So that it would appear that the Turkish Government relied more on the friendship of the King, than on the principles of the Administration.

To the Porte it was not a simple matter of regulation: had it been so, it needed not to send to England. It was a delicate and precarious negotiation, in which it was essential to succeed if once they adventured upon a step; their position was alarmingly insecure at home, they were under the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi, and the Russian debt was unliquidated. They could not venture on a rupture with Russia without the assurance of the support of England, and without that support so assured beforehand, they knew by hard experience that a rupture with Russia would be a rupture with England. They wished then that England would make one of those proposals to them, that she was scattering over the earth, so that they might appear only to consent.

CHAPTER II.

Negotiations with Turkey.

BETWEEN the period when this mission was planned, and that when it arrived in England a discouraging change of administration had taken place. The party favourable to Free Trade had fallen from power, and the Duke of Wellington, whom the nations of the East had been taught to consider as a servant of the Emperor, was Prime Minister.* The two grounds of hope were thus cut off, and it proved impossible to effect anything. I owe it, however, to the Duke of Wellington to say, that he neither closed the door to discussions, nor wrapped himself up in mystery and reserve. He entered frankly into the subject, and even laboriously perused statements of the case both with reference to the matters of trade and with respect to the means of political existence of that empire; and then rejected the overtures upon two grounds: First, his theoretic opinions upon taxation which were in favour of those upon trade; secondly, on his conclusion, which nothing could shake, that Turkey was past salvation. He hesitated not to charge upon Lord Grey the ruin of that Empire in his admission of the Treaty of Adrianople, and subsequently of that of Hunkiar Skelessi.† That, however deplorable such a result might be,

* The change of Administration was announced from St. Petersburg in these terms: "A marshal of the Emperor is now minister in England."

† Lord Grey with whom discussions were simultaneously carried on, concurred with the Duke of Wellington in his opinion respecting Turkey, but attributed to *him* the catastrophe, saying, that it had been sacrificed by his own misjudgment of the war of 1828, and the conduct of the Government of which he was a member during that war.

it was now incontestible and accomplished, and England could not undertake the Quixotic task of setting up a dead body upon its feet. He denied, moreover, that England was possessed of faculties to carry out any system whatever, and did not wish that it should be otherwise. "England," said he, "has done nothing great save by insubordination." I may further add that he was greatly rejoiced at the publication of Mr. Cobden's pamphlet, and exulted in my having been "answered."

Soon, however, the other party came into office, and we anticipated an immediate and a joyful acceptance of our proposals, for the last measure of Lord Palmerston on leaving office had been one which implied the fullest approval of all the steps I had taken at Constantinople in reference to this matter.

I know not in what terms to describe the reception of the proposal by the new Administration. Reception! it was scouted and branded, with what withering epithet will the reader imagine, or believe?—Russian.* The Porte of course hastened to withdraw its proposal.

Fortunately there was then on the Throne a Sovereign who believed it to be his right and duty to attend to those matters which especially are confided to his prerogative. Then also

* "TO SIR HERBERT TAYLOR.

(Extract.)

"January 20, 1835.

"I have just been dismayed to learn that Nouri Effendi has written to Constantinople, expressing all the discouragement and despair that Lord Palmerston had filled him with in their last interview, particularly his Lordship's observation, that my proposal for the tariff, that has cost so much to bring to the pitch where it now is, was a *Russian proposal*. This indeed is an act of suicide, and I am most anxious to know your opinion on the subject. Unless you have gained Lord Palmerston entirely—unless he understands the fault he has committed, I do not see what chance there is of my being of any—the slightest use, as serving the Government; and, on the other hand, I am sacrificing myself and the question.

"I have just learnt, also, that the mission of Ellis is in a state of abeyance, and that Mac Neill has come to the resolution of resigning his situation, unless the government adopts a more worthy policy."

the King had a Private Secretary who applied to the subject his clear, judicious, and vigorous mind, and devoted to it his unwearied assiduity. The ambassador at Constantinople most heartily entered into the same views.* I need not enumerate further; suffice it say that, excepting the two chiefs of the Foreign and Trade Departments, the whole official body concurred in the plan as originally sketched at Constantinople. Several months of intense labour ensued, nor did I shrink from attributing the opposition of the Foreign Secretary to the only intelligible cause. At last he gave in, and unfortunately I accepted the change as a *bona fide* one, and was, therefore, willing to resign my previous convictions. It was now resolved that the proposal which the English Government had rejected when it came from the Turkish should be presented to it as an English one, and I was commissioned to discuss it with the Board of Trade.

Here difficulties of an unexpected nature arose; at the Foreign Office it had been hateful as a *Russian* project, at the Board of Trade it was obnoxious as an *Anti-Baltic one*. The President of the Board of Trade was a Baltic merchant, and the same process had to be adopted with respect to him as with his colleague. After a futile attempt to bargain for the imposition of an export duty of ten per cent. on Turkish

* "MY DEAR SIR,—By Mr. Urquhart's desire, I forward to you a Letter for Moosheer Ahmed Pasha, and also a copy of a Memoir respecting the commercial system of this country, &c.

"This Memoir, I think, deserves to be minutely explained to the Pasha, and studied by him.

"I am of opinion, that were it acted upon in its main points, it would produce the most magnificent results to, the Ottoman Empire.

"The latter part of the Memoir states the mode of acting, to which I have always looked as the certain and effectual means whereby to defeat Russia—means most easy to be applied by us, and which, in the application, will produce great benefit to England; independent of their political action.

"I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

"Yours, very faithfully,

"PONSONBY."

produce, which he conceived would protect the Baltic trade, he gave in.

The chiefs of the two departments had, however, yielded only to necessity, and under the dread of exposure during the lifetime of the King. I pass over the painful interval. In little more than two years this Treaty, nominally the same but really changed into that which Mr. Poulett Thomson had desired for the prohibiting of Turkish exports, was imposed on the Porte as the condition of that aid against Mehemet Ali, which subsequently furnished the pretext for the Syrian Intervention.

CHAPTER III.

Commercial Treaty with Turkey of 1848.

THIS Treaty as it stands merely doubles the duties of import upon British goods, and quadruples the duty on export of Turkish produce, and this concession is made on the condition of abolishing all prohibitions and monopolies.

Two questions naturally arise: First, Was an equivalent required? Second, Was the concession so hampered of any value? That no equivalent was requisite must have already appeared; what illegal vexations could counterbalance this legal burden it is difficult to imagine.

Turkish exports must be classed in two categories. Many articles were nowhere subject to monopolies, and provinces containing ten millions of souls, were subject to no monopoly of any article. Silk, cotton, opium, tobacco, gums, dyes, &c. were perfectly free everywhere: grain, tallow, wool, timber, were free in Syria,* Egypt, Wallachia, Servia, Moldavia, and Samos. In regard, then, to the first class of articles and to all articles in the cited provinces, the increased duty was a mere surrender of the rights of British subjects, and a gratuitous imposition on Turkish trade. The Treaty was assumed to be a substitution of one kind of import for

Aleppo, August 3d, 1843.

* "The trade of the north of Syria, nor of Syria generally, derives no benefit by the abolition of monopolies; because previous to the Convention, no commercial monopolies existed. The Convention in relation thereto cannot be considered a boon, nor in fact a compensation of any kind, to the trade of Great Britain with Syria; certainly not for having inflicted on its produce an exportation duty of 12 per cent., after the grower has paid on the spot the usher of 10 per cent. to the government."—MR. WERRY.

another, but the relief of a taxed article could not be obtained by the burdening of an untaxed one.*

The Prohibitions were not permanent or universal, and might any day be unconditionally raised; firmans could be obtained on the payment of a certain sum; and if it would not pay they were not purchased. Firmans were yearly purchased for Mitylene, and oil was exported: grain was at times exported by firmans. Under the new system Mitylene exports no oil, and Constantinople *imports* grain! Thus, then, the equivalent has placed on the free goods an uncompensated burden, on the monopolised goods a tax which is a prohibition! In the restricted provinces it has replaced a partial by a general impost, and into the free provinces introduced the prohibitive system. The articles which were obstructed before are obstructed now, and the articles that were free before are burdened now.†

It required not to wait for the result to be certain that a duty of twelve per cent. was more than heavy articles, such as grain, Indian corn, oil, and the like, could bear. The absence of roads had been the subject of lamentation to all those who had taken an interest in the Ottoman Empire, and what are bad roads, save a charge on heavy goods. By them, the country, 150 miles from a point of shipment, was doomed, as far as external traffic went, to sterility. The new duty was equivalent to lengthening the journey by fifty miles, and reduced to that extent the area of productive land. This is the result of a change introduced by system at the very moment that you are endeavouring to induce Turkey to call science to her aid.

* "The duty of 12 per cent. amounts, in reality, on many of the products of Turkey—especially the coarse ones—to a total prohibition. It is, therefore, a matter of trifling consideration to merchants, what estimate the tariff places on objects which the convention has now set without the sphere of speculation."—*Times*.

† What grain has been exported since 1839, has either been from provinces where the Treaty has not come into operation, or during an increase of price sufficient to over-ride the tariff.

But this was not all :

The twelve per cent. was not left to be paid in kind, or at a local valuation, but the amount in money was fixed by a Tariff for all the Empire. At Constantinople, the price of grain is raised by a consumption duty of eight per cent., and by heavy transport charges. The price of Constantinople was taken as the basis of the Tariff, and the twelve became twenty-five per cent. At this time England was under the sliding scale, fixed every fortnight by averages taken all over England; she *proposed this scale*. She also suggested the specification of the Constantinople kilo,—the smallest measure, the highest price.

Nor was this all.

Goods derive in Turkey their nationality from the trader, not from the place of production. Whatever the foreigner buys is "foreign." The word "exportation" was thus accepted in its first intention, and applied in its natural sense, and whatever was "carried out" paid the duty, whether it went to the next town or to Canton. But foreign goods came in for the subjects of Russia, who did not join in the Treaty, at one and a half per cent.: consequently, at Constantinople, or the other ports, Russian grain was charged but a third or a fourth of the duty imposed on Turkish grain. Constantinople now imports from Odessa to the value of 40,000,000 of piastres of wheat and flour. Such things may appear incredible to a person who reads them in Europe: they are so even in Turkey. The late Minister for Foreign Affairs would not believe the fact here stated, till he had it confirmed to him by the Customer. In fact the Turkish Government were utterly in the dark respecting this negotiation from the beginning to the end.

It is the same with respect to every other article. Tobacco is charged in the tariff two piastres, all but four paras. The tobacco exported from Syria to Alexandria averages two piastres in value; the duty amounts to *ninety-five per cent.*; consequently the tobacco of America, which at Alexandria

pays but three per cent. (the additional two per cent. is only when sent into the interior), is brought across the Atlantic to undersell in the ports of Turkey its own produce. Take again a manufactured article, silk. The people of the Lebanon pay an *export* duty of twelve per cent. (in reality fifteen,) on sending it to the towns where it is manufactured. Manufactured it is considered a new produce and is again subject to an *export* duty, which amounts to twenty per cent. so that an inhabitant of the Lebanon before he can wear his own silk, manufactured in a neighbouring town, has to pay *thirty-five per cent.* He therefore buys the silk, or the silk and cotton imitations of Switzerland and Prussia, which are charged but five per cent.

So far then the two preliminary questions are answered, and as no equivalent was required for the abrogation of monopolies, so has their abrogation on such conditions proved entirely sterile of all advantage. The commerce of the country has increased, but it has not been in those articles in which it was desired to open it, nor in those provinces on which it has been imposed.

But England had the right in Turkey by the capitulations of exporting and importing all articles, on the payment of three per cent. and "nothing more." * No vexation could therefore exist save by sufferance; and to resist these no new Treaty was required: † what use could there be in new Treaties, if the old ones were not executed? But let us grant that the stipulations were not precise and specific enough—then England possessed the right of the "most favoured nation:" this Turkey did not desire to contest, the seventh article of the Treaty of Adrianople was framed to meet every supposable case. ‡

* "CLAUSE 30.—That having once paid the customs at the ports, not an asper more shall be taken or demanded." See also Clauses 31, 34, 50, 51, 52, 53.

† "CLAUSE 18.—All the capitulations, privileges, and articles granted to the French government, and other powers, having been in like manner granted to the English." See also Clauses 44, 48.

‡ "See this article cited at p. 376.

The object professed was to develop the resources of Turkey; if an equivalent in augmented duties was necessary, surely it must have been laid on British imports. Why invent a distinction between imports and exports to apply it the wrong way? The aggregate increase is ten per cent.; why not halve it, and place five on imports, and five on exports?*

The explanation offered is that on no other terms could it be obtained. "You cannot," said Lord Palmerston, on the 1st March, 1847; "go to the minister of a foreign power with a draft in one hand, and a pen in the other, and say, 'there sir, sign that or jump out of the window.'" This was said in reference to the additional two per cent. on British goods; there is no explanation for the burden on Turkish produce, and for the best of reasons, for it was enforced by the process above described.

Finally: the Treaty does not abrogate monopolies, nor being abrogated does it prevent their reimposition. They were abrogated by the act of the Turkish Government,† and the wording of the Treaty, as we shall presently see, deprives England of all powers under it, of resisting the imposition of any and every tax; and further deprives her of those rights which she possessed under the old Capitulations.

The negotiation, which commenced with the view of setting free the ports of Turkey, has ended with sealing them up. It has, at the moment when Turkey was about to abandon its prohibitions, substituted for them prohibitory duties. This is the measure for which the English minister has

* This was the original proposal of the Turkish government itself, and which it gave up on my urgent remonstrance, adopting in lieu of it that suggestion of the distinction between exports and imports, which will be hereafter explained, and which has been so artfully perverted.

† "En effet, après l'abolition de tous les droits intérieurs qui ont été remplacé par le droit de 9 per cent., payable à l'exportation, et de deux sur l'importation, nous voyons resusciter tous les jours les anciens droits qui étoient tombés en desuetude avant d'être supprimés par les traités."—*The Consul General of Russia to the Pasha of Beyrout, 26 March, 1850.*

claimed from applauding England and Europe, the credit of having over-mastered and outwitted the cabinet of St. Petersburg on the field of all its triumphs; this is the Treaty which all Europe has rushed to join, believing it to be a masterpiece of commercial legislation and of political design.

I must now state what the principles of the Treaty were, which I proposed and which the English Government adopted, and sent out to Constantinople in 1837.

1st. The "most favoured nation" clause.

2d. The privileges of the British merchants to be extended to subjects of Turkey.

3d. The duty on imports to be retained at three per cent.; those on exports *to rise or fall on each article according to the difference between its value in the markets of Turkey and Europe*: a commission of merchants at intervals of years to fix the scale: in no case the sum to exceed that previously paid.

4th. Transit free.

5th. To come into operation only when all powers had joined.

The negotiation was to have been secret, and when settled between England and the Porte, they were conjointly to address themselves to the other powers to obtain their adhesion. No one would have gained by standing aloof.

The Treaty as signed stipulates,

1st. The "most favoured nation" clause.

2d. Subjection of the English merchants in regard to internal trade to the duties paid by the subjects of the Porte, and not paid by other nations.

3d. The concession of the right of internal legislation as against Treaties with foreign Powers.

4th. Imports raised from three to five per cent. Exports from three to twelve: one and the same sum for all articles whether they could bear it or not.

5th. Transit charged at three per cent.

6th. To come into operation although no other nation joined.

Such were the Treaties which, according to Lord Palmerston,

“differed in no material respect.” * The changes were made under the pretext of securing additional advantages. The British merchant is made to pay “as much” as the Turkish subject, by means of the words he shall pay “no more:” appearing to gain the privileges of the *most favoured subject*, he loses those of “the most favoured nation.”

On the Treaty coming into operation, the Porte made arrangements to indemnify the farmers of customs, imagining that the English duties were to be reduced to the level of those of Russia, according to the 1st Article. One of our consuls fell into the same mistake, and demanded the repayment of duties on a cargo already shipped, and obtained it.

The truly marvellous portion of this negotiation is, after all, the adhesion of the other Powers. The abolition of monopolies being effected, was effected once for all, why then should France submit to a gratuitous charge on the ground that it was the price of their abolition? The French Ambassador had received instructions to negotiate a Treaty similar to the English, but on a memorial from the merchants, he wrote home to say that he could obtain more favourable terms. He was answered by peremptory orders, the reason assigned being that the French Government, “had yielded this point to England.”

The French merchants, so soon as their Treaty was signed, demanded the execution of the first clause. They were answered that a “*tacit agreement* existed between the Powers not to require in that respect the execution of the Treaty!” One of them exclaimed, “had Turkey no friend when she signed that Treaty?”

Austria’s repugnance was openly avowed, she indeed yielded as regarded the trade of the Mediterranean; but retained her old rights for the trade of the adjoining provinces as Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia.

Every cabinet of Europe was brought to surrender its rights, and betray its people’s interest; not a single power, however great, or however small, stood out. Russia was left

* Lord Palmerston’s statement in Parliament will be found at the end of this Chapter.

alone to play the part of antagonist, and to realise the profits of their self-imposed disabilities.

It thus appears that whenever England takes a course, supposed to have in view the maintenance of public law, she is immediately followed by every state and government of Europe. A fact like this shows that the originality of design, or the hostility of dispositions, we lend to France, are but supposititious; and that the obstructions we there meet with, or the dangers we may thence apprehend, are solely, in as far as they may be or become real, of our own creating.

It will be recollected that this had been treated by Russia, not merely as a hostile, but as a perfidious measure. She coupled it with the occupation of Carack, as acts forcing her to have recourse to arms, laying "on England the terrible responsibility of such a conflagration."* In her avowed, as in her official organs, she threatened to retrieve at Calcutta the *defeat* she had experienced on the Bosphorus; but in the manner of these threats she could not suppress her exultation, and on the very day that the Treaty was settled at the Board of Trade, these words were published in the *Frankfort Journal*—

"We will make their profoundest combinations and master-strokes of design, the pivots of our policy, and the instruments of our greatness."

On the other hand the English Journals, and especially those connected with the Foreign Department,† asserted that

* Odessa Gazette.

† "It may be assumed, without any unseemly exaggeration of self-deluding triumph, that by the prudence of Lord Palmerston and the efforts of Lord Ponsonby, seconded by fortunate dispositions in the Court of Vienna and of the Porte, Russian influence has sustained a signal defeat—a defeat which arms cannot retrieve, which bravado cannot efface, nor menace, nor perversion repair."—*British and Foreign Review*.

"Lord Ponsonby, in a letter to me, quoted in the published correspondence, says:—"I wrote to you when you were away that I was sure the agitation of it (the Treaty) would lead to nothing like a settlement. I say, that I have not the smallest expectation of its

it would transfer to Turkey from Russia that European demand of raw materials by which she had been enriched within the century to the amount of two hundred and sixty millions sterling. When concluded, it was pompously announced from the throne, extolled by the opposition, rapturously hailed by the nation. Was it not then natural for the statesmen of Europe, ignorant save in opinions, blind save for print, to believe that England had taken the lead in a great work which was to secure permanent tranquillity ?

If Russia stood aloof, was it by mere indifference ? The Treaty either served her, or threatened her. In the one case, why did she not join—in the other, why did she not oppose ? While any power stood out, the Treaty was inoperative, because the merchants of the dissenting power, and through them all other merchants, rode right over it. Had she not influence with one ? If not *one* stood out, clearly she was not opposed. Why then did she not join ? Because by her simulated opposition she ensured its success, and justified the impression that the falsified Treaty was the original one. When they had all joined, her position was magnificent : her merchants could import at one quarter of the duty paid by all others, and export at one quarter ; all her triumphs had conferred upon her no privileges to be compared with those which she reaped from a Treaty, levelled at her existence.

A new administration comes into power in England ; remonstrances pour in from every quarter : the monstrous fact was proclaimed of English Merchants being forced to borrow the names of Russian firms.* The necessity of a remedy was

being accepted. Russian interests would be deeply affected by it. The Russians are not, I must presume, ignorant of the consequences of it ; and I know they are at this moment *all powerful*."

* Col. Rose writes, on the 7th September, 1843 :—" An unanswerable fact proves the superiority of the advantage which the Russian merchant now enjoys over the British merchant. I know that a British merchant gave 1 per cent. to a person trading as a

so evident that the Turkish government prepared for it. * But means were found to set them on a false track, that of devising a process for equalising the duty between the British and Russian by *making the native dealer who sold to or bought from the Russian, pay an illegal tax.* The plan is designated by one of our own agents, "a bold and unexpected attempt:" he attributed it to Turkey. It was met by a Russian "armed janissary" being sent to embark the goods "by force." †

Russian merchant, whom I also know to trade as a Russian merchant in his name; and I further know, that a sort of national pride alone has prevented the rest of the British merchants in Syria from doing the same."

* "Even the Custom-house appaltators here, sensible of the advantages enjoyed by the Russian trade, and foreseeing the probability in consequence of a modification of the English Convention, have stipulated with the Government that they are to be indemnified for the loss they will sustain should the modification take place. . . .

"Need a clearer proof be adduced of the advantages which Russia has gained by the Treaty, than the fact that a crowd of nominal Russian merchants has sprung up one hardly knows from where, since it came into operation."—*Conjoint Despatch of COLONEL ROSE and MR. MOORE (Consul-General for Syria and Consul of Beyrout.)*

† THE AMBASSADOR.—"Upon my inquiring of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in what manner the really important difference between 12 and 5 per cent. paid by British merchants on exports and imports respectively, and the uniform duty of 3 per cent. paid on both by Russian traders was removed, his Excellency assured me that in BOTH cases that difference (!) was levied upon the Turkish subject—in the former as a seller, in the latter as a purchaser."—*Sir Stratford Canning (18th Nov. 1842.)*

THE CONSUL-GENERAL.—"A Russian merchant, or at any rate trading as such, purchased lately a large quantity of silk, but the appaltator having been unable to discover the sellers or producers thereof, in order to exact the 9 per cent. export duty from them, objected to his so doing. . . . The cancellier proceeded to the Custom-house with a janissary armed, and declared his determination to embark the silk by force. . . . The Custom-house officer applied to Assad Pascha for support, to prevent its embarkation; but in consequence of a communication from the Russian cancellier, his Excellency ordered the appaltators to allow the embarkation of the bales on the payment of 3 per cent. only!"—*Col. Rose, 7th Sept., 1842.*

Puzzled and confounded by the working of a measure which, when in opposition, they had hastened to extol, the new administration now sent about to the consuls and merchants to ask their opinion; this was the unanswerable question which they put "Shall we keep the third clause, or, abandoning it, take to the first?" Here are the very words of the inevitable Lord Aberdeen:—

"WHETHER the *disadvantages* under which British merchants labour are of such an *extent* AS to render it *more* advantageous to claim the *benefit* of the First Article, AND insist upon British merchants being placed on the same footing with Russian merchants, ALTHOUGH such a course might lead to the sacrifice of *whatever* advantages the British trader now enjoys under the Convention, BY the substitution of fixed and for variable and arbitrary duties of import and export, and by the abolition of monopolies and other ancient sources of vexation and annoyance?"

There can be no alternative between two clauses of a Treaty; if you have something to choose between, you have nothing to stand upon, for there must be contradiction. But you had none by the first article, for it is general, and the obligations incurred by the third are special. The three volumes of correspondence tally with their text. They contain, however, one passage of sense.

"We cannot see how our being placed 'on the footing of the most favoured nation' can in any way subject us to 'variable and arbitrary duties of import and export.' The Russian Merchants and others, under Russian protection, are liable to no variable or arbitrary duty."*

When Lord Palmerston is at length charged in the House with surrendering the rights of the "most favoured nation," he answers:—

"The hon. and learned gentleman really has not read the Treaty. He may lift up his eyes at that statement; but I repeat that he cannot have read the Treaty, or, if he has,

* Mr. Scott of Shimlan.

he has not read it correctly. He stated, that by the Treaty as signed, British subjects and ships were not placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation; if the hon. Member will only look at the Treaty itself, he will see that the first Article states—

‘All former rights and privileges are confirmed, and all rights, privileges, and immunities, which the Sublime Porte now grants, or may hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects of any other foreign Power, or which it may suffer [not merely grant] the ships and subjects of any other foreign Power to enjoy, shall equally be granted, exercised, and enjoyed by the subjects and the ships of Great Britain.’

If that is not securing to British subjects and ships all the advantages enjoyed by the most favoured nation, I do not know how the grant of those advantages could have been expressed in words more clear or more comprehensive. It is not only so in the plain meaning of the words, *But it has been so acknowledged since by both parties. We have acted upon that interpretation.* Indeed, there could have been no interpretation required in the matter, because the words are as clear and as plain as words can be, and from them it is clear that British subjects and ships are upon the footing of the most favoured nation.”

This statement was received with loud cheers, Good God! why print volumes of correspondence! Varro did not despair after Cannæ; who can hope after this?

The British officials put up their prayers for one, one only, boon,—that Russia may join; then would be covered all their sin and hidden all their shame. Little did they see, and less did they care, that her adhesion would withdraw one immunity from British trade, for Russian subjects trafficked in our goods, and lent their names to our merchants. When a favourable reception was to be managed for the Czar in London, the Russian Cabinet *promised* to gratify their wishes. Lord Aberdeen solemnly announced the event to Parliament, assuring it that “Her Majesty’s government had not been

idle in this matter." The temporary end obtained, she continued to adhere to her "*base, positive et invariable,*" through a fire of Blue Books, until in the midst of the din of the Spanish marriages, and the annexation of Cracow, she quietly, without the observation of a single soul, or the comment of a single journal—joined the Treaty.

English Diplomacy now entered the haven of repose: the English Merchants were contented: in what age do we live when such a fact could not awaken even curiosity? Could stultification be more perfect, or demonstration complete?

But already, in 1838, the Russian Cabinet was preparing the occasion to shift its ground. An elaborate exposée of its ideas was transmitted to its ambassador at Constantinople and communicated to the consuls. In this document the same basis was assumed as that of the English Treaty, but doubts were entertained in consequences of its "loose wording," through which the Turkish Government might slip: the "isolation" of Russia is represented as a pause until she has seen "what results shall manifest themselves."

In 1846 the desired results had consequently been manifested—were they favourable or unfavourable? If the first, why impose on her trade a gratuitous burden of 12 per cent. and sacrifice all her exclusive advantages? In that year she had usurped Cracow, while England and France were protesting against each other about a Treaty (Utrecht) which had ceased for fifty years to exist. If the second—if, in the words of one of her consuls "worse than the abuses were now reappearing, which had fallen into desuetude even before the Treaty was signed;" why give up the stringent clauses of the Treaty of Adrianople? If she who has proclaimed that clause the chief reward of her campaign of 1829, abandons the faculty it confers to interfere in the internal administration of the Porte, it must be for something even better still.

Against Russia England will never strike a blow. The contest of the strong mind and the weak is not determined by the relative power of their bodies or by their bodies at all.

Therefore did paramount importance attach to a measure which would have altered the relative bases of the power of Russia and Turkey.

Every remarkable man for the last fifty years has prognosticated the extinction of the Western States and the triumph over them of Russia. Several of these were themselves Sovereigns and Ministers, and had practical means of working out their thoughts. Not one of them has succeeded—not one of them has even approached towards the way to success. Russia owes infinitely more to the energy with which she has been opposed by men of first-rate genius and highest station, than to the devotedness with which she has been served either by her own officials or by the traitors whom she has at all times had at her disposal in foreign Cabinets. It is not the difficulty of the enterprise that has caused these failures. I take an illustration from the other hemisphere :

Fourteen years ago, the plains watered by the Parana and the Plata, fertile as they are vast, where herds might multiply like the sands of the sea, towards which a tide of emigration had set in from Europe, gave promise of an enormous supply of hides and tallow. Internal dissensions arose, and England and France commenced thereupon a series of the strangest freaks that have ever been seen. One of the leading merchants was sent over in 1847 to see what could be done. He came to me with his case. After he had concluded his narrative, he asked me if I could explain the source of the malignity of which they were the object. I asked him in turn what were the articles of export—to what amount—what the probable increase without the interference, &c. ? He replied, that a million and a quarter sterling worth of hides, tallow, &c., were exported, and had they been let alone, or the matter once for all settled, they would be now exporting to the value of six, eight or ten millions. I then asked him the amount and nature of the exports from the Baltic. He commenced to reply, when suddenly, he stopped, and after a pause, exclaimed, " Sir !

you have caused the scales to fall from my eyes." He then informed me of a variety of circumstances which had never struck him before, all indicating the connection of Russia with those countries, and it even appeared that the brig of war which had been captured by the blockading squadron was a present from the Czar to Rosas. If a merchant did not understand the diplomatic value of the disturbance of the Plata, how should statesmen?

Thus have Pitt, Napoleon, Talleyrand, Gustavus III, failed. They knew nothing of commerce, and could not counteract a system of which commerce formed the basis. The proposed Treaty met her on this ground.

Let it not be supposed that any wrong was here intended to Russia: there was no purpose to injure the legitimate Baltic trade, and all that was proposed was, to allow the English merchant to buy on the same terms as in Russia. The project might have its political side: it had also its commercial. It opened to England a new and a vast supply derived from a country where our export trade is only hampered by our inability to obtain returns. From Syria, we take one and sell forty. Russia, for her raw materials, requires gold, and affords no market, far less a prospective field for our wares. With Turkey the whole transport would be effected in British bottoms.

Had the British Minister been *constrained*, in 1838, to admit these high duties, he would subsequently have made some endeavours to reduce them. France and Austria had yielded unwillingly: he was sure of their backing: Russia assumed to be on the same line; not only she professed to desire unlimited freedom of trade, but she exacted it. How, then, is it that England could never obtain a single reduction? The little king of Greece was not so helpless.*

* The British consul of Janina (12th July, 1843) arguing that it is easy to obtain reductions by taking advantage of *concessions made by other States*, mentions "a secret understanding come to with a Hellenic merchant in 1841, for an abatement of duty on a cargo of wool;" another reduction of the duty on wool in favour of the in-

The Governments of Europe have lost the tithes, so that it is with the greatest difficulty that they can impose direct taxes, and they are driven to tax trade. The Turkish Treasury receives the tithes: what then would be its profit were grain free? Ten per cent. is paid in every case on exportation, independently of any Customs' duty. The interest of the Turkish Government is therefore that of proprietor not of tax-gatherer; the tax-gatherer stops demand, renders unsaleable its goods and unrealisable its revenue.

The English Minister then could have no scruples in seeking for a reduction which would have encountered no obstacle. Every province of the Ottoman Empire has become by this Treaty a foreign state for its neighbour, every change in the nature of an article subjects it to a new duty, and every change effected in a foreign article subjects it to the duty of a native produce. The Customers roam throughout the land levying Black Mail upon the villages, for to no other form of taxation can this imposition be compared.*

Whether Turkey could supply grain to Europe or not, would have remained a problem had it not been for the dearth of 1846.

The price of grain in Roumelia, on the threshing-floor, averages seven piastres the kilo, or one shilling and three-pence the English bushel. At the end of 1846, it began to rise, and soon attained twenty piastres; and the outpouring commenced. From the walls of Vienna might be traced, along the plain, as far as eye could reach, double lines of waggons, the one arriving full, the other returning empty; night and day, week after week, month after month, this stream continued to flow, and when the price no longer habitants from 24 piastres 24 paras to 21-10, "which privilege was also shared by Hellenic merchants," and that "the same rule was followed in a reduction of the duty on valonia to 40 piastres from 68 piastres as established by our tariff:" and he says that he had, in consequence, claimed and obtained the same concessions for British merchants.

* In a table of the farms belonging to the Grand Vizier, drawn up by Jonesco, *Gumbruk* is a regular entry.

permitted exportation, the granaries were still full. By the Black Sea alone* twenty millions of kilos were exported, and Turkey received between two or three millions sterling. Had this supply not been forthcoming, this money would have gone to Russia, while she might have increased the price, and thereby, the severity of the famine in Europe. This exportation was not the result of a particularly favourable season—the high price had tided traffic over the bar of the Tariff. It was on this that Russia hastened to renounce the suggestive privileges which she had hitherto maintained.

England has now put herself in Russia's shoes. It is England that has to exert her influence to obstruct the development of the territorial resources of Turkey. Every attempt to facilitate trade is now broken by the interposition of the English embassy. "You have," said M. Thiers, on a memorable occasion, "adopted the interests of Russia for your own. You have nothing more to do." Say rather you have much to do.

I trust that the foregoing pages will justify my declaration in the House of Commons the 23d of February, 1848.

"I am prepared to prove, and I stake my character upon it, and the house will be justified in applying any censure to me if I fail, that in one negotiation which has been referred to to-night, viz., that of the Treaty of Turkey, there have been changes made in the stipulations, with the view and with the effect of securing the interests of Russia. Sir, I am possessed of documents so numerous and minute, and of

* During the year 1847, 1224 vessel were despatched with cargoes from the former, and 1638 from the latter,—a great part of which were British bottoms. The exports of grain from Ibraila, which, in 1837, amounted to only 220,000 quarters, and in 1840, to 325,000 quarters, attained in 1846, 750,000 quarters, and in 1847, 1,338,138 quarters; to which if we add about two-thirds for Galatz, and about the same quantity for the Turkish ports, we have a total of nearly three millions of quarters exported to Constantinople and different ports in Europe in the course of one year.—(Report of a Cornfactor of Constantinople.) This statement is exclusive of Varna and Roumelia.

testimony so consecutive, that no body of men, sitting down with the purpose of ascertaining the facts, can arrive at any other conclusion, save that of intentional falsification to serve the interests of a Foreign Power."

It was in the course of the foregoing transaction that was brought home to me the idea of treachery in the bosom of the British State and Cabinet. In this volume it is used as the Key of all transactions. It therefore appears to me that this is the place where I may be justified in approaching it directly, explaining the position in which I have been placed—the motives under which I have acted, and the steps which I have taken. I owe this as a duty to the reader, and I conceive that an impartial consideration of my statement is a duty which he owes to me.

In the course I have pursued I had no option. I had the misfortune to know what it would have been guilty to conceal. I was fully convinced that by discharging my duty I must incur obloquy; whilst by closing my lips I could have secured the highest objects of personal ambition. I was as one who by accident found himself in the midst of a conspiracy, or witness to the preparation of a murder. A portion of the circumstances to which I refer is before the reader. I may have been mistaken in my conclusions, but I acted upon them so as to bring to evidence their truth or my mistake. I laid them before my Sovereign.

The Minister, the object of the charge, immediately changed his course, and adopted the very measures which he had repudiated. It was my misfortune to believe this change to be real, within two years he had frustrated every measure he had adopted and had reverted to the course he had abandoned. It was then that I publicly proclaimed to the Nation what I had before privately presented to its Sovereign.

I now repaired a neglect of which I had been guilty—that of examining this Minister's previous conduct. It was not

till the month of June, 1838, that I read his speech delivered on the 1st of June, 1829, and which if it had fallen into my hands two years before would have entirely altered the Foreign Policy of this country; that speech was delivered when there was no suspicion abroad, yet that and similar speeches were of so striking a nature as to create suspicion even in the mind of Sir Robert Peel, who went so far as to insinuate that Lord Palmerston was then the Representative of Russia in the British Parliament. I next turned to his conduct on other fields; for this inquiry materials were supplied by the documents which then began to be poured forth, in consequence of the sudden expansion of England's diplomatic action. In every one I found the same result. Of these I published elaborate expositions which were re-echoed in the columns of the Leading Journals. No refutation in any case was attempted. I endeavoured by every means to bring the matter to adjudication. I appealed to Lord Melbourne, as head of the Government, and as member of the Privy Council: I did so to Sir R. Peel. The charge was made not figuratively, or in the spirit of invective; but practically, with a view to forcing an inquiry. Finally, after long endeavours, I succeeded in bringing it into the House.

These circumstances are at least evidence that my conviction was complete, and such a conviction had it regarded only the life or property of an individual, no conscientious man could despise.

The reception which the charge met with in the House affects neither my conduct nor the merits of the case; that belongs to the character of the body. "It is impossible to deny," says Mr. Macaulay, "that impeachment, though it is a fine ceremony, and though it may have been useful in the seventeenth century, is not a proceeding from which much good can now be expected. Whatever confidence may be placed in the decision of the Peers on an appeal arising out of ordinary litigation, it is certain that no man has the least confidence in their impartiality, when a great public func-

tionary, charged with a great state crime, is brought to their bar. They are all politicians. There is hardly one among them whose vote on an impeachment may not be confidently predicted before a witness has been examined: and, even if it were possible to rely on their justice, they would still be quite unfit to try such a cause." The authority of this writer will not be questioned as regards his knowledge of his time; and according to him the men who for all moral or political purposes control, or rather constitute England, are without character, and when not frivolous, dishonest. This is his judgment, not mine; for less than this he cannot imply when he denies the capacity of Parliament to entertain the gravest of charges and to perform the most solemn of duties.

The matter, however, was not dismissed as frivolous or vexatious, far less were proceedings taken against the two members by whom it was brought forward: public morality had not sunk to the pitch of pretending to inquire where they had resolved not to examine. The subject was simply dropped, and committed to the charge of the future historian.

Towards that history, however, a valuable contribution is furnished in Lord Palmerston's five hours' reply. It was continued during two sittings of the 28th of February and the 1st of March, and in it preeminently shine the elaborate memory and consummate tact of the speaker. But there is not a single assertion of his accuser refuted, or even met. It is composed of three portions—Silence, mystification, and superfluity: Silence where the charge was of a nature intelligible to the audience, such as, for instance, the note to Prince Talleyrand rejecting the proposed intervention on the part of France and Austria for the support of Poland, on the betrayal to the Russian Embassy of the Turkish communication of the draft of the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi; Mystification in respect to matters of which his audience knew nothing, a specimen of which we have just seen in reference to the Turkish Commercial Treaty; Superfluity, in

defending himself against a variety of charges not made, eight or nine in number.

By a process, "Parliamentary, but perhaps not the less discreditable," I was forced into speaking before him, and it was only after I was thus deprived of the faculty of reply, that he commenced his speech, in full security against any possibility of exposure.

A circumstance most significant is, that the accused Minister sought the member by whom the charge was made, and was content to accept his public co-operation and private friendship without the forms of recantation or apology. This is a fact to have weight, even in times when law is without force and public character a marketable commodity.

The member in question (Mr. Anstey) did not derive from me his judgment of the Minister: he to me expressed that judgment before he was aware of mine. In respect to matters which he derived from me, nothing could exceed the labour which he devoted to their examination, nor the close scrutiny which he applied to their details. Other legal gentlemen assisted in preparing the case. My entire correspondence, without the reservation of a single letter was placed conjointly in their hands, and whatever the motives which may now be attributed to Mr. Anstey, it is evident that his first object must have been to assure himself of the truth: his recent legal appointment by the present Government speaks for itself.

I cannot dismiss this matter without bearing my testimony to the admirable manner in which the case was handled. As an effort of memory it was stated by a veteran and most influential politician, to have exceeded any he had ever listened to in that House. It was no doubt called "a failure" by those who if they had capacity to comprehend had not courage to listen; but it will remain for avertimes a landmark to guide the future historian through the mazes of their selfish dexterity and the quagmires of their ephemeral success.

Hallam has elaborately shown how the secrecy involved in

the Cabinet Council, renders judicial proof of malversation, or of treason next to an impossibility; but there is a still greater obstacle to moral evidence in the present admitted practice of carrying on public business by private letters, and giving, when they are given, public documents in extract; so that it is only in exceptional cases that in carrying out a purpose, the intention would require to be manifested, or that a trace of the proceeding need be left, after it has been effected.

Those exceptional cases, however, are sufficiently numerous and important to furnish all the proof that would be required were it not that the self-love of colleagues and opponents, and indeed of all the statesmen of this country and of the other countries of Europe is enlisted against the charge. The parties among the public cannot endure a reference of events to causes independent of those maxims by which each would rule the world; and the morality of the day reveals itself not in susceptibility for the honour of an accused Statesman, but in candour that denies the possibility of guilt.

The change that is considered too heinous to be possible, is that of being "Russian," but certainly it has no claim to originality. It has for years been ringing through Europe, and turn by turn applied to Emperors, Editors, Sultans, Chartists, Viziers, Arch-Chancellors, Ministers, Ambassadors, Regents, Palatines, Primates, Bishops, Kings, and Dragomans. On no lips has it been found more often, or with more deadly effect, than on those of Lord Palmerston; he was, in fact, the first to give to it its odious character: by it he upset a dynasty in France; expelled a Regency from Greece; destroyed, or attempted to destroy, a ministry in Turkey, and always using it for Russia's ends. He has brought it against myself, but there is this difference between the two allegations, his was made in a whisper—mine openly proclaimed.

Nor do I stand alone in this. There are several members of the public service who have come to this conclusion, severally on their own grounds. If not universal it is a

very common opinion amongst European residents in the East. It was for a time at last entertained by Prince Metternich; a document published during the troubles of Vienna, show that it is entertained by M. Prokesch; it has been unhesitatingly asserted in the German Encyclopædia (*Conversations Lexicon*) and finally the present Government in England, constrained to admit him into the Cabinet, dare not confide to him the Foreign Department. What Minister has ever before been exposed to the like suspicions, and how could an English Minister be suspected without grounds?

The question is not one of condemnation but of inquiry—whether or not there be a *prima facie* case.

NOTE I.

DIFFERENCE OF THE TWO TREATIES ACCORDING TO LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 1, 1848.

(See p. 392.)

“This I will say, that the Treaty *as concluded does not differ in any material respect from the draft of the Treaty* as settled by the Board of Trade and by the Foreign Office, and as sent to Mr. Urquhart to be proposed to the Turkish Government.”

“I can state to the house the differences between the draft of the Treaty sent out in consequence of communications between Mr. Urquhart, the Board of Trade, and the Foreign Office, and the treaty concluded by Lord Ponsonby. The draft provided that British goods should pay only the import duty of 3 per cent. after which they might be transported to, and sold in, any part of the Ottoman dominions, without any further payments. The Treaty in addition to the 3 per cent. import duty, laid on a further duty of 2 per cent. upon the transport and sale of goods; and beyond that no other duty is to be paid in any part of the Ottoman dominions. *This was one of the things to which in negotiation we were obliged to submit.* Nobody can suppose, especially in arranging commercial transactions between two countries, that you can go with a draft treaty in one hand, and a pen in the

other, and say to a Foreign Minister, 'There, Sir, sign that treaty, or jump out of the window.' You cannot do that, therefore, you must negotiate. *The draft makes no provisions with regard to foreign goods purchased in Turkey by British subjects with the view of their being again sold in Turkey. This was an omission in the draft (!)* but the Treaty provides that foreign goods so purchased may be resold upon the same conditions as Turkish goods (!). The draft allows the Porte to levy upon goods exported a duty *not exceeding the rate of 3 per cent. (!)*; and in return it allows British subjects to purchase all kinds of goods in the Ottoman dominions either for resale or exportation, subject only to the payment of the transport duty on such goods, and to the tolls demanded for the maintenance of the roads along which the goods are conveyed: *the Treaty limits the export duty to 3 per cent. (!)*, and admits of duties being levied upon goods purchased by British subjects for resale in Turkey to the same amount as those *levied upon subjects of the most favoured nations (!)*. It further stipulates with regard to goods re-exported, and which may not have paid interior duties, that British subjects shall pay in lieu of such interior duties, one fixed duty of 9 per cent. (!). It was a great object with us to *abolish these interior duties (!)*, which were a great obstacle to the progress of British manufactured goods in Turkey, and which, being made arbitrarily at the caprice of the Governors of the provinces, were uncertain in their amount, and excessively vexatious in their mode of being levied. The draft provides that no duties shall be levied on goods *in transitu*: *the Treaty limits the duties on goods in transitu to the 3 per cent. impost (!)*. The draft does not allude to the point I am now about to state. *The Treaty specifies in detail the various ports of the Ottoman Empire at which it is applicable (!)*, and *records the consent of the Porte to other powers settling their commercial matters upon the same basis (!)*. Of course it was intended to bring all other Powers within the same regulations; and this is the memorandum I have upon the draft (!). The above seems to be the essential points to be discussed. I think I have now stated enough with regard to the commercial Treaty."

NOTE II.

TURKISH COMMERCE.

The Prussian statistician, Hubner, makes the total exports of Turkey, for the year 1850, 13 millions, and its imports 10½ millions sterling.

	Imports from Turkey.	Exports to Turkey.
England	29,903,772	26,895,160
Austria	22,058,666	22,515,333
France	17,027,420	11,256,000
Russia	5,434,418	7,479,484
Belgium	293,330	1,036,533
Netherlands	571,360	458,000
Greece	1,312,500	333,000
United States	1,351,854	341,599
Hamburg	694,940	57,105
Bremen	70,601	5,635
Portugal	9,946	—
Prussian thalers	78,728,807	70,377,849

The exports from England have increased from 1830 to 1850 sixfold, the declared value being in the last year £3,100,000.

Since the opening of our ports for foreign grain our trade with Russia has diminished 50 per cent., that with Turkey has increased 50 per cent.; but no grain comes from those provinces of Turkey where the English Treaty has taken effect. We imported directly and indirectly, in 1850, from the Danube, above two millions of quarters, and sent to brail and Galatz £998,000 value of goods.

CHAPTER IV.

The Red Sea—Egypt.

“Every great man who has looked at the map of the world has thought of Egypt.”—THIERS.

EGYPT was of old a broken reed, piercing the hand that leant upon it: the Scriptural proverb has proved itself true in our times. The extreme of insignificance to which this country has attained in contrast to its ancient pre-eminence of splendour, is not however harmless: its wonderful geographical position gives to it an extrinsic value, which, though existing in all times, acquires a new importance from the gradually interlocking around it of the great Empires; England has a dominion in India, France a settlement in Africa, and Russia looks to subverting Turkey.

It is now twenty-three years since Europe was all but plunged in a war, not because a new Napoleon had made it the stepping-stone to India, but merely because of a quarrel between its Pasha and the Sultan. By that event the tenure of Egypt was practically altered, its dependence on the Porte shaken, and the chances increased of its becoming a bone of contention. The Powers then interposed to force the Sultan to concede to its ruler a hereditary title in violation of the maxims of that empire, and in opposition to the principles of its restoration. This change was merely nominal: so long as Mehemet Ali lived and ruled, the power of Egypt was, so to say, a personal matter; it disappeared with him. On his demise Egypt would have merged into its anterior condition, but that under this arrangement the new Pasha, neither being appointed by the Sultan, nor having strength in himself to stand against him, has to lean for support

on Foreign Governments, and will receive it only from those who are inimical to his Sovereign.*

All that is said of danger to that Empire from disaffection of its Christian subjects is idle breath; its danger is from a Mussulman Schism and in such a Schism Egypt disaffected must play the first part; it is a Mussulman Province; it stands between Turkey and the Holy Places, the possession of which is a vital matter; its Ruler may control Syria, and dispose of the predatory Arabs of the Desert, and although regiments of Fellahs may not again traverse Asia Minor, the impression of past events remains, and Egypt in the hands of a Foreign Power may shake the throne of the Sultans to its foundation.

Amongst us the sinew of war is money: in the East, as the reader of the 'Arabian Nights' well knows, it is gold. It affords the largest amount of nutriment in the smallest space, is of all grains that which is least liable to deterioration; it is the accustomed food of the people, not like wheat constituting a portion of the diet, but the whole of it. Rice comes from Egypt: cutting off Egypt is stopping the supplies, and this is its moral as well as its physical effect.

In a war with Russia, Egypt being the province furthest removed, is that from which supplies may be most readily drawn; it is therefore of the utmost importance to detach it from its allegiance. It was by experience of its value that Catherine called Egypt one of the horns of the Crescent (the other was Greece), of both of which that Luminary had to be shorn before, according to her opinion, it could lapse into her amorous embrace. In fact she pre-

* I wrote the following words a year before the Treaty of 1840 was signed.

"The power of Mehemet Ali must fall with himself. The introduction of hereditary succession, a principle at variance with the laws and administration of the empire, can only be proposed for the purpose of perpetuating differences between Egypt and Constantinople, and allowing the Powers of Europe to interfere under colour of rights conceded to their intervention."

luded to her great war with Turkey by a traitorous intelligence with the Beys of Cairo; in consequence of its discovery that war was declared against her by the Turks. "The use which she made of her first successes was to offer Egypt to France, if she would join in dismembering the Ottoman Empire." *

A footing in Egypt thus appears to have a value beyond the weakening of the power of Turkey. It may serve to raise up other enemies to that Empire, to convert its protectors into spoilers, and to place those protectors themselves at variance. The proposition of Catherine to Louis XVI recalls to mind Poland her proposition to Frederick the Great and Joseph II: we have there seen how, by tempting neighbours with territory, she can convert them into dependents. Egypt was far off and could only be reached by sea; but as Poland furnished her the occasion for occupying the military Powers of the North, so did Egypt for the maritime Powers of the West. Egypt could not be divided, there is but one Nile: if it could be possessed by one only, it could be offered to two. At the time that the French Government was thus tempted, England was alarmed at the designs of Catherine on Turkey, and preparing to oppose them; had the French Government yielded to the temptation, England must have immediately sent an expedition to Egypt, as she did a few years later on a similar occasion, and England and France being engaged in war, she would have disembarrassed herself of the opposition of the one, and acquired in the other a partitioning ally against the Ottoman Empire. It must not be supposed that she risked even the ultimate possession of Egypt, for that province must remain dependent on Constantinople, whether possessed by Turkey or by herself. besides neither England nor France could endure its possession by the other; when they will have exhausted themselves in a war respecting it, they will be ready enough to submit to its occupation by

* "Progress of Russia in the East."

her: they are the clients, Turkey the oyster, and she the lawyer.

In the often quoted Testament of Peter, the inspiring of rivalry is impressively laid down as the rule for his successors. Its effects are thus tersely described: "Inspire France and Austria with the ambition of universal dominion, such hatred will then arise between them, that they will destroy each other." Since that period the relative positions of these and the other States of Europe have been materially altered, and the method holds under a new distribution of the parts. It is not two predominant States to which the maxim has now to be applied; the passion of ambition has subsided, but jealousy, which has taken its place, is no less available for setting nations by the ears. Wherever there is affinity of dispositions and equality of power, such as, for instance, in Denmark and Sweden, Russia and Austria, Turkey and Persia, England and France, she finds ample field for the perfecting of this art. Since the peace England and France have been five times brought to the verge of war merely by jealousy: twice in reference to Spain, once to Tahiti, once to Morocco, and once to Egypt. It can only be by some most unexpected combination that any of the other countries can afford again the like chance; but Egypt is in every respect prepared for it.

There is no other portion of the Ottoman Empire in designs on which it would be possible to involve any two Powers. It is not only the only portion of the Ottoman Empire, but the only district in the globe, *for* the possession of which *two* Foreign Powers can be brought into competition. The United States may covet Cuba from Spain, or Canada from England; France may seek to take the Rhenish frontier from Prussia; Russia may be desirous of wresting India from England, or the Danubian Principalities from Turkey; but of Egypt alone can it be said that it is equally coveted by Russia, by France, and by England. Has not France already occupied it, has not England driven her out—was not this the occasion of the last war that desolated Europe? Now, too,

the authority of the Porte has been shaken in that province by an international compact, in virtue of which you have bound yourselves to interfere in its internal administration: that compact was signed in *London*, to the exclusion of France.

It is a singular fact that the differences between Philip Augustus and Richard the First arose out of the desire of the French to direct the efforts of the Crusaders upon Egypt. Innocent III adopted with fervour the idea, and it was carried into execution by Louis IX, though the expedition failed from his yielding to an inferior temptation. At another period the plan was revived by Cardinal Ximenes, who engaged his sovereign, and Emmanuel of Portugal, in a coalition for carrying it into effect. That expedition in like manner was directed to another object. So soon as the Portuguese had established themselves in India, Albuquerque, judging that the Nile and the Red Sea might despoil his country of his conquests and frustrate his magnificent schemes, conceived the bold design of turning the course of the Nile from the Mediterranean into the Red Sea, and so render Egypt a desert.

The next European name of celebrity connected with Egypt was that of Leibnitz. When Louis XIV was about to engage in the disastrous wars with Holland, Leibnitz addressed to him his celebrated Memoir, proposing the occupation of Egypt as a more effectual means of crushing Holland. His argument equally applies to England; except that the Dutch had commerce only in India or Colonies, but not dominion:—

“I maintain,” says he, “that Holland will be more easily conquered in Egypt than in her own breast, for she will be robbed with ease of that which renders her flourishing—the treasures of the East. The difference of the two methods of attack has this of remarkable, that she will not feel the blow directed at her on this side, until it is struck home; and if she does foresee it she will be powerless to parry it. * * * If the means of execution are kept secret as well as the real end towards which they tend, all will have been done to secure the success of an enterprise in which is involved the

possession of India, the commerce of Asia, and the dominion of the universe."

Napoleon's expedition has been supposed to be based upon the same views and directed to the same end: he has, however, himself avowed that these were struck out as after-thoughts.

"I had raised myself by the sword alone; to restore it to the scabbard was to deprive myself of the means of rising higher; I had bestridden too brilliant a charger to allow him to return quietly to his stall; I apprehended the dangers of a prolonged inaction, and exhausted my ingenuity to cause it to cease. Europe offered me nothing; I planned an expedition to Egypt. This was to me at first but an expedient; burying myself, however, in idea, in the consequences which might be drawn from such an enterprise, if carried to a fortunate issue, I was agreeably surprised to discover that France might derive from it incalculable advantages; England concurred with me in the same opinion, and posterity will say that she was right."

The far-reaching mind of Kleber had, however, not required that he should cross the Mediterranean to apprehend the full consequences of the step. He writes to the Directory:—"I know all the importance of the possession of Egypt; while yet in Europe I used to say that it was for France, the fulcrum by means of which she might shake the system of Commerce in the four quarters of the globe."

England had the good fortune to expel the French, and the good sense not to put herself in their place. With these events Russia had nothing to do; but as we have already seen, eight years before the expedition of Napoleon, she had proposed one to the French Government of the old *regime*: if that of the Restoration reverted to the project, and prepared for it by the occupation of Algiers, it is not to be supposed that she was a mere indifferent spectator. There is a mass of evidence which I have collected elsewhere which establishes the interest that she took in the quarrel, and the helping hand she lent to the denouement: she must have

been blind if she had not seen, and insane if she had not advanced, a project fraught with such vast consequences, in the distracting of the internal condition of France and in compromising the external position of Turkey.

France now standing to Turkey as a partitioning power, the latter must apprehend that Egypt will next fall: * that her new African neighbour looks to Syria, she has ample reasons for suspecting. Can England whose intercourse with India is now carried on through the Red Sea, remain indifferent, and will not her jealousy act as an additional spur to the ambition of France? A new Napoleon whom Russia has helped to a throne at Paris, immediately assumes for his title that of "Defender of the Holy Places," which Europe soon learns to be of such vast importance, that the holding of the keys by this or that sexton involves war between two great Empires.

The restoration was upset by the African expedition, the dynasty which replaced it was upset by the Algerine army and system—so deeply is France implicated in these projects, the aim and end of which is Egypt; for Algiers on the one side and Syria on the other, are connected with the affairs of Europe only in so far as they are connected with Egypt: the importance of Egypt is with reference to the traffic of the Red Sea, and the means of communication with India; the solution is therefore to be found in the opening of the canal of Suez, and the establishing of its neutrality by common consent. This is what Russia has to prevent.

But the dynasty that was upset in 1830, and that which again fell in 1848, had both been placed upon the throne by Russia; she has then an equal motive in knocking down as in setting up; whom she sets up assuredly she will knock down. It would be well for himself and for Europe if the

* During the French occupation the fortifications of Alexandria were commenced under the celebrated Cretin: since the occupation of Algiers, the French Government has seized every opportunity to urge the strengthening of those works.

present ruler of France would consider before it is too late the fate of his predecessors. His own experience has shown with what ease anything can be done with the French.

The Ottoman Empire presents two salient geographical features, the Dardanelles and the Isthmus of Suez; the one opening, the other obstructing, the communication of the central portion of the globe. Since the invention of gunpowder, which has placed a padlock upon the Dardanelles, that strait has been in the hands of a power which did not seek to use it against other nations. Possessing it, Russia would have in her hands the seas and continents, the passages of the north and south, and the bread of Europe, and could at any moment paralyse the east of Europe and the west of Asia. The importance of the Isthmus of Suez is in like manner veiled by being closed. By keeping it so until it falls into her possession, she retains the overland traffic to the east and her check over India. When it is in her possession, she may indeed open it, but it will be for herself.

The effectual control which England possesses over Russia is commercial. Russia's power being exclusively military cannot be brought to bear directly on England, so that she is without any possible counterpoise (diplomatic considerations apart) until she shall have advanced sufficiently towards India to establish a countercheck. "From the moment," says Sir J. M'Neill, "that she occupies this position, it will become necessary so to augment our army in India, especially the European part of it, as to be prepared for the contingencies that may arise out of her proximity. This will be a large addition to our national expenditure, which will become permanent; because, if Russia were at Herat, *we could no longer send out our troops by sea as quickly as she could march them by land.*" The calculation of relative distance is here based upon the passage round the Cape. With a canal opened to the Red Sea, and that route becoming the ordinary course of communication, the troops would be forwarded by steam, and India brought two months closer to England: by the same blow the schemes of opening

the Overland Trade by the Danube and the Euxine would be laid prostrate.

The Ottoman Empire to convulse, England and France to be set at variance, the direct communication between England and India to stop, and ultimately the dominion of the Indian Ocean secured—such are the ends which Russia may advance through Egypt.

The objects of England are, first, to prevent Russia's interference; secondly, to prevent the authority of the Porte from being shaken; thirdly, to prevent any difference arising between herself and France upon the subject; fourthly, to obtain the opening of the canal by a common understanding with Turkey and with France, the first of which would gladly see the enterprise undertaken, the second of which has already exerted herself to bring it about.

CHAPTER V.

The Canal of Suez.

“Necho commenced the digging of a Canal, but was frightened by some oracular words of the priests.”

THE opening up of the passage from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, a work associated with the glories of the Pharaohs, the Ptolemies, and the Caliphs, was a task which ought to have been vindicated to herself, by the ruler of the ocean and the mistress of India. The Pharaohs did not supply China with woollens, nor the Ptolemies, Hindostan with cottons; the Caliphs were not rulers of the Deccan: none of them claimed superiority in the world by mechanical enterprise, or commercial ambition. England, with the dominion and the commerce of the East, with the dominion and the command of the seas, with wealth in one hand, and steam in the other, has had no thought of bringing India and the Eastern hemisphere to her doors. If we had been ignorant of history, geography might have invited us to the attempt; and without surveys past events might have suggested the enterprise.

The physical difficulties are nothing: the dangers of the navigation of the Red Sea have disappeared; we have now the aid of locks and steam; we have illimitable capital and endless inventions. If, therefore, a canal had even proved impracticable in ancient times, that would be no argument now; what then are we to say of those who, despite the evidence of its former existence, pronounce it an impossibility?*

* Mr. Galloway was the first, I believe, to speak of “impossibility,” but he qualifies it as “*financial*.” Mr. Stephenson makes the matter

The canal is mentioned by all the old writers, Herodotus, Pliny, Diodorus Siculus, &c. It was in the Roman period restored under Adrian. Again closed up by the shifting sands, it was opened as soon as the Arabs had got possession and established themselves on the Nile. The conqueror of that country, Amru, completed the work,* and it remained open for 120 years, until it again fell amidst the schisms of Abassides and Ommiades.

Scarcely had Napoleon a sun-rise free, when he rode forth to the desert, in search of the traces of the ancient work, and was the first to discover it; he then ordered the well-known survey. When it was brought to him, he asked whether the reopening was a project feasible, and being answered that it was easy, and even offered greater facilities than it had presented before, he said,—“ Well, it is a great undertaking; publish a report, and force the Turkish Government to find in its execution, profit and glory.” If it presented greater facilities in the time of Napoleon than in those of Necho and Amru, how much greater are those it offers to-day? Then there was no steam: it was not for France, as it is for England, a domestic matter.

The total distance, by the French report, from Suez to Tyneh, on the Mediterranean, is 180,852 metres, or less than ninety miles. The cost is estimated at 30,000,000 francs, or £1,250,000 sterling (not more than a railroad from Varna to Silistria, or from Alexandria to Cairo), they further estimate at some hundred millions of acres the irrigable land that would

very difficult, by reason of an asserted want of scour, and calculates the cost at £8,000,000. Both these gentlemen were railwaymen and had counter-projects; and, besides they were both under the influence of the British consul at Alexandria, if not of the Foreign Office in Downing Street.

* The Egyptians, alarmed at the threatened *drain of provisions*, succeeded in persuading Amru that the difficulties he would have to encounter were insurmountable; probably from the reverse of “the want of scour.” The Caliph, however, saw more clearly into the motives of the Egyptians than his lieutenant.

be recovered. I have not had the opportunity of examining the surveys of M. Linan, but they are understood to be even more favourable and at a lower estimate than that of the French scientific commission.

The French calculated the Red Sea about thirty feet higher in level than the Mediterranean: this the English railway engineers have taken upon themselves to deny; I am not aware upon what data: the aqueous and atmospheric currents would suggest the inference, even if the fact had not been established by positive survey, of a higher level at the western extremity of the Red Sea, than at the eastern of the Mediterranean.*

There is a competition between two lines: the one from Suez to the Nile, at the ancient city of Bubastis; the other from Suez direct to the Mediterranean, at the Pelusiac or Eastern mouth of the Nile. But it is immaterial to discuss their relative merits, as the most cumbersome and expensive would yet be sufficiently remunerative and practical. In ancient times the line to Bubastis was no doubt preferable because they were destitute of our means for shortening labour, and a passage was not required for vessels of the dimensions of those which now navigate the Indian Ocean: still the ancient canal was of depth sufficient (30 feet) to float line-of-battle ships, and the canal of Omar was finished in six months, so that on the seventh vessels floated through it,

* "The surface of all the seas that communicate one with another must be regarded as generally perfectly equal in respect of mean elevation. Prevailing winds and currents, however, in extensive land-locked seas, the Red Sea, for example, produce permanent, though still inconsiderable, differences of level. At the Isthmus of Suez, the level of the Red Sea is from 24 to 36 feet above that of the Mediterranean at different hours of the day. The form of the canal (the Straits of Babelmanded), by which the Indian Ocean communicates with the Red Sea being such, that the waters find a readier access than outlet, appears to assist in producing this remarkable, permanent, superior elevation of the surface of the Red Sea, which was already known to the ancients."—*Humboldt's Cosmos*, vol. i. p. 329.

carrying the grain of Egypt to Mecca. An English engineer officer, Captain Vetch, who has surveyed both lines decides in favour of the direct one; he points out a consideration not to be neglected, the greater specific gravity of the waters of the Red Sea, which, in the discharge at the Pelusiac mouth, would clear out the deposit from the Nile, which the current from the Mediterranean always carries eastward. His estimate, including the works at both entrances, slightly exceeds two millions sterling. *There lies dormant a sum of money sufficient for the enterprise, and which the Court of Directors, with the consent of the Government would dispose of for this purpose.*

Independently of India, and its 150 millions of inhabitants, this canal would shorten by six weeks the trade of England with nearly 420 millions of souls,* and diminish the charges on the double voyage of the large vessels by at least £2000. Amongst these populations there are none who are our rivals; they are all, or would be, our customers. The opening of this passage would be equivalent to the acquisition of a second India.

	POPULATION.
* Abyssinia	2,500,000
Africa (eastern) say	10,000,000
Arabia, say	2,500,000
Australia and New Zealand	500,000
Ava	3,500,000
Borneo	1,500,000
Ceylon	1,500,000
China	350,000,000
Cochin China, and Cambodia	4,000,000
Java	10,000,000
Madagascar and Zangibar, Mauritius and Bourbon	2,500,000
Malacca	500,000
Persia	9,000,000
The Philippines	3,000,000
Siam	2,500,000
Sumatra	3,000,000
Tonquin	12,000,000
	418,500,000

If it has not been so, it is tacitly referred to indisposition upon the part of the Turkish Government—a supposition which receives weight from the resistance which it has opposed to the Cairo Railway, and to the Euphrates Expedition. That resistance is, however, attributable to other causes. The following incident will assist in judging of the dispositions of the Porte, and of the nature of the obstructions likely to be thrown in the way.

Colonel Chesney, at the close of 1834, having by unwearied exertions succeeded in *forcing* on the Foreign Office the plan for the navigation of the Euphrates, it was announced to the Embassy at Constantinople, that a demand was to be forwarded by the next messenger for a firman. Being on the point of starting for England I told Lord Ponsonby that the firman would be refused, and proposed to leave with him a sealed note to be used in that case. It turned out as I had expected, and a messenger was despatched home announcing the refusal; my note having, however, been sent to its destination, on the following day the firman came, and a second messenger was despatched with it. The matter presented this difficulty only, that it was proposed *through a Dragoman*. The Turk through whom it was subsequently obtained was no other than Achmet Pasha—against whom, from that hour the inveterate hostility of England was directed, on the score of his being "*Russian*." These facts were brought to light in the trial of the *Times*, for a libel on the Dragoman system, at the instance of M. Pisani, the Dragoman in question, who was forced by Lord Ponsonby to attempt his vindication against the statements made in that journal by Dr. Millingen, its then correspondent.

On a recent visit to Constantinople, I learnt this further incident. One of the Foreign Ministers visiting the Chief of the Dancing Dervishes, a favourite of Sultan Mahmoud, observed a snuffbox of exquisite workmanship, with a butterfly, the emblem of their order, in diamonds and enamel; it was a present from the Russian Ambassador.

The Dervish then brought out a large atlas, in which Mesopotamia, was marked to illustrate the proposed stations for the English expedition, and began to expatiate on the deep and perfidious purposes of England in her pretended desire of navigating the Euphrates. On inquiry, my friend discovered that these visits of the Russian Ambassador, which were made by night, and the presentation of these gifts, had coincided with the demand for the firman. Had the firman been refused, it would have been by the snuffbox: henceforward the principle would have been introduced into the policy of the Porte of setting its face against all schemes for communication with India through its territory.

If before the event any one had said "England with all her power will be shipwrecked in her attempt to obtain a firman for the Euphrates by an enamelled Butterfly, and after it has been refused, a traveller will obtain it by a billet of a couple of lines," would he not have been considered insane?

As to the Cairo Railway, the obstruction arose from the pretensions of the Pasha of Egypt; so soon as these were withdrawn, the firman was granted; but had the meeting in London occurred a month earlier, it would have been equal to a snuffbox; the language there held would have exasperated the Porte and encouraged the Pasha. Russia had, however, an interest in that railway which I shall presently explain.

The Government of Turkey has not been slow to appreciate the value of steam and the advantage of opening up channels of commerce; this one is especially of value, and affects her in regard to Arabia precisely as it does England in regard to India. She has at heart the incorporation of Arabia, by which she would confirm her tenure of Egypt; the matter is of importance not only in a military and political but also in a religious point of view, for the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities would be brought within reach of every inhabitant of the Empire. There is, however, one indispensable condition, that is, that it shall be proposed and

effected in a manner which shall not infringe upon the rights of the Porte or endanger its sovereignty.

How it may be asked could a man so bold and practical as Mehemet Ali, so long in possession of Egypt, so anxious to make it the seat and passage of commerce, neglect this work? It was incessantly pressed on his attention, not only by his engineer, M. Linan, but by other scientific men, and merchants, the Consuls of France and the United States, the present director of the Austrian railways, &c.; there was no want of scientific data, and no lack of offers of capital. But whenever the canal was urged he objected that there was another project which might be preferable, namely, a railway, and when that was pressed he had a hankering for the canal. Thus both were staved off, the one by the other, and this was explained as a balancing of the influence of England and France! the Canal was a *French project*,* the Railway was *the English one*; in fact it was the story of the Canal of the Danube over again.

* "Having been generally misinformed on matters of that kind in Egypt, I paid little or no attention to what I heard respecting them. It was commonly said there, that the French, Austrians, and Americans desired the canal, and that the English opposed them, on the ground that it would facilitate the intercourse of other nations with India."—*Letter of a Resident in Cairo.*

"He (the Pasha) was particularly careful to guard against the impression in the first instance that he wished the railway made to Suez: as I afterwards learned, the reason of that was, that the French interests are very much opposed to the establishment of a railway across the Isthmus, *believing, rightly or wrongly I do not know, that it is much better for France and all the countries lying on the Mediterranean to have a canal instead of a railway*, in order to make the Mediterranean the high road to India both for passengers and for commercial purposes; *therefore they have for a long time been endeavouring to establish the feasibility of making a canal across the Isthmus.*

"Q. I think you said the French interest was hostile to a line between Alexandria and Suez. Is it equally so to one between Alexandria and Cairo? A. *Quite so.*"—*Evidence of Mr. Stephenson before the select Committee for Steam Communication with India.*

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The Railway, which for five and twenty years has served to stave off the Canal, is now at length being carried into execution; what is gained by it for the Indian Trade? A powerful body with local interests determinately hostile to the Canal, and in a position to render that hostility effective. The local traffic no doubt may support the Railway, and some of the lighter and more valuable goods may be conveyed by it as far as Cairo, but is that the opening up of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans through the Mediterranean and Red Seas? If the line be hereafter carried on from Cairo to Suez you will only have a Railway, ships will not pass. The distance will be 250 miles, and even at the rate of an English Railway the charge will be 10*s.* a ton in addition to the expenses of unloading and reloading; amounting on the full freight out and in of a vessel of 1200 tons to £2500,—say that the “French project” is impracticable, at least the *English* one is absurd. Amru, the Lieutenant of the Caliph Omar, made in his day objections to the canal: but he had a master who knew better, and who said to him, “The Egyptians have persuaded thee, but I will punish thee if thou dost not dig the canal so that *ships may sail upon it*,” and in the seventh month from that time they did sail upon it.

The projects of Louis Philippe ran in the line of *Mines et Forêts*; those of Louis Napoleon in that of Canals. His grand scheme was the opening of the Isthmus of Panama, and at one time he was prepared to sacrifice to its execution his European life and his Imperial prospects. When he came into power, his attention was naturally directed to Suez; being the nephew of that Napoleon who, in modern times, had revived the project. The matter was forced upon him by the rivalry of the engineers of the two countries in Egypt, and he naturally imagined that there must be some mistake: consequently he directed his Minister in London, M. Walweski, to open the matter with Lord Palmerston, and to suggest concert between the two Governments to carry this magnificent work. Imagine the bewilderment of

that diplomatist when he was met with menace and indignation, and told, "this a project of yours—England will never suffer it." The English Minister had discovered that Louis Napoleon wished to send through men-of-war to drive the English out of India!

Did it want a canal to bring Napoleon to Egypt on his intended way to India? With Malta in your hands, you are nearer than France to Egypt, if it signified one iota whether France was far or near. It is not France who menaces India; she once held extensive sway there, and lost it by England's maritime superiority. Whatever brings India nearer to Europe renders that superiority more complete; and if any measure could thwart the project of making the Mediterranean a "French Lake," it is one which should carry through it the full current of British trade.

The idea is one which can scarcely be announced with a grave countenance, and how the Franks of Cairo had been led to accept it as they have done is intelligible only through the power of inuendo and whisper. When reasons have been sought for it, people have contented themselves with referring to Napoleon's expedition, when he at once aimed at India and proposed the Canal. His projects against India were based upon the *possession of Egypt*; he proposed the Canal in the interest of Turkey after these plans were abandoned. The schemes on India are thus referred to by Thiers:—

"Egypt was the true intermediary position between Europe and India. To ruin England it sufficed for France to establish herself there. Thence she could dominate for ever the Mediterranean, and convert it, according to one of the expressions of Napoleon, into a *French lake*; thence she would be in a position either to ensure the existence of the Turkish Empire or to seize the best portion of the spoils. (The erroneousness of this position Napoleon afterwards understood and acted upon at the conference of Erfurt.) Once established in Egypt two courses were open—the first to create a marine in the Red Sea, and by means of it to destroy the British establishments in India, or to make of it a colony, and a

entrepôt by means of which Trade would abandon the route of the Cape of Good Hope.”*

The statement I have made will appear incredible. It will pass belief that an English minister should have opposed such a work ; but what can I urge more than I have done?—I have shown the interest of Russia, the dependence in every case of the minister ; I have referred to facts, I have given names,—if what I say is not the truth it must be contradicted ; if not contradicted, it is that contradiction is impossible : these details have been published before and have not been contradicted. Unless it was an object to prevent the canal, must it not have been made ? It is a case in which there is no possibility of hesitation, or of a middle course. The *lay* reader may indeed object that Governments have nothing to do with promoting private enterprises ; that it is enough for them to afford protection when they are formed, and that it would be an improper interference if they lent their authority to private schemes, or influenced capitalists in the placing of their funds. What then shall we say if we find the Government influence not only of this, but of other countries exerted to call into existence a *counter project*, for which favour is bespoken because realising the very ends proposed by the plan it is devised to frustrate ?

It will be perceived that I refer to Panama, and the Isthmus of Darien, and doubtless it will occasion surprise that I should speak in such terms of that vast and incomparable enterprise : that surprise will be increased though diverted to another quarter, if the reader will take the trouble to examine a globe, compasses in hand : he will then make the discovery that by Panama the distance not only from London but also from New York, to the Indian Ocean is greater not only than by Suez, but also than by the Cape of Good Hope !

The local traffic of the back of America and that of the United States with China no doubt would be greatly benefited by this passage, but is it upon this basis that the

* Histoire de la Revolution, vi, 428.

scheme is constructed, or from this source that the returns are to come? It is the connection of the East and the West, that is proposed. Consequently all those who enter into the scheme, whether speculatively or practically, must be opposed to the Suez project: from the moment that the other is subscribed for, being of vast dimensions, a powerful organisation will be created, possessing the subject, controlling all the organs of publicity, counteracting in secret and scouting in public the counter scheme, if it ever comes into public notice, a circumstance scarcely to be expected seeing that the press of Europe is in the hands of Russia. This is her interest in the matter; she does not want to trade in California, but she "will not fail to take advantage of every means presented by her position to oppose the shorter and safer way to the Indian Sea, through the Euphrates or the Isthmus of Suez."* What avails it then that the Suez canal be the canal for the whole world. She is against it.

The Isthmus which unites North and South America differs from that which unites Africa and Asia, no less in the difficulties it presents than in the advantages which it affords. The Realejo was the line selected by Louis Napoleon: he calculated the cost at £4,000,000 (the distance 278 miles), and expected that 900,000 tons of shipping would pass, that from Europe paying 10s. a ton, that from America 20s. That is to say, a vessel of 1200 tons leaving London or New York for Calcutta was to take a circuit of some thousand miles for the privilege of paying some thousand pounds.

The scheme of the French Emperor is, however, a trifle compared to the one now in vogue, estimated at the sum of £12,000,000; not the estimate of those who oppose it, but of those who are engaged in promoting it.† This indeed is an "American project," to facilitate the trade and the ambition of the United States on the Pacific, but the watchful English minister is fortunately at hand. We will see how he settles this matter.

* Nebenius.

† Consult Dr. Cullen's 'Ship Canal of Darien.'

By Panama compared with Suez, the voyage from London to Calcutta would be lengthened 9,300 miles; from London to Hong Kong, 4,600; from New York to Hong Kong, 1,200; and from New York to Calcutta, 4,500.* The expenditure would be greater by three-fourths,† and the traffic less by three-fourths. Nevertheless, the English Government oversteps all form and all discretion to promote, to suggest, to call into existence the Panama Project, even seducing capitalists to investing in it: it positively enters into a treaty with the United States for this end.

When this treaty was signed, it was accepted as an evidence of the praiseworthy anxiety of those governments to hurry on the march of intellect and the progress of civilisation. No one was struck with the extraordinary nature and provisions of the act; no one looked at the map; as in the case of the Austrian Treaty for the Danube, they took from *it* their notions of Geography, and all the world imagined that this canal was to put in direct communication the East and the West. The Atlantic and Pacific were now to be joined—who cared for a communication between the *Mediterranean* and the Red Sea, by a cut across the Isthmus, the actual road from London to Calcutta, and which would join the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, and also to the Pacific? If heard of at all, it was smiled at as a cunning but defeated scheme of the envious French.

The Treaty with the United States is of so strange a nature that I cannot avoid inserting an abstract of its articles. It was signed on the 19th of April 1850, and contains the eight following stipulations.

ART. 1.—Neither Court to obtain or maintain exclusive

	<i>Via Suez.</i>	<i>Via Panama.</i>
● London to Calcutta	7,920	— 17,280
New York „	9,800	— 14,340
London to Hong Kong	9,660	— 14,340
New York „	11,460	— 12,640

† If we take the extreme calculations the Suez Canal would only cost one twelfth.

control, or occupy or erect fortifications, or form local alliances, &c.

ART. 2.—Not to be liable to blockade in case of war.

ART. 3.—To encourage and protect all enterprises for the opening of the canal.

ART. 4.—To exercise their influence with the local Government, to facilitate the enterprise, and obtain at each extremity a free port.

ART. 5.—When completed, to protect it against hostile attack.

ART. 6.—To invite all other Governments to join in this convention.

ART. 7.—To hasten by all means the execution of the work, by encouragement held out to parties proposing to undertake it.

ART. 8.—Contracting parties wish not only to effect a "particular object," but also to establish a "general principle," but a general principle limited to inter-communication *between the Atlantic and Pacific*.

There were other considerations besides those of mere statistics which one would have supposed likely to influence the British Cabinet—the relative exposure of the two channels in case of war to a *coup de main*. Any European or Transatlantic enemy of England might send an expedition, to the Isthmus of Darien with the greatest facility and secrecy; by entrenching themselves upon any one point they could stop the passage; they would have a long line to operate upon, strong positions to get possession of, no local power to impede them, extensive coasts to land upon, and the Pacific on the one side, and the Atlantic on the other, to approach or retire by: our whole navy, locked up at the two extremities, instead of affording protection, would only invite attack.

Egypt presents the exact counterpart. In case of war your Indian traffic would no longer be having to double the

Cape, be exposed either to France, or the United States. As regards the latter, the protection you would have to afford would then have to extend no further than the gut of Gibraltar. In the Mediterranean you would be exposed to France, but you have always had the supremacy in that sea, and unless you have it, you cannot carry on war with her. Hitherto you have had for *warlike purposes* to maintain your supremacy in the Mediterranean and simultaneously to employ a large portion of your navy to *protect your Indian traffic in its course of 10,000 miles*. From the latter drain you would be relieved by the passage through Egypt. The two seas which give access to Egypt on either side are themselves confined by a gut, both of which are in your hands, and close to which you have naval stations, so that no armament can be within reach, without at least your knowledge. But being superior at sea in the Mediterranean, Egypt is entirely in your hands; you are equally superior in the Red Sea; there is no one there to contest it with you. No attempt could be made by any foreign power on the canal, unless by an expedition of sufficient force to conquer Egypt itself. England's power of coercion over the government of Egypt is absolute: in the height of the naval strength of Mehemet Ali, a single line of battle ship with a frigate sealed up Alexandria.

In the first speech he ever made—the Demosthenian oration, which, in a short hour, brought his fame from germ to maturity, Canning exclaimed, “Secrecy is Treason!” The secrecy which he denounced bore on the motives of the English Government in respect to its dealing with other States: England, in his opinion, had no legitimate object which would not have been advanced by publicity. On the other hand, Russia has no object which publicity would not frustrate. Secrecy is, therefore, as essential a portion of her system as it is essentially opposed to England's interest and character; we may rest assured that wherever there is concealment there is a Russian hand at work, and a Russian object in view.

That secrecy is now no longer confined to the reciprocal operations of governments, but grasps also the most important of material enterprises. It must be evident to any one, that if the objection secretly made by Lord Palmerston to M. Walweski had been publicly stated, whether in Parliament, or in a document, instead of attaining its end, it would have produced the very contrary effect; the capital of England would then have effected that which the diplomacy of England prevented France from attempting.

I cannot conclude with a more striking fact. If any thing could bring home to us the nature and consequences of that indirect and un-English process, by which we are represented abroad, it would be a practical application such as this. If Englishmen could but apprehend it, they could not fail to put an end to it. It is endured only because so unlike the ordinary dealing of Englishmen, that, despite all evidence, its existence cannot be believed.

Here is a case in which the nation may rectify as well as judge. We are seeking for means of investment for superfluous capital: here is a field better than any loan or railway at home or abroad. The present traffic by the Cape amounts to 1,500,000 of tons, we may estimate it by canal at 2,000,000 which would soon be largely increased. Estimating the dues at the half of that sum proposed by Louis Napoleon, for Panama (the quarter upon American vessels), the yearly returns would amount to half a million, or 20 per cent. upon the original investment. There is no difficulty whatever in the enterprise, if those who conduct it steer clear of Downing Street in England, and the British Embassy at Constantinople.

But if English merchants are unfit to walk by themselves, is there no capital available in France?

We have heard much of the spirit of enterprise of the Anglo-Saxon race; we have heard much of what its energy was capable when planted in the New World, and freed from the

governing trammels which oppress it in the Old: if so let it appear. Here is something worthier than buccaneering expeditions against Cuba, or civilising armaments for Japan. The United States have pretensions to justify and character to regain, no less than interests to advance and fortune to pursue. The parental stock in these Islands pleases itself sometimes in the anticipation of their future greatness, strange if it should have to look to them for its own present extrication.

NOTE.

HUMBOLDT ON THE SUEZ CANAL.

“The History of the Survey of the Earth includes the narration of all the means by which nations have been drawn closer together, by which greater portions of the globe have become accessible, and the sphere of man’s knowledge has been widened. One of the noblest of these means was the actual formation of a navigable route from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean by the Nile. At the point where the two Continents, which are scarcely connected together, admit the waters of the sea to the farthest extent between them, Sesostris (Ramses Miamim) according to the representations of Aristotle and Strabo, or at any rate Necho (Neku) commenced the digging of a canal, but was frightened by some oracular words of the priests, and again gave it up. Herodotus saw and described one which had been completed, opening with the Nile a little above Bubastus; it was the work of Darius Hystaspis, of the family of the Achæmenides. This canal having fallen into disuse, was afterwards so completely re-constructed by Ptolemy Philadelphus, that it kept alive the trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, and India until the time of the Roman Empire, until Marcus Aurelius, and probably as late as Septimius Severus; and this for more than four centuries and a half, even though it was not navigable at every season

of the year, in consequence of its artificial contrivances for enclosing the water. For the similar object of promoting commerce in the Red Sea, the houses at Myos Hormos and Berenice were carefully built, and connected with Coptus by means of a splendid artificial road."—*Cosmos*, vol. ii, p. 200.

CONCLUSION.

See J. M. McCord

THE author of the "Progress of Russia in the East," has selected for the period illustrated in his map that between the accession of Peter and the accession of Nicholas. Since the accession of the present Emperor, her advance has been greater than in the previous period: the victims are POLAND, HUNGARY, and DENMARK,—the work of dismemberment being completed for the first, and commenced for the latter two.

During the first period, there stood against her in the West an array of substantive power, which she might overreach but could not coerce. In the course of the second, all power and purpose of resistance has been swept away.

The East presents a different picture. It was on that side that the power of Peter first developed itself: he planned the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, he commanded the Caspian by a fleet; his influence and alliances extended to the banks of the Indus; and he had secured by Treaty more than one half of Persia. Nadir Shah arose, and Russia was driven back behind the Caucasus: the Turks signally defeated her in the West and drove her back behind the Dnieper. The accession of Nicholas was followed by a Persian and a Turkish war, which re-advanced the position of Russia to the point which she had occupied ninety-two years before, and even beyond it: Persia, under her dictation, was expending its last resources in an invasion of Herat as the means of reaching India: the Ottoman empire, tottering to its fall, was signing, with the Russians encamped in the Bosphorus, a Treaty

to exclude its Protectors from the Black Sea. Without the appearance of a conqueror, she has again been driven back : she has incurred no defeat such as that of the Pruth ; there has been no new adjustment of frontiers, no revision of Treaties. Her position has been reversed by the RESTORATION OF A PEOPLE. It has been restored by adversity ; by the blows she struck, and the humiliations she inflicted. But disasters might have crushed not tempered the Ottomans, had it not been for the protection afforded by the Caucasus, the example held out by its defenders, and the shame of their success. Here is the shield under cover of which Persia has regained courage, and Turkey resumed strength. A small population, without the learning of the nations of the West, and unaided by the wise counsels of their Governments, has rendered this service to humanity. A new struggle indeed is opening, but it commences at this point.



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